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Botnet

A botnet is a group of Internet-connected devices, each of which runs one or more bots, controlled by its owner through command-and-control software (src:wp:botnet). Walked as botnet researchers describe it: the population of compromised computers, phones and IoT devices; how bots are recruited (scanning and brute force, drive-by downloads, trojans, spam) at the level the measurement literature describes; the command-and-control rendezvous (IRC, web domains, domain generation algorithms, fast-flux, peer-to-peer); the herder's control; the uses and the market (DDoS, spam, credential theft, fraud, proxies, rental); the operators; the defenders who measure, sinkhole, detect and take botnets down; and their history from 2001 to the 2024-2025 takedowns.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born at2001 (first acknowledged); Mirai 2016-08-01
born precisionyear
boundaryInside: the compromised devices while they run the bot and answer the controller, the bot programs, the command-and-control rendezvous (servers, channels, domains, peer lists, proxy and loader machines) and the herder's control. Outside: the devices' owners and their other uses, the malware family as a kind (its own system), the operators as people (threat actor), the customers who rent it, the targets, the Internet and DNS it runs over, and the defenders, researchers and police who act on it. A bot cut off from C&C stays infected but sits at the edge: dormant, not commanded.
nested levelBuilt from compromised computers and IoT devices running bot malware, joined by a C&C channel; run by threat actors; carried by the Internet; a criminal infrastructure inside human society's cybercrime economy.
scaletechnological

Measures (29) published science

characteristic clock: bot check-in interval (Torpig)20 minutes
Mirai doubling time (first infections)76 minutes
Mirai infections in its first 20 hoursnearly 65,000 devices
Mirai steady-state population200,000-300,000 (later 100,000; brief peak 600,000) devices
Torpig takeover length10 days
Torpig bots vs unique IPs (10 days)182,800 bots; 1,247,642 IPs count
Torpig DHCP churn factor (IPs per bot), all countries6.83 (1.75 NL to 13.35 DE) ratio
Torpig new IPs vs new bots per hour4,690 vs 705 per hour
share of Torpig bots behind NAT/VPN/proxy/firewall78.9 %
Torpig accounts stolen in ten days8,310 accounts at 410 institutions
Torpig data collected in ten daysalmost 70 GB
Krebs on Security attack volume (Sept 2016)over 600 Gbps
Mirai DDoS attack commands in five months15,194 commands
Mirai credential dictionary62 pairs (BASHLITE: 6 usernames, 14 passwords)
Conficker C DGA output50,000 domains per day over 113 TLDs; 30 organisations to contain domains/day
DGA-based malware families analysed43 (253 seeds) families
domain registration price that sets the cost of sinkholingabout 5-10 per year per .com/.net USD
crawler underestimate of P2P botnet sizeup to two orders of magnitude; 60-87% of nodes unverifiable behind NAT factor
lifespan of active P2P botnets (2013)as long as five years
largest P2P botnet familiesover a million bots
Storm peers publishing Storm content per day5,000-6,000 peers/day
spam conversion (Storm pharmacy campaign)28 sales from almost 350 million mails in 26 days (well under 0.00001%) sales/mails
revenue of the measured campaign2,731.88 (over 100 a day) USD
share of world spam from zombies (2005 estimate)50-80 %
first acknowledged botnet's share of spam (2001)nearly 25 %
one request per bot every ~10 minutes yieldsmore than 5 million attempts per day attempts/day
Operation Endgame, May 20244 arrests; 100+ servers; 2,000 domains count
DDoS scale by 2016over 1 Tbit/s
Sandia emulation1,000,000 Linux kernels on a 4,480-node cluster VMs

Open contentions (3) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (11)

Sits inside / holds (2)

Trades with (valence) (15)

expressed by (22)

floor filled by (11)

Kinds (12)

wired (3)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: Command-and-control infrastructure: the rendezvous where bots and controller meet (IRC channels, web domains, DGA and fast-flux domains, P2P peer lists, report and loader servers, proxy bots)
  2. L5: The bot herder's control: commands issued, configurations and new binaries pushed, logs of active bots; signed commands in P2P botnets; master servers in Storm
  3. L6: Uses and the market: DDoS, spam, credential theft, click and ad fraud, mining, residential proxies; botnets rented as commodities; operators compete for size
  4. L7: The operator's purpose: profit, a protection racket, state power, protest (carried by the operators: threat actor's motive)

the botnet as botnet researchers describe it: a population of compromised devices up to the operator's purpose (reader's view)

  1. L1: The device population: Internet-connected computers, phones and IoT devices (IP cameras, home routers) with flaws and weak or default logins
  2. L2: Recruitment: scanning and brute force, drive-by downloads, trojans, spam lures
  3. L3: The bot on the host: runs, hides (MBR rootkit, renamed process), harvests, kills rivals
  4. L4: Rendezvous: the C&C channel (IRC, HTTP domains, DGA, fast-flux, P2P)
  5. L5: Control: the herder's commands, updates and counts
  6. L6: Uses and market: DDoS, spam, theft, fraud, proxies; rented as a commodity
  7. L7: The operator's purpose: profit, racket, state power, protest

way in: Check-in: the bots report themselves

  1. L1: The bot population, each bot on its own host, behind NATs and changing IPs
  2. L2: Each bot contacts the C&C every 20 minutes with a header naming itself (nid, os, cn, bld, ver)
  3. L3: Submissions carry harvested data and status; workers report success or error codes, relayed by proxies
  4. L4: The C&C keeps logs of how many bots are active and online

way in: Code from the forums

  1. L1: Hacker forums where code is posted (Mirai's source on hackforums.net, 30 September 2016)
  2. L2: Code taken up by new operators; credential lists reused (Mirai's 62 pairs subsumed BASHLITE's)
  3. L3: Variants built: new exploits, detection avoidance, DNS resilience (variants targeted 11 additional protocols)

way in: Customers: orders for attacks and spam

  1. L1: Customers who rent botnets as commodities (booter/stresser services)
  2. L2: DDoS-for-hire services take customers' targets (gaming platforms among them)

way in: Defenders acting on the control channel

  1. L1: Domains registered by researchers, servers seized, IRC channels shut, DNS entries null-routed, peer lists poisoned
  2. L2: C&C rendezvous unreachable, or answered by a sinkhole that returns a valid C&C response
  3. L3: Response: switch to the next server or domain; Zeus P2P blacklists sinkholes that talk too aggressively; Sality weighs peer reputation

way in: Harvest: what the user does on the infected host

  1. L1: The user's activity on the host: logins, stored passwords, web forms
  2. L2: Injected DLLs inspect all data handled by browsers, FTP, mail and chat clients and cmd.exe
  3. L3: Man-in-the-browser phishing on trigger pages set by an injection server draws out data passive watching would miss

way in: Lures and exploits: people at their machines

  1. L1: People at their computers: email attachments opened, web pages visited
  2. L2: Drive-by download, browser exploit, or a trojan run from an attachment; spam lures (a fake e-postcard)
  3. L3: Installer runs; Mebroot replaces the Master Boot Record and loads before the operating system; the bot calls home

way in: Peers: the P2P overlay

  1. L1: Other infected machines, reachable at IP addresses; the overlay's distributed hash table
  2. L2: Probe random IPs until another bot answers; exchange version and lists of known bots
  3. L3: Newer version passed on by file transfer; peer lists kept (with reputation in Sality)

way in: Police and courts

  1. L1: Police, prosecutors and courts in several countries (Europol, Eurojust)
  2. L2: Coordinated action: servers seized, domains taken over, arrests (Emotet 2021; Endgame 2024-2025)
  3. L3: Infrastructure taken from the operators; investigators control it

way in: Rivals on the same device

  1. L1: The same device held or sought by other botnets (other Mirai variants, .anime, Qbot)
  2. L2: Processes bound to TCP/22 or TCP/23 and processes of competing infections found
  3. L3: Killed

way in: Scanning: the address space and the devices that answer

  1. L1: The Internet's address space with its devices: IP cameras, home routers, DVRs, with default or weak logins
  2. L2: Stateless TCP SYN probes to pseudorandom IPv4 addresses on Telnet ports 23 and 2323, minus a hard-coded blacklist; replies show an open port
  3. L3: Brute-force login: 10 pairs drawn from 62 credentials; first success reported

way in: The device's own life: reboot, patch, new address

  1. L1: The host device restarts, is patched by its maker or ISP, or gets a new IP address
  2. L2: Mirai does not persist across reboot; a patch needs a reboot to take effect
  3. L3: Population falls (Mirai steady state 300,000 to 100,000); IPs change faster in some countries (DHCP churn factor 1.75 to 13.35)

way out: Distributed denial of service

  1. L1: The target's bandwidth and servers overloaded (Krebs over 600 Gbps; OVH, Dyn, Lonestar Cell)
  2. L3: Each bot floods (SYN, UDP, HTTP requests), or sends one request every 10 minutes to slip under volume detectors
  3. L4: Relayed to every bot through the C&C
  4. L5: Attack command issued (IRC topic "DDoS www.victim.com"; 15,194 Mirai attack commands in five months)

way out: Residential proxies

  1. L1: The target sees an organic internet user
  2. L3: Traffic relayed through the host's home connection
  3. L6: Proxy access sold; rotating through a pool

way out: Self-spreading

  1. L1: New devices taken
  2. L3: Bots scan and brute-force new devices; a separate loader infects them
  3. L5: Self-spreading set by the controller's instructions

way out: Spam

  1. L1: Inboxes and readers: about 350 million mails, 28 sales
  2. L3: Worker bots send the mail
  3. L4: Proxy bots relay between workers and masters
  4. L5: Master servers hand templates and address lists to workers
  5. L6: A campaign: pharmacy ads, or self-propagation under a fake e-postcard

way out: Stolen data sold or used

  1. L1: Accounts at banks and services (8,310 accounts at 410 institutions in ten days)
  2. L4: Harvested data uploaded to the C&C (almost 70 GB in ten days of Torpig)
  3. L6: Credentials sold online or used; credential stuffing

way out: Updates and new binaries

  1. L3: The bot program replaced: new domain algorithm, new exploits
  2. L4: Spread through C&C or peer-to-peer file transfer
  3. L5: Controllers distribute a new binary or configuration

Sources (17) published science

Anderson, Barton, Boehme, Clayton, Ganan, Grasso, Levi, Moore and Vasek, Measuring the Changing Cost of Cybercrime, WEIS 2019
Botnet (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot)
Antonakakis, M. et al. (2017) Understanding the Mirai Botnet. 26th USENIX Security Symposium (behind its links)
Kanich C, Kreibich C, Levchenko K, et al. Spamalytics: An Empirical Analysis of Spam Marketing Conversion. ACM CCS 2008 (behind its links)
Denial-of-service attack (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Stone-Gross B, Cova M, Cavallaro L, et al. Your Botnet is My Botnet: Analysis of a Botnet Takeover. ACM CCS 2009 (behind its links)
Plohmann D, Yakdan K, Klatt M, Bader J, Gerhards-Padilla E. A Comprehensive Measurement Study of Domain Generating Malware. USENIX Security 2016 (behind its links)
Rossow C, Andriesse D, Werner T, et al. SoK: P2PWNED - Modeling and Evaluating the Resilience of Peer-to-Peer Botnets. IEEE S&P 2013 (behind its links)
Holz T, Steiner M, Dahl F, Biersack E, Freiling F. Measurements and Mitigation of Peer-to-Peer-based Botnets: A Case Study on Storm Worm. USENIX LEET 2008 (behind its links)
Gu G, Perdisci R, Zhang J, Lee W. BotMiner: Clustering Analysis of Network Traffic for Protocol- and Structure-Independent Botnet Detection. USENIX Security 2008 (behind its links)
Vu, Thomas, Collier, Hutchings, Clayton & Anderson 2024, Getting Bored of Cyberwar: Exploring the Role of Low-level Cybercrime Actors in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict, WWW '24, doi:10.1145/3589334.3645401 (arXiv:2208.10629) (behind its links)
Li VG, Dunn M, Pearce P, McCoy D, Voelker GM, Savage S, Levchenko K (2019) Reading the Tea Leaves: A Comparative Analysis of Threat Intelligence. 28th USENIX Security Symposium, 851-867 (open access) (behind its links)
Mirai (malware) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Emotet (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Wakili AA, Guni S, et al. Advancing Machine Learning Strategies for Power Consumption-Based IoT Botnet Detection. Sensors 2025. doi:10.3390/s25247553 (behind its links)
Masoudi A, Joseph RA, Keyhani NO. Viral- and fungal-mediated behavioral manipulation of hosts: summit disease. Appl Microbiol Biotechnol 2024. doi:10.1007/s00253-024-13332-x (behind its links)
Conficker (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)