EVOPEDIA

← all systems · see it in The System

Computer security

Computer security (cybersecurity, IT security) is a subdiscipline of information security that protects computer software, systems and networks from threats leading to unauthorized disclosure, theft or damage, or to the disruption or misdirection of their services (src:wp:computer-security). In the field's founding paper, 'security' names the techniques that control who may use or modify the computer or the information in it (Saltzer and Schroeder 1975). Walked here as the field and what it protects: the protection mechanisms, the defenders and attackers, and the contest between them.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born at1967 (the Ware session at the Spring Joint Computer Conference); the founding paper on protection 1975
born precisionyear; the field had no single birth
boundaryInside: the protection mechanisms (authentication, access control, cryptography, filtering, audit and detection, patching, backups), the people and organisations that defend (security engineers, security operations centres, incident responders, vulnerability researchers, standards bodies), the attackers (threat actors, their malware and infrastructure), and the contest between them. Outside, protected by it: the computers, software, data and networks themselves, the people who use them, and the economy and law that set its incentives. Where the edge with information security (non-computer records) and with physical security sits is not sharp: 'IT security is not a perfect subset of information security' (src:wp:computer-security).
nested levelA practice and body of knowledge carried by people and organisations (rung 11-12), running on computers, software and the Internet, which it protects; nested in information security as a subdiscipline; its incentives set by markets and law (Anderson and Moore 2006).
scaletechnological

Measures (25) published science

characteristic clock: Slammer spread (more than 90% of vulnerable hosts infected)10 minutes
Code Red population doubling time37 minutes
Slammer: time to full scanning rateabout 3 minutes (more than 55 million scans per second)
characteristic clock: human-mediated filtering response to Slammerwithin an hour hours
Slammer hosts infectedat least 75,000 hosts
Slammer per-worm scan rate, Internet-wide average early onabout 4,000 (largest observed 26,000) scans per second per worm
time to compromise of an unpatched PC (cited study)12 minutes
global information security spending, 2026 estimates244 to 308 billion US$
malicious share of websites: all vs one vendor's certifiedabout 3% vs some 8%
chance the defender has already found the attacker's bug10 % (model: 1000 attacker hours vs 10,000,000 defender hours a year)
user-time cost of anti-phishing advice vs phishing lossestwo orders of magnitude greater ratio
spam: externalities vs spammer's gainmore than 10x ratio (per-hand-off efficiency below 0.1 of social cost arriving as gain)
ad fraud: advertiser spend per fraudster dollar2-5 US$ per US$ (efficiency 0.2-0.5)
share of property crime onlineabout half by volume and by value
ransomware attacks on US health care delivery organisations, 2016-2021374 (PHI of nearly 42 million patients) attacks
annual ransomware attacks on US health care, 2016 to 202143 to 91 attacks per year
share of health-care ransomware attacks that disrupted care44.4 %
computers on the Internet at the Morris worm, 198860,000 computers
password accounts and daily password entries per userabout 25 accounts; 8 per day per user
participants fooled by good phishing websites90 %
DRAM modules with disturbance errors110 of 129 modules
fewest row accesses to induce a DRAM disturbance error139K accesses
risk-based alert prioritization vs severity orderingAUROC 0.92 vs 0.72 (means across eight datasets)
Forrest et al.'s computer 'peptide' length6 system calls per sequence
UK residents kept from online banking by security concerns (Eurostat, as used)16 %

Open contentions (2) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (17)

Sits inside / holds (23)

Trades with (valence) (38)

expressed by (31)

floor filled by (19)

same practice as (1)

Kinds (5)

wired (1)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

the attacker's side: from the target's exposed surface up to the motive (secondary stack)

  1. L1: The target's exposed surface: addresses, listening services, people, physical leaks
  2. L2: Probes, scans and measurements
  3. L3: Replies and leaks read; the defender's detectors modelled
  4. L4: The operation: weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, actions on objectives
  5. L5: Campaigns: intrusions linked by reused tools; persistence
  6. L6: Criminal markets and infrastructure (botnets, crime services)
  7. L7: Motives and backers

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: Detection and analysis: security operations centres screen alerts (filter, prioritize, correlate, contextualize) under large numbers of false alerts; NIST DETECT
  2. L4: The attacker's operation: the intrusion kill chain from reconnaissance through weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation and command and control
  3. L5: Response and recovery: incident response contains, eradicates and restores; NIST RESPOND and RECOVER
  4. L5: The attacker's campaign: intrusions linked by reused tools and infrastructure; persistence over months
  5. L6: Risk understanding, policy and models: risks understood (NIST IDENTIFY), security policy and threat models, the economics of incentives, work factor
  6. L6: Criminal markets and infrastructure: botnets, pay-per-install, crime-as-a-service; grey markets for exploits
  7. L7: Governance and purpose: strategy, expectations and policy set by the people the field serves; the security goals (confidentiality, integrity, availability)
  8. L7: Motives and backers: thrill, activism, profit, state sponsorship

the protection of computing: the world it touches up to the goals people set for it (reader's view)

  1. L1: The physical world computing runs in: hardware, signals, people at keyboards; every computation affects its surroundings
  2. L2: The protected assets: computers, software, data and networks under controlled sharing, with their vulnerabilities
  3. L3: Protection mechanisms: authentication, access control with complete mediation, cryptography, filters; defence in depth (NIST PROTECT)
  4. L4: Detection and analysis: audit records, intrusion detection, alert screening in security operations centres (NIST DETECT)
  5. L5: Response and recovery: incident response contains and restores (NIST RESPOND, RECOVER)
  6. L6: Risk, policy and models: risks understood (NIST IDENTIFY), threat models, work factor, the economics of incentives
  7. L7: Governance and goals: confidentiality, integrity and availability, and the strategy and policy that set them (NIST GOVERN)

way in: Credentials presented at the gate

  1. L1: A person or agent making a request, holding secrets in memory
  2. L2: Credentials typed (about 25 accounts, 8 password entries a day per user)
  3. L3: Verification of identity; every access checked for authority

way in: Host and application events (audit records, system-call traces)

  1. L1: The protected computers' activity: logins, file accesses, system calls of privileged processes
  2. L2: Audit records and logs generated and kept (stored remotely, append-only)
  3. L3: Profiles of normal behaviour and anomaly rules; signatures of known attacks

way in: Losses and costs (the economic channel)

  1. L1: Direct losses, indirect losses and defence costs
  2. L2: Incidents counted and reported (e.g. ransomware on health care: 374 attacks, nearly 42 million patients' records)
  3. L3: Aggregated estimates and victimisation studies
  4. L4: Priced by insurers (correlated risks hard to insure)
  5. L5: Market reaction: share prices fall after breaches that leak confidential information

way in: Malware samples

  1. L1: Malicious programs released into cyberspace
  2. L2: Samples collected (honeypots, user submissions, sensors)
  3. L3: Classification by signatures and machine-learning detectors with chosen feature sets

way in: Network traffic (packets at sensors and filters)

  1. L1: Packets crossing an organisation's links, legitimate and hostile
  2. L2: Routers, firewalls and network sensors that see and can filter traffic
  3. L3: Signatures that distinguish attack traffic

way in: People as sensors (users noticing and reporting)

  1. L1: A message or page in front of a person (Human channel sight)
  2. L2: Noticing cues: address bar, status bar, security indicators
  3. L3: The vigilant user as a detector at the delivery phase

way in: Reconnaissance (the attacker's view of the target)

  1. L1: The exposed surface: addresses, listening services, people
  2. L2: Probes and scans
  3. L3: Replies read, or no reply needed (the wait)

way in: Side channels (what a computation leaks)

  1. L1: A computation's physical effects on its surroundings
  2. L2: Measurement of timing (or power, emanations)
  3. L3: Inference of internal state (keys) from the measurements

way in: The defender as seen by the attacker

  1. L1: Deployed detectors, filters and their decisions
  2. L2: Knowledge of the defender's feature set
  3. L3: Evasive manipulation planned

way in: Threat intelligence (indicators shared between defenders)

  1. L1: Intrusions seen elsewhere (other organisations, earlier campaigns)
  2. L2: Indicators extracted: atomic, computed, behavioral
  3. L3: Indicators matured into tools and matched against activity

way in: Vulnerability discovery and disclosure

  1. L1: Flaws in software and hardware (about 1% of a large program's bugs security-critical, in Anderson's model)
  2. L2: Discovery by testing, research and attackers (a race; vulnerabilities often rediscovered)
  3. L3: Disclosure and cataloguing (CVE, advisories)
  4. L4: Pricing and market for vulnerability reports
  5. L5: Vendor response: patches (faster under public disclosure)

way out: Actions on objectives (theft, ransom, disruption, physical damage)

  1. L1: Effects in the world: downtime, cancelled care, ambulance diversion; centrifuges
  2. L4: Actions on objectives, the last kill-chain phase
  3. L7: The motive picks the objective

way out: Advice and training to users

  1. L1: Advice reaches people, who often rationally reject it
  2. L6: Security advice issued

way out: Attack delivery (exploit, install, command and control)

  1. L1: A packet or file crosses into the target (Slammer: one UDP packet)
  2. L4: Delivery and exploitation chosen

way out: Containment and filtering

  1. L1: Hostile packets dropped (and legitimate ones, if the port is shared)
  2. L3: Filter rules on routers and firewalls
  3. L5: Responders decide to contain

way out: Deception (honeypots, tarpits)

  1. L1: Decoy computers left vulnerable on purpose
  2. L5: Responders choose deception courses of action

way out: Recovery (restore from backups)

  1. L1: Data and systems restored (in health care, less often from backups over 2016-2021)
  2. L5: Recovery restores assets and operations

way out: Safeguards deployed (access control, encryption, patches)

  1. L1: Patches and configuration written into the computers
  2. L3: Mechanisms: every access checked; least privilege; encryption
  3. L6: Safeguards chosen against risks
  4. L7: Policy sets what is protected and how much

way out: Sharing and disclosure (indicators, advisories, reports)

  1. L1: Advisories and patches published; read by both sides
  2. L6: Indicators revealed through analysis or collaboration

way out: Social engineering and phishing (attacks on people)

  1. L1: Imitation pages and messages on a person's screen (Human sight; urgency on emotion)
  2. L4: Pretexts chosen: impersonation, urgency

Who fills each layer

Sources (51) published science

Computer security (Wikipedia)
Li, Li, Ye and Xu, Arms Race in Adversarial Malware Detection: A Survey (arXiv:2005.11671) (behind its links)
Hutchins, Cloppert and Amin, Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains, ICIW 2011 (behind its links)
Anderson and Moore, The Economics of Information Security, Science 314, 2006 (doi:10.1126/science.1130992), authors' extended copy (behind its links)
Moore, Paxson, Savage, Shannon, Staniford and Weaver, Inside the Slammer Worm, IEEE Security & Privacy 1(4), 2003 (doi:10.1109/MSECP.2003.1219056) (behind its links)
Denning, An Intrusion-Detection Model, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering SE-13(2), 1987 (doi:10.1109/TSE.1987.232894) (behind its links)
Information security (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Diffie and Hellman, New Directions in Cryptography, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 22(6), 1976 (doi:10.1109/TIT.1976.1055638) (behind its links)
Kim, Daly, Kim, Fallin, Lee, Lee, Wilkerson, Lai and Mutlu, Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors, ISCA 2014 (doi:10.1145/2678373.2665726) (behind its links)
Herley, So Long, And No Thanks for the Externalities: The Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users, NSPW 2009 (doi:10.1145/1719030.1719050) (behind its links)
Anderson, Why Information Security is Hard: An Economic Perspective, ACSAC 2001 (doi:10.1109/ACSAC.2001.991552) (behind its links)
Anderson, Barton, Boehme, Clayton, Ganan, Grasso, Levi, Moore and Vasek, Measuring the Changing Cost of Cybercrime, WEIS 2019 (behind its links)
Neprash, McGlave, Cross, Virnig, Puskarich, Huling, Rozenshtein and Nikpay, Trends in Ransomware Attacks on US Hospitals, Clinics, and Other Health Care Delivery Organizations, 2016-2021, JAMA Health Forum 3(12), 2022 (doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2022.4873; PMC9856685) (behind its links)
Florencio and Herley, A Large-Scale Study of Web Password Habits, WWW 2007 (doi:10.1145/1242572.1242661) (behind its links)
Dhamija, Tygar and Hearst, Why Phishing Works, CHI 2006 (doi:10.1145/1124772.1124861) (behind its links)
Uetz et al., Can Risk-Based Alerting Mitigate Cybersecurity Alert Fatigue? (arXiv:2609.02465) (behind its links)
Forrest, Hofmeyr and Somayaji, Computer Immunology, Communications of the ACM 40(10), 1997 (doi:10.1145/262793.262811) (behind its links)
Saltzer and Schroeder, The Protection of Information in Computer Systems, Proceedings of the IEEE 63(9), 1975 (doi:10.1109/PROC.1975.9939) (behind its links)
Ndichu et al., AI-Driven Security Alert Screening and Alert Fatigue Mitigation in Security Operations Centers: A Survey (arXiv:2605.08316) (behind its links)
NIST, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, 26 February 2024 (doi:10.6028/NIST.CSWP.29) (behind its links)
Cryptographic hash function (encyclopedia, Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Public-key cryptography (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Authentication (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Anderson R (2008) Security Engineering, 2nd edition, chapter 4 Access Control (author's free copy) (behind its links)
Kokulu, F. B., Soneji, A., Bao, T., Shoshitaishvili, Y., Zhao, Z., Doupé, A. & Ahn, G.-J. (2019). Matched and Mismatched SOCs: A Qualitative Study on Security Operations Center Issues. ACM CCS 2019. doi:10.1145/3319535.3354239 (author copy) (behind its links)
Nelson A, Rekhi S, Souppaya M, Scarfone K (2025) Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management: A CSF 2.0 Community Profile. NIST SP 800-61r3. doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r3 (behind its links)
Threat actor (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
NIST (2024). The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0. NIST CSWP 29. doi:10.6028/NIST.CSWP.29 (behind its links)
Firewall (computing) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Vulnerability (computer security) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Secure by design (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Security information and event management (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Cyber threat intelligence (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Vulnerability management (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Bell DE (2005). Looking Back at the Bell-La Padula Model. Proceedings of the 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 337-351. doi:10.1109/CSAC.2005.37 (behind its links)
Penetration test (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Security awareness (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Mutlu O, Kim JS. RowHammer: a retrospective. arXiv:1904.09724 (2019) (behind its links)
Bellovin, S. M. (1989) Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite. Computer Communication Review 19(2):32-48, doi:10.1145/378444.378449 (behind its links)
Recursion (computer science) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-10-01) (behind its links)
Lipp et al. 2018, Meltdown, arXiv:1801.01207 (behind its links)
Athalye, Carlini & Wagner, Obfuscated Gradients Give a False Sense of Security (ICML 2018; arXiv:1802.00420) (behind its links)
Wheeler 2009. Fully Countering Trusting Trust through Diverse Double-Compiling (PhD dissertation, CC BY-SA). arXiv:1004.5534 (behind its links)
Oest A, Zhang P, Wardman B, Nunes E, Burgis J, Zand A, Thomas K, Doupé A, Ahn G-J (2020) Sunrise to Sunset: Analyzing the End-to-end Life Cycle and Effectiveness of Phishing Attacks at Scale. 29th USENIX Security Symposium (behind its links)
Kindy DA, Pathan A-SK (2012) A Detailed Survey on Various Aspects of SQL Injection in Web Applications: Vulnerabilities, Innovative Attacks, and Remedies. arXiv:1203.3324 (behind its links)
Computer network (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Phishing (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Dittrich D, Kenneally E et al. (2012). The Menlo Report: Ethical Principles Guiding Information and Communication Technology Research. US DHS Science and Technology Directorate (behind its links)
Siva Kumar RS, Penney J, Schneier B, Albert K (2020). Legal Risks of Adversarial Machine Learning Research. arXiv:2006.16179 (preprint). (behind its links)
Kocher, Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems, CRYPTO 1996 (doi:10.1007/3-540-68697-5_9) (behind its links)
Thompson 1984, Reflections on Trusting Trust, Communications of the ACM 27(8):761-763, doi:10.1145/358198.358210 (behind its links)