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Threat actor

In cybersecurity and risk assessment, a threat actor is a person, group, organisation, state, or other entity with the ability to cause, carry, transmit, support, or exploit a threat (src:wp:threat-actor). Walked as the people and groups behind attacks on information systems as the security literature and criminology describe them: their kinds (criminal networks and ransomware firms, state units and APTs, hacktivists and volunteer militias, insiders, thrill seekers), what they sense and how they choose targets, how they organise (core members, enablers, mules; operators and affiliates; leaderless collectives; military units), the markets and sponsors around them, their motives, their history, and how defenders track and name them.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

aliasesThreat actors (attackers)
born at1983 (the 414s); 1986 (Hess found); a named group e.g. Conti December 2019
born precisionyear
boundaryInside: the people who plan and carry out attacks on information systems, together with the ways they organise (a lone person, a stable core with enablers and money mules, a ransomware firm of operators and affiliates, a leaderless collective, a state unit), the tradecraft they run (reconnaissance through actions on objectives), the tools and infrastructure they own or rent, and their motives. Outside: the targets (people, organisations, networks), the software, vulnerabilities and malware they use (each their own system), the markets, forums and sponsors they draw on, the defenders, trackers and police who answer them, and the money systems their proceeds pass through.
nested levelMade of people (Human) acting together as a group or organisation; embedded in human society and its markets, sponsored at times by states; the attacker side of computer and information security; carries malware and exploits as tools.
scalesocial

Measures (28) published science

APT mean dwell time, 2018 (Americas / EMEA / APAC)71 / 177 / 204 days
average period attackers controlled victim networks (Mandiant APT1 incidents, 2004-2013)1 (longest almost 5) years
characteristic clock: Conti salary cycle2 per month; 5-day workweek pay periods
Conti payroll headcount>100 people
Conti members with specialised discussions4 (96 all-rounders) %
Conti leaked chats168,711 chats; 346 actors (2020-06-21 to 2022-03-02) count
likely ransom payments to Conti and predecessor (traced on-chain)>80 million USD
Conti core share of split ransom payments5-40 (mode 20, 9 of 17 addresses) %
monthly salary bill of one Conti team146,294 USD
ransomware groups with public leak sites since 2019~80 groups
ransomware payments, 2021 (Chainalysis, as cited)>600 million USD
ransomware payment market, 35 families, 2013 to mid-2017 (lower bound)12,768,536 (22,967.54 BTC) USD
networks with three layers (core, enablers, mules)30 of 40 networks
cybercriminal network size (core members and enablers, 36 networks)2 of four; 21 of 5-10; 11 of 11-20; 1 over 21 networks by size
networks grown mainly through offline ties29 of 39 networks
networks with ties to traditional organised crime5 of 40 networks
IT saboteurs with concerning behaviour before the attack90 (spies: all) %
IT sabotage cases with undiscovered technical indicators27 of 28 cases
threat actor names across 17 vendor taxonomies3,287 (13,371 reports, 15 sources) names
alias clusters for 3,287 threat actor names977 clusters
alias clusters with 15 or more names2 (62 have one name) %
website defacements analysed around the 2022 invasion358k defacements; 1.7M UDP amplification DDoS attacks
characteristic clock: low-level actors' interest in the 2022 conflicta few weeks time to fade
booter return after domain seizure3 days
hacktivist share of ENISA-recorded incidents (2025 analysis)almost 80 %
ATT&CK techniques at first public release (May 2015)96 (9 tactics) techniques
Bangladesh Bank heist, amount stolen (2016)81 million USD
US reward for information on Conti (May 2022)up to 10 million USD

Open contentions (7) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (43)

Sits inside / holds (5)

Trades with (valence) (36)

expressed by (27)

floor filled by (30)

Kinds (14)

wired (8)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: The operation: the intrusion run through its phases (reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, C2, actions on objectives), persistence and covering tracks
  2. L5: The group: who does what (core members, enablers, money mules; operators and affiliates; managers, team leaders, HR), trust, pay and schedules; no strict hierarchy in most criminal networks, a firm in Conti, a leaderless network in Anonymous, a military unit in state groups
  3. L6: The ecosystem and the sponsor: as-a-service markets (RaaS, MaaS, booters, access brokers), enablers who serve many networks, state sponsorship; the landscape of interconnected actors
  4. L7: Motive and intent: financial gain, espionage and state interest, ideology and protest, revenge, curiosity, challenge and notoriety

the threat actor as security analysts and criminologists describe it: the target's exposed world up to the actor's motive (reader's view)

  1. L1: The target world: people, organisations and their networks, the victim in the Diamond Model
  2. L2: Reconnaissance and access: research and target selection, lures, bought or inside access
  3. L3: Capability and infrastructure: exploits, malware, C2 servers, domains, email addresses; social engineering and phishing
  4. L4: The operation: the kill chain run end to end, hands on keyboard, persistence, covering tracks, actions on objectives
  5. L5: The group: roles, division of labour, trust, pay; network, firm, collective or unit
  6. L6: The ecosystem and sponsor: as-a-service markets, enablers, brokers, states
  7. L7: Motive and intent: money, espionage, ideology, revenge, curiosity, notoriety

way in: Bought access (initial access brokers)

  1. L1: Compromised networks and systems held by brokers
  2. L2: Listings: brokers advertise access priced by the target's value
  3. L3: Access bought and handed over to the attacker

way in: Defenders' answers and exposure

  1. L1: Defenders' actions and reports: detections, blocks, threat intelligence published at tactical, operational and strategic levels
  2. L2: Intrusions fail or are exposed; persistence becomes a liability the defender leverages
  3. L3: Forced change: the adversary must change every phase to succeed next time

way in: Implants reporting home (C2)

  1. L1: Compromised hosts beacon outbound to a controller server
  2. L2: Persistence: a remote access trojan or backdoor keeps the presence
  3. L3: Hands on keyboard: APT malware needs manual interaction

way in: Inside access (the insider's job)

  1. L1: The organisation's data, systems and security practices, known from inside
  2. L2: Legitimate access: a relationship with, access to or position inside the organisation
  3. L3: Unknown access paths created: backdoor accounts, planted logic bombs

way in: Members' feelings: stress and grievance (inner)

  1. L1: Stressful events, including the organisation's own sanctions
  2. L2: Personal predispositions and needs; negative attitudes form
  3. L3: Concerning behaviours appear (90% of saboteurs, every spy)

way in: Members' thoughts: beliefs, curiosity, learning (inner)

  1. L1: Beliefs a member brings: some firmly believe they act for the greater good
  2. L2: Learning from others: offenders learn their behaviour from others

way in: Other actors' tools, personas and claims

  1. L1: Other actors in the same landscape
  2. L2: Shared toolsets, personas and methods seen and borrowed; state-aligned use of hacktivist personas
  3. L3: Impersonation and false flags: masquerading as other groups

way in: People's answers to lures (social engineering)

  1. L1: People in the target organisation: inboxes, phones, physical sites
  2. L2: The lure answered: spear-phishing opened, a call taken (a fake call-centre agent obtaining one-time codes), a site entered by infiltration
  3. L3: Foothold: credentials or a first compromised machine

way in: Police, courts and sanctions

  1. L1: Law enforcement and governments
  2. L2: Takedowns, arrests, indictments and rewards (FBI seizure of 15 booter domains, Dec 2018; up to $10 million offered for Conti, May 2022)
  3. L3: Return on a spare domain registered months ahead; brands shut and re-formed
  4. L4: Operations dip only for a while; firm-like structure grows where the risk of arrest is absent

way in: Proceeds (ransom and theft)

  1. L1: Victims pay, mostly in cryptocurrency (harder to trace)
  2. L2: Payments arrive and are split between core and affiliate at a fixed percentage
  3. L3: Laundering: exchanges, third-party services, money mules disguising the trail
  4. L4: Salaries paid to members (twice a month at Conti)

way in: Reconnaissance: the target's exposed surface

  1. L1: The target world: organisations, people and the information they expose (conference proceedings, mailing lists, websites)
  2. L2: Reconnaissance: crawling websites for email addresses, social relationships and technologies
  3. L3: Targets chosen: specific organisations for a singular objective

way in: Sponsor's requirements (state units)

  1. L1: A state's interests: political (Fancy Bear, GRU Unit 26165) or revenue under sanctions (Lazarus)
  2. L5: A military or intelligence unit as the group (GRU Unit 26165; the '414 Liaison Office' per a defector)

way in: Underground forums and job boards

  1. L1: Online forums and chat rooms (coders' chat boxes, hacker forums), legitimate job sites
  2. L2: Posts, advertisements and job listings read and answered
  3. L3: Co-offenders found, tools and services bought, stolen data sold
  4. L4: Trust built through statuses and ranking systems

way in: Vulnerabilities and exploits

  1. L1: Flawed software in the target's systems
  2. L2: Flaws found or bought; a leaked state exploit (EternalBlue, made public by Shadow Brokers in April 2017) reused
  3. L3: Weaponization: exploit and payload joined into a deliverable

way in: World events and causes

  1. L1: Events in the world: an invasion, a conflict, a cause
  2. L2: Attention caught: the conflict briefly drew low-level actors
  3. L3: Discussion: forum posts and Telegram replies
  4. L4: Announced targets: a state-backed group coordinating volunteers (IT Army of Ukraine)

way out: Cash-out and laundering

  1. L1: Money moved through mules and exchanges
  2. L5: Coordinating transfers to mules' accounts

way out: Denial of service and defacement

  1. L1: Websites defaced, services flooded; since 2022 also operational technology
  2. L4: Attacks launched, often bought from booters

way out: Extortion: encryption, ransom notes, leak sites

  1. L1: Victims threatened with publication on leak sites (about 80 groups since 2019)
  2. L4: Affiliates deliver and execute the ransomware and negotiate
  3. L5: Operators run the victim payment portal and leak site

way out: Hack-and-leak for influence

  1. L1: Stolen emails released to influence an election (DNC, 2016)
  2. L7: Promote a state's political interests

way out: Insider sabotage

  1. L1: Systems sabotaged (a logic bomb activated after termination)
  2. L3: Precursor acts: backdoor accounts, a planted logic bomb
  3. L7: Harm directed at an organisation or a person

way out: Intrusion and persistence

  1. L1: The target's hosts and networks
  2. L3: A payload breaches a trusted boundary and establishes presence
  3. L4: Deliver, exploit, install

way out: Lures: phishing, phone calls, infiltration

  1. L1: The person who reads, hears or opens the door
  2. L2: Phishing emails and websites; a fake call-centre agent on the phone
  3. L4: Social engineering planned against chosen people

way out: Sale of access, data and services

  1. L1: Forum posts and listings
  2. L6: Access, credentials and services sold to other actors

way out: Theft of data (espionage, IP, credentials)

  1. L1: Data collected, encrypted and extracted from the victim environment
  2. L4: Actions on objectives: typically data exfiltration

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