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Security information and event management (SIEM)

A field within computer security that combines security information management (SIM) and security event management (SEM) to enable real-time analysis of security alerts generated by applications and network hardware; NIST defines a SIEM tool as an application that gathers security data from information system components and presents it as actionable information via a single interface (src:wp:security-information-and-event-management). Researchers describe SIEMs as systems with 'the capacity to collect, aggregate, store, and correlate events generated by a managed infrastructure', the central platform of modern security operations centres (src:gonzalez-granadillo-2021-siem). Walked as the technology and the content its operators write: collectors and agents, parsing and normalisation, the event store, correlation rules and use cases, alarms, dashboards, searches, reports and automated reactions, with the people who run it at its top floor.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

aliasesSIEM
born at2005 (term); SIM/SEM products before it; forerunners 1977 (NBS SP 500-19 audit criteria) and 1980 (Anderson's audit-trail surveillance)
born precisionyears
boundaryInside: the collectors and agents, parsers and normalisers, the event store and index, the correlation and rule engine with its rules and use cases, the prioritisation module, the knowledge base of assets and threats, the consoles, dashboards, search node and reporting, and the automated reactions it triggers; with the content its operators write (rules, parsers, use cases). Outside: the estate it watches (hosts, applications, networks, users, OT plant), the tools whose alerts it reads (IDS, firewalls, antivirus, which other walks own), threat intelligence platforms, the SOC analysts who judge its alarms, SOAR platforms, the organisation, auditors and regulators. Whether its operators belong inside is contested (C-1623).
nested levelA technological system (rung 12): software and appliances on log and database servers, a part of the security operations centre (its collection and correlation floors) inside an organisation; built on logs written by operating systems, applications and security tools; its top floor is run by people.
scaletechnological

Measures (18) published science

live retentionno more than 90 days
raw event retention (typical archive)about 6 months, about 6 TB months; terabytes
correlation window (failed-login rule)3 or more failed logins in 1 minute; 15 or more firewall drops in 1 minute events per minute
characteristic clock: log rotationhourly, daily or weekly, or at a size limit schedule
events per day (large enterprise)millions or billions events per day
alerts per day at one SOC24,000-134,000; 0.01% tied to true attacks; 49% benign triggers alerts per day; share
network alerts in the dataset (2018-2022)115,617,526 alerts
post-attack investigation time53 days on average
manual correlation per ticket (one SOC, slow SIEM)10 minutes on average
evadable Sigma rules110 of 292 fully (38%), 19 partially (7%) rules
benign to malicious events in validation dataabout 145,000 : 1 ratio
redundant rules in public rule sets139 of 2,347 Sigma; 58 of 1,640 Splunk rules
SIEM market size (Gartner, as cited)3.55 billion (2019) to 3.58 billion (2020) US dollars (currency as cited)
vendors in the 2020 SIEM vendor map22 vendors
share of surveyed SOC practitioners using a SIEM80% (IDS 90%) of 20 survey participants
anomaly threshold in the 1980 surveillance plan2.58 standard deviations
log volume of one commercial cloud applicationabout gigabytes per hour data per hour
signal yield per hand-off (alerts to true attacks)0.0001 (0.01%) usable out / sent in

Open contentions (5) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (16) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Security information and event management (SIEM). Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (19) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (11)

Sits inside / holds (3)

expressed by (27)

floor filled by (21)

Kinds (4)

wired (6)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

the SIEM as security engineers and analysts describe it: the monitored estate's activity up to the use cases it serves (reader's view)

  1. L1: The monitored estate and its activity: hosts, applications, network hardware, users, physical plant and OT, and the attackers acting on them
  2. L2: Source devices and sensors that write logs and alerts (IDS, antivirus, firewalls, OSs, applications, badge readers)
  3. L3: Log collection: collectors and aggregators, agents or agentless push and pull
  4. L4: Parsing and normalisation into one event format, with filtering, aggregation and reduction
  5. L5: Storage and index: database servers hold the events for search and correlation over time
  6. L6: Correlation, alerting and prioritisation: rules link events into alarms
  7. L7: Use cases served: detection, compliance reporting, forensics and hunting, through dashboards, reports and responses, set by the people who run it

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L5: Storage and index: one or more database servers hold the normalised events (live for about 90 days, raw events about 6 months), searchable across sources and times
  2. L6: Correlation, alerting and prioritisation: directive alarms (correlation rules) link related events from many sources, enriched with asset and threat context, into prioritised alarms
  3. L7: Use cases and the monitoring programme: what the SIEM is for (detection, compliance reporting, insider threat, threat hunting, forensics), which sources and rules serve it, how long data is kept; set and tuned by the people who run it (SIEM engineers, content authors, log management administrators) with the analysts' verdicts

way in: Alerts from security tools (IDS/IPS, antivirus, firewalls)

  1. L1: Alert records the security tools write when they detect a threat
  2. L2: The sensors: intrusion detection systems, anti-virus, firewalls
  3. L3: Collector plug-ins: SDEE-enabled devices keep logs that the SIEM retrieves; others send logs directly
  4. L4: Parsed into a security event when the raw log matches a criterion

way in: Analysts' searches and hunts

  1. L1: An analyst's question over many nodes and periods
  2. L2: The search node or console where queries are typed
  3. L3: Written in a search processing language
  4. L4: Fast queries driven by the analyst's own reasoning

way in: Analysts' verdicts and tuning requests on alarms

  1. L1: Each alarm judged false positive or escalated, from knowledge of the environment and tacit experience
  2. L2: Tracked as incidents and tickets in the SIEM's workflow
  3. L3: Turned into tuning: false positives corrected one by one

way in: Asset, vulnerability and identity context (inventories, scan results, directories)

  1. L1: Records of the organisation's assets, users and vulnerabilities
  2. L2: Vulnerability scans and asset discovery
  3. L4: Asset information stored for correlation
  4. L5: Held in the knowledge base

way in: Detection rules and use cases (expert-written, community Sigma rules)

  1. L1: Rules that define known malicious behaviour: signatures, title, description, references
  2. L2: Authors: security experts in the SOC and a large open community (the Sigma repository)
  3. L3: Converted from the generic format into the SIEM's own query language
  4. L4: Use cases configured into the SIEM to alarm on chosen scenarios
  5. L5: Stored in the SIEM's rule database

way in: Endpoint behaviour events (process creations, network connections, file changes)

  1. L1: Low-level events on endpoints: process creations, network connections, file manipulations
  2. L2: Behaviour collected from endpoints because encryption and obfuscation evade traditional detection
  3. L3: Endpoint agents (e.g. Wazuh agents) send events to the SIEM
  4. L4: Events captured by rule matching and logged in JSON

way in: Laws, regulations and control frameworks (HIPAA, PCI DSS, FISMA, NIST SP 800-53, EO 14028)

  1. L1: Regulations that require logging and reporting
  2. L2: Control frameworks that say what to audit: NIST SP 800-53 AU-2 event monitoring, SI-4 system monitoring
  3. L3: The organisation's logging requirements and goals, prioritised by risk

way in: Network traffic seen by network monitors (flows, Zeek logs)

  1. L1: Traffic on the networks
  2. L2: Network monitoring tool (Zeek) and a customised rule engine over network and system logs
  3. L3: Network-level alerts carried to the SIEM
  4. L4: Each alert characterised by timestamp, IPs, category and metadata

way in: Operating system, application and network device logs

  1. L1: Log entries: records of events on systems and networks (syslog, Windows Event Log)
  2. L2: Log generators: OSs, security software, application servers, web and e-mail servers
  3. L3: Agents on the hosts, or agentless push and pull with credentials
  4. L4: Parsing and normalisation: the SIEM knows the important fields of each source type; free text is reduced to templates

way in: Physical-access and operational-technology events (badge readers, industrial plant probes)

  1. L1: Physical plant: doors, badge readers; production and manufacturing OT environments; a hydroelectric dam
  2. L2: Physical security devices such as badge readers; probes on industrial processes
  3. L3: A security collector (GET) monitors the plant's events
  4. L4: Translated into a common format for the correlator

way in: The SIEM's own state (sources logging, transfers failing, storage, malfunctions)

  1. L1: The infrastructure's own condition: failures in logging software or archival media, sources that stop sending
  2. L2: Logging status of every source checked

way in: Threat intelligence and open-source intelligence

  1. L1: Threat information published and exchanged; open-source intelligence (OSINT)
  2. L2: Cyber threat intelligence exchange platforms
  3. L3: Custom connectors and APIs bring the data in
  4. L4: Contextual data from threat intelligence platforms fed into the SIEM
  5. L5: Held in the security knowledge base the analysts customise

way in: Time: the clocks of every log source

  1. L1: Each log source's clock; systems in many time zones; clocks out of sync
  2. L2: NTP servers keep log sources' clocks consistent
  3. L3: Administrators make sure each logging host's clock is synched to a common source
  4. L4: Logged times normalised to a single time zone

way out: Alarm to the analysts' console and dashboards

  1. L1: Light from the screens to the analyst's eyes
  2. L2: Shown through dashboards and visualisations
  3. L6: Rule triggered: alarm fired and prioritised

way out: Archive, reduce and dispose of old data

  1. L1: Old entries cleared
  2. L5: Archived out of the live system, by custom scripts to attached storage, HDFS or cloud
  3. L7: Retention set by policy and law

way out: Automated reaction (scripts, tickets, e-mails, firewall changes)

  1. L1: The unauthorised data path closed on the network
  2. L3: Reaction system acts on the security controls
  3. L6: Directive triggers an action

way out: Compliance and audit reports

  1. L1: Reports handed to compliance audits
  2. L2: Reports generated automatically
  3. L7: Reports chosen to meet regulatory frameworks

way out: Reconfigure agents and log sources

  1. L2: The log sources' settings changed
  2. L3: Server reconfigures the agent; forwarding filtered at the source
  3. L7: Changes to logging decided (what entries and fields are sent, which format)

way out: Search results and forensic answers

  1. L1: Read by the analyst
  2. L2: Shown on the search node
  3. L5: Matching events retrieved across nodes and periods

Sources (20) published science

Intrusion detection system (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01)
González-Granadillo, G., González-Zarzosa, S. & Diaz, R. (2021). Security Information and Event Management (SIEM): Analysis, Trends, and Usage in Critical Infrastructures. Sensors 21(14):4759. doi:10.3390/s21144759 (PMC8309804, CC BY)
Security information and event management (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Vielberth, M., Böhm, F., Fichtinger, I. & Pernul, G. (2020). Security Operations Center: A Systematic Study and Open Challenges. IEEE Access 8:227756-227779. doi:10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3045514 (CC BY 4.0; University of Regensburg repository copy) (behind its links)
Ismail, Kurnia, R., Widyatama, F., Wibawa, I. M., Brata, Z. A., Ukasyah, Nelistiani, G. A. & Kim, H. (2025). Enhancing Security Operations Center: Wazuh Security Event Response with Retrieval-Augmented-Generation-Driven Copilot. Sensors 25(3):870. doi:10.3390/s25030870 (PMC11820992, CC BY) (behind its links)
Garofalo, A., Di Sarno, C., Matteucci, I., Vallini, M. & Formicola, V. (2014). Closing the loop of SIEM analysis to Secure Critical Infrastructures. arXiv:1405.2995 (behind its links)
Kent, K. & Souppaya, M. (2006). Guide to Computer Security Log Management. NIST Special Publication 800-92. doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-92 (behind its links)
Uetz, R., Herzog, M., Hackländer, L., Schwarz, S. & Henze, M. (2023). You Cannot Escape Me: Detecting Evasions of SIEM Rules in Enterprise Networks. arXiv:2311.10197 (its artifact note points to USENIX Security 2024) (behind its links)
Yang, L., Chen, Z., Wang, C., Zhang, Z., Booma, S., Cao, P., Adam, C., Withers, A., Kalbarczyk, Z., Iyer, R. K. & Wang, G. (2024). True Attacks, Attack Attempts, or Benign Triggers? An Empirical Measurement of Network Alerts in a Security Operations Center. 33rd USENIX Security Symposium (open access) (behind its links)
Sundaramurthy, S. C., McHugh, J., Ou, X., Wesch, M., Bardas, A. G. & Rajagopalan, S. R. (2016). Turning Contradictions into Innovations or: How We Learned to Stop Whining and Improve Security Operations. SOUPS 2016, USENIX (open access) (behind its links)
Shukla, A., Gandhi, P. A., Elovici, Y. & Shabtai, A. (2025). RuleGenie: SIEM Detection Rule Set Optimization. arXiv:2505.06701 (behind its links)
Rosenberg, M., Schneider, B., Scherb, C. & Asprion, P. M. (2023). An Adaptable Approach for Successful SIEM Adoption in Companies. arXiv:2308.01065 (behind its links)
Alahmadi, B. A., Axon, L. & Martinovic, I. (2022). 99% False Positives: A Qualitative Study of SOC Analysts' Perspectives on Security Alarms. 31st USENIX Security Symposium (behind its links)
Anderson, J. P. (1980). Computer Security Threat Monitoring and Surveillance. James P. Anderson Co., report, revised 15 April 1980 (NIST CSRC early papers copy) (behind its links)
Zhu, J., He, S., Liu, J., He, P., Xie, Q., Zheng, Z. & Lyu, M. R. (2019). Tools and Benchmarks for Automated Log Parsing. ICSE 2019; arXiv:1811.03509 (behind its links)
Kokulu, F. B., Soneji, A., Bao, T., Shoshitaishvili, Y., Zhao, Z., Doupé, A. & Ahn, G.-J. (2019). Matched and Mismatched SOCs: A Qualitative Study on Security Operations Center Issues. ACM CCS 2019. doi:10.1145/3319535.3354239 (author copy) (behind its links)
Yuan & Wu 2020, Deep Learning for Insider Threat Detection: Review, Challenges and Opportunities (arXiv:2005.12433v1) (behind its links)
Cyber threat intelligence (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Vulnerability management (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Mirheidari, S. A., Arshad, S. & Jalili, R. (2013; arXiv 2018). Alert Correlation Algorithms: A Survey and Taxonomy. arXiv:1811.00921 (behind its links)