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Social engineering

In information security, the use of psychological pressure to influence people to perform actions or divulge confidential information (src:wp:social-engineering-security); a kind of psychological attack that persuades a victim to act as intended by an attacker, exploiting weaknesses in human cognition (src:montanez-2020-cognition). Walked as the security and psychology literature describes it: the approach (reconnaissance, pretext, lure on a channel: email, text, phone, QR code, a dropped drive, a person at the door), the persuasion principles it leans on, the target's cognition it works through, what the target does (discloses, runs, pays, admits) or does instead (suspects, verifies, reports), and how people and organisations resist it (awareness, warnings, crowd reporting, phishing-resistant authentication, cooling-off periods, law).

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

aliasessys:social-engineering-security, Social engineering security
born atthe shell game, at least ancient Greece; the 'confidence man' named in 1849; phishing of AOL accounts reported in 1995
born precisionmillennia (kind); year (security form)
boundaryInside: the approach (reconnaissance, pretext, the lure on a channel), the persuasion it carries, the target's cognition it works through, and the act it asks for (disclose, run, pay, admit) or the resistance it meets in the target (suspicion, verification, report). Outside: the attacker as an actor (threat actor), the organisation and its assets, the awareness programmes, filters, authentication and laws that answer it, and the larger intrusion or fraud it opens.
nested levelRuns on people: on the target's cognition (Human L5-L6) and on the attacker's craft (threat actor's lure outlet); one of the threat actor's ways in and the inside face of many intrusions; a modern branch of the confidence trick.
scalesocial

Measures (25) published science

Short con durationminutes, possibly seconds time
Long con durationseveral days or weeks time
Time to employee reports of a phishing campaignabout 10% within 5; 20% within 15; 30-40% within 30 minutes after delivery
Knowledge retention after phishing training (as cited)a few days to a few months at most time
Study period over which young users' susceptibility declined21 days
Simulated phishes clicked (one company, 15 months)6,680 of 117,864 (5.67%) emails
Employees clicking at least one simulated phish in 15 months4,729 of 14,733 (32.10%) employees
Dangerous actions (credentials, macros) as share of clicks73.13 %
Reports received in 15 months (participants and others)18,476 emails
Employees doing at least one dangerous action in 15 months3,747 of 14,733 (25.43%) employees
Users clicking at least one of 21 daily spear-phishing emails43.3 %
Spear-phishing click-through by author (control, human expert, AI, AI with human)12 / 54 / 54 / 56 %
AI-gathered target profiles accurate and useful88 %
Office keys surrendered to a stranger (no intervention vs intervention)62.5 vs 37.0 %
Lie-truth judgment accuracy without aids54 (47 of lies, 61 of truths) % correct
USB drives picked up / called home (campus drop, 297 drives)98 / 45 %
Lateral phishers compromising at least one more accountat least 11 % of attackers
Organisations with a lateral phishing incident in seven months14 % of sampled organisations
Lateral attacks in the hijacked account's working hoursover 80 %
Phishing emails clicked in health care organisations (as cited)14.2 % on average
Phishing attacks counted by APWG3.8 million (2025); 3.76 million (2024) unique reported sites
Business email compromise reported losses (FBI IC3, 2025)24,768 complaints; $3,046,598,558 complaints; US$
Text-message scam losses reported to the FTC (2024)470 million US$
Malicious domains registered the day after the Equifax help site194 domains
Conversion funnel, lure to dangerous act (per hand-off yield)sent to click 0.0567; click to dangerous action 0.7313 fraction

Open contentions (3) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (5)

Sits inside / holds (4)

Trades with (valence) (11)

expressed by (12)

floor filled by (14)

Kinds (18)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

social engineering as security and psychology researchers describe it: people and the channels that reach them, up to the attacker's objective (reader's view)

  1. L1: People and the channels that reach them: inboxes, phones, text messages, websites they visit, premises, found objects; and their public traces
  2. L2: The lure delivered: an email, a text, a call, a QR code, a dropped drive, a person at the door (general phishing sent broadly; spear phishing aimed)
  3. L3: Pretext and impersonation: an invented scenario, a spoofed sender or caller ID, a cloned page, a hijacked colleague's account
  4. L4: Persuasion: influence principles and urgency carried by the message
  5. L5: The target's cognition: perception, working memory, decision making and action, with short- and long-term factors
  6. L6: Compliance or resistance: the target acts as intended (disclose, run, pay, admit) or suspects, verifies, reports
  7. L7: The attacker's objective: information, money, access; often one step in a larger scheme

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: The crafted approach: a pretext and an impersonated sender carrying influence principles (liking, reciprocity, social proof, consistency, authority, scarcity, unity; distraction, herd, need and greed, time) and timed for a manufactured crisis (the 'hurrah')
  2. L5: The target's cognition: perception, working memory, decision making and action on a foundation of long-term memory, moved by short-term factors (workload, stress, vigilance) and long-term ones (expertise, age, culture)
  3. L6: Persuaded or not: the target acts as the attacker intended (clicks, discloses, runs, pays, opens the door), or suspects, verifies and reports
  4. L7: The attacker's objective: information, money or system access, usually one step in a larger fraud or intrusion

way in: Defences met on the way

  1. L1: Content and reputation filters, sender authentication (SPF, DKIM, DMARC), browser and DNS blocklists
  2. L2: Lures blocked, or let through in the gap before a site is listed
  3. L3: Evasion: 31% of lateral phishers invest effort in evading detection; spoofed caller ID impedes detection

way in: Domain binding: the authenticator's own check

  1. L1: The relying party's actual domain, which a look-alike page cannot share
  2. L2: The authenticator answers a challenge bound to that domain (WebAuthn, passkeys)
  3. L3: A look-alike domain gets no usable response; one-time codes, by contrast, can be relayed

way in: Emotion: the lure's charge

  1. L1: The emotional charge the lure carries: urgency, fear of loss, need and greed, kindness
  2. L3: Background anxiety (the pandemic) raises the chance attacks succeed
  3. L4: Acute stress narrows attention (attentional tunneling): the message text, not the address or the warning

way in: Experience: what memory holds of lures and training

  1. L1: Past encounters with lures and training, held in long-term memory
  2. L3: Narrow security expertise helps; general computer expertise may not; overconfidence
  3. L4: Age: young users' susceptibility fell over 21 days of lures, older users' did not; older age with lower working memory raises it

way in: Hearing: a voice on the phone

  1. L1: A voice on the line, live or synthetic; spoofed caller ID; cloned voices of a trusted person
  2. L2: Heard: automated text-to-speech calls direct victims to a number; live callers pose as bank, police or provider
  3. L3: Trust in the telephone, greater than in email
  4. L4: Judged in real time: audible lies are judged more accurately than visible ones, yet partners are regarded as honest

way in: Hijacked accounts and their trust

  1. L1: A hijacked enterprise account: its mailbox, contacts and the implicit trust colleagues give it
  2. L2: Account taken over with phished credentials; the access may be used to spear phish others inside
  3. L3: Internal lures: a shared-document pretext or a fake account warning, sent during the account's working hours

way in: Prevalence: how often lures arrive

  1. L1: The stream of messages, malicious ones at 20, 5 or 1% (one experiment's groups)
  2. L3: Expectation: where attacks are expected the attacker is at a disadvantage
  3. L4: Detection accuracy lowest when malicious emails are rarest

way in: Reconnaissance: the target's digital footprint

  1. L1: The target's digital footprint: public profiles, posts, organisational pages
  2. L2: Reconnaissance by scraping and searching, by hand or by an AI tool (88% of AI-gathered profiles accurate and useful)
  3. L3: A profile for the pretext: personal facts (date of birth, account numbers, last bill) and a vulnerability profile

way in: Salient events and announcements

  1. L1: Public events: a pandemic, a data breach, government announcements, tax season
  2. L2: Watched by attackers and acted on fast: 194 look-alike domains registered the day after the Equifax help site went up
  3. L3: A lure theme fitted to the event and timed to announcements

way in: Sight: the lure on a screen or page

  1. L1: The lure as seen: text, logos, a display name, links, QR codes; email's protocols carry no sender authentication
  2. L2: Read by eye: perception converts what the senses sample into neural codes (Human sight channel)
  3. L3: Superficial cues read as legitimacy: professional appearance, logos, name spoofing (visual deception)
  4. L4: Attention: urgency cues crowd out deception cues such as the sender's address or spelling

way in: The physical world: drives, doors, visitors

  1. L1: Things and people met in person: drives left in bathrooms, lifts and car parks with curious labels; a courier at the door
  2. L2: Picked up, seen, met face to face: 98% of 297 dropped drives were picked up
  3. L3: Curiosity or greed (baiting), helpfulness (holding the door)

way in: The target's replies

  1. L1: Replies: a recipient questions the email's validity; a voice on the phone hesitates
  2. L2: Read by the attacker: 107 hijacked-account attackers received at least one reply
  3. L3: A reassuring follow-up ('It's safe to open'): 25% of reply-receiving attackers sent one

way in: Thought: the target's own reasoning about the request

  1. L1: Where the target's thoughts come from is contested (C-413); here, reasoning about whether the request is real
  2. L4: Decision making driven two ways: fast heuristics and biases, or conscious, controlled reasoning

way in: Tools and services: kits, platforms, voices, language models

  1. L1: Phishing kits, phishing-as-a-service platforms (Darcula impersonated more than 200 organisations), text-to-speech, language models
  2. L2: Kits clone login pages automatically and distribute links through templated infrastructure
  3. L3: Content made at scale: personalised emails on par with human experts; audio deepfakes of a trusted voice

way in: Training and simulated phishing

  1. L1: Awareness interventions; simulated phishing with training shown after a click
  2. L2: The periodic reminder the exercise creates (more than the material after a click)
  3. L3: Learning that reaches habit guides safer behaviour largely unconsciously
  4. L4: Felt safety: 43% of trained respondents said the training page made them feel safe

way in: Warnings on the lure

  1. L1: Warnings on top of suspicious emails; browser warnings for blocklisted sites
  2. L2: Seen on top of the email, short or detailed
  3. L3: Effective; detailed warnings not significantly better than short ones

way in: Workload: the working day

  1. L1: The working day: large volumes of email, tasks, deadlines
  2. L3: Workload: the only factor that predicted clicking among hospital employees
  3. L4: Vigilance declines the longer a task runs; a high email load triggers automatic responses

way out: Admission: a door held, keys handed over

  1. L1: The intruder inside the building
  2. L4: A door held for a 'courier'; office keys handed to a stranger (62.5% without an awareness intervention)
  3. L6: Persuaded to let in

way out: Disclosure: credentials and information handed over

  1. L1: Credentials and live sessions reach the attacker; one-time codes relayed in real time
  2. L4: Credentials typed into a counterfeit login page, or read out on the phone
  3. L6: Persuaded to disclose

way out: Execution: an attachment opened, a found drive plugged in

  1. L1: Malware runs: backdoor access (RSA 2011); 45% of 297 dropped drives called home
  2. L4: A spreadsheet titled '2011 Recruitment Plan' opened; a found drive inserted
  3. L6: Persuaded to open or plug in

way out: Follow-on: the access used

  1. L1: Further accounts and systems: at least 11% of lateral phishers compromise another account
  2. L4: Access used: SecurID data used against Lockheed Martin; campaign emails leaked; others inside spear phished
  3. L7: The objective pursued: information gathering, fraud or system access

way out: Payment: money moved on a false instruction

  1. L1: Money leaves: nearly $47 million (Ubiquiti, 2015); $100 million (Google and Facebook, recouped); $3.05 billion in BEC losses reported to the FBI in 2025
  2. L4: Payment details changed or invoices paid on an impersonated instruction
  3. L6: Persuaded to pay

way out: Resistance: the lure reported

  1. L1: Reports feed newly found URLs to blocklists; takedown requested
  2. L4: Report button pressed: 18,476 reports in 15 months, about 10% of a campaign's reports within 5 minutes
  3. L6: Suspicion turned into a report

Sources (20) published science

Dhamija, Tygar and Hearst, Why Phishing Works, CHI 2006 (doi:10.1145/1124772.1124861)
Social engineering (security) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01)
Ho G, Cidon A, Gavish L, Schweighauser M, Paxson V, Savage S, Voelker GM, Wagner D (2019) Detecting and Characterizing Lateral Phishing at Scale. 28th USENIX Security Symposium, 1273-1290 (behind its links)
Montañez R, Golob E, Xu S (2020) Human Cognition Through the Lens of Social Engineering Cyberattacks. Front Psychol 11:1755. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01755 (CC BY; Europe PMC PMC7554349) (behind its links)
Lain D, Kostiainen K, Čapkun S (2022) Phishing in Organizations: Findings from a Large-Scale and Long-Term Study. IEEE S&P 2022; arXiv:2112.07498 (behind its links)
Phishing (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Lin T, Capecci DE, Ellis DM, Rocha HA, Dommaraju S, Oliveira DS, Ebner NC (2019) Susceptibility to Spear-Phishing Emails: Effects of Internet User Demographics and Email Content. ACM Trans Comput Hum Interact 26(5):32. doi:10.1145/3336141 (PMC7274040) (behind its links)
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Heiding F, Lermen S, Kao A, Schneier B, Vishwanath A (2024) Evaluating Large Language Models' Capability to Launch Fully Automated Spear Phishing Campaigns: Validated on Human Subjects. arXiv:2412.00586 (behind its links)
Bullee JWH, Montoya L, Pieters W, Junger M, Hartel PH (2015) The persuasion and security awareness experiment: reducing the success of social engineering attacks. J Exp Criminol 11:97-115. doi:10.1007/s11292-014-9222-7 (behind its links)
Bond CF, DePaulo BM (2006) Accuracy of deception judgments. Pers Soc Psychol Rev 10(3):214-234. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2 (PMID 16859438) (behind its links)
Jalali MS, Bruckes M, Westmattelmann D, Schewe G (2020) Why Employees (Still) Click on Phishing Links: Investigation in Hospitals. J Med Internet Res 22(1):e16775. doi:10.2196/16775 (CC BY; PMC7005690) (behind its links)
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Voice phishing (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
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