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Security awareness
The knowledge and attitude members of an organization possess regarding the protection of the physical, and especially informational, assets of that organization (src:wp:security-awareness); in NIST's words awareness focuses attention on security so that people 'recognize IT security concerns and respond accordingly', the first stage of a learning continuum that builds to training and education (src:nist-sp800-50). Walked as the awareness people hold and the programmes that build it: campaigns and posters, annual training, simulated phishing with embedded training, warnings, reporting buttons and feedback, metrics, and what the field research says works and does not.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | World War II (the earliest sourced campaigns: 'Loose lips might sink ships' posters); computer-era form from 1987 (Computer Security Act training requirement) |
| born precision | years (1940s) |
| boundary | Inside: what members of an organisation know and feel about protecting its assets (recognising lures, knowing the rules, caring to follow them), and the programmes that build it: awareness activities (posters, newsletters, logon messages, awareness months), annual training, role-based courses, simulated phishing with embedded training at the teachable moment, warnings on suspicious messages, reporting buttons and the feedback on reports, and the metrics that assess it. Outside: the attackers and their lures (threat actor, phishing, social engineering), the security operations centre that receives reports, the information security function that sets policy and owns the programme, the law that mandates training, the vendors that sell material, and the members' own minds and bodies (Human), on which the awareness runs. |
| nested level | A practice and a state of mind (rung 11) held by an organisation's members and built by its learning programme; part of information security (its awareness-and-training outlet) and of the organisation's culture; carried by each person's senses, judgement and habits. |
| scale | social |
Measures (26) published science
| employees failing at least one of ten simulated phishing campaigns over eight months | 56% (11,077 of 19,789) % of employees |
| failure rate per simulated phishing lure | 1.8 to 30.8 % of recipients |
| reduction in average failure rate from embedded phishing training | 2 percentage points (absolute) |
| embedded-training sessions ending within 10 seconds; users formally completing | over half within 10 s; under 24% complete % of sessions; % of users |
| relative reduction in clicking the next lure after completing interactive training | 19 % (relative) |
| employees current on annual awareness training (average over eight months) | 83.7 % of employees |
| odds ratio of failing a simulation per 30 days since annual training | 0.998 (95% CI 0.996-1.000, P = 0.06) odds ratio per 30 days |
| phishing as a share of successful breaches (IBM 2023, as cited) | 16 % of breaches |
| employees clicking at least one simulated phishing email over 15 months | 32.10% (4,729 of 14,733) % of employees |
| characteristic clock: reports of a phishing email arriving after delivery | about 10% within 5 min; 20% within 15 min; 30-40% within 30 min % of reports by minutes after delivery |
| employees doing at least one dangerous action over 15 months | 25.43% (3,747 of 14,733) % of employees |
| accuracy of employees' reports | 68% (79% if spam counts) % of reports correct |
| share of reported-email decisions left to human administrators | 9% (689 of 7,191) % of reports |
| respondents saying the training page made them feel safe | 43% (and 40%: the company is protecting me) % of respondents who remembered the page |
| employees clicking two or more phishing emails, without and with the training page | 647 without; 801 with employees |
| employees giving their password: control and the three interventions | 22% control; 16% information, 14% experience, 13% both % of employees |
| knowledge retention after embedded training | at least 28 days |
| characteristic clock: awareness effect before a reminder is needed | present at four months, gone at six |
| characteristic clock: the training cycle | once a year (at joining, then usually annually) per employee |
| characteristic clock: the awareness month | every October, since 2004 per year |
| onset of habituation to a repeated warning | after the second exposure; partial recovery between workdays exposures; days |
| variance in phishing susceptibility explained by human-centred variables | about 54 % of variance |
| click rates in a hospital phishing simulation by group | 65% control; 44% dissonance-primed; 53% neutral (not significant) % clicking |
| effect of awareness on information security compliance (resident physicians) | β = .552 (P < .001) standardised path coefficient |
| user-time cost of reading URLs a minute a day against all phishing losses | two orders of magnitude greater ratio |
| accuracy of predicting phishing suspiciousness (younger and older adults) | 73.1 (95% CI 66.0-80.3) |
Open contentions (8) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-413 Where do thoughts come from?
booked: No theory is proven, so the map lists the main ones side by side and doesn't pick one. It shows where thinking is handled in the brain, not where thoughts start.
the other reading: see C-413 in research/CONTENTIONS.md - C-414 Where do emotions come from?
booked: No theory is proven, so the map lists the leading ones side by side and doesn't pick one.
the other reading: see C-414 - C-1348 Does training people right after they click a fake phishing email help?
booked: The map records the large field study that found it made employees more likely to click again, and keeps the earlier, smaller studies that found it helped alongside.
the other reading: embedded training improves resilience (Kumaraguru et al. 2009); embedded training as deployed makes people more susceptible (Lain et al. 2022) - C-1383 Are users the weakest link in security?
booked: The map keeps both: people as the most vulnerable point, and people rationally ignoring advice that costs them more than it saves.
the other reading: people are one of the weakest links; rejection of advice is rational; users are the last line of defence and a sensor - C-1638 Does security awareness training stop people falling for phishing?
booked: The map keeps the large field studies that found little or no effect alongside the studies that found real effects from well-designed training.
the other reading: awareness training as commonly deployed offers little practical value against phishing; awareness training works if designed well (interactive, repeated, timed reminders); the measured effect depends on the lure, the control group and the outcome measured (clicks, passwords, reports) - C-1646 Were the WWII 'loose lips' posters about spies or about morale?
booked: The map keeps both readings: protecting secrets from spies, and damping gloomy rumours.
the other reading: the posters protected secrets from spies; the posters controlled rumour and morale - C-1673 Which age group falls for phishing most?
booked: The map lists every finding: the young, the old, both ends, or age changing which lure works.
the other reading: the young are most susceptible; the old are most susceptible; both ends are; age changes which lure works, not how often - C-1681 When did security awareness begin?
booked: The map dates it to the WWII careless-talk campaigns and keeps the computer-era starting point alongside.
the other reading: rung 12: security awareness as a computer-era practice, from the Computer Security Act of 1987 and NIST guidance; older: security of secrets taught wherever organisations kept them (not sourced here)
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (10)
- Security awareness training (annual and onboarding courses)
- Simulated phishing (phishing tests)
- Embedded (contextual) training at the teachable moment
- Awareness activities and campaigns (posters, newsletters, awareness months)
- Security warnings on suspicious messages
- Reporting button and crowd-sourced reports
- Security culture (habits and shared norms)
- The learning programme and its metrics (NIST CPLP)
- Lures against members' trained judgement, for their clicks and credentials
- Security advice against members' work, for their time and attention
Sits inside / holds (3)
Trades with (valence) (13)
- Security policy and governance via sys:human · Security awareness gain
- Phishing via sys:electromagnetic-field · Security awareness loss
- Insider threat via sys:human-society · Security awareness loss
- Social engineering via sys:human-society · Security awareness gain
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:sensory-environment · Security awareness gain
- Law (rules and law) via sys:human-society · Security awareness gain
- Education via sys:human-society · Security awareness gain
- Computer security via sys:sensory-environment · Security awareness gain
- Security operations center (SOC) via sys:written-record · Security awareness gain
- Threat actor via sys:electromagnetic-field · Security awareness loss
- Information security via sys:human-society · Security awareness gain
- Organization via sys:human-society · Security awareness gain
- Security awareness vendors (training and phishing-simulation companies) via sys:market · Security awareness mixed
expressed by (14)
- Templating / Standardization
- Sensing/Scanning
- Uncertainty Reduction/Learning
- Active Experimentation / Probing (Optimal Experimental Design)
- Surprise / Change-Point Detection
- Social Learning / Public Information Use
- Quick Harm Avoidance
- Reactive Response
- Proactive Defense
- Technique-Based Identification (a.k.a. Technique-Based Detection)
- Self-Monitoring
- Validation of Identity/Intention
- Validation of Effectiveness
- Triage & Prioritized Allocation
floor filled by (17)
- Social engineering
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Law (rules and law)
- Human brain
- Threat actor
- Information security
- Organization
- Security awareness training (annual and onboarding courses)
- Simulated phishing (phishing tests)
- Embedded (contextual) training at the teachable moment
- Awareness activities and campaigns (posters, newsletters, awareness months)
- Security warnings on suspicious messages
- Reporting button and crowd-sourced reports
- Security culture (habits and shared norms)
- The learning programme and its metrics (NIST CPLP)
- Polymorphic warning
- Security awareness vendors (training and phishing-simulation companies)
Kinds (4)
- Physical security awareness
- Information security awareness
- Internet security awareness (ISAT/SETA)
- Wartime careless-talk awareness (Loose lips sink ships, Careless Talk Costs Lives, En svensk tiger)
Notes published science
- In a hospital system with 19,500 staff, how recently someone had done the annual security course made no measurable difference to whether they clicked a fake phishing email; over half of the 'you clicked, here is your lesson' pages were closed within 10 seconds, and by month eight 56% of staff had clicked at least one test lure (src:ho-2025-phishing-training).
- Feeling protected lowers the guard: in a company of 14,733 people, those shown a training page after clicking went on to click more, and 43% of those who remembered it said it made them feel safe; in German hospitals, doctors with better IT tools showed less security awareness (src:lain-2022-phishing-organizations, src:kraushaar-2025-hospital-security).
- Staff make a fast alarm system: about 10% of reports of a phishing email arrived within 5 minutes of delivery, and people who got a thank-you style result back reported more (src:lain-2022-phishing-organizations). The WWII 'Loose lips sink ships' posters, by contrast, may have been more about stopping gloomy rumours than spies: the FBI had rounded up the key German agents in June 1941 (src:wp:loose-lips-sink-ships).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
security awareness as researchers of awareness, training and phishing describe it: the lures and assets in members' working world up to the organisation's learning programme (reader's view)
- L1: The working world where threats arrive and assets sit: mail and links, calls, posters and materials, sensitive information and buildings
- L2: Perceiving: the eyes explore a message or warning (gaze spread, fixations), the ears a call
- L3: Attention and cues: awareness focuses attention on security; urgency, emotion, workload and habituation pull it away
- L4: Recognition and judgement: genuine or malicious (hits, misses, false alarms)
- L5: Knowledge, attitude and motivation: able to apply the advice and willing to
- L6: Habit and security culture, a subculture of the organisation's culture
- L7: The learning programme and its purpose: behaviour change as part of risk management; awareness as the first line of defence
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L4: Recognition and judgement: at the moment a message, call or warning arrives, each member judges it genuine or malicious (hits, misses and false alarms), under the cues, knowledge, confidence, emotion and workload of that moment
- L5: Knowledge, attitude, motivation and self-efficacy: understanding and being able to apply the advice, and being willing to; felt safety and confidence in the tools
- L6: Habit and security culture: secure behaviour embedded until thinking becomes habit and a part of the organisation's culture; a subculture of the organisational culture, carried by leadership
- L7: The learning programme and its purpose: an organisation-wide, life-cycle-managed programme of awareness, training and education meant to change behaviour as part of risk management, assessed by its metrics and answerable to law
way in: Body state (interoceptive): workload, acute stress, vigilance
- L1: Acute stress
- L2: Cognitive workload, set by the task and the person
- L3: Vigilance decrement: performance falls over 30-60 minutes of watching
way in: Emotion (inner): urgency, fear, the felt safety of being protected
- L1: What arrives as emotion: fear appeals in campaigns, urgency and authority in lures (where emotion comes from is contested: C-414)
- L3: Attention tunnelling: an emotion-charged message narrows attention to the text, away from the address and warnings
way in: Feedback on reports from the security team
- L1: The result of a report returned to the employee who sent it
way in: Felt protection (the organisation's IT tools and defences, as members sense them)
- L1: The IT resources members work with; better resources went with lower awareness
way in: Law, regulation and mandates
- L1: Laws and standards mandating training (GDPR, HIPAA, PCI DSS; the US Computer Security Act of 1987; FISMA)
- L2: Agency heads made responsible for trained personnel (FISMA, 2002)
way in: Leadership, colleagues and communication (the social channel)
- L1: Managerial security participation
- L2: Security-related communication and further education reach awareness
way in: Lures in the inbox (phishing email, read by eye)
- L1: A phishing email or a simulated one, arriving inside normal work
- L2: The eyes explore the email: dispersed, regular fixations go with correct detections; clustered scanning with false alarms
- L3: Cue processing: urgency cues draw attention, deception cues (sender address, spelling) are overlooked
way in: Security warnings on suspicious messages
- L1: A warning shown on top of an email the filter finds risky but cannot label phishing
- L2: Visual processing of the warning; repeated views draw fewer fixations and less sampling
- L3: Repetition suppression: the brain's response to a repeatedly viewed warning drops (habituation), less so for polymorphic warnings
way in: Simulated phishing and the teachable moment (experience)
- L1: A simulated phishing email sent by the organisation to its own staff
- L2: A small fraction click in any one exercise (median 10%)
- L3: The teachable moment: a training page shown to those who click
- L4: Simulated experience as a teacher of better decisions
way in: The changing threat landscape
- L1: New attack vectors: AI-driven attacks, deepfakes, insider threats; lures growing more sophisticated
- L2: Phishing kits make deceptive copies of websites automatically
way in: The programme's own measures (click, report and completion rates)
- L1: Click rates, password reuse, policy adherence
- L2: Measurement: who received a test email and reported it
- L3: Analysis against an untrained control group
way in: Thought (inner): knowledge, confidence, the sense of what is malicious
- L1: Knowledge of phishing, perceived maliciousness and on-task confidence come to bear (where thoughts come from is contested: C-413)
way in: Training and awareness materials (courses, posters, newsletters, videos, the embedded-training page)
- L1: Awareness materials in the working world: logon messages, newsletters, posters, awareness-month fairs, emailed tips; courses
- L2: Engagement: most embedded-training sessions end within ten seconds; few complete
- L3: Retention: the gain holds at four months and fades by six
- L4: Knowledge retained and used: trained users recognise phishing weeks later
way in: Voice lures and talk (vishing, pretext calls)
- L1: Calls and spoken requests: vishing, one of the social engineering forms exercises simulate
way out: Act on the lure (click, give the password, enable macros)
- L1: A password given away on the lure's page
- L4: Judgement fails: many employees eventually fall for phishing
way out: Deploy warnings on suspicious messages
- L1: Warnings appear on top of flagged messages
- L7: The organisation decides to deploy warnings (short and detailed)
way out: Hold back careless talk (speech)
- L1: Talk kept back by servicemen and citizens
- L6: The norm: beware of unguarded talk
way out: Record and report training compliance
- L1: Completion recorded: about 84% current at any time
- L7: The requirement: every employee completes the course once a year
way out: Report the suspicious message (button, in doubt)
- L1: The report reaches the security team through the button in the mail client
- L4: The judgement to report, encouraged even when in doubt
way out: Teach: campaigns, courses, simulations, targeted extra training
- L1: Materials and simulated lures arrive in members' working world, all year
- L6: Targeting by role and by who needs extra support
- L7: The programme chooses campaigns and exercises by subject, threat, season and role