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Physical security

Security measures designed to deny unauthorized access to facilities, equipment and resources and to protect personnel and property from damage or harm, using 'multiple layers of interdependent systems' (CCTV, guards, barriers, locks, access control, perimeter intrusion detection, deterrents, fire protection) (src:wp:physical-security). Practitioners describe it as a system of equipment and procedures that runs 'deter - detect - alarm - delay - respond' (src:anderson-2008-se-ch11), resting on 'the primary physical protection functions of detection, delay and response' (src:iaea-2011-nss13). Walked as the practice and its machinery: walls, locks, guards, cameras, alarms, the design of protected places, the people who run them and their history.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born atby 6800 BC (walled town of Sesklo, Greece); locks over 6000 years ago
born precisionmillennia
boundaryInside: the protected place and its layers (perimeter barriers, walls, doors, locks, safes and vaults), the sensors and cameras that watch them, the alarm panels and the communications that carry their signals, the central alarm station and the guards who assess and respond, the deterrents shown to the outside (signs, lighting, visible guards), and the plan behind it all (threat model, graded approach, defence in depth, procedures, testing, security culture). Outside: the assets protected (people, property, information, nuclear material), the would-be intruders and insiders, the police and emergency services that answer alarms, the law, standards bodies and insurers that set its rules, and the neighbourhood whose residents watch or don't.
nested levelA practice carried by people and organisations (rung 11): guards, designers, architects, locksmiths and alarm companies, inside an organisation's security programme, under State law. Part of security as a whole, beside information security (the 'physical side' of joined-up protection); holds access control as one of its layers; its alarm systems are the physical kin of intrusion detection systems.
scalesocial

Measures (23) published science

characteristic clock: vigilance decrement of a watchersteep drop in detection in the first 30 min of a 2-h watch, then a steadier decline minutes
response time in a worked case (police arrival after an alarm)twelve minutes
certified vault resistance vs fire department entry10 min certified; 2 min with an abrasive wheel minutes
UL vault classes (time to breach)Class M 15, Class I 30, Class II 60, Class III 120 minutes
cavity brick wall breach time< 1 minute (sledgehammer)
false alarm share of US alarm activations94-99 percent
police alarm calls involving a crimeabout 1 percent
false alarm rate that degrades radar operators> 15 percent
test threats that got through airport screening (2006)75% LAX, 60% O'Hare (tested once per shift); 20% SFO (several times per shift) percent
US security guard jobs, 2025about 1.3 million jobs
theft drop among cars with electronic immobilisers (US, n = 141,385 thefts)80 percent
protection from door and window locks plus external lights or chains>= 20 times relative protection vs no security (burglary with entry)
households burgled, England and Wales 2012/132.1% (694,000 burglaries) households
street lighting effect (updated meta-analysis)14% fewer crimes overall; non-significant 3% after dark percent
lighting towers RCT: serious crime after dark-35 (6 months) percent
CCTV effect in public streets and subways (2017 review)24-28 percent reduction
crimes solved by CCTV (UK police chiefs, 2008)3 percent
pin-tumbler key diversity10^5 to 10^6 (theoretical) key differs
cost of deriving a master key from one lock and key< about 2 US dollars
insured value above which two independent alarm links are required (London market)20 million GBP
Lojack: private cost vs social benefit (Ayres and Levitt, as reported)about $100 a year vs $1500 US dollars
minimum security illumination in US nuclear plant isolation zones0.2 foot-candles
airport passengers screened yearly under security-game scheduling (US)800 million passengers per year

Open contentions (5) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (11)

Sits inside / holds (5)

Trades with (valence) (13)

expressed by (29)

floor filled by (17)

Kinds (6)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

physical security as practitioners describe it: the protected place and what approaches it, up to the protection goals the security plan serves (reader's view)

  1. L1: The protected place and what approaches it: people, property, equipment and the would-be intruder who meets a target where no capable guardian is
  2. L2: Barriers and sensors in layers: fences, walls, doors, locks, alarm sensors, cameras, guards; concentric perimeters, the outermost most needed and least reliable
  3. L3: Signals carried: sensor cabling to the panel, the panel's line to the alarm company, camera feeds, readers to the access panel
  4. L4: Assessment: is the alarm real? the central alarm station, the camera feed, the call to the premises
  5. L5: Delay and response: barriers hold while guards and police come
  6. L6: Design and management: threat, graded approach, defence in depth, procedures, culture, testing
  7. L7: Purpose: deny unauthorized access, protect people and property, within costs and society's values

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: Assessment: the central alarm station, the control room and the guard on the spot decide whether an alarm is real (camera feed, a call to the premises, an eyewitness), trading missed alarms against false ones
  2. L5: Delay and response: barriers hold the attacker while guards, a response force or police come; lockdowns and evacuations; the race between delay time and response time
  3. L6: Design and management: the threat model and design basis threat, the graded approach, defence in depth, the mix of hardware, procedures and layout, security culture, testing and redesign
  4. L7: Purpose: deny unauthorized access and protect people and property from harm, balanced against costs, aesthetics, human rights and norms

way in: Barrier sensors (doors, windows, fences, glass, floors)

  1. L1: The barrier itself: fences, walls, doors, windows, the outermost layer an intruder must cross
  2. L2: Sensors on the barrier: vibration detectors on fences and walls, switches on doors and windows, glass-break detectors, pressure pads
  3. L3: Cabling from the sensors to the alarm controller (the panel), attacked as often as the sensors

way in: Cameras (CCTV and IP video)

  1. L1: Light from the watched scene; cameras placed in view also act on the watcher-to-be
  2. L2: Cameras turn the scene into a signal sent to a limited set of monitors
  3. L3: The feed carried on closed circuits or IP networks to monitors and recorders; video analytics flag events; without a live watcher it is only evidence

way in: Costs and the wider values (budget, aesthetics, rights, norms)

  1. L1: Costs of specifying, building, running and maintaining controls; aesthetics, human rights, health and safety, norms
  2. L2: Some measures ruled out where they don't fit the place (a fenced shopping centre)
  3. L3: Measures fitted to the setting: what suits a prison may not suit a home

way in: Credentials at the access points (keys, cards, badges, biometrics)

  1. L1: A credential held by a person at an access point
  2. L2: Read at the door: the keyway's pins, or a reader (proximity, magnetic stripe, smart card, biometric) that sends the data on; keys grow unmanageable with many users
  3. L3: Checked: the lock answers one bit per key; the panel compares the number with its access levels and logs it; held or forced doors raise an alarm

way in: Fire and smoke (fire protection inputs)

  1. L1: Smoke and heat in the protected place; fire protection is one of the layers
  2. L2: Fire alarm detectors; combination systems give fire and intrusion protection
  3. L3: The fire signal reaches the burglar alarm, which may then ignore its infrared sensors

way in: Guards' eyes and ears on patrol

  1. L1: The site as a guard sees and hears it on patrol: signs of crime or other hazards

way in: Residents, staff and passers-by (natural surveillance)

  1. L1: People who live, work or pass near the place, keeping entrances in view
  2. L2: An intruder noticed and challenged; small shared spaces make strangers stand out
  3. L3: Residents as key agents of their own security, reporting what they see

way in: Rules, standards and insurers

  1. L1: The State's responsibility, law and regulation
  2. L2: Written standards and test ratings for walls, roofs, safes, vaults and locks
  3. L3: Insurers' terms: two independent alarm links above a value; discounts for a 24-hour presence
  4. L4: Licensing of the people: background checks, training and permits for guards
  5. L5: Reviewed and updated as threats and technology change

way in: Space sensors (body heat and motion inside the protected space)

  1. L1: A body's heat and movement in the protected space
  2. L2: Passive infrared detectors, ultrasonic and microwave motion detectors, infrared and microwave beams
  3. L3: The alarm control panel reads the inputs and tracks armed state; its line to the alarm company is supervised (a pseudorandom heartbeat or challenges)

way in: Tests and incidents (how the defences actually did)

  1. L1: An incident or a test at the site: a robbery, a break-in, a test object in a bag, a force-on-force exercise
  2. L2: Recorded: access attempts, alarms and tracking logged; video kept
  3. L3: Tested on purpose: performance testing at least yearly, force-on-force exercises
  4. L4: Scored: how many test threats got through
  5. L5: Evaluated and validated against the required level

way in: The threat (what attackers have done and could do)

  1. L1: Crime and attacks in the world: burglaries, robberies, theft, sabotage, terrorism
  2. L2: Recorded and surveyed: victim surveys, police records, the modus operandi seen
  3. L3: Shared with the authority from other organisations
  4. L4: Assessed: attackers sorted by skill, equipment and motive (Derek, Charlie, Bruno, Abdurrahman); insiders weighed
  5. L5: Fixed as a design basis threat

way out: Audible alarm in the place

  1. L1: A loud alarm tells the intruder he has been detected
  2. L4: Intrusion signalled by the panel

way out: Build and harden the place

  1. L1: The built environment changed: shrubs, escape routes removed, lighting, foot traffic
  2. L3: Reinforced concrete, steel doorframes, crash-tested bollards
  3. L6: Choose barriers by delay against the expected tools

way out: Doors released, held or locked down

  1. L1: Free way out without an alarm
  2. L3: Electrified locks, strikes and maglocks release for valid credentials; time locks hold a vault shut
  3. L5: Lockdown on a bomb; evacuation on a fire

way out: Evidence handed on

  1. L1: Evidence to police and courts; a small share of crimes solved this way
  2. L4: After an attack, the recording at the point of attack reviewed

way out: Guards, response force or police sent

  1. L1: Responders arrive, or don't; the attacker counts them
  2. L3: The call: to emergency services, or first to the premises to check
  3. L5: Response initiated by the central alarm station

way out: Procedures for people (two-person rule, random patrols, training)

  1. L1: Staff and guards act on the place: patrolling, checking passes, escorting
  2. L3: Patrols logged by guard tour systems, now randomised
  3. L6: Procedures set against insiders and predictability

way out: Show strength (or hide)

  1. L1: Seen by the would-be intruder, who keeps to the dark
  2. L2: Signs, fences, lighting, uniformed guards in high-visibility presence
  3. L6: Deterrence chosen, or anonymity

Sources (27) published science

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US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook: Security Guards and Gambling Surveillance Officers (2025 data) (behind its links)
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