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Authentication
Authentication is the act of proving an assertion, such as the identity of a computer system user; in contrast with identification (indicating an identity), it is the process of verifying that identity (src:wp:authentication). NIST: 'the process of determining the validity of one or more authenticators used to claim a digital identity', which establishes that the subject 'is in control of the technologies used to authenticate' (src:nist-sp800-63-3). Walked as the practice of checking who or what is asking, across seals, watchwords, passwords, tokens, biometrics and cryptographic protocols, and across objects (art, goods, documents), with the human verifier's own face and voice recognition booked as one of its channels.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | at least the 6th millennium BC (stamp seals, Halaf culture) |
| born precision | millennium; 'probably earlier' |
| boundary | Inside: the claim and the evidence offered for it (the factors: something one knows, has, is or does; seals, signatures and marks on objects; attestations and records), the stored reference the evidence is checked against (a salted password hash, a template, a public key, a known seal), the check itself (comparison, challenge-response, protocol), the accept/reject decision with its throttling and sessions, and the binding work that makes references trustworthy (enrollment, identity proofing, credential lifecycle, trusted third parties and certificate authorities). Outside: authorization, what an authenticated party may do ('authorization is the process of verifying that "you are permitted to do what you are trying to do"'); the resources and transactions it guards; the people and devices that claim; the forgers, guessers and phishers it guards against; and the cryptography it borrows. The edge with identification and with identity proofing is drawn as NIST draws it: proofing establishes who someone is, authentication that they control the authenticators bound to that identity. |
| nested level | A practice carried by people and institutions (rung 11), since 1961 largely run by computers and networks (rung 12). Part of access control (identification, authentication, authorization) inside information and computer security; uses cryptography, hash functions and public-key cryptography; feeds authorization, signatures and trust. |
| scale | social |
Measures (26) published science
| password-replacement benefits and schemes rated | 25 benefits; 35 schemes count |
| characteristic clock: reauthentication at AAL2 | 12 h; 30 min idle hours / minutes |
| reauthentication at AAL1 | 30 days |
| lifetime of a military challenge and response | 3 days (D-Day 1944); 24 h (TRIAD) days / hours |
| Roman watchword cycle | daily: issued at sunset, tablets back before dark day |
| time per password guess (PDP-11/70, first scheme) | 1.25 ms |
| salt multiplier on bulk guessing (Unix crypt) | 4,096 (12-bit salt) factor |
| DES iterations in Unix crypt | 25 iterations |
| user-chosen passwords in easily searched classes (Unix, 1979) | 2,831 of 3,289 (86%) passwords |
| guessing resistance of user-chosen passwords | fewer than 10 bits online (trawling); about 20 bits offline |
| most common password's share (Yahoo!, 2011) | 1.08 % |
| users observed (Yahoo! corpus) | 69,301,337 unique users in 48 h |
| passwords per user and sites per password (2006) | 6.5 passwords; 3.9 sites each; about 25 accounts; 8 entries a day per user |
| average password bit strength (2006) | 40.54 bits |
| monthly password forgetting rate | at least 1.5% of Yahoo users a month share of users |
| phishing: users typing passwords at verified phishing sites | 0.4 % of users per year |
| break-even daily burden of security advice | 0.98 s per user per day (1% victims a year, 10 h each) |
| throttling wait after failed attempts | 30 s up to 1 h (example) time |
| failed-attempt limit per account | 100 consecutive failures |
| minimum memorized secret length | 8 (subscriber-chosen); 6 (random, may be numeric) characters |
| risk reduction from multi-factor authentication | 99.22% (population); 98.56% (leaked credentials); compromise 0.0079% with MFA vs 1.0071% without |
| passport officers' false acceptance of fraudulent photos | 14 % |
| required biometric false match rate (AAL2+) | 1 in 1000 or better; presentation-attack resistance at least 90% (should) rate |
| Kerberos default port | UDP 88 port |
| oldest stamp seals | at least the 6th millennium BC (Halaf culture) date |
| drongo hosts: cuckoo eggs predicted rejected (sibling system) | 93.7 % |
Open contentions (3) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-1383 Are users the weakest link in security?
booked: The map keeps both: people as the most vulnerable point, and people rationally ignoring advice that costs them more than it saves.
the other reading: users are the weakest link; users' rejection of advice is 'entirely rational' - C-1426 Is checking identity the same thing in people, birds and ants?
booked: The map books authentication as the human practice from the first seals, with birds' egg 'signatures' and ants' nestmate recognition as related kinds, and keeps that link open.
the other reading: authentication is the same system as biological self/non-self recognition and begins with life (rung 6-7); authentication is only the human practice; animal recognition is a different system that merely shares the job - C-1437 How reliable are fingerprints as proof of identity?
booked: The map books fingerprints as one identifying trait among others, with their reliability contested in courts and research.
the other reading: 'the most authoritative method of authentication' historically; court cases 'have raised fundamental doubts about fingerprint reliability'; 'few' readers have not been spoofed
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (14)
- Computer security
- Digital signatures and certificates
- Something one knows (password, PIN)
- Something one has (card, licence)
- Something one is (biometrics)
- Authentication protocols (challenge-response, Kerberos, WebAuthn)
- The verifier and its stored references
- Credential service providers (enrollment and lifecycle)
- Seals (matrix and impression)
- Phishers against legitimate sites for a person's trust
- Guessers against verifiers for the accounts behind passwords
- Phishers against claimants and verifiers for credentials
- Forgers against authenticators of seals, documents, art, goods and money
- Digital identity
Sits inside / holds (5)
- Digital signatures and certificates
- Operating system
- Computer security
- Access control
- Information security
Trades with (valence) (18)
- Digital signatures and certificates via sys:written-record · Authentication gain
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:human-society · Authentication mixed
- State (polity); the nation state its predominant modern form via sys:human-society · Authentication gain
- Law (rules and law) via sys:human-society · Authentication gain
- Internet via sys:electromagnetic-field · Authentication mixed
- Money via sys:written-record · Authentication gain
- Operating system via sys:computer-hardware · Authentication gain
- Cryptography via sys:written-record · Authentication gain
- Cryptographic hash function via sys:written-record · Authentication gain
- Public-key cryptography via sys:electromagnetic-field · Authentication gain
- Computer security via sys:electromagnetic-field · Authentication gain
- Access control via sys:human-society · Authentication gain
- Phishing via sys:internet · Authentication loss
- Information security via sys:written-record · Authentication gain
- Forgery and counterfeiting via sys:written-record · Authentication loss
- AI voice cloning via sys:acoustic-wave · Authentication loss
- Digital identity via sys:human-society · Authentication gain
- Art history (the field) via sys:human-society · Authentication even
expressed by (22)
- Generation/Synthesis
- Recombination/Composition
- Templating / Standardization
- Interoperability/Transduction (Bridging)
- Distributed Autonomy/Decentralized Execution (Subsidiarity)
- Sensing/Scanning
- Uncertainty Reduction/Learning
- Trail-Marking / Externalized Memory (Stigmergy)
- Surprise / Change-Point Detection
- Reactive Response
- Proactive Defense
- Physical/Virtual Barrier
- Self-Monitoring
- Delay/Redirection Tactics
- Validation of Identity/Intention
- Validation of Effectiveness
- Enclave/Segregation
- Resilience & Repair
- Redundancy & Diversity
- Triage & Prioritized Allocation
- Deterrence
- Scheduled Build-and-Dismantle (On-Demand Structure)
floor filled by (24)
- Digital signatures and certificates
- Computer security
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- State (polity); the nation state its predominant modern form
- Written record (durable external marks: texts, archives, canon)
- Internet
- Human society (from local community up to societies)
- Computer
- Operating system
- Cryptographic hash function
- Access control
- Web of trust
- Something one knows (password, PIN)
- Something one has (card, licence)
- Something one is (biometrics)
- Certificate authorities (trust anchors)
- Authentication protocols (challenge-response, Kerberos, WebAuthn)
- The verifier and its stored references
- Credential service providers (enrollment and lifecycle)
- Seals (matrix and impression)
- Kerberos (trusted third-party tickets)
- Web Authentication (public-key credentials, FIDO2)
- Digital identity
- Art history (the field)
Kinds (15)
- Self nonself recognition
- Something one knows (password, PIN)
- Something one has (card, licence)
- Something one is (biometrics)
- Single-factor authentication
- Multi-factor authentication
- Strong authentication
- Continuous (active) authentication
- Digital (electronic) authentication
- Challenge-response authentication
- One-time password
- Mutual authentication
- Authentication of objects (art, antiques, goods, evidence)
- Authentication of messages and documents
- Authentication of works of art
wired (4)
Notes published science
- Trained passport officers checking a live person against an ID photo accepted 14% of 'fraudulent' photos and did no better than students; the best officers were not the most experienced ones (src:white-2014-passport-officers).
- Birds invented the signature long before people: hosts of cuckoos lay eggs whose colour and pattern traits are uncoupled from each other, so each female's clutch is a hard-to-forge 'signature'; fork-tailed drongos reject a predicted 93.7% of near-perfect cuckoo forgeries this way (src:caves-2015-egg-signatures, src:lund-2023-drongo-signatures).
- In 1979 the Unix designers made password checking slow on purpose: 'the first algorithm used was far too fast', so they ran DES 25 times and added a 12-bit 'salt' that multiplies an attacker's bulk work by 4,096, framing the whole design as an arms race like armour plate against shells (src:morris-thompson-1979).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
authentication as practitioners describe it: a claimant and its evidence up to the assurance that lets access, signatures and trust follow (reader's view)
- L1: A claimant and its claim: a person, device or object asserting an identity or origin, and the media its evidence lives on (memory, objects held, the body, wax and paper, the network)
- L2: The evidence offered: something one knows, has or is; seals and signatures; attestations
- L3: The protocol that carries it: challenge and response, tickets, signed and scoped assertions, the sealed container
- L4: Verification: the evidence compared with the stored reference (hash, template, public key, known mark)
- L5: Decision and session: accept or block, throttle, open or end a session
- L6: Binding and trust: enrollment, identity proofing, lifecycle, assurance levels, trusted third parties and webs of trust
- L7: Purpose: the one asking now is the one bound before, so access, transactions, signatures and chains of authority can follow
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L5: The decision: evidence from the factors combined, accepted or rejected, attempts throttled, a session opened or ended
- L6: Binding and trust: enrollment and identity proofing, the credential's lifecycle, assurance levels chosen by risk, trusted third parties (certificate authorities, Kerberos KDC) or a web of trust
- L7: Purpose: assurance that the one asking now is the one bound before, so that access can be granted, transactions approved, documents signed and authority passed on
way in: A face checked against a photo (human verifier's sight)
- L1: A live face and a photo on an ID card
- L2: Seen by the officer (Human sight)
- L4: Unfamiliar-face matching: poor, and no better with training or experience
way in: A voice heard (watchwords, shibboleths, callers)
- L1: A spoken word or voice
- L2: Heard by the listener (Human hearing)
- L4: Judged same or different identity; AI clones pass as the real speaker
way in: An object's own attributes (style, materials, age, tags)
- L1: The object's materials and markings, some invisible to the eye
- L2: Examined: style, signature placement, carbon dating, chemical and spectroscopic analysis
- L4: Compared with what is known of objects of that origin
way in: Attestations and records (witnesses, certificates, chain of custody)
- L1: A witness's testimony or a written record, itself open to forgery and perjury
- L2: Proof of identity given by a credible person with first-hand evidence
- L3: A chain of custody kept by evidence log or testimony
- L4: Courts' rules of evidence require the chain to be established
way in: Evidence of compromise (breach corpora, leaked credentials)
- L1: Collections of real passwords and leaked credentials
- L2: Attackers' guessing lists: dictionaries, names, spellings backwards
- L4: A newly chosen secret compared against the list of compromised values
way in: How one acts (touch, keystrokes, gait, writing style)
- L1: Behaviour read throughout the session, not only at log-in
- L2: Phone sensors extract touch dynamics, keystroke dynamics and gait
- L4: Users verified implicitly and continuously
way in: Marks on documents and packages (seals, signatures, watermarks)
- L1: A medium that takes an impression: wax, clay, paper
- L2: A hard-to-reproduce artifact: seal, signature, watermark, stationery, fingerprint
- L3: Carried with the document or closing the container, which must be broken to open it
- L4: Checked by trained receivers against what genuine marks look like
way in: Public-key credentials (digital signatures, WebAuthn, TLS)
- L1: A key pair held in an authenticator; only the public half is known to the relying party
- L2: The authenticator signs only with the user's consent
- L3: The credential is scoped to one relying party, so it answers only the site it was made for
- L4: Proof of possession of a key through a cryptographic protocol
way in: Something one has (cards, tokens, phones, one-time codes)
- L1: A physical or software object in the claimant's possession
- L2: The object produces its output: a one-time code from a seed and a hash, a card read
- L3: Carried in band or out of band (a display, an SMS or voice call over the phone network)
- L4: The verifier checks proof of possession and control; a used code is no longer valid
way in: Something one is or does (biometrics, read by a sensor)
- L1: The body's traits: fingerprint, retinal pattern, DNA, face, voice, bio-electric signals
- L2: A sensor captures a sample; the sensor itself must be authenticated first
- L3: One-to-one comparison against the template named by a card, user name or PIN (verification mode)
- L4: A probabilistic match score against a threshold; false matches traded against false non-matches
way in: Something one knows (passwords, PINs, watchwords)
- L1: A secret held in the claimant's memory, chosen by people under their limits of memory
- L2: Asked for and typed or spoken: the challenge asks for the password; the sentry asks for the watchword
- L3: Carried to the verifier over an authenticated protected channel
- L4: Compared, salted and hashed, against the stored one-way form
way in: The record of attempts (failed tries, risk signals)
- L1: Every authenticator ever bound and every attempt kept on record
- L2: The information needed for throttling is kept
- L4: Consecutive failures counted against a limit of 100
way in: Tickets from a trusted third party (Kerberos)
- L1: An open network where packets can be read, modified and inserted at will
- L2: The client asks the authentication server for credentials for a given server
- L3: A ticket and a session key come back, encrypted in the client's key
- L4: The server decrypts the ticket in its own key; the shared session key authenticates the client
way out: Access granted and a session opened
- L1: Handed on to authorization: what the authenticated party may do
- L3: A session key shared, usable to protect what follows
- L5: Accepted: access or a transaction allowed to proceed
way out: Authenticators issued and references stored (enrollment)
- L1: The claimant holds it and must maintain it
- L2: The subscriber receives an authenticator: a token and credentials
- L4: The stored reference: salted, slow one-way hash with a cost factor
- L6: The applicant proven and made a subscriber
way out: Change forced on evidence of compromise
- L1: Everyone's password changed, often all at once, after a lapse
- L6: Evidence of compromise ruled on
way out: Rejected, slowed or locked out
- L1: Access stays blocked
- L4: Waits that grow as the account nears its limit; a CAPTCHA before the next try
- L5: Rejected with the same answer whether the name or the password was wrong
way out: Seals pressed and signatures applied (the issuing side)
- L1: The mark on clay, wax or paper, or a label on trade goods
- L2: The matrix pressed; the impression is a mirror of the die
- L7: An author gives readers a way to authenticate that a message came from them
way out: Session ended; reauthentication demanded
- L1: Logged out when a limit is reached
- L5: Time limits on a session regardless of activity