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Access control
In physical security and information security, access control is the action of deciding whether a subject should be granted or denied access to an object, a place or a resource; accessing may mean consuming, entering or using (src:wp:access-control). In computing, 'all the mechanisms that control the access of a program to other things in the system' (src:lampson-1971). Walked as the practice and its machinery, from locks, guards and turnstiles to access control lists, capabilities, security labels and role- and attribute-based policies.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| aliases | Access control (access control lists, capabilities) |
| born at | over 6000 years ago (lock at Nineveh) |
| born precision | millennia |
| boundary | Inside: the decision whether a subject may do an act on an object, and everything that makes and carries it out: the door or point of interception (lock, turnstile, guard, the kernel's check), what is presented and gathered (keys, cards, the system-supplied identity, capabilities, labels, roles, attributes, conditions, history), the check against what is stored, the enforcement and its record, and the authorization state with its administration (granting, revoking, delegating, separation of duty). Outside: authentication, which verifies who is asking (the edge is a contention: often 'combined into a single operation'); the resources guarded; the people and programs who ask; intruders; the organisation's wider security policy and the law that set its purpose. |
| nested level | A practice carried by people and institutions (rung 11), since the 1960s largely run in operating systems, middleware and applications (rung 12). Part of information security and computer security (one of their controls) and of physical security (one of its layers); fed by authentication; enforced by the operating system and hardware. |
| scale | social |
Measures (13) published science
| characteristic clock: sensitive permission checks on a phone | 213 per hour (about every 20 s) checks per hour per user |
| participants who would have blocked at least one request | >=80%; over a third of requests judged invasive share |
| requests to protected resources per user per day | >100,000 (27M in one week, 36 participants) requests |
| overprivileged Android applications | about one-third of 940 applications |
| broken access control in tested web applications | 94% tested; average incidence 3.81%; over 318k occurrences; 34 CWEs mapped share / count |
| age of the lock | over 6000 years |
| life of the Bramah challenge lock | over 67 (1784/1790 to 1851) years |
| time to open the Bramah challenge lock | about 51 hours over 16 days |
| distinct keys on a commercial lock | several thousand to several million keys |
| cost of deriving a master key from one lock | less than about 2 US dollars (worst case, key blanks) |
| OS/360 MVT protection contexts | 1 supervisor + up to 15 user contexts (4-bit keys) |
| roles in a bank | 40 or 50 staff categories |
| nuclear pore passive-diffusion cutoff as long held (donor system, for comparison) | 30-60 kD, found to be a soft barrier kDa |
Open contentions (4) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-1344 What does it mean for information to be secure?
booked: The map uses confidentiality, integrity and availability as standards and law state them, and keeps the wider six-part version and the 'appropriate access' definition alongside.
the other reading: see C-1344 in research/CONTENTIONS.md - C-1453 Is access control a human invention, or the same thing as the gates in cells and ant nests?
booked: The map books it as the human practice from the first locks, with cell gates and nest guards as related kinds, and keeps the link open; it is one question with authentication's.
the other reading: access control is the same system as selective gating in life and begins with cells (rung 6); access control is only the human practice; cellular and insect gates are different systems that share the job - C-1454 What does 'access control' cover?
booked: The map uses the broad meaning (identifying, checking, permitting and recording), and keeps the narrower ones alongside.
the other reading: narrow: only access approval, 'a decision to grant or reject an access request from an already authenticated subject'; access control and authorization are the same thing ('often used interchangeably') - C-1455 Should permissions live with the user or with the thing protected?
booked: The map keeps both designs as two ways of storing the same table, each with its own known way of failing.
the other reading: capability systems protect against the confused deputy and lists do not (encyclopedia); lists give better accountability and revocation (Saltzer and Schroeder)
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (14)
- Computer security
- Locks and keys
- Readers and control panels
- Reference monitor
- Access matrix
- Access control list
- Capability
- Security labels and clearances
- Transaction log
- Information security
- Physical security
- Guessers against verifiers for the accounts behind passwords
- Intruders against access control for protected places and resources
- Requesters tricking privileged programs into using their authority
Sits inside / holds (6)
- Authentication
- Computer security
- Information security
- Physical security
- Firewall (computing)
- Formal security policy model
Trades with (valence) (20)
- Malware via sys:operating-system · Access control loss
- Authentication via sys:human-society · Access control gain
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:human-society · Access control mixed
- Law (rules and law) via sys:human-society · Access control mixed
- Operating system via sys:computer-hardware · Access control gain
- Computer security via sys:electromagnetic-field · Access control gain
- Information security via sys:written-record · Access control gain
- Organization via sys:human-society · Access control gain
- Computer hardware via sys:electromagnetic-field · Access control gain
- Database via sys:computer-hardware · Access control gain
- Software vulnerability via sys:software · Access control loss
- Physical security via sys:mechanical-contact · Access control gain
- Intruder (burglar and trespasser) via sys:human-society · Access control mixed
- Privacy via sys:human-society · Access control gain
- Intrusion detection system via sys:human-society · Access control gain
- Security policy and governance via sys:information-system · Access control gain
- Insider threat via sys:access-control · Access control mixed
- Firewall (computing) via sys:human-society · Access control gain
- Formal security policy model via sys:access-control · Access control gain
- Digital identity via sys:human-society · Access control gain
expressed by (21)
- Generation/Synthesis
- Recombination/Composition
- Templating / Standardization
- Interoperability/Transduction (Bridging)
- Encapsulation & Modularity (Abstraction)
- Evolvability/Plasticity Engineering (Design for Future Variation)
- Distributed Autonomy/Decentralized Execution (Subsidiarity)
- Sensing/Scanning
- Trail-Marking / Externalized Memory (Stigmergy)
- Surprise / Change-Point Detection
- Reactive Response
- Proactive Defense
- Physical/Virtual Barrier
- Self-Monitoring
- Delay/Redirection Tactics
- Validation of Identity/Intention
- Validation of Effectiveness
- Enclave/Segregation
- Resilience & Repair
- Redundancy & Diversity
- Quality Control & Error Correction
floor filled by (24)
- Operating system
- Computer security
- Authentication
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Law (rules and law)
- Access control panel
- Turnstile
- Protected resource
- Information security
- Mandatory access control
- Non-discretionary (role-based) access control
- Organization
- Computer hardware
- Locks and keys
- Readers and control panels
- Reference monitor
- Access matrix
- Access control list
- Capability
- Security labels and clearances
- Transaction log
- Computer program
- Insider threat
- Formal security policy model
Kinds (10)
- Discretionary access control
- Mandatory access control
- Non-discretionary (role-based) access control
- Attribute-based access control
- Capability-based access control
- History-based access control
- Relationship-based access control
- Lattice-based access control
- Electronic access control
- Exit control
wired (6)
- Authentication
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Alarm control panel
- Information classification (labels and handling)
- The verifier and its stored references
- Security audit and compliance
Notes published science
- Joseph Bramah put a lock in his London shop window in 1790 with a prize for anyone who could pick it; the challenge stood for over 67 years until the American locksmith Alfred Hobbs opened it at the Great Exhibition of 1851, after some 51 hours spread over 16 days (src:wp:lock-and-key).
- Matt Blaze showed that a master-keyed lock is an 'online oracle' answering one bit per key: with one lock and its ordinary key, a few blanks and a file, anyone can work out the building's master key, for less than about two US dollars in the worst case (src:blaze-2003-master-keys).
- Ant colonies keep strangers out without any single good guard: an intruder 'can get by one defender' whose nose is fooled, but 'it is nearly impossible to get past many defenders if there is the slightest difference in cues' (src:johnson-2011-nestmate). The cell's nuclear pore works the same way, a soft barrier made of many weak, wriggling protein strands rather than one hard size cutoff (src:timney-2016-npc).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
access control as practitioners describe it: subjects and the resources they ask for, up to the protection goals the policy serves (reader's view)
- L1: Subjects and objects: people, programs and machines that ask; places, files, memory and devices that are asked for
- L2: The door: every request stopped where it meets the protected thing (a lock, a turnstile, a guard, the kernel's check on every reference)
- L3: What comes with the request: a key or card, the system-supplied identity, a capability, the object's label, roles and attributes, the conditions of the moment
- L4: The check against what is stored: the pins, the access control list, the capability, the dominance of levels, the role's transactions
- L5: Decision carried out and recorded: open for a set time, let the operation run, refuse, alarm; the reference monitor
- L6: Who may do what, and its keeping: the access matrix, the model (discretionary, mandatory, roles, attributes), granting, revoking, separation of duty
- L7: Purpose: keep one party's malice or error from harming others; least privilege; the organisation's security policy, privacy and law
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L5: Decision and enforcement: grant or deny; open for a set time or let the operation run; record it; alarm on a forced door. Done by a guard, a lock, a control panel or reader, or a reference monitor in the kernel (the policy decision and enforcement points)
- L6: The authorization state and its keeping: the access matrix (stored by columns as lists, by rows as capabilities), the model that shapes it (discretionary, mandatory, role- or attribute-based), and its administration: granting, revoking, delegating, separation of duty
- L7: Purpose: keep one party's malice or error from harming others; each party reaches only what its job needs; the organisation's security policy, privacy and the law
way in: A guard's eyes (badges and faces at the gate)
- L1: The bearer and the card or badge shown
- L2: Seen by the guard, bouncer or ticket checker (Human sight)
- L4: Matched against what the guard knows: the list, the something-known and something-held
way in: Capabilities (tickets inside the computer)
- L1: A capability: an unforgeable reference to an object together with access rights
- L2: Held in the domain's list of capabilities (C-list)
- L3: Passed between programs over a secure channel; each copy is a new authorization
- L4: Used: the program must present a capability to reach the object; possession is the check
way in: Conditions of the moment (time, place, circumstance)
- L1: Where and when the request comes
- L3: Environment conditions gathered with the request's other attributes
- L4: Checked against a time or place clause (students in labs only at certain hours)
way in: Keys, cards and fobs (what the subject holds)
- L1: A key or a card held by the subject: a cut bitting, a card number, a fob, a phone
- L2: Presented at the door: put into the keyway, or held to a reader
- L3: Read: the key lifts the pins out of the bolt; the reader sends the card's number to a control panel
- L4: Checked: the bitting against the pin stacks at the shear line, or the number against the panel's access control list; the lock answers one bit
way in: Roles and subject attributes (job, clearance, department)
- L1: The organisation's people sorted into a small number of jobs
- L2: Assigned: role membership granted and revoked by an administrator; attributes assigned by authorities
- L3: Gathered for the decision by a context handler and passed to the policy decision point
- L4: Checked: does the role's set of transactions (or the attribute rule) include this act
way in: The door's own state (contacts, exit buttons)
- L1: The door itself: shut, open, forced or held
- L2: Sensed by a magnetic door switch and request-to-exit devices
- L3: Wired to the reader or controller (lock, door contact, exit button)
- L4: Checked: forced open, or held open longer than set
way in: The object's own labels (owner, classification, resource attributes)
- L1: The protected object: a room, file, directory, port, memory segment, device, table
- L2: Labelled: a classification (Unclassified to Top Secret) plus categories; or an owner
- L3: The protection information stored with the object itself (its access control list or label)
- L4: Compared: the subject's level must dominate the object's
way in: The owner's or user's own say (grants, prompts)
- L1: What the owner or user expects and would allow
- L2: Asked: an install-time permission list, or a prompt
- L3: Granted and passed on at the owner's discretion
- L4: Checked: the permission entry for the asking application
way in: The requester's own history (past attempts and accesses)
- L1: Earlier requests by the same party: behaviour, timing, content, failures
- L2: Each attempt recorded, refused ones too
- L4: Checked: a rate or count rule (more than one query a second; growing lockouts after failures)
way in: Who is asking (the authenticated identity)
- L1: A person or program asking; people act only through the programs they control
- L2: Authenticated: identity verified (by sys:authentication) or an anonymous token issued
- L3: Carried with every request: the system attaches the requester's name, which cannot be forged
- L4: Looked up on the object's access control list (owner, group, others; or named entries)
way out: Alarm to the people who respond
- L1: Administrators and guards told of a door left open too long
- L5: Forced or propped door detected
way out: Changes to who may do what
- L1: Locks re-keyed when a key is lost or a holder leaves
- L3: Access conveyed by editing the list, or by handing over a capability
- L6: Role membership granted or revoked; entries edited
way out: Door unlocked for a set time
- L1: The door opens for a predetermined time, then relocks
- L3: A relay drives the strike or magnetic lock; the reader shows green
- L5: Granted on a match
way out: Operation allowed on the object
- L1: Memory addresses, files and ports reached as allowed by the hardware and the OS
- L5: The kernel finds the right in the matrix entry
way out: Refused and locked out
- L1: The requester turned away; automated repetition made infeasible
- L3: Stays locked; red light; growing lockout after failures
- L5: No match: the default is no access
way out: Transaction log
- L1: A record for accountability: who did what
- L5: Every grant and refusal logged