EVOPEDIA

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Digital signatures and certificates

A digital signature is a mathematical scheme for verifying the authenticity of digital messages or documents: key generation, signing with a private key, and verifying with the public key, so that anyone can recognise the signature as authentic and only the signer can make it (src:wp:digital-signature; Diffie and Hellman 1976). It is 'an electronic analog of a written signature' that also detects whether data was modified after signing (FIPS 186-5). Walked here with the certificates that bind public keys to names, the certificate authorities that sign them and the chain of trust back to a trust anchor (RFC 5280), as the built system: schemes, keys, certificates, CAs, root programs, revocation, transparency logs, the laws that give signatures effect, its history and its people.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

aliasesDigital signature
born at1976 (notion published); 1977-78 (first scheme, RSA); 1989 (first widely marketed product, Lotus Notes 1.0)
born precisionyear
boundaryInside: signature schemes (key generation, signing, verifying) and their keys; the message digest; public key certificates and certification paths; certificate authorities, root programs, revocation, Certificate Transparency logs and webs of trust; the devices that hold signing keys (smart cards, HSMs); timestamps; the standards and laws that define and give effect to signatures. Outside: the documents, code and transactions that are signed, the networks that carry them, the computers that run the algorithms, the hash functions and hard problems it borrows, the people who sign and rely, and the attackers who forge.
nested levelBuilt from key pairs, hash functions, trap-door or lattice problems and certificates; embedded in public-key cryptography (one of its schemes), in public key infrastructure, and in authentication (one of its verifications); carried by computers, the Internet, people and law.
scaletechnological

Measures (25) published science

characteristic clock: maximum TLS certificate lifetime (Baseline Requirements, from 15 March 2029)47 days
maximum TLS certificate lifetime, by date (Baseline Requirements)60 months (July 2012), 39 months (April 2015), 825 days (March 2018), 398 days (September 2020), 200 days (March 2026), 100 days (March 2027), 47 days (March 2029) lifetime
Let's Encrypt certificate lifetime90 days
issuance delay after the final click (RapidSSL, 2008)6 seconds
rogue-CA collision computationabout 18 hours on 200 PlayStation 3 consoles, 30 GB memory
CA validity periods seen (2013)up to 40 years
breach detection to root removal (DigiNotar)about 10 (19 June to about 29 August 2011) weeks
Ed25519 signature size64 octets
ML-DSA signature sizes (44 / 65 / 87)2420 / 3309 / 4627; public keys 1312 / 1952 / 2592 bytes
browser-trusted CA certificates (2013)1,832 controlled by 683 organisations certificates
trusted certificates controlled by three organisations (2013)75 percent
HTTPS sites behind one intermediate (2013)26 percent
hosts serving trusted certificates in a way that errors in some browser (2013)12.7 percent
hosts with port 443 open completing a TLS handshake (2013)67 percent
root certificates trusted by Firefox (2020)147 roots, 52 organisations (macOS 168/60; Windows 255/101)
certificates issued by Let's Encrypt to January 2019over 538 million, for 223 million domain names certificates
Let's Encrypt usage share (W3Techs, July 2024)60.6 (market share 64.1) percent of sites
participants who ignored the warning and used the bank site (FF2 / IE7)18 of 20 (90%) / 18 of 20 (90%) participants
properly signed malware samples still valid (2017)57.7 percent of 189
certificates used to sign malware likely revoked over 15 yearsabout 20 percent
signed-malware amplification517 (180 developer machines to 93,016 machines) times
MD5-signed certificates in the rogue-CA team's sample (2008)about 9,000 of 30,000 (97% from RapidSSL) certificates
quantum estimate to factor 2048-bit RSAunder a week with under a million noisy qubits qubits, time
jurisdictions adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signaturessome 30 jurisdictions
UK adults with no consistent signature (2018)a fifth (21% of 18-24) share of adults

Open contentions (4) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (23) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Digital signatures and certificates. Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (16) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (13)

Sits inside / holds (3)

expressed by (24)

floor filled by (22)

represents (1)

Kinds (16)

wired (1)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

digital signatures and certificates: signed bits up to evidence a stranger can rely on (reader's view)

  1. L1: Signed data in the world: documents, e-mail, software updates, certificates, transactions; any bitstring, stored or sent
  2. L2: The message digest: the data condensed by a hash function (EdDSA hashes inside the algorithm)
  3. L3: The key pair: a private signing key held by the signatory (smart card, HSM) and a public verification key anyone may hold
  4. L4: Signing and verifying: RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA; verification accepts or rejects; the security notion is unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attack
  5. L5: Binding a key to a name: the certificate (X.509) and the certification path from the leaf through intermediates to a trust anchor, checked for validity, constraints and revocation
  6. L6: Governing trust: certificate authorities as trusted third parties, root programs and the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements, revocation, Certificate Transparency logs, webs of trust, and the law that gives signatures effect
  7. L7: What it gives people and what they do with it: authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation, evidence a third party (a court) can rely on; acting on it by installing the update, opening the connection, accepting the contract or the coin

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: Signature generation and verification: the algorithms (RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, ML-DSA) and their security notion
  2. L5: Certification path validation: binding the key to a name, from leaf to trust anchor, with validity, constraints and revocation
  3. L6: Trust governance: CAs, root programs and the Baseline Requirements, Certificate Transparency, webs of trust, law
  4. L7: Assurance and action: authenticity, integrity, non-repudiation; evidence a third party can rely on, acted on by people and machines

way in: Attacks and research results: collisions, forgeries, key-recovery, quantum estimates

  1. L1: Published results: weaknesses in hashes and keys, quantum resource estimates
  2. L2: Proofs of concept against the deployed system: a rogue CA certificate from an MD5 collision
  3. L3: Measured against what is deployed: MD5 still signed until 2013, 1024-bit RSA in half of chains; current standards not quantum-resistant
  4. L4: Reaches the verify step: the attack models (key-only to adaptive chosen-message) and breaks (existential forgery to total break)
  5. L5: The path's weakest link: any trusted CA can sign for any name, so one break opens all

way in: Certificate Transparency: logs, signed timestamps and proofs

  1. L1: Publicly auditable, append-only logs of issued certificates
  2. L2: A Signed Certificate Timestamp: the log's promise to merge within the Maximum Merge Delay
  3. L3: Merkle audit and consistency proofs show the log only grows
  4. L4: Auditors check that each certificate with an SCT is in the log
  5. L5: Monitors and domain owners notice suspect certificates; a log's misbehaviour is itself evidence

way in: Certificates presented: the leaf and its intermediates

  1. L1: The server or signer presents a leaf certificate with the chain linking it to a trusted root
  2. L2: Parsed: subject, issuer, validity period, public key, extensions, the CA's signature
  3. L3: A path assembled from leaf to anchor; often incomplete or misordered, and the global directory to fetch missing links never materialised
  4. L4: Each certificate's signature checked with its issuer's public key

way in: Identity evidence brought to a CA by applicants

  1. L1: An applicant asks for a certificate for a name
  2. L2: Domain validation probes (email to administrative addresses, ACME challenges); EV adds identity documents
  3. L3: The probes cross unprotected networks and can be watched or hijacked
  4. L4: The CA decides to sign the binding, fully robotically at Let's Encrypt
  5. L5: Bound by the Baseline Requirements, a condition of root-store inclusion

way in: Law and policy: statutes, model laws and regulations

  1. L1: Statutes enacted, Utah first in 1995; the UNCITRAL model laws (1996, 2001); ESIGN (2000); eIDAS (2014)
  2. L2: What a signature binds: anything digitally signed legally binds the signer to its terms, where the statute says so
  3. L3: Tiers of signature: electronic, advanced, qualified (certificate, secure creation device, qualified trust service provider)
  4. L4: A qualified signature is hard to challenge in court
  5. L5: Accreditation ties CAs to local law, so the CA business is national

way in: Randomness: key-generation seeds and per-message secret numbers

  1. L1: An entropy source feeding a random bit generator
  2. L2: Random bits drawn into a key pair or a per-message secret number k
  3. L3: Its quality matters per signature: weak randomness in k reveals the private key; EdDSA is deterministic; ML-DSA hedges fresh and precomputed randomness

way in: Revocation status: CRLs, OCSP answers, pushed lists

  1. L1: The issuing CA's cryptographically authenticated statement that a certificate is revoked
  2. L2: Fetched as a CRL or asked of an OCSP responder
  3. L3: Timeliness traded against bandwidth, latency and privacy
  4. L4: Applied, or skipped: browsers limit checks and fail soft

way in: Signed data arriving: messages, documents, updates, transactions with their signatures

  1. L1: The data and its signature as received or retrieved
  2. L2: The verifier recomputes the digest with the same hash function
  3. L3: The claimed signatory's public key is taken up
  4. L4: Verification accepts or rejects the signature

way in: The person: the signer's intent and the relying party's eyes

  1. L1: Indicators and warnings on the screen; a card and a PIN pad in the hand
  2. L2: Seen, but the bits are not: the user does not see what they sign
  3. L3: Risk perception decides whether to heed
  4. L4: Heed or click through: most ignored the FF2 and IE7 warnings
  5. L5: The person's own trust settings: adding or removing CA certificates
  6. L6: What signing means to the signer: identity, intent and informed consent

way in: Time: the verifier's clock, validity periods and trusted timestamps

  1. L1: The verifier's current time and, for code, a timestamp from a timestamping authority
  2. L2: A signed timestamp binds the signature to a moment
  3. L3: Compared with the certificate's notBefore and notAfter
  4. L4: The certificate is accepted only within its window; timestamped code outlives revocation

way in: Trust anchors: the root store installed ahead of time

  1. L1: Root certificates shipped with browsers and operating systems by their vendors (in RSA's 1978 plan, the directory's key handed over in person)
  2. L2: The root store: self-signed roots, plus intermediates cross-signed into trust
  3. L3: Policy selects the anchor for a path
  4. L4: The anchor's key verifies the top of the chain; different verifiers may use different anchors

way out: A CA distrusted: its roots removed from root stores

  1. L1: The roots leave the shipped stores; the CA's business can end
  2. L6: Root programs judge a CA compromised or misbehaving

way out: A certificate issued

  1. L1: The certificate delivered to the subject and served to relying parties
  2. L5: Signed with an intermediate key held in an online HSM
  3. L6: The CA certifies the binding under its policy

way out: A certificate logged for transparency

  1. L1: The log grows by one entry, for anyone to read
  2. L6: The CA submits the (pre)certificate to one or more logs

way out: A certificate revoked

  1. L1: A signed revocation statement in a CRL or OCSP answer
  2. L5: The CA publishes revocation status
  3. L6: Compromise, error or a changed binding: the CA must revoke

way out: A signature made and attached

  1. L1: The data goes out with its signature
  2. L3: The private key stays in the card or HSM
  3. L4: The signing algorithm runs on the digest with the private key
  4. L5: The key is unlocked: a smart card activated with a PIN
  5. L7: A person or program intends to sign: approval, consent, a release

way out: A warning shown to a person

  1. L1: A warning page, reaching the person's sight
  2. L7: Validation failed or is in doubt

way out: Acted on: the update installed, the connection opened, the payment or contract accepted

  1. L1: The code runs, the session proceeds, the coin moves
  2. L5: Each layer runs the next only if its signature checks
  3. L7: Accepted as authentic

way out: Algorithms retired and replaced

  1. L1: Published as a standard
  2. L4: New algorithms specified for signing
  3. L6: Standards bodies retire what attacks or quantum risk have weakened

Sources (31) published science

Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems, Communications of the ACM 21(2), 1978 (doi:10.1145/359340.359342)
Digital signature (Wikipedia)
DigiNotar (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Kim D, Kwon BJ, Dumitras T (2017) Certified malware: measuring breaches of trust in the Windows code-signing PKI. Proc. ACM CCS 2017. doi:10.1145/3133956.3133958 (behind its links)
Aas J et al. (2019) Let's Encrypt: an automated certificate authority to encrypt the entire Web. Proc. ACM CCS 2019. doi:10.1145/3319535.3363192 (behind its links)
Sotirov A, Stevens M, Appelbaum J, Lenstra A, Molnar D, Osvik DA, de Weger B (2008) MD5 considered harmful today: Creating a rogue CA certificate (research project page, TU Eindhoven HashClash) (behind its links)
Sunshine J, Egelman S, Almuhimedi H, Atri N, Cranor LF (2009) Crying wolf: an empirical study of SSL warning effectiveness. Proc. USENIX Security 2009 (behind its links)
Chain of trust (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
NIST (2023) FIPS 186-5: Digital Signature Standard (DSS). doi:10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5 (behind its links)
Diffie and Hellman, New Directions in Cryptography, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 22(6), 1976 (doi:10.1109/TIT.1976.1055638) (behind its links)
Certificate authority (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Durumeric Z, Kasten J, Bailey M, Halderman JA (2013) Analysis of the HTTPS certificate ecosystem. Proc. Internet Measurement Conference 2013. doi:10.1145/2504730.2504755 (behind its links)
Josefsson S, Liusvaara I (2017) RFC 8032: Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA). IETF. doi:10.17487/RFC8032 (behind its links)
NIST (2024) FIPS 204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard. doi:10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204 (behind its links)
Gidney, How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917 (2025, preprint) (behind its links)
Electronic signature (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Signature (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Laurie, Langley and Kasper, Certificate Transparency, RFC 6962, IETF, 2013 (behind its links)
Cooper D et al. (2008) RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. IETF. doi:10.17487/RFC5280 (behind its links)
Authentication (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Goldwasser S, Micali S, Rivest RL (1988) A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks. SIAM J Comput 17(2):281-308. doi:10.1137/0217017 (behind its links)
Public key certificate (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Nakamoto 2008, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (behind its links)
Code signing (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Cryptographic hash function (encyclopedia, Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Threat actor (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Digital identity (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Public key infrastructure (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Hong C, Jeong Y-C, Kwon O et al. (2025) Quantum digital signature using entangled states for network. Entropy 27:1179. doi:10.3390/e27111179 (behind its links)
Anton BP, Blumenthal RM, Eaglesham JB et al. (2025) Biology of host-dependent restriction-modification in prokaryotes. EcoSal Plus. doi:10.1128/ecosalplus.esp-0014-2022 (behind its links)
X.509 (Wikipedia) (behind its links)