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Security awareness

The knowledge and attitude members of an organization possess regarding the protection of the physical, and especially informational, assets of that organization (src:wp:security-awareness); in NIST's words awareness focuses attention on security so that people 'recognize IT security concerns and respond accordingly', the first stage of a learning continuum that builds to training and education (src:nist-sp800-50). Walked as the awareness people hold and the programmes that build it: campaigns and posters, annual training, simulated phishing with embedded training, warnings, reporting buttons and feedback, metrics, and what the field research says works and does not.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born atWorld War II (the earliest sourced campaigns: 'Loose lips might sink ships' posters); computer-era form from 1987 (Computer Security Act training requirement)
born precisionyears (1940s)
boundaryInside: what members of an organisation know and feel about protecting its assets (recognising lures, knowing the rules, caring to follow them), and the programmes that build it: awareness activities (posters, newsletters, logon messages, awareness months), annual training, role-based courses, simulated phishing with embedded training at the teachable moment, warnings on suspicious messages, reporting buttons and the feedback on reports, and the metrics that assess it. Outside: the attackers and their lures (threat actor, phishing, social engineering), the security operations centre that receives reports, the information security function that sets policy and owns the programme, the law that mandates training, the vendors that sell material, and the members' own minds and bodies (Human), on which the awareness runs.
nested levelA practice and a state of mind (rung 11) held by an organisation's members and built by its learning programme; part of information security (its awareness-and-training outlet) and of the organisation's culture; carried by each person's senses, judgement and habits.
scalesocial

Measures (26) published science

employees failing at least one of ten simulated phishing campaigns over eight months56% (11,077 of 19,789) % of employees
failure rate per simulated phishing lure1.8 to 30.8 % of recipients
reduction in average failure rate from embedded phishing training2 percentage points (absolute)
embedded-training sessions ending within 10 seconds; users formally completingover half within 10 s; under 24% complete % of sessions; % of users
relative reduction in clicking the next lure after completing interactive training19 % (relative)
employees current on annual awareness training (average over eight months)83.7 % of employees
odds ratio of failing a simulation per 30 days since annual training0.998 (95% CI 0.996-1.000, P = 0.06) odds ratio per 30 days
phishing as a share of successful breaches (IBM 2023, as cited)16 % of breaches
employees clicking at least one simulated phishing email over 15 months32.10% (4,729 of 14,733) % of employees
characteristic clock: reports of a phishing email arriving after deliveryabout 10% within 5 min; 20% within 15 min; 30-40% within 30 min % of reports by minutes after delivery
employees doing at least one dangerous action over 15 months25.43% (3,747 of 14,733) % of employees
accuracy of employees' reports68% (79% if spam counts) % of reports correct
share of reported-email decisions left to human administrators9% (689 of 7,191) % of reports
respondents saying the training page made them feel safe43% (and 40%: the company is protecting me) % of respondents who remembered the page
employees clicking two or more phishing emails, without and with the training page647 without; 801 with employees
employees giving their password: control and the three interventions22% control; 16% information, 14% experience, 13% both % of employees
knowledge retention after embedded trainingat least 28 days
characteristic clock: awareness effect before a reminder is neededpresent at four months, gone at six
characteristic clock: the training cycleonce a year (at joining, then usually annually) per employee
characteristic clock: the awareness monthevery October, since 2004 per year
onset of habituation to a repeated warningafter the second exposure; partial recovery between workdays exposures; days
variance in phishing susceptibility explained by human-centred variablesabout 54 % of variance
click rates in a hospital phishing simulation by group65% control; 44% dissonance-primed; 53% neutral (not significant) % clicking
effect of awareness on information security compliance (resident physicians)β = .552 (P < .001) standardised path coefficient
user-time cost of reading URLs a minute a day against all phishing lossestwo orders of magnitude greater ratio
accuracy of predicting phishing suspiciousness (younger and older adults)73.1 (95% CI 66.0-80.3)

Open contentions (8) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (10)

Sits inside / holds (3)

Trades with (valence) (13)

expressed by (14)

floor filled by (17)

Kinds (4)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

security awareness as researchers of awareness, training and phishing describe it: the lures and assets in members' working world up to the organisation's learning programme (reader's view)

  1. L1: The working world where threats arrive and assets sit: mail and links, calls, posters and materials, sensitive information and buildings
  2. L2: Perceiving: the eyes explore a message or warning (gaze spread, fixations), the ears a call
  3. L3: Attention and cues: awareness focuses attention on security; urgency, emotion, workload and habituation pull it away
  4. L4: Recognition and judgement: genuine or malicious (hits, misses, false alarms)
  5. L5: Knowledge, attitude and motivation: able to apply the advice and willing to
  6. L6: Habit and security culture, a subculture of the organisation's culture
  7. L7: The learning programme and its purpose: behaviour change as part of risk management; awareness as the first line of defence

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: Recognition and judgement: at the moment a message, call or warning arrives, each member judges it genuine or malicious (hits, misses and false alarms), under the cues, knowledge, confidence, emotion and workload of that moment
  2. L5: Knowledge, attitude, motivation and self-efficacy: understanding and being able to apply the advice, and being willing to; felt safety and confidence in the tools
  3. L6: Habit and security culture: secure behaviour embedded until thinking becomes habit and a part of the organisation's culture; a subculture of the organisational culture, carried by leadership
  4. L7: The learning programme and its purpose: an organisation-wide, life-cycle-managed programme of awareness, training and education meant to change behaviour as part of risk management, assessed by its metrics and answerable to law

way in: Body state (interoceptive): workload, acute stress, vigilance

  1. L1: Acute stress
  2. L2: Cognitive workload, set by the task and the person
  3. L3: Vigilance decrement: performance falls over 30-60 minutes of watching

way in: Emotion (inner): urgency, fear, the felt safety of being protected

  1. L1: What arrives as emotion: fear appeals in campaigns, urgency and authority in lures (where emotion comes from is contested: C-414)
  2. L3: Attention tunnelling: an emotion-charged message narrows attention to the text, away from the address and warnings

way in: Feedback on reports from the security team

  1. L1: The result of a report returned to the employee who sent it

way in: Felt protection (the organisation's IT tools and defences, as members sense them)

  1. L1: The IT resources members work with; better resources went with lower awareness

way in: Law, regulation and mandates

  1. L1: Laws and standards mandating training (GDPR, HIPAA, PCI DSS; the US Computer Security Act of 1987; FISMA)
  2. L2: Agency heads made responsible for trained personnel (FISMA, 2002)

way in: Leadership, colleagues and communication (the social channel)

  1. L1: Managerial security participation
  2. L2: Security-related communication and further education reach awareness

way in: Lures in the inbox (phishing email, read by eye)

  1. L1: A phishing email or a simulated one, arriving inside normal work
  2. L2: The eyes explore the email: dispersed, regular fixations go with correct detections; clustered scanning with false alarms
  3. L3: Cue processing: urgency cues draw attention, deception cues (sender address, spelling) are overlooked

way in: Security warnings on suspicious messages

  1. L1: A warning shown on top of an email the filter finds risky but cannot label phishing
  2. L2: Visual processing of the warning; repeated views draw fewer fixations and less sampling
  3. L3: Repetition suppression: the brain's response to a repeatedly viewed warning drops (habituation), less so for polymorphic warnings

way in: Simulated phishing and the teachable moment (experience)

  1. L1: A simulated phishing email sent by the organisation to its own staff
  2. L2: A small fraction click in any one exercise (median 10%)
  3. L3: The teachable moment: a training page shown to those who click
  4. L4: Simulated experience as a teacher of better decisions

way in: The changing threat landscape

  1. L1: New attack vectors: AI-driven attacks, deepfakes, insider threats; lures growing more sophisticated
  2. L2: Phishing kits make deceptive copies of websites automatically

way in: The programme's own measures (click, report and completion rates)

  1. L1: Click rates, password reuse, policy adherence
  2. L2: Measurement: who received a test email and reported it
  3. L3: Analysis against an untrained control group

way in: Thought (inner): knowledge, confidence, the sense of what is malicious

  1. L1: Knowledge of phishing, perceived maliciousness and on-task confidence come to bear (where thoughts come from is contested: C-413)

way in: Training and awareness materials (courses, posters, newsletters, videos, the embedded-training page)

  1. L1: Awareness materials in the working world: logon messages, newsletters, posters, awareness-month fairs, emailed tips; courses
  2. L2: Engagement: most embedded-training sessions end within ten seconds; few complete
  3. L3: Retention: the gain holds at four months and fades by six
  4. L4: Knowledge retained and used: trained users recognise phishing weeks later

way in: Voice lures and talk (vishing, pretext calls)

  1. L1: Calls and spoken requests: vishing, one of the social engineering forms exercises simulate

way out: Act on the lure (click, give the password, enable macros)

  1. L1: A password given away on the lure's page
  2. L4: Judgement fails: many employees eventually fall for phishing

way out: Deploy warnings on suspicious messages

  1. L1: Warnings appear on top of flagged messages
  2. L7: The organisation decides to deploy warnings (short and detailed)

way out: Hold back careless talk (speech)

  1. L1: Talk kept back by servicemen and citizens
  2. L6: The norm: beware of unguarded talk

way out: Record and report training compliance

  1. L1: Completion recorded: about 84% current at any time
  2. L7: The requirement: every employee completes the course once a year

way out: Report the suspicious message (button, in doubt)

  1. L1: The report reaches the security team through the button in the mail client
  2. L4: The judgement to report, encouraged even when in doubt

way out: Teach: campaigns, courses, simulations, targeted extra training

  1. L1: Materials and simulated lures arrive in members' working world, all year
  2. L6: Targeting by role and by who needs extra support
  3. L7: The programme chooses campaigns and exercises by subject, threat, season and role

Sources (29) published science

Security awareness (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01)
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Reinheimer B, Aldag L, Mayer P, Mossano M, Duezguen R, Lofthouse B, von Landesberger T, Volkamer M. An investigation of phishing awareness and education over time: When and how to best remind users. SOUPS 2020 (USENIX open access) (behind its links)
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Herley 2009, So long, and no thanks for the externalities: the rational rejection of security advice by users, NSPW 2009, doi:10.1145/1719030.1719050 (behind its links)
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Ho G, Mirian A, Luo E, Tong K, Lee E, Liu L, Longhurst CA, Dameff C, Savage S, Voelker GM. Understanding the Efficacy of Phishing Training in Practice. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2025 (author PDF) (behind its links)
Baillon A, de Bruin J, Emirmahmutoglu A, van de Veer E, van Dijk B. Informing, simulating experience, or both: A field experiment on phishing risks. PLoS One 2019;14(12):e0224216. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0224216 (PMC6919577, CC BY) (behind its links)
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Kleitman S, Law MKH, Kay J. It's the deceiver and the receiver: Individual differences in phishing susceptibility and false positives with item profiling. PLoS One 2018. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0205089 (PMC6203253) (behind its links)
Yeng PK, Fauzi MA, Vestad A, Yang B, et al. Cognitive Dissonance-Based Priming Intervention: Randomized Encouragement With in-the-Wild Phishing Simulation Attack in a hospital. Journal of Medical Internet Research 2026 (PMC13225503) (behind its links)
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NIST SP 800-50r1: Building a Cybersecurity and Privacy Learning Program (September 2024) (behind its links)
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Phishing (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Insider threat (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
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