EVOPEDIA

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Cyber threat intelligence

A part of cybersecurity that collects, analyses and shares information about potential or existing cyber threats (src:wp:cyber-threat-intelligence): evidence-based knowledge about existing or emerging threats (src:mavroeidis-2021-cti-model). Walked as the practice and the trade: the intelligence cycle as security practice runs it, indicator feeds and the platforms that hold them, analysts and their frameworks (kill chain, Diamond Model, ATT&CK), naming and attribution, sharing bodies (ISACs, TLP, STIX/TAXII), the paid and open market, and the limits the research measures.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

aliasesCyber threat intelligence (trackers), sys:threat-intelligence, Threat intelligence and signature vendors
born at2013 as a named industry (APT1 report); forerunners 1948 (intelligence cycle), 1998-1999 (PDD-63, sector ISACs), early 2000s (TLP, blacklists), 2011 (kill chain)
born precisionyears to decades (contested)
boundaryInside: the work of producing threat intelligence (requirements, collection, processing, analysis, production, dissemination), the people who do it (CTI analysts in vendors, SOCs and government), their platforms (threat intelligence platforms, MISP), their frameworks and standards (kill chain, Diamond Model, ATT&CK, STIX/TAXII, TLP) and the feeds and reports they make. Outside: the threat actors it watches, the SOCs, incident responders and leaders who consume it (their use floor is booked as CTI's L6 where it nests in a SOC), sharing bodies (ISACs), governments and law enforcement. Edges contested: whether CTI is a process or only a product (C-1598).
nested levelA practice and an industry at rung 12, part of cybersecurity, borrowed from military and government intelligence; run inside organisations (in-house teams, SOCs) and as a market of vendors and sharing communities.
scalesocial

Measures (23) published science

characteristic clock: feed pull cycleonce a day, the indicators of the last 24 hours per day
indicator validity window (common query window)30 days
phases of the intelligence cycle5 phases
feeds measured (Li et al.)47 IP feeds and 8 malware hash feeds
share of indicators unique to one feed73% (scan), 88% (brute force), over 97% (other categories) % of indicators
coverage of large scanners by scan feedsabout 10 %
indicator overlap between two leading paid vendors on 22 shared actors2.5 to 4.0 %
delay before a shared indicator appears at the second paid vendorabout one month (average) time
commercial threat intelligence marketover 5 billion USD (global)
high-end paid TI subscription100k to 650k USD per year
requests for information in a paid contractabout 10 per year
threat intelligence held at one SOC17 then 20 two months later terabytes
share of collected TI a SOC aims to filter outhalf (per-hand-off yield about 0.5) fraction
sightings in a MISP community10,219 sightings, 30 confirmed false positives
threat actor names across vendor taxonomies3,287 names in 977 alias clusters (17 taxonomies, 13,371 reports)
ATT&CK at public release (May 2015)96 techniques under 9 tactics
ATT&CK tactics today14 tactics
indicator publication after a vulnerability (CVE-2023-34362)149 IPv4 indicators over 46 days, starting 30 days after the CVE
users satisfied with timeliness of intelligence52 (46 dissatisfied with expired indicators not removed) % of survey respondents
strategic intelligence forecasts scored1,514 (discrimination and calibration very good; underconfident) forecasts
epidemic intelligence: sensitivity of single systems vs pooled38-72% single, 93% combined
one campaign's intrusions studiedthree intrusions over seven months
share of breaches through exploited vulnerabilities (IBM)47 % of attacks

Open contentions (6) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (14)

Sits inside / holds (3)

Trades with (valence) (21)

expressed by (23)

floor filled by (24)

Kinds (7)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

cyber threat intelligence as CTI researchers and analysts describe it: adversaries' activity and its traces up to the decisions it is meant to direct (reader's view)

  1. L1: The threat landscape: adversaries' activity and the traces it leaves (IP addresses, domains, file hashes, malware, tactics, talk on forums), seen in many places
  2. L2: Collection: internal telemetry, vendor feeds, open sources, dark-web monitoring, malware analysis, government and community reports
  3. L3: Processing: raw information filtered and prepared (decryption, translation, data reduction), normalised into machine-readable formats (STIX), scored and aged
  4. L4: Analysis: indicators linked into intrusions, campaigns and actors with the kill chain, the Diamond Model and ATT&CK; attribution with stated confidence
  5. L5: Production and dissemination: tactical indicators, operational reports on actors and campaigns, strategic briefings; feeds, reports and TLP-labelled sharing
  6. L6: Use: the SOC enriches alerts and blocks infrastructure, incident responders and hunters follow the leads, leaders set priorities
  7. L7: Planning and direction: the customer of the intelligence states what it needs to know; the aim is less danger and less uncertainty for the decisions it serves

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: Analysis: analysts and platforms link indicators into intrusions, campaigns and actors (kill chain phases, the Diamond Model's adversary, capability, infrastructure and victim, ATT&CK techniques); attribution with low, medium or high confidence
  2. L5: Production and dissemination at three levels: tactical (indicators for SIEM rules, firewalls, endpoint tools), operational (actors, TTPs, campaigns), strategic (risk for executives and boards); delivered as feeds, reports and briefings, labelled for sharing
  3. L6: Use: the intelligence becomes action in the SOC (alert enrichment, blocking), in incident response and threat hunting, and in leaders' priorities; information that leads to no action is not intelligence
  4. L7: Planning and direction: the customer's requirements set what is collected and analysed, to give leadership relevant intelligence that reduces danger and uncertainty

way in: Analysts' tacit knowledge and judgement (inner)

  1. L1: Tacit knowledge, hard to put into algorithms
  2. L2: Judgements arrive with a felt confidence; strategic analysts discriminate well but are underconfident
  3. L3: Shaped by the craft's tools: priority intelligence requirements, Kent's words of estimative probability

way in: Dark web and underground forum monitoring

  1. L1: Data from the dark web and deep web
  2. L2: Dark web monitoring as a collection source

way in: Government indicators and advisories

  1. L1: Classified and declassified indicators held by government, shared by law since 2015 (US)
  2. L2: Released to companies under the 2015 act

way in: Indicator feeds (open lists, commercial vendors, aggregators)

  1. L1: Indicators of compromise published by others: simple observable behaviours that signal compromise
  2. L2: Subscribed feeds, pulled on a cycle (paid, open and shared); organisations subscribe to many
  3. L3: Held for a validity window set by how the user queries the feed (30 days is common), then expired

way in: Internal telemetry (logs, alerts, endpoint data from the organisation's own estate)

  1. L1: Activity on the organisation's own networks and endpoints
  2. L2: Security tools record it as telemetry and logs; internal and external data must be combined
  3. L3: The threat intelligence platform aggregates it with outside indicators and correlates them

way in: Load on the analysts (volume, notification fatigue)

  1. L1: Volume: one SOC held 17 then 20 terabytes of threat intelligence two months apart
  2. L2: Felt as too much to examine
  3. L3: Shows as filtering and ignoring a frequent source

way in: Malware samples and intrusion artefacts

  1. L1: Malware and artefacts recovered from intrusions
  2. L2: Analysis reveals what intrusions share (the same encryption key, the same shellcode)
  3. L3: Computed indicators: hash values and regular expressions

way in: Open sources (vendor and government reports, news, social media, vulnerability notices)

  1. L1: Published threat reports: security vendors the biggest producers, intelligence agencies at times
  2. L2: Collected as they appear; indicators for a new vulnerability trickle in days to weeks after it is announced
  3. L3: Extracted from text by NLP and, lately, large language models, which are inconsistent and overconfident on real reports

way in: Sightings and false-positive reports from consumers

  1. L1: Consumers' detection systems and honeypots report when an indicator is seen
  2. L2: Sightings recorded, a few as confirmed false positives
  3. L3: Each new sighting resets the indicator's score; without one it decays

way in: The adversary's changes (new infrastructure, new tooling)

  1. L1: Attackers change their infrastructure and indicators over time
  2. L2: Mature indicators stop matching: the adversary must avoid them to succeed
  3. L3: Each kind of indicator ages at its own rate

way in: The customers' questions (requirements, requests for information)

  1. L1: Leaders' questions about business risk: who targets the sector, geopolitics, trends, impact
  2. L2: Requests for information, budgeted in vendor contracts at about ten a year

way in: Trusted sharing communities (ISACs, peer groups, sharing platforms)

  1. L1: Members' own threat information, exchanged without payment in formal (ISAC) or informal communities of trust
  2. L2: Labelled by the originator with how far it may travel (Traffic Light Protocol)
  3. L3: Exchanged machine to machine (STIX over TAXII, sharing platforms such as MISP)

way out: Attribution statements (with confidence) for law enforcement and policy

  1. L1: Used in investigations and policy responses
  2. L5: Assessments in low, medium or high confidence; errors carry diplomatic, legal or strategic costs

way out: Courses of action for detection, mitigation and response (hunting and incident response)

  1. L1: Detection and courses of action moved up the kill chain, before the exploit
  2. L6: Each phase of an intrusion mapped to courses of action

way out: Public reports naming actors

  1. L1: Actors named in each vendor's own scheme
  2. L5: A report released with the actor's fingerprints: domains, IP addresses, file hashes (APT1, 2013)

way out: Sharing back to communities (ISACs, peers), TLP-labelled

  1. L1: Indicators shared in a community of trust
  2. L3: Encoded in STIX, the most used sharing standard
  3. L5: The originator labels each item with one of four colours

way out: Strategic briefings to leaders

  1. L1: Priorities set and security resources allocated
  2. L7: Reports, briefings and risk assessments for executives and boards

way out: Tactical indicators into blocking and detection tools

  1. L1: Matching activity on the network flagged or blocked
  2. L3: Pushed through integrations into SIEM, EDR and response platforms
  3. L5: Tactical product: IP addresses, domains, hashes for SIEM rules, firewall policies and endpoint tools

Sources (33) published science

Hutchins, Cloppert and Amin, Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains, ICIW 2011
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