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Incident response

What an organisation does when a computer security incident happens: 'a violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices' (src:nist-sp800-61r2) is detected, analysed, contained, eradicated and recovered from, and learned from, by a response team following a plan (src:wp:computer-security-incident-management). Walked as the practice and the capability that does it: the signs coming in, the triage desk, the incident handlers and their lead, the plans and procedures, the lessons learned, and the wider web of coordination centres (CERT/CC, FIRST) that grew up after the 1988 Morris worm.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

aliasesIncident response and recovery
born atNovember 1988 (CERT/CC, Pittsburgh, at DARPA's direction after the Morris worm)
born precisionmonth
boundaryInside: the incident response capability of an organisation (or of a community, for a coordinating team): its policy, plan and standard operating procedures; the reporting mechanisms and the triage function that receives every sign; the incident handlers, the incident lead and the team manager; the analysis, prioritisation, notification, containment, eradication and recovery work; the evidence handling; the lessons learned, follow-up reports and incident data. Outside: the monitored systems themselves; the detection tools that raise alerts (IDPS, SIEM, antivirus) and the security operations centre that watches them around the clock (the edge is drawn differently by different teams: 'The first tier of an incident response team often assumes responsibility for intrusion detection'); the attackers and their malware; prevention and protection, which the 2025 guide places outside incident response itself (contention C-1575); the organisation's management, legal, public affairs and business continuity groups the team depends on; law enforcement, regulators, media and peer teams.
nested levelA practice of computer and information security (rung 12), part of an organisation; its handlers are people (Human), its tools run on computers and networks, and its teams are linked across organisations by coordination centres and forums (CERT/CC 1988, FIRST 1989).
scalesocial

Measures (21) published science

ransomware attacks on US health care delivery organisations43 (2016) to 91 (2021); 374 in all attacks per year
escalation wait before raising a levelperhaps 15 minutes
lessons learned meeting after a major incidentwithin several days
breach report deadline (Netherlands)72 hours after discovery
recovery time of large-scale incidentsmonths (early phases days to weeks) time
incident response duration, 2012 picture against 2025usually within a day or two (then); weeks or months (now) time
dwell time before detection (SolarWinds)14 months
average time to detect and contain a data breach (IBM 2023, as cited)204 days
share of alarms analysts call false positives99 % (one analyst's figure)
share of organisations struggling with EDR alert volumenearly 70 %
Internet hosts at the Morris worm60,000 (estimate); more than 36 million a decade later; 171.6 million in January 2003 hosts
machines infected by the Morris wormaround 6,000 (usually reported; a guess at 10% of 60,000) machines
share of health care ransomware attacks that disrupted care44.4 (166 of 374) %
share of ransomware victims restoring from backups20.6 %
health care ransomware attacks reported late to HHS203 (54.3% of all attacks), outside the 60-day window
CrowdStrike outage at one health system: devices crashed8647 BSOD events; 729 devices needing manual remediation
command center open (CrowdStrike outage, one health system)approximately 30 hours
share of CryptoLocker victims who paidup to 40 (about two-thirds of payers recovered files) %
major errors attributed to handover miscommunication (health care, cited)80 %
WannaCry: start to kill-switch halt07:45 to 15:03 UTC, 12 May 2017 time of day (UTC)
FIRST membership810+ organisations from more than 110 countries

Open contentions (5) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (21) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Incident response. Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (26) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (13)

Sits inside / holds (5)

expressed by (25)

floor filled by (23)

Kinds (6)

wired (3)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

incident response as incident handlers describe it: signs of an incident in the organisation's systems up to the mission it protects (reader's view)

  1. L1: The organisation's systems, networks, data and users, where events happen; an event is any observable occurrence, an incident a violation or imminent threat of violation of policy
  2. L2: Signs of incidents gathered: precursors and indicators from IDPSs, SIEMs, antivirus, file integrity checks, logs, flows, third-party services and people
  3. L3: Triage: a single point of contact accepts, acknowledges, tags, tracks and gives an initial priority
  4. L4: Detection and analysis: validate, correlate, scope, prioritise
  5. L5: Coordination and decision: incident lead, escalation, notification, containment, eradication and recovery
  6. L6: Policy, plan, procedures and lessons learned
  7. L7: Mission: minimise loss and disruption, restore services, meet the law

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L3: Triage: one focal point accepts every report and alert, acknowledges it, gives it a tracking number, tags it to an existing or new event and assigns an initial priority (the help desk, the hotliner, or the first tier of a security operations centre)
  2. L4: Detection and analysis: incident handlers validate indicators, correlate events across sources, determine scope, and prioritise by functional impact, information impact and recoverability
  3. L5: Coordination and decision: the incident lead (incident commander) coordinates the handlers, escalates, notifies, and decides containment, eradication and recovery; handovers between shifts and teams
  4. L6: Policy, plan, procedures and learning: the incident response policy and plan, standard operating procedures, lessons learned meetings, follow-up reports and incident data; the retention face of sensemaking
  5. L7: Mission and governance: minimise loss and disruption and restore normal services; management commitment, budget and staffing; law and the organisation's risk strategy (CSF Govern)

way in: Attacker communication channels (e.g. IRC channels bots and attackers use)

  1. L1: Channels attackers and their bots use
  2. L2: Watched by handlers; what is seen is a lead, not a fact

way in: Forensic evidence from affected systems (snapshots, disk images, preserved logs)

  1. L1: The machine's state, changing as the incident runs
  2. L2: Acquired with forensic tools: disk images, packet captures
  3. L3: Logged and passed hand to hand under chain of custody

way in: Law, regulation and reporting duties (breach notification deadlines, mandatory reporting)

  1. L1: A reporting duty with a deadline
  2. L2: Read by the legal department into plans and procedures

way in: Logs and flows (operating system, service, application and network device logs; network flows)

  1. L1: What the systems record: accounts accessed, actions performed, sessions between hosts
  2. L2: Kept by a log retention policy and centralised
  3. L3: Automation selects events of interest for human review

way in: New vulnerabilities, exploits and threat advisories

  1. L1: Public information on new vulnerabilities and exploits
  2. L2: Fed in automatically (NVD feeds) and tracked under their own numbers (VU#)

way in: People inside the organisation reporting signs (users, administrators, security staff)

  1. L1: Something a person notices (an odd filename, bounced mail, a defaced page)
  2. L2: Reporting mechanisms set up in advance, one of them anonymous; the help desk as first point of contact

way in: Reports from outside (other organisations, other incident response teams, coordination centres)

  1. L1: An outside party says something is wrong (a claim of attack, a defaced page)
  2. L2: Monitored mechanisms for external reports, forwarded to the help desk

way in: Security tool alerts (IDPS, SIEM, antivirus, file integrity checks)

  1. L1: Events on hosts and networks: the medium the tools watch
  2. L2: Detection tools turn events into alerts (signatures, anomaly checks, checksums)

way in: The team's own record of past incidents (tickets, knowledge base, follow-up reports)

  1. L1: The issue tracking system and the follow-up reports
  2. L2: Queried for related activity
  3. L3: New information tagged to existing or past events

way in: The team's own state: workload, stress, shifts and handovers

  1. L1: Stress, on-call duty, peaks and troughs of work
  2. L2: Handovers between people and shifts carry the current situation

way in: Third-party monitoring and shared indicators (blacklists, CSIRC notification lists, sector feeds)

  1. L1: Other organisations' incident activity linked to this organisation's addresses and names
  2. L2: Subscriptions and notification lists, some open only to incident response teams

way in: Threats and demands from attackers (announced attacks, extortion, ransom notes)

  1. L1: An announced attack: a precursor
  2. L2: Extortion: pay or the data is released

way out: Changes to controls, policies and procedures (lessons learned put back into risk assessment)

  1. L1: Controls and procedures changed
  2. L6: Incident data fed back into risk assessment

way out: Containment (disconnect, shut down, segment, disable functions, redirect to a sandbox)

  1. L1: Isolation on the medium: from a locked server room to a segmented network
  2. L3: Network controls altered (firewall rulesets) by information security staff
  3. L5: Choose a containment strategy for the incident type

way out: Eradication and recovery (remove malware, disable accounts, restore from clean backups, rebuild, patch, change passwords)

  1. L1: Systems restored to normal operation
  2. L5: Phased remediation, prioritised

way out: Follow-up report, chronology and retained evidence

  1. L1: A formal chronology and damage estimate, kept for legal use
  2. L6: A follow-up report for each incident

way out: Information sharing and advisories (to peer teams, ISACs, coordination centres; advisories inside the organisation)

  1. L1: Advisories issued
  2. L6: Taking part in sharing groups

way out: Notification and status updates (CIO, legal, human resources, public affairs, coordination centres, law enforcement, affected parties, media)

  1. L1: Told by email, website, phone, in person, voice mail or paper notices
  2. L5: Who must be told, what and when

way out: Paying a ransom (a victim's option under ransomware)

  1. L1: The ransom paid
  2. L5: Pay or lose the files

Who fills each layer

Sources (31) published science

NIST, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, 26 February 2024 (doi:10.6028/NIST.CSWP.29)
Cichonski P, Millar T, Grance T, Scarfone K (2012) Computer Security Incident Handling Guide. NIST Special Publication 800-61 Rev. 2. doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r2 (US government work, not subject to copyright)
Rao S (2024) After the Breach: Incident Response within Enterprises. arXiv:2406.07559 (behind its links)
Nelson A, Rekhi S, Souppaya M, Scarfone K (2025) Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cybersecurity Risk Management: A CSF 2.0 Community Profile. NIST SP 800-61r3. doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r3 (behind its links)
Computer security incident management (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Van der Kleij R, Kleinhuis G, Young H (2017) Computer Security Incident Response Team Effectiveness: A Needs Assessment. Front Psychol 8:2179. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02179 (CC BY) (behind its links)
Kent K, Chevalier S, Grance T, Dang H (2006) Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response. NIST SP 800-86 (behind its links)
Neprash, McGlave, Cross, Virnig, Puskarich, Huling, Rozenshtein and Nikpay, Trends in Ransomware Attacks on US Hospitals, Clinics, and Other Health Care Delivery Organizations, 2016-2021, JAMA Health Forum 3(12), 2022 (doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2022.4873; PMC9856685) (behind its links)
Alahmadi, B. A., Axon, L. & Martinovic, I. (2022). 99% False Positives: A Qualitative Study of SOC Analysts' Perspectives on Security Alarms. 31st USENIX Security Symposium (behind its links)
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Morris worm (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
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Kent L, Tuptuk N, Becker I (2026) Passing the Baton: Shift Handovers within Cybersecurity Incident Response Teams. arXiv:2601.07788 (behind its links)
WannaCry ransomware attack (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Information security (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Grispos G, Glisson WB, Storer T (2014) Rethinking Security Incident Response: The Integration of Agile Principles. AMCIS 2014. arXiv:1408.2431 (behind its links)
Lakshmi R, Naseer H, Maynard S, Ahmad A (2021) Sensemaking in Cybersecurity Incident Response: The Interplay of Organizations, Technology, and Individuals. ECIS 2021. arXiv:2107.02941 (behind its links)
Sundaramurthy, S. C., Bardas, A. G., Case, J., Ou, X., Wesch, M., McHugh, J. & Rajagopalan, S. R. (2015). A Human Capital Model for Mitigating Security Analyst Burnout. SOUPS 2015, USENIX (open access) (behind its links)
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