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Insider threat

An insider threat is a perceived threat to an organisation that comes from people within it, such as employees, former employees, contractors or business associates, who have inside information concerning its security practices, data and computer systems (src:wp:insider-threat); CERT: the potential for an individual who has or had authorised access to an organisation's critical assets to use that access, maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organisation (src:cert-2022-common-sense-guide). Walked as the research describes it: the kinds (IP theft, sabotage, fraud, espionage, unintentional incidents, misuse; traitor, zealot, browser, well intentioned; masqueraders and infiltrators), the path to harm (predispositions, stressors, concerning behaviours, unanswered violations), the cases (Hanssen, Leeson, Snowden), the programmes against it and what the research says works, and the new case of AI agents as insiders.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born atbefore computers (World War II case in the CERT repository; 'mole' applied to spies in 1626); as a field, the CERT and PERSEREC studies from the early 2000s
born precisioncentury (kind); year (one case)
boundaryInside: the people (and, in simulation, agents) who hold an organisation's trust and access, the path from their access, predispositions and stressors through concerning behaviour and intent to harm, and what they do (theft, sabotage, fraud, espionage, disclosure, error). Outside: the organisation and its assets (the host and the target), the insider risk management program, access control, awareness training and the SOC that answer it, the outside actors who recruit or trick insiders, and the courts and press where cases end.
nested levelRuns on an organisation's membership and access (L2) and on a person's mind (L5-L7); the inside face of the threat actor; answered by information security's programs.
scalesocial

Measures (28) published science

Window of illicit activity around terminationwithin 90 days
Log review around departure (CERT recommendation)30 (minimum) to 90 days before and after
Hanssen's espionage span1979-2001 (three cycles: 1979-81, 1985-91, 1999-2001) years
Duration of the elicitation-training effectup to 12 months
Cases in the CERT Insider Threat Incident Repository (2022)over 3,000 cases
IT sabotage cases modelled (Band et al. 2006)30 cases
Insiders showing concerning behaviour before the attack (IT sabotage cases)90% (and every spy studied) percent
IT sabotage cases with undiscovered technical indicators27 of 28 cases
Motives in US financial-sector insider cases (2012 report): financial gain / revenge81 / 23 percent of cases
Breaches involving the human element (Verizon DBIR 2022, as cited)82 percent
Breaches reported to the UK ICO from end-user mistakes, 201990 percent
Share of electronic crime events caused by insiders (State of Cybercrime survey, as cited)20 percent
Cyber crime incidents suspected to be by insiders (survey cited by Homoliak et al.)27 percent
Insider risk (CERT definition): impact and likelihoodimpact x likelihood qualitative
Prior arrest history among IT saboteurs (CERT study, as cited)30 percent
US adults arrested by age 23 (2011 study, as cited)30 percent
Adjudicated personnel security investigations linked to selection data (Swedish Armed Forces)650 cases
Explanatory power of selection assessments for later security investigations (pseudo-R2)about 0.06 to 0.16 pseudo-R2
Correlation of Dark Tetrad composite with insider-attack propensity (vignettes)0.57 r (N = 470)
Employees who reported an adversary's approach (MITRE study, as cited)35 percent
Participants in the elicitation-training trial72 employees
Detection of suspicious EHR accesses (AUC)0.91 (LR) / 0.95 (SVM) on 1291 events AUC
Insiders in the CERT r6.2 synthetic dataset5 among 3995 normal users
Price paid by the FBI for the file identifying Hanssen7,000,000 USD
Classified documents sold by Hanssenabout 6,000 documents
Leeson's loss at Barings (1995)1.3 billion USD
Documents downloaded by Snowden (HPSCI 2016 estimate)1.5 million documents
AI models stress-tested for agentic misalignment16 models

Open contentions (6) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (20) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Insider threat. Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (17) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (4)

Sits inside / holds (2)

expressed by (13)

floor filled by (8)

Kinds (9)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

insider threat as insider-threat researchers and practitioners describe it: the organisation's critical assets and the access granted to them, up to the insider's motive (reader's view)

  1. L1: Critical assets: data, IP, systems, money and premises; what an insider can harm
  2. L2: Authorised access and inside knowledge: employees, former employees, contractors and partners with legitimate accounts and knowledge of security practice
  3. L3: Precursors: concerning behaviours and technical actions (backdoor accounts, after-hours downloads, rule violations)
  4. L4: The critical path and the organisation's answer: stressors, sanctions, detection, trust
  5. L5: The person: predispositions, needs, emotions, personality
  6. L6: Intention: pressure, opportunity, rationalisation, perceived risk
  7. L7: Motive or goal: money, revenge, ideology or conscience, coercion; or, unintentionally, the work itself

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: The critical path and the organisation's answer: predispositions meet stressors, concerning behaviours and technical precursors build up, and the organisation's response (or none) shapes what follows; deterrence, prevention and detection in turn
  2. L5: The person: predispositions, needs and emotions (disgruntlement the primary trigger), personality (dark traits, low agreeableness and conscientiousness), stress tolerance
  3. L6: Intention formed: pressure, opportunity and rationalisation weighed against the perceived risk of being caught (deterrence); traits activated by situational cues; the security action cycle's 'formation of intention'
  4. L7: Motive or goal: financial gain, revenge, ideology or conscience (traitor, zealot), divided loyalty or coercion; for the unintentional insider (browser, well intentioned) the work itself

way in: Access granted: accounts, privileges and the paths into critical assets

  1. L1: Critical assets: data, intellectual property, systems, networks and premises the organisation depends on
  2. L2: Authorised access: the insider's own accounts and privileges, shared passwords, badges
  3. L3: Access paths: legitimate, forgotten or newly made (backdoor accounts), some unknown to management

way in: An AI agent's goals and the company's plans for it (the agent as insider)

  1. L1: A simulated company's email and systems the agent can use
  2. L2: The agent reads that it will be replaced or that its goal conflicts with the company's direction
  3. L3: Goal conflict or replacement threat: in some runs, blackmail or leaking chosen

way in: Approaches from outside: social engineering, elicitation, recruitment

  1. L1: Outside actors: criminals, foreign services, competitors
  2. L2: An approach received (a malicious elicitation on a professional network, a phishing email)
  3. L3: Recognised and reported, or not (only 35% reported in the MITRE study cited)

way in: Coworkers and supervisors: what they notice, say and model

  1. L1: Coworkers and supervisors
  2. L2: What supervisors notice and whether they act
  3. L3: Social learning: stressed people bonding with stressed people grow jointly angry; connectedness strengthens commitment

way in: Inside knowledge of the organisation's security practice

  1. L1: The organisation's practices, data and computer systems
  2. L2: Inside information about security practices, data and systems, learned through work
  3. L3: Full knowledge of the systems and the actual policies (traitors); less for masqueraders

way in: Organisational support and fairness (positive incentives)

  1. L1: Workforce practices: engagement, perceived organisational support, connectedness
  2. L2: Perceived support: valued, cared for, treated fairly
  3. L3: Reciprocity: individuals return their employer's treatment, good or bad

way in: Rules, sanctions and their enforcement (negative incentives)

  1. L1: Policies, monitoring and punishment
  2. L2: Knowledge of penalties (education and outreach)
  3. L3: Perceived risk of being caught; lowered by technical competence; too many rules leave too little latitude

way in: Signs of being watched: the organisation's detection, read from inside

  1. L1: The organisation's audit, monitoring and case records
  2. L2: The insider checks whether they are watched (Hanssen searched the FBI's case records)
  3. L3: No detection comes back; perceived risk falls

way in: Stressful events at work: sanctions, conflicts, layoffs, injustice

  1. L1: Workplace decisions: discipline, demotion, layoffs, raises and promotions withheld
  2. L2: A stressful event or perceived injustice met by the insider
  3. L3: Maladaptive reaction: concerning behaviour at work

way in: Stressors outside work: debt, personal and family crises

  1. L1: Life outside work: money, family, health, legal trouble
  2. L2: Financial difficulty or personal stressor
  3. L3: A need beyond expected means (money, attention, revenge)

way in: Tasking and pay from an outside beneficiary (a foreign service, a competitor)

  1. L1: A foreign intelligence service or beneficiary organisation
  2. L2: Contact: recruited before access (a mole) or volunteering after (Hanssen walked in)
  3. L3: Payment and requirements through dead drops

way in: The insider's emotions: stress, anger, disgruntlement (inner)

  1. L1: Contested origin (thought and emotion origins are not settled): stress develops over time from the person's situation
  2. L2: Stress felt: emotional strain and pressure
  3. L3: Anger, then disgruntlement, then ideas of revenge
  4. L4: Concerning behaviour visible at work

way in: The insider's thoughts: justifications, beliefs, rationalisation (inner)

  1. L1: Contested origin: where thoughts come from is not settled; the sources read describe only what thoughts do here
  2. L2: Beliefs about the organisation (the zealot: the organisation is on the wrong side)
  3. L3: Justification: work completion, rationalisation

way in: Workload and time pressure (the unintentional route)

  1. L1: Tasks and deadlines
  2. L2: Time pressure, task difficulty, lack of knowledge, inattention
  3. L3: Shortcuts and slips: data copied to an unsecured drive to finish at home; the 'Should I do this?' check skipped

way out: Coercion and blackmail (seen in simulated AI-agent insiders)

  1. L1: An official threatened with exposure
  2. L4: A threat composed and sent

way out: Disclosure to the press or public (whistleblowing or leaking, contested)

  1. L1: Documents given to journalists and published
  2. L4: Documents gathered from work systems

way out: Espionage: secrets passed to a foreign service

  1. L1: Documents in the hands of a foreign service
  2. L2: Dead drops and signals
  3. L4: Official information systems used to search, retrieve and store

way out: Fraud and unauthorised modification for gain

  1. L1: Money and records changed; losses hidden until they surface
  2. L4: Unauthorised trades or records modified (rogue trading)

way out: IT sabotage

  1. L1: Systems and data deleted or disabled
  2. L3: Access paths unknown to management used, often after termination
  3. L4: Precursor technical actions: backdoor accounts, logic bombs, log changes

way out: Theft of information and intellectual property

  1. L1: IP and data leave the organisation
  2. L3: Removable media, personal email, cloud
  3. L4: Download and copy before leaving (often within 90 days of termination)

way out: Unintentional harm: misdirected email, a malicious link clicked, data on an unsecured drive

  1. L1: Data reaches the wrong recipient or malware gets in
  2. L3: A slip under pressure

Sources (24) published science

Nieles M, Dempsey K, Pillitteri VY (2017) NIST SP 800-12 Rev. 1: An Introduction to Information Security. doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-12r1
Insider threat (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot)
Band, Cappelli, Fischer, Moore, Shaw & Trzeciak 2006, Comparing Insider IT Sabotage and Espionage: A Model-Based Analysis, CMU/SEI-2006-TR-026 (behind its links)
Ruohonen & Saddiqa 2025, What Do We Know About the Psychology of Insider Threats? (ICDF2C 2024, Springer; doi:10.1007/978-3-031-89363-6_11; arXiv:2407.05943v2) (behind its links)
CERT National Insider Threat Center 2022, Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats, Seventh Edition, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University (DM21-0782; Distribution Statement A) (behind its links)
Gelman, Hastings, Herath & Covert 2026, Workplace Surveillance and Insider Threat Risk Management: Legal Limits and Privacy Harms (arXiv:2608.21205v1) (behind its links)
Homoliak et al. 2019, Insight into Insiders and IT: A Survey of Insider Threat Taxonomies, Analysis, Modeling, and Countermeasures, ACM Computing Surveys (arXiv:1805.01612) (behind its links)
Mole (espionage) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
CERT Division & ExactData, Insider Threat Test Dataset (KiltHub, CC BY 4.0), dataset documentation page (behind its links)
Robert Hanssen (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Caputo, Danley & Ratcliff 2024, Employee risk recognition and reporting of malicious elicitations: longitudinal improvement with new skills-based training, Frontiers in Psychology (doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1410426; PMC11321953) (behind its links)
Lilja-Lolax, Alm & Annell 2026, Psychological assessments predict insider threat risk-mitigation measures, but only marginally, Frontiers in Psychology (doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1926403; PMC13593516; CC BY) (behind its links)
Forsyth et al. 2026, Personality and situational predictors of insider threat: a vignette study, Australian Journal of Psychology (doi:10.1080/00049530.2026.2628384; PMC12951658) (behind its links)
Boxwala, Kim, Grillo & Ohno-Machado 2011, Using statistical and machine learning to help institutions detect suspicious access to electronic health records, JAMIA (doi:10.1136/amiajnl-2011-000217; PMC3128412) (behind its links)
Yuan & Wu 2020, Deep Learning for Insider Threat Detection: Review, Challenges and Opportunities (arXiv:2005.12433v1) (behind its links)
Rogue trader (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Edward Snowden (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Lynch, Wright, Larson, Ritchie, Mindermann, Hubinger, Perez & Troy 2025, Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider Threats (arXiv:2510.05179v2) (behind its links)
Investigative journalism (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Adomako, Mumuni, Akoto & Koranteng (2026). Exploring the Drivers of Information Security Policy Compliance Among Contingent Employees. arXiv:2603.07208 (behind its links)
General Data Protection Regulation (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Social engineering (security) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Khan et al. 2022, Understanding factors that influence unintentional insider threat: a framework to counteract unintentional risks, Cognition, Technology & Work (doi:10.1007/s10111-021-00690-z; PMC8550909) (behind its links)
Jiang & Zhang 2023, The impact of work pressure and work completion justification on intentional nonmalicious information security policy violation intention, Computers & Security (doi:10.1016/j.cose.2023.103253; PMC10079594) (behind its links)