EVOPEDIA

← all systems · see it in The System

Access control

In physical security and information security, access control is the action of deciding whether a subject should be granted or denied access to an object, a place or a resource; accessing may mean consuming, entering or using (src:wp:access-control). In computing, 'all the mechanisms that control the access of a program to other things in the system' (src:lampson-1971). Walked as the practice and its machinery, from locks, guards and turnstiles to access control lists, capabilities, security labels and role- and attribute-based policies.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

aliasesAccess control (access control lists, capabilities)
born atover 6000 years ago (lock at Nineveh)
born precisionmillennia
boundaryInside: the decision whether a subject may do an act on an object, and everything that makes and carries it out: the door or point of interception (lock, turnstile, guard, the kernel's check), what is presented and gathered (keys, cards, the system-supplied identity, capabilities, labels, roles, attributes, conditions, history), the check against what is stored, the enforcement and its record, and the authorization state with its administration (granting, revoking, delegating, separation of duty). Outside: authentication, which verifies who is asking (the edge is a contention: often 'combined into a single operation'); the resources guarded; the people and programs who ask; intruders; the organisation's wider security policy and the law that set its purpose.
nested levelA practice carried by people and institutions (rung 11), since the 1960s largely run in operating systems, middleware and applications (rung 12). Part of information security and computer security (one of their controls) and of physical security (one of its layers); fed by authentication; enforced by the operating system and hardware.
scalesocial

Measures (13) published science

characteristic clock: sensitive permission checks on a phone213 per hour (about every 20 s) checks per hour per user
participants who would have blocked at least one request>=80%; over a third of requests judged invasive share
requests to protected resources per user per day>100,000 (27M in one week, 36 participants) requests
overprivileged Android applicationsabout one-third of 940 applications
broken access control in tested web applications94% tested; average incidence 3.81%; over 318k occurrences; 34 CWEs mapped share / count
age of the lockover 6000 years
life of the Bramah challenge lockover 67 (1784/1790 to 1851) years
time to open the Bramah challenge lockabout 51 hours over 16 days
distinct keys on a commercial lockseveral thousand to several million keys
cost of deriving a master key from one lockless than about 2 US dollars (worst case, key blanks)
OS/360 MVT protection contexts1 supervisor + up to 15 user contexts (4-bit keys)
roles in a bank40 or 50 staff categories
nuclear pore passive-diffusion cutoff as long held (donor system, for comparison)30-60 kD, found to be a soft barrier kDa

Open contentions (4) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (14)

Sits inside / holds (6)

Trades with (valence) (20)

expressed by (21)

floor filled by (24)

Kinds (10)

wired (6)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

access control as practitioners describe it: subjects and the resources they ask for, up to the protection goals the policy serves (reader's view)

  1. L1: Subjects and objects: people, programs and machines that ask; places, files, memory and devices that are asked for
  2. L2: The door: every request stopped where it meets the protected thing (a lock, a turnstile, a guard, the kernel's check on every reference)
  3. L3: What comes with the request: a key or card, the system-supplied identity, a capability, the object's label, roles and attributes, the conditions of the moment
  4. L4: The check against what is stored: the pins, the access control list, the capability, the dominance of levels, the role's transactions
  5. L5: Decision carried out and recorded: open for a set time, let the operation run, refuse, alarm; the reference monitor
  6. L6: Who may do what, and its keeping: the access matrix, the model (discretionary, mandatory, roles, attributes), granting, revoking, separation of duty
  7. L7: Purpose: keep one party's malice or error from harming others; least privilege; the organisation's security policy, privacy and law

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L5: Decision and enforcement: grant or deny; open for a set time or let the operation run; record it; alarm on a forced door. Done by a guard, a lock, a control panel or reader, or a reference monitor in the kernel (the policy decision and enforcement points)
  2. L6: The authorization state and its keeping: the access matrix (stored by columns as lists, by rows as capabilities), the model that shapes it (discretionary, mandatory, role- or attribute-based), and its administration: granting, revoking, delegating, separation of duty
  3. L7: Purpose: keep one party's malice or error from harming others; each party reaches only what its job needs; the organisation's security policy, privacy and the law

way in: A guard's eyes (badges and faces at the gate)

  1. L1: The bearer and the card or badge shown
  2. L2: Seen by the guard, bouncer or ticket checker (Human sight)
  3. L4: Matched against what the guard knows: the list, the something-known and something-held

way in: Capabilities (tickets inside the computer)

  1. L1: A capability: an unforgeable reference to an object together with access rights
  2. L2: Held in the domain's list of capabilities (C-list)
  3. L3: Passed between programs over a secure channel; each copy is a new authorization
  4. L4: Used: the program must present a capability to reach the object; possession is the check

way in: Conditions of the moment (time, place, circumstance)

  1. L1: Where and when the request comes
  2. L3: Environment conditions gathered with the request's other attributes
  3. L4: Checked against a time or place clause (students in labs only at certain hours)

way in: Keys, cards and fobs (what the subject holds)

  1. L1: A key or a card held by the subject: a cut bitting, a card number, a fob, a phone
  2. L2: Presented at the door: put into the keyway, or held to a reader
  3. L3: Read: the key lifts the pins out of the bolt; the reader sends the card's number to a control panel
  4. L4: Checked: the bitting against the pin stacks at the shear line, or the number against the panel's access control list; the lock answers one bit

way in: Roles and subject attributes (job, clearance, department)

  1. L1: The organisation's people sorted into a small number of jobs
  2. L2: Assigned: role membership granted and revoked by an administrator; attributes assigned by authorities
  3. L3: Gathered for the decision by a context handler and passed to the policy decision point
  4. L4: Checked: does the role's set of transactions (or the attribute rule) include this act

way in: The door's own state (contacts, exit buttons)

  1. L1: The door itself: shut, open, forced or held
  2. L2: Sensed by a magnetic door switch and request-to-exit devices
  3. L3: Wired to the reader or controller (lock, door contact, exit button)
  4. L4: Checked: forced open, or held open longer than set

way in: The object's own labels (owner, classification, resource attributes)

  1. L1: The protected object: a room, file, directory, port, memory segment, device, table
  2. L2: Labelled: a classification (Unclassified to Top Secret) plus categories; or an owner
  3. L3: The protection information stored with the object itself (its access control list or label)
  4. L4: Compared: the subject's level must dominate the object's

way in: The owner's or user's own say (grants, prompts)

  1. L1: What the owner or user expects and would allow
  2. L2: Asked: an install-time permission list, or a prompt
  3. L3: Granted and passed on at the owner's discretion
  4. L4: Checked: the permission entry for the asking application

way in: The requester's own history (past attempts and accesses)

  1. L1: Earlier requests by the same party: behaviour, timing, content, failures
  2. L2: Each attempt recorded, refused ones too
  3. L4: Checked: a rate or count rule (more than one query a second; growing lockouts after failures)

way in: Who is asking (the authenticated identity)

  1. L1: A person or program asking; people act only through the programs they control
  2. L2: Authenticated: identity verified (by sys:authentication) or an anonymous token issued
  3. L3: Carried with every request: the system attaches the requester's name, which cannot be forged
  4. L4: Looked up on the object's access control list (owner, group, others; or named entries)

way out: Alarm to the people who respond

  1. L1: Administrators and guards told of a door left open too long
  2. L5: Forced or propped door detected

way out: Changes to who may do what

  1. L1: Locks re-keyed when a key is lost or a holder leaves
  2. L3: Access conveyed by editing the list, or by handing over a capability
  3. L6: Role membership granted or revoked; entries edited

way out: Door unlocked for a set time

  1. L1: The door opens for a predetermined time, then relocks
  2. L3: A relay drives the strike or magnetic lock; the reader shows green
  3. L5: Granted on a match

way out: Operation allowed on the object

  1. L1: Memory addresses, files and ports reached as allowed by the hardware and the OS
  2. L5: The kernel finds the right in the matrix entry

way out: Refused and locked out

  1. L1: The requester turned away; automated repetition made infeasible
  2. L3: Stays locked; red light; growing lockout after failures
  3. L5: No match: the default is no access

way out: Transaction log

  1. L1: A record for accountability: who did what
  2. L5: Every grant and refusal logged

Sources (40) published science

Saltzer and Schroeder, The Protection of Information in Computer Systems, Proceedings of the IEEE 63(9), 1975 (doi:10.1109/PROC.1975.9939)
Access control (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01)
Lock and key (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Felt AP, Chin E, Hanna S, Song D, Wagner D (2011) Android Permissions Demystified, ACM CCS 2011 (doi:10.1145/2046707.2046779) (behind its links)
Anderson R (2008) Security Engineering, 2nd edition, chapter 4 Access Control (author's free copy) (behind its links)
Physical security (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Authentication (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Newman D. Benchmarking Terminology for Firewall Performance. RFC 2647, IETF, August 1999 (doi:10.17487/RFC2647) (behind its links)
Computer security model (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Wijesekera P, Baokar A, Hosseini A, Egelman S, Wagner D, Beznosov K (2015) Android Permissions Remystified: A Field Study on Contextual Integrity, USENIX Security 2015; arXiv:1504.03747 (behind its links)
OWASP Top 10:2021, A01 Broken Access Control (CC BY-SA 4.0) (behind its links)
Blaze M (2003) Rights Amplification in Master-Keyed Mechanical Locks, IEEE Security & Privacy 1(2) (doi:10.1109/MSECP.2003.1193207); author's preprint (behind its links)
Lampson BW, Protection, Proc. 5th Princeton Conf. on Information Sciences and Systems 1971; reprinted ACM Operating Systems Review 8(1) 1974 (doi:10.1145/775265.775268); author's OCR copy (behind its links)
Timney BL, Raveh B et al. (2016) Simple rules for passive diffusion through the nuclear pore complex, J Cell Biol 215(1):57-76 (doi:10.1083/jcb.201601004; PMC5057280) (behind its links)
Anderson JP (1972) Computer Security Technology Planning Study, Vol. I (ESD-TR-73-51) (behind its links)
Capability-based security (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Bell–LaPadula model (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Information security (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Ferraiolo DF, Kuhn DR (1992) Role-Based Access Controls, 15th National Computer Security Conference, pp. 554-563 (behind its links)
Discretionary access control (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
File-system permissions (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Hu VC et al. (2014) Guide to Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) Definition and Considerations, NIST SP 800-162 (doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-162) (behind its links)
Bell DE, LaPadula LJ (1976) Secure Computer System: Unified Exposition and Multics Interpretation (MTR-2997 Rev. 1, ESD-TR-75-306) (behind its links)
Mandatory access control (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Computer access control (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Antonakakis, M. et al. (2017) Understanding the Mirai Botnet. 26th USENIX Security Symposium (behind its links)
Intrusion detection system (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Nieles M, Dempsey K, Pillitteri VY (2017) NIST SP 800-12 Rev. 1: An Introduction to Information Security. doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-12r1 (behind its links)
Band, Cappelli, Fischer, Moore, Shaw & Trzeciak 2006, Comparing Insider IT Sabotage and Espionage: A Model-Based Analysis, CMU/SEI-2006-TR-026 (behind its links)
Organization (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Vulnerability (computer security) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Digital identity (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Biba Integrity Model (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Harrison MA, Ruzzo WL, Ullman JD (1976) Protection in operating systems, Communications of the ACM 19(8):461-471 (doi:10.1145/360303.360333) (behind its links)
Hardy N (1988) The Confused Deputy (or why capabilities might have been invented), ACM Operating Systems Review 22(4) (doi:10.1145/54289.871709) (behind its links)
Master keying (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Johnson BR, van Wilgenburg E, Tsutsui ND (2011) Nestmate recognition in social insects: overcoming physiological constraints with collective decision making, Behav Ecol Sociobiol 65(5):935-944 (doi:10.1007/s00265-010-1094-x; PMC3078317; CC BY-NC) (behind its links)
Reference monitor (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Principle of least privilege (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Confused deputy problem (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)