← all systems · see it in The System
Physical security
Security measures designed to deny unauthorized access to facilities, equipment and resources and to protect personnel and property from damage or harm, using 'multiple layers of interdependent systems' (CCTV, guards, barriers, locks, access control, perimeter intrusion detection, deterrents, fire protection) (src:wp:physical-security). Practitioners describe it as a system of equipment and procedures that runs 'deter - detect - alarm - delay - respond' (src:anderson-2008-se-ch11), resting on 'the primary physical protection functions of detection, delay and response' (src:iaea-2011-nss13). Walked as the practice and its machinery: walls, locks, guards, cameras, alarms, the design of protected places, the people who run them and their history.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | by 6800 BC (walled town of Sesklo, Greece); locks over 6000 years ago |
| born precision | millennia |
| boundary | Inside: the protected place and its layers (perimeter barriers, walls, doors, locks, safes and vaults), the sensors and cameras that watch them, the alarm panels and the communications that carry their signals, the central alarm station and the guards who assess and respond, the deterrents shown to the outside (signs, lighting, visible guards), and the plan behind it all (threat model, graded approach, defence in depth, procedures, testing, security culture). Outside: the assets protected (people, property, information, nuclear material), the would-be intruders and insiders, the police and emergency services that answer alarms, the law, standards bodies and insurers that set its rules, and the neighbourhood whose residents watch or don't. |
| nested level | A practice carried by people and organisations (rung 11): guards, designers, architects, locksmiths and alarm companies, inside an organisation's security programme, under State law. Part of security as a whole, beside information security (the 'physical side' of joined-up protection); holds access control as one of its layers; its alarm systems are the physical kin of intrusion detection systems. |
| scale | social |
Measures (23) published science
| characteristic clock: vigilance decrement of a watcher | steep drop in detection in the first 30 min of a 2-h watch, then a steadier decline minutes |
| response time in a worked case (police arrival after an alarm) | twelve minutes |
| certified vault resistance vs fire department entry | 10 min certified; 2 min with an abrasive wheel minutes |
| UL vault classes (time to breach) | Class M 15, Class I 30, Class II 60, Class III 120 minutes |
| cavity brick wall breach time | < 1 minute (sledgehammer) |
| false alarm share of US alarm activations | 94-99 percent |
| police alarm calls involving a crime | about 1 percent |
| false alarm rate that degrades radar operators | > 15 percent |
| test threats that got through airport screening (2006) | 75% LAX, 60% O'Hare (tested once per shift); 20% SFO (several times per shift) percent |
| US security guard jobs, 2025 | about 1.3 million jobs |
| theft drop among cars with electronic immobilisers (US, n = 141,385 thefts) | 80 percent |
| protection from door and window locks plus external lights or chains | >= 20 times relative protection vs no security (burglary with entry) |
| households burgled, England and Wales 2012/13 | 2.1% (694,000 burglaries) households |
| street lighting effect (updated meta-analysis) | 14% fewer crimes overall; non-significant 3% after dark percent |
| lighting towers RCT: serious crime after dark | -35 (6 months) percent |
| CCTV effect in public streets and subways (2017 review) | 24-28 percent reduction |
| crimes solved by CCTV (UK police chiefs, 2008) | 3 percent |
| pin-tumbler key diversity | 10^5 to 10^6 (theoretical) key differs |
| cost of deriving a master key from one lock and key | < about 2 US dollars |
| insured value above which two independent alarm links are required (London market) | 20 million GBP |
| Lojack: private cost vs social benefit (Ayres and Levitt, as reported) | about $100 a year vs $1500 US dollars |
| minimum security illumination in US nuclear plant isolation zones | 0.2 foot-candles |
| airport passengers screened yearly under security-game scheduling (US) | 800 million passengers per year |
Open contentions (5) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-1521 Do burglar alarms protect a home?
booked: The map keeps both findings: a study where alarms gave less protection than having none, and surveys that rank alarms among the best deterrents.
the other reading: alarms deter (Shachmurove et al., as reported in src:anderson-2008-se-ch11); alarms alone do not protect, perhaps because alarmed homes are richer targets or alarms go unset (src:tseloni-2017-burglary-devices) - C-1522 Do security cameras cut crime?
booked: The map keeps the readings that they help in some places, such as car parks, and little elsewhere, and rules none.
the other reading: CCTV reduces crime in public places; CCTV deters only in narrow settings and mostly serves evidence - C-1524 Why did crime fall from the 1990s?
booked: The map books better security as one explanation, and keeps the others the literature argues over.
the other reading: security improvements caused the international crime drop; other causes (demographics, policing, imprisonment, lead) did - C-1543 When did physical security begin?
booked: The map books walled settlements and locks from about 6800 BC, and keeps insect nest guards as an older reading.
the other reading: the same system as nest and colony defence in social animals, beginning with them; only the human practice; colony defence shares the job, not the system - C-1548 Does street lighting cut crime?
booked: The map keeps the readings for and against, and rules none.
the other reading: better lighting reduces crime; lighting acts mainly through community pride and daytime effects; the right kind of light matters more than the amount
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (11)
- Access control
- Locks and keys
- Protective barriers (fences, walls, vehicle barriers)
- Security alarms and their sensors
- Video surveillance (CCTV)
- Security personnel
- Central alarm station
- Security lighting
- Safes and vaults
- Intruders against physical security for protected places
- Defender against attacker over which targets are covered (Stackelberg security game)
Sits inside / holds (5)
- Access control
- State (polity); the nation state its predominant modern form
- Built environment (buildings, streets, public space)
- Information security
- Organization
Trades with (valence) (13)
- Police via sys:human-society · Physical security gain
- Insurance via sys:law · Physical security gain
- Access control via sys:mechanical-contact · Physical security gain
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:human-society · Physical security mixed
- Fire via sys:fire · Physical security mixed
- State (polity); the nation state its predominant modern form via sys:law · Physical security gain
- Electrical grid via sys:electricity · Physical security gain
- City via sys:built-environment · Physical security gain
- Intrusion detection system via sys:written-record · Physical security gain
- Information security via sys:written-record · Physical security gain
- Organization via sys:human-society · Physical security gain
- Intruder (burglar and trespasser) via sys:built-environment · Physical security mixed
- Penetration testing via sys:physical-security · Physical security gain
expressed by (29)
- Generation/Synthesis
- Templating / Standardization
- Niche Construction (alter environment)
- Quality Improvement/Refinement
- Interoperability/Transduction (Bridging)
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Sensing/Scanning
- Hypothesis/Goal Selection
- Mapping/Modeling
- Uncertainty Reduction/Learning
- Active Experimentation / Probing (Optimal Experimental Design)
- Multi-Scale Data Fusion / Triangulation
- Trail-Marking / Externalized Memory (Stigmergy)
- Offline Simulation & Replay-Guided Planning
- Quick Harm Avoidance
- Reactive Response
- Proactive Defense
- Physical/Virtual Barrier
- Self-Monitoring
- Delay/Redirection Tactics
- Validation of Identity/Intention
- Validation of Effectiveness
- Enclave/Segregation
- Deception
- Resilience & Repair
- Redundancy & Diversity
- Triage & Prioritized Allocation
- Deterrence
- Quality Control & Error Correction
floor filled by (17)
- Police
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- State (polity); the nation state its predominant modern form
- Electrical grid
- Insurance
- Protected resource
- Organization
- Telephone network (circuit-switched carrier)
- Computer network
- Locks and keys
- Intruder (burglar and trespasser)
- Protective barriers (fences, walls, vehicle barriers)
- Security alarms and their sensors
- Video surveillance (CCTV)
- Security personnel
- Central alarm station
- Safes and vaults
Kinds (6)
- Nuclear physical protection
- Prison security
- Fortification
- Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED)
- Hostile vehicle mitigation
- Close protection (bodyguards)
Notes published science
- The first recorded use of RSA, the public-key cipher behind much of the Internet, was not to keep messages secret: in 1978 it signed the badges staff used to get past the entry barrier of a plutonium reactor at Idaho Falls, badges that carried the holder's body weight and hand shape (src:anderson-2008-se-ch11).
- A bank vault certified to hold off attackers for ten minutes can be opened by the local fire brigade in two with an abrasive wheel, and a brick cavity wall falls to a sledgehammer in under a minute. The design question is never 'will it hold?' but 'will it hold until help comes?', and in Anderson's worked case help took twelve minutes (src:anderson-2008-se-ch11).
- The guards at a stingless bee's nest are a body type of their own: about 30% heavier than the foragers, with bigger legs and smaller heads, reared as only 1-2% of new workers, posted hovering at the entrance and standing on the wax entrance tube (src:gruter-2012-soldier-bees).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
physical security as practitioners describe it: the protected place and what approaches it, up to the protection goals the security plan serves (reader's view)
- L1: The protected place and what approaches it: people, property, equipment and the would-be intruder who meets a target where no capable guardian is
- L2: Barriers and sensors in layers: fences, walls, doors, locks, alarm sensors, cameras, guards; concentric perimeters, the outermost most needed and least reliable
- L3: Signals carried: sensor cabling to the panel, the panel's line to the alarm company, camera feeds, readers to the access panel
- L4: Assessment: is the alarm real? the central alarm station, the camera feed, the call to the premises
- L5: Delay and response: barriers hold while guards and police come
- L6: Design and management: threat, graded approach, defence in depth, procedures, culture, testing
- L7: Purpose: deny unauthorized access, protect people and property, within costs and society's values
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L4: Assessment: the central alarm station, the control room and the guard on the spot decide whether an alarm is real (camera feed, a call to the premises, an eyewitness), trading missed alarms against false ones
- L5: Delay and response: barriers hold the attacker while guards, a response force or police come; lockdowns and evacuations; the race between delay time and response time
- L6: Design and management: the threat model and design basis threat, the graded approach, defence in depth, the mix of hardware, procedures and layout, security culture, testing and redesign
- L7: Purpose: deny unauthorized access and protect people and property from harm, balanced against costs, aesthetics, human rights and norms
way in: Barrier sensors (doors, windows, fences, glass, floors)
- L1: The barrier itself: fences, walls, doors, windows, the outermost layer an intruder must cross
- L2: Sensors on the barrier: vibration detectors on fences and walls, switches on doors and windows, glass-break detectors, pressure pads
- L3: Cabling from the sensors to the alarm controller (the panel), attacked as often as the sensors
way in: Cameras (CCTV and IP video)
- L1: Light from the watched scene; cameras placed in view also act on the watcher-to-be
- L2: Cameras turn the scene into a signal sent to a limited set of monitors
- L3: The feed carried on closed circuits or IP networks to monitors and recorders; video analytics flag events; without a live watcher it is only evidence
way in: Costs and the wider values (budget, aesthetics, rights, norms)
- L1: Costs of specifying, building, running and maintaining controls; aesthetics, human rights, health and safety, norms
- L2: Some measures ruled out where they don't fit the place (a fenced shopping centre)
- L3: Measures fitted to the setting: what suits a prison may not suit a home
way in: Credentials at the access points (keys, cards, badges, biometrics)
- L1: A credential held by a person at an access point
- L2: Read at the door: the keyway's pins, or a reader (proximity, magnetic stripe, smart card, biometric) that sends the data on; keys grow unmanageable with many users
- L3: Checked: the lock answers one bit per key; the panel compares the number with its access levels and logs it; held or forced doors raise an alarm
way in: Fire and smoke (fire protection inputs)
- L1: Smoke and heat in the protected place; fire protection is one of the layers
- L2: Fire alarm detectors; combination systems give fire and intrusion protection
- L3: The fire signal reaches the burglar alarm, which may then ignore its infrared sensors
way in: Guards' eyes and ears on patrol
- L1: The site as a guard sees and hears it on patrol: signs of crime or other hazards
way in: Residents, staff and passers-by (natural surveillance)
- L1: People who live, work or pass near the place, keeping entrances in view
- L2: An intruder noticed and challenged; small shared spaces make strangers stand out
- L3: Residents as key agents of their own security, reporting what they see
way in: Rules, standards and insurers
- L1: The State's responsibility, law and regulation
- L2: Written standards and test ratings for walls, roofs, safes, vaults and locks
- L3: Insurers' terms: two independent alarm links above a value; discounts for a 24-hour presence
- L4: Licensing of the people: background checks, training and permits for guards
- L5: Reviewed and updated as threats and technology change
way in: Space sensors (body heat and motion inside the protected space)
- L1: A body's heat and movement in the protected space
- L2: Passive infrared detectors, ultrasonic and microwave motion detectors, infrared and microwave beams
- L3: The alarm control panel reads the inputs and tracks armed state; its line to the alarm company is supervised (a pseudorandom heartbeat or challenges)
way in: Tests and incidents (how the defences actually did)
- L1: An incident or a test at the site: a robbery, a break-in, a test object in a bag, a force-on-force exercise
- L2: Recorded: access attempts, alarms and tracking logged; video kept
- L3: Tested on purpose: performance testing at least yearly, force-on-force exercises
- L4: Scored: how many test threats got through
- L5: Evaluated and validated against the required level
way in: The threat (what attackers have done and could do)
- L1: Crime and attacks in the world: burglaries, robberies, theft, sabotage, terrorism
- L2: Recorded and surveyed: victim surveys, police records, the modus operandi seen
- L3: Shared with the authority from other organisations
- L4: Assessed: attackers sorted by skill, equipment and motive (Derek, Charlie, Bruno, Abdurrahman); insiders weighed
- L5: Fixed as a design basis threat
way out: Audible alarm in the place
- L1: A loud alarm tells the intruder he has been detected
- L4: Intrusion signalled by the panel
way out: Build and harden the place
- L1: The built environment changed: shrubs, escape routes removed, lighting, foot traffic
- L3: Reinforced concrete, steel doorframes, crash-tested bollards
- L6: Choose barriers by delay against the expected tools
way out: Doors released, held or locked down
- L1: Free way out without an alarm
- L3: Electrified locks, strikes and maglocks release for valid credentials; time locks hold a vault shut
- L5: Lockdown on a bomb; evacuation on a fire
way out: Evidence handed on
- L1: Evidence to police and courts; a small share of crimes solved this way
- L4: After an attack, the recording at the point of attack reviewed
way out: Guards, response force or police sent
- L1: Responders arrive, or don't; the attacker counts them
- L3: The call: to emergency services, or first to the premises to check
- L5: Response initiated by the central alarm station
way out: Procedures for people (two-person rule, random patrols, training)
- L1: Staff and guards act on the place: patrolling, checking passes, escorting
- L3: Patrols logged by guard tour systems, now randomised
- L6: Procedures set against insiders and predictability
way out: Show strength (or hide)
- L1: Seen by the would-be intruder, who keeps to the dark
- L2: Signs, fences, lighting, uniformed guards in high-visibility presence
- L6: Deterrence chosen, or anonymity