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Supply chain security

Activities that keep trust in the parts a system is built from and in the way they travel: for goods, the security of the transport and logistics chain (credentialing participants, screening cargo, seals, inspection on entry) against terrorism, piracy and theft; for computing, the integrity of the components, libraries, tools, build systems, hardware and vendors that make up a product, against malicious code or circuits injected upstream to reach users downstream (src:wp:supply-chain-security; src:ohm-2020-backstabber). Walked as the practice with the people, organisations, standards and laws that carry it.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born at1974 (Karger and Schell, trusting trust); 2001 (C-TPAT, after 9/11)
born precisionyear
boundaryInside: the activities that keep parts and their journeys trustworthy: credentialing suppliers and maintainers, inventories of components (bills of materials, SBOMs), signing and provenance (code signing, in-toto layouts, SLSA provenance), reproducible and diverse builds, isolated build systems, screening and testing of incoming parts (package scanning, chip testing, cargo screening), seals and tracking in transit, inspection on entry, and the response when a part turns out to be compromised (revocation, rebuilding, takedown); plus the standards, programmes and laws that carry them (C-TPAT, ISO 28000, O-TTPS, SSDF, SLSA, EO 14028). Outside: the supply chains themselves (goods, software, hardware), the attackers, the vulnerabilities, the products built, and the organisations' wider security.
nested levelA practice carried by organisations, maintainers, registries and states (rung 12), working on supply chains; the part of information security and of supply-chain management that deals with what comes in from others. Overlaps secure software development, whose SSDF covers protecting the software and its build.
scaletechnological

Measures (29) published science

characteristic clock: time a malicious package is available before public report209 mean (median 67, max 1,216) days
SolarWinds trojanized update dormancyup to 14 days
XZ campaign durationover two years (2021 to 2024)
Log4Shell time unnoticed2013 to November 2021 (about 8) years
malicious packages in the Backstabber dataset (npm, PyPI, RubyGems, 2015-2019)174 packages
share of malicious packages using typosquatting61 %
average Levenshtein distance of a typosquat to its target2 edits
event-stream dependents at takeover1,600 packages; 1.5 million weekly downloads
CCleaner trojanized downloads before detectionabout 2.3 million (over a month) downloads
implicit trust per average npm package79 packages, 39 maintainers count
maintainers whose accounts reach more than half of npm20 maintainers
share of npm packages depending on known-vulnerable codeup to 40 %
attack vectors / incidents / safeguards in the OSS supply-chain taxonomy107 / 94 / 33 count
Debian packages reproducibleover 95% of 30,000+ (after seven years)
reproducible builds: experts rating utility very high / cost high58.8 / 70.6 %
commercial codebases with open-source code; share of code open source96 / 76 (1,703 codebases, 2023) %
PyPI projects listing a signatureabout 4 %
SolarWinds entities affected / US agencies confirmed compromisedabout 18,000 / fewer than 10 count
historical supply chain attacks addressable by in-toto deployments83-100 %
XZ commits carrying the attack8 commits
Log4Shell enterprise cloud environments affected93 %
C-TPAT members (2014)10,854 (7 at launch, November 2001) members
share of US import value carried by C-TPAT importersabout 54 (4,315 importers) %
Target fourth-quarter 2013 profit fall after the HVAC-vendor breach46 %
reported year-over-year rise in software supply chain attacks (vendor report)650 (2021), 430 (2020) %
reported rise in supply chain attacks, 2018 (vendor report)78 %
substandard and falsified medicines prevalence (LMICs)13.6 (95% CI 11.0-16.3; 67,839 samples)
mitigation tasks missing from all ten frameworks3 of 73 tasks mapped
per-hand-off yield of a security fix down the dependency chainbelow 0.5 (more than half of dependents still affected after the fix) fraction

Open contentions (4) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (12)

Sits inside / holds (3)

Trades with (valence) (14)

expressed by (18)

floor filled by (23)

represents (1)

Kinds (4)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

supply chain security as practitioners and researchers describe it: the parts a system is built from and where they came from, up to products whose parts can be trusted (reader's view)

  1. L1: The parts and their sources: packages and libraries, build tools and build systems, chips and IP cores, vendors with access, cargo in transit, and the people who maintain them
  2. L2: Intake and checking: dependency managers, signature verification, rebuilds, chip tests, credentialing, seals and screening
  3. L3: Findings: typosquats, mismatched binaries, invalid or misused signatures, Trojans, counterfeit parts, vulnerable dependencies
  4. L4: The inventory and provenance picture: SBOMs, layouts and link metadata, provenance
  5. L5: Trust decisions: pin, verify, accept or reject; consensus of independent builders
  6. L6: Organisation and governance: frameworks, programmes, standards, registry policy and law
  7. L7: Purpose and response: products verifiable from inception to deployment, legitimate trade facilitated; revocation and rebuilding when trust fails

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: The inventory and provenance picture: what is in the product and where each part came from (SBOM, layout and link metadata, provenance, the implicitly trusted code base)
  2. L5: Trust decisions: accept, pin, verify, reject; reproducible-build consensus; diverse double-compiling; MFA and isolated hardened builds
  3. L6: The organisation's supply-chain risk management: frameworks and programmes (SSDF, SLSA, ISO 28000, C-TPAT, O-TTPS), stakeholder roles, registry policy; mandates join here
  4. L7: Purpose: products whose parts can be trusted from inception to deployment, and legitimate trade facilitated; response when that trust fails

way in: Anomalies in running systems

  1. L1: The installed product running: a trojanized update dormant for up to two weeks; a backdoored library loaded by sshd
  2. L2: Noticed: unexpected CPU use and Valgrind errors in SSH logins (XZ); system monitoring
  3. L3: Investigated and reported (Freund to Debian and Openwall; FireEye's discovery of SolarWinds)

way in: Goods in transit (cargo and containers)

  1. L1: Cargo moving through shipper, carrier and consignee; theft and shrinkage possible anywhere
  2. L2: Seals and locks in transit; tracking (RFID, GPS); advance notification of contents to the destination
  3. L3: Screening and inspection: containers screened at foreign ports (CSI), cargo inspected on entry

way in: Hardware parts (chips, IP cores, devices)

  1. L1: Chips and components from outsourced fabrication, bought IP cores and brokers; possible Trojans or counterfeits
  2. L2: Testing: logic testing to activate rare events; side-channel measurement (power signature) without triggering
  3. L3: Deviation found or missed: small Trojans hidden by process variation; triggers on rare conditions

way in: Law, mandates and markets

  1. L1: Mandates: EO 14028 (12 May 2021); EU Community Customs Code (2008); registry signing policies

way in: People in the chain (maintainers and contributors)

  1. L1: Maintainers and contributors, partly unknown or anonymous; a few accounts reach most of npm
  2. L2: Contributions, reviews and requests (event-stream handed over on request; XZ's years of patches and reviews)
  3. L3: Trust granted: maintainer permissions, publishing rights

way in: Signatures and provenance records

  1. L1: Signed artifacts arriving: code signatures, PGP signatures in registries, in-toto link metadata, SLSA provenance
  2. L2: Verification: signature checked with the author's key or certificate; checksum confirms no alteration since signing
  3. L3: Checked against the expected: link metadata against the layout; a valid signature can still sit on a trojanized product (SolarWinds)

way in: The build (source to binary)

  1. L1: The build chain: version control, build farm, CI/CD, packaging; compromising any single step can modify the software
  2. L2: Independent rebuilds from the same source (reproducible builds) or with a second, trusted compiler (diverse double-compiling)
  3. L3: Mismatch or match: binaries that do not match their source; build provenance (metadata on how outputs were generated)

way in: Third-party components (packages and libraries)

  1. L1: Packages published in registries (npm, PyPI, RubyGems, Maven); 96% of commercial codebases use open source, 76% of their code
  2. L2: The dependency manager resolves, downloads and installs packages (and runs install scripts) automatically
  3. L3: The transitive tree: an average npm package brings implicit trust in 79 packages and 39 maintainers; a typosquat sits two edits from its target

way in: Vendors and suppliers (organisations with access)

  1. L1: Suppliers and their access: adversaries infiltrate trusted suppliers and vendors (Target via an HVAC contractor's credentials)
  2. L2: Credentialing participants; certification programmes (C-TPAT, Common Criteria EAL 4, ISO 28000)
  3. L3: Risk standing: certified firms considered low risk

way in: Vulnerability and threat reports

  1. L1: Disclosures about components: Log4Shell (unnoticed since 2013, disclosed 2021), CTI reports on SolarWinds, Log4j, XZ
  2. L2: Matched against the inventory: with an accurate SBOM you immediately know whether you are impacted
  3. L3: Impact judged: SBOM-based management rarely considers actual exploitability

way in: What practitioners know (inner)

  1. L1: Case histories and principles: Thompson's lesson; Saltzer and Schroeder's principles read against SolarWinds and Log4j
  2. L2: Taught and surveyed: expert and developer surveys (17 experts, 134 developers)
  3. L3: Organised as an attack tree: 107 vectors, 94 incidents, 33 safeguards

way out: Block, pin and remove

  1. L1: The registry and the dependency tree changed
  2. L3: Malicious package reported and removed (on average 209 days after publication)
  3. L5: Decision: pin versions, disable install scripts, reject a package that fails verification

way out: Respond: revoke, rebuild, decontaminate

  1. L1: Systems taken offline and decontaminated over months; a safe version restored
  2. L2: Code-signing certificate revoked (SolarWinds); distributions rebuild their packages (XZ)
  3. L7: Response chosen after a compromise

way out: Seal, release or inspect cargo

  1. L1: Cargo released, sealed or held
  2. L3: Expedited processing and fewer customs examinations, or inspection on entry
  3. L6: Certified low-risk status (C-TPAT) or a risk flag

way out: Sign, attest and publish inventories

  1. L1: Signed artifacts and SBOMs published for the next link downstream
  2. L3: Provenance generated by the CI/CD pipeline; SBOMs generated in machine- and human-readable formats
  3. L6: Policy: registries mandate signing; standards require SBOMs and provenance

Sources (30) published science

Supply chain security (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot)
XZ Utils backdoor (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Ohm M, Plate H, Sykosch A, Meier M. Backstabber's knife collection: a review of open source software supply chain attacks. arXiv:2005.09535 (DIMVA 2020) (behind its links)
Schorlemmer et al. 2024. Signing in Four Public Software Package Registries: Quantity, Quality, and Influencing Factors (IEEE S&P 2024). arXiv:2401.14635 (behind its links)
Lamb & Zacchiroli 2021, Reproducible Builds: Increasing the Integrity of Software Supply Chains, IEEE Software (arXiv:2104.06020) (behind its links)
Software bill of materials (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Zimmermann, Staicu, Tenny, Pradel 2019. Small World with High Risks: A Study of Security Threats in the npm Ecosystem (USENIX Security 2019). arXiv:1902.09217 (behind its links)
Supply chain attack (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Ladisa, Plate, Martinez, Barais 2022/2023. Taxonomy of Attacks on Open-Source Software Supply Chains (IEEE S&P 2023). arXiv:2204.04008 (behind its links)
Hardware Trojan (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Ozawa, Evans, Bessias et al. 2018. Prevalence and Estimated Economic Burden of Substandard and Falsified Medicines in Low- and Middle-Income Countries (JAMA Netw Open). doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2018.1662, PMC6324280 (behind its links)
Wheeler 2009. Fully Countering Trusting Trust through Diverse Double-Compiling (PhD dissertation, CC BY-SA). arXiv:1004.5534 (behind its links)
Hamer, Bowen, Haque, Madden, Hines, Williams 2025. Closing the Chain: How to reduce your risk of being SolarWinds, Log4j, or XZ Utils. arXiv:2503.12192 (behind its links)
Log4Shell (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Reproducible builds (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Torres-Arias, Afzali, Kuppusamy, Curtmola, Cappos 2019. in-toto: Providing farm-to-table guarantees for bits and bytes (USENIX Security 2019, open access) (behind its links)
Przymus, Durieux 2025. Wolves in the Repository: A Software Engineering Analysis of the XZ Utils Supply Chain Attack. arXiv:2504.17473 (behind its links)
Xia, Bi, Xing, Lu, Zhu 2023. An Empirical Study on Software Bill of Materials: Where We Stand and the Road Ahead (ICSE 2023). arXiv:2301.05362 (behind its links)
Code signing (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Tamanna, Hamer, Tran, Fahl, Acar, Williams 2024. Analyzing Challenges in Deployment of the SLSA Framework for Software Supply Chain Security. arXiv:2409.05014 (behind its links)
Katte, Fernandez 2023. A Survey Report on Hardware Trojan Detection by Multiple-Parameter Side-Channel Analysis. arXiv:2307.02012 (behind its links)
ISO 28000 (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Software supply chain (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Dennis CR et al. (2025) Resilience in the Face of Disruption: Viewpoint on the CrowdStrike Incident in July 2024. JMIR Med Inform 13:e69958. doi:10.2196/69958 (CC BY) (behind its links)
Threat actor (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
NIST (2024). The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0. NIST CSWP 29. doi:10.6028/NIST.CSWP.29 (behind its links)
2020 United States federal government data breach (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Das Chowdhury, Tahaei, Rashid 2022. Better Call Saltzer & Schroeder: A Retrospective Security Analysis of SolarWinds & Log4j. arXiv:2211.02341 (behind its links)
Peukert, Gasser, Orth et al. 2023. Trojan Horse Siderophore Conjugates Induce Pseudomonas aeruginosa Suicide and Qualify the TonB Protein as a Novel Antibiotic Target (J Med Chem). doi:10.1021/acs.jmedchem.2c01489, PMC9841981 (behind its links)