EVOPEDIA

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Intrusion detection system

A device or software application that monitors a network or systems for malicious activity or policy violations, reporting it to an administrator or collecting it centrally (src:wp:intrusion-detection-system); intrusion detection is 'the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and analyzing them for signs of possible incidents' (src:nist-sp800-94). Walked as the technology and the practice around it: sensors and agents, the decoding and detection engines (signature, anomaly, stateful protocol analysis), alerts and records, the analysts who validate them, and the site policy that says what counts as an intrusion.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

aliasesIntrusion detection
born at1980 (Anderson's study); 1986 (Denning's model, the basis of many systems)
born precisionyears
boundaryInside: the sensors and agents that watch (network taps, packet capture, host agents, audit-trail readers, wireless sensors), the decoding of what they see into events, the detection engines (signatures, profiles of normal behaviour, protocol-state models), the alerts, logs and reports, the management servers, databases and consoles, and the people who tune it and validate its alarms, with the site policy that says what counts as an intrusion. Outside: the monitored hosts and networks themselves; the intruders and the benign users whose activity it reads; the firewall and access control that block (the edge is a contention: an intrusion prevention system 'performs access control like an application layer firewall'); the SIEM and security operations centre that collect its output; incident response beyond the alert.
nested levelA security technology (rung 12) built on computer networks and operating systems, one of the detection controls of computer security and information security; its alerts feed SIEMs and security operations centres, where people read them.
scaletechnological

Measures (13) published science

connection-attempt timer (Bro)5 minutes
characteristic clock: alert presentation rate in a cyber vigilance task8 (slow) or 16 (fast) events per minute
wireless channel scanningeach channel a few times per second visits per second
training period for an anomaly profiledays, sometimes weeks
vigilance decrement in Mackworth's clock testcorrect detections down 10% in the first 30 min of a 2-h task percent
audit records per day at a small installationabout 1,000,000 (against one or two intrusion attempts a day) records per day
Bayesian detection rate at a false alarm rate of 1e-5about 66% with detection rate 1.0; about 58% with detection rate 0.7 share of alarms that are true
password-failure threshold (Denning's example)more than 10 in a brief period failures
share of alarms analysts call false positives99% (one analyst's estimate, 7 SOCs, n = 21 interviews) percent
Snort active usersover 300,000 users
Kitsune throughput on a Raspberry Piabout 1,000 packets/s with one autoencoder; about 5,400 with 35 packets per second
cost of Target's malware-detection tool (2013)$1.6m US dollars
web share of border bandwidth in an example profile13% on workdays percent

Open contentions (2) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (14)

Sits inside / holds (4)

Trades with (valence) (20)

expressed by (23)

floor filled by (20)

Kinds (9)

wired (5)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L5: Alerting and recording: alerts and anomaly records written, events logged to disk and database servers, correlated across sensors at management servers, sent to consoles, syslog or a SIEM (Bro's policy-script handlers; Snort's logging and alerting subsystem)
  2. L6: Validation and triage: analysts in a security operations centre judge each alarm (true, false, or a benign trigger), give it context and priority, and close the semantic gap between an anomaly and an actionable report; their sustained attention bounds what is seen
  3. L7: The security policy and what to do: what counts as an intrusion (violations of security, acceptable-use or standard practice), expressed in rule sets and policy scripts; the decision to respond, block, tune or report

the intrusion detection system as security practitioners describe it: monitored activity up to the security policy it serves (reader's view)

  1. L1: The monitored activity: network traffic, host events, files, flows, radio frames; intruders and benign users alike
  2. L2: Sensors and agents: taps and span ports, packet capture, host agents, audit trails, wireless and flow sensors
  3. L3: Decoding and reduction: packets decoded layer by layer, streams reassembled, reduced to events and audit records
  4. L4: Detection: signatures, anomaly profiles, stateful protocol analysis, thresholds and lists
  5. L5: Alerts and records: logged, correlated at management servers, sent to consoles and SIEMs; in-line systems also block
  6. L6: Validation and triage by analysts: true alarm, false alarm or benign trigger; context; priority
  7. L7: The security policy and the response: what counts as an intrusion, and what to do about it (respond, block, tune, report)

way in: Critical files and their attributes

  1. L1: Critical files: system binaries, configuration, ownership and permissions
  2. L2: Snapshots and message digests taken periodically
  3. L4: Digests compared with reference values; any difference flagged, after the fact

way in: Host audit records (logins, commands, file and device access)

  1. L1: Subjects (users, processes) acting on objects (files, commands, devices)
  2. L2: Audit records generated by the target system for each action performed or attempted
  3. L3: Records collected daily, consolidated and sorted into sessions
  4. L4: Each record matched against the subject's profile: counters, means and standard deviations, Markov transitions

way in: Network packets on the monitored link

  1. L1: Traffic to and from every device on the segment
  2. L2: Captured at a tap or switch port, copied promiscuously by libpcap and a kernel filter
  3. L3: Decoded layer by layer and reduced to events (Snort's decoder, Bro's event engine)
  4. L4: Matched against the rule set (signatures), protocol-state models, or a learned model of normal traffic

way in: New signatures and rule updates

  1. L1: New exploits revealed (e.g. on the Bugtraq mailing list)
  2. L2: Rules written in a simple per-packet test language
  3. L3: Released by the vendor for all its products; updated on time
  4. L4: Loaded into the detection engine's rule chains, the port every packet is matched against

way in: People noticing (vigilant users, security officers)

  1. L1: A user behaving strangely; suspicious messages or activity
  2. L2: Noticed by security officers or vigilant users

way in: Reputation and shared indicators (blacklists, hot lists)

  1. L1: Hosts, addresses and files already seen in attacks elsewhere
  2. L2: Written into blacklists (hot lists) and whitelists
  3. L4: Observed entities matched against the lists; matches blocked or raised in priority

way in: System calls of privileged processes

  1. L1: Privileged processes running on the host
  2. L2: A host agent traces which processes call what
  3. L3: The trace cut into short sequences (windows of six calls)
  4. L4: Each sequence compared with the normal database; mismatches counted in a locality frame

way in: The monitor's own load (packets received and dropped)

  1. L1: The monitor's own packet-filter buffer and network interface
  2. L2: Counts kept of packets received, dropped by the filter, dropped by the interface
  3. L3: A periodic net stats update event
  4. L4: Scripts read it to judge whether the monitor is becoming overloaded

way in: Touches on decoys (honeypots)

  1. L1: Attackers' probes reaching a decoy that looks valuable
  2. L2: The decoy, isolated and monitored
  3. L4: Any use is suspect: its value comes from attackers using it

way in: Traffic flows (who talked to whom, how much)

  1. L1: Communication sessions between hosts
  2. L2: Flow records (addresses, ports, packet and byte counts, timestamps) from routers or sensors
  3. L4: Compared with the network's profile against thresholds (web at 13% of border bandwidth)

way in: Wireless frames on radio channels

  1. L1: Wireless LAN traffic on the radio channels in range
  2. L2: Sensors hop between channels a few times per second (channel scanning)
  3. L4: Rogue access points, unauthorised stations and poorly secured devices recognised

way out: Alert to an administrator

  1. L1: Shown to the administrator
  2. L3: Carried by syslog, popup messages or the management network to a console
  3. L5: Alert raised on a match or deviation

way out: Block in-line (drop, reset, throttle)

  1. L1: Malicious packets dropped, connection reset, offending address blocked
  2. L3: Inline firewalling, throttling, or TCP resets to both ends
  3. L5: Prevention action chosen for the alert

way out: Incident response by people

  1. L1: Telephoning the site the attack comes from; minimising damage
  2. L7: Decide to trace and contain

way out: Reconfigure firewalls and routers

  1. L1: Firewalls and routers reconfigure themselves to block certain activity
  2. L5: Decision to block a source elsewhere

way out: Reports and threat documentation

  1. L1: Logged threat information used to educate management
  2. L7: Document the existing threat; find policy problems

way out: Tuning (thresholds, whitelists, profiles, rules)

  1. L4: Thresholds, black- and whitelists, profiles changed; static profiles regenerated
  2. L7: Decide to improve accuracy for this environment

Sources (28) published science

Denning, An Intrusion-Detection Model, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering SE-13(2), 1987 (doi:10.1109/TSE.1987.232894)
Intrusion detection system (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01)
Sommer, R. & Paxson, V. (2010). Outside the Closed World: On Using Machine Learning For Network Intrusion Detection. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. doi:10.1109/SP.2010.25 (behind its links)
Alahmadi, B. A., Axon, L. & Martinovic, I. (2022). 99% False Positives: A Qualitative Study of SOC Analysts' Perspectives on Security Alarms. 31st USENIX Security Symposium (behind its links)
Scarfone, K. & Mell, P. (2007). Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS). NIST Special Publication 800-94. doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-94 (behind its links)
Paxson, V. (1999). Bro: a system for detecting network intruders in real-time. Computer Networks 31(23-24):2435-2463. doi:10.1016/S1389-1286(99)00112-7 (behind its links)
Hutchins, Cloppert and Amin, Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains, ICIW 2011 (behind its links)
Guidetti, O. A., Speelman, C. & Bouhlas, P. (2023). A review of cyber vigilance tasks for network defense. Frontiers in Neuroergonomics 4:1104873. doi:10.3389/fnrgo.2023.1104873 (PMC10790933, CC BY) (behind its links)
Axelsson, S. (2000). The Base-Rate Fallacy and the Difficulty of Intrusion Detection. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security 3(3):186-205. doi:10.1145/357830.357849 (behind its links)
Mirsky, Y., Doitshman, T., Elovici, Y. & Shabtai, A. (2018). Kitsune: An Ensemble of Autoencoders for Online Network Intrusion Detection. NDSS 2018. arXiv:1802.09089 (behind its links)
Roesch, M. (1999). Snort: Lightweight Intrusion Detection for Networks. LISA XIII, USENIX (behind its links)
Malware (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Cichonski P, Millar T, Grance T, Scarfone K (2012) Computer Security Incident Handling Guide. NIST Special Publication 800-61 Rev. 2. doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r2 (US government work, not subject to copyright) (behind its links)
Advanced persistent threat (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Gu G, Perdisci R, Zhang J, Lee W. BotMiner: Clustering Analysis of Network Traffic for Protocol- and Structure-Independent Botnet Detection. USENIX Security 2008 (behind its links)
Crosby, Wallach 2003, Denial of Service via Algorithmic Complexity Attacks, USENIX Security 2003 (behind its links)
Scarfone K, Hoffman P. Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy. NIST Special Publication 800-41 Revision 1, 2009 (doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-41r1) (behind its links)
Anderson R. Security Engineering, 2nd ed., chapter 11: Physical Protection (Wiley 2008; author's free copy) (behind its links)
Li VG, Dunn M, Pearce P, McCoy D, Voelker GM, Savage S, Levchenko K (2019) Reading the Tea Leaves: A Comparative Analysis of Threat Intelligence. 28th USENIX Security Symposium, 851-867 (open access) (behind its links)
Anderson, J. P. (1980). Computer Security Threat Monitoring and Surveillance. James P. Anderson Co., report, revised 15 April 1980 (NIST CSRC early papers copy) (behind its links)
Forrest, Hofmeyr and Somayaji, Computer Immunology, Communications of the ACM 40(10), 1997 (doi:10.1145/262793.262811) (behind its links)
Honeypot (computing) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Ptacek, T. H. & Newsham, T. N. (1998). Insertion, Evasion, and Denial of Service: Eluding Network Intrusion Detection. Secure Networks, Inc. technical report (behind its links)
Alhajjar, E., Maxwell, P. & Bastian, N. D. (2020). Adversarial Machine Learning in Network Intrusion Detection Systems. arXiv:2004.11898 (behind its links)
Nesse, R. M., Labov, J. B. & Madhavan, G. (2025). Explanations for failures in designed and evolved systems. PNAS Nexus 4(4):pgaf086. doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf086 (PMC12041745, CC BY) (behind its links)
Baotic, A. & Szipl, G. (2025). Predator experience enhances giraffe vigilance to oxpecker alarm calls. BMC Biology 23:304. doi:10.1186/s12915-025-02395-5 (PMC12512274, CC BY) (behind its links)
Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity, University of New Brunswick. Intrusion Detection Evaluation Dataset (CIC-IDS2017), dataset page (behind its links)
Zeek (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)