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Authentication

Authentication is the act of proving an assertion, such as the identity of a computer system user; in contrast with identification (indicating an identity), it is the process of verifying that identity (src:wp:authentication). NIST: 'the process of determining the validity of one or more authenticators used to claim a digital identity', which establishes that the subject 'is in control of the technologies used to authenticate' (src:nist-sp800-63-3). Walked as the practice of checking who or what is asking, across seals, watchwords, passwords, tokens, biometrics and cryptographic protocols, and across objects (art, goods, documents), with the human verifier's own face and voice recognition booked as one of its channels.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born atat least the 6th millennium BC (stamp seals, Halaf culture)
born precisionmillennium; 'probably earlier'
boundaryInside: the claim and the evidence offered for it (the factors: something one knows, has, is or does; seals, signatures and marks on objects; attestations and records), the stored reference the evidence is checked against (a salted password hash, a template, a public key, a known seal), the check itself (comparison, challenge-response, protocol), the accept/reject decision with its throttling and sessions, and the binding work that makes references trustworthy (enrollment, identity proofing, credential lifecycle, trusted third parties and certificate authorities). Outside: authorization, what an authenticated party may do ('authorization is the process of verifying that "you are permitted to do what you are trying to do"'); the resources and transactions it guards; the people and devices that claim; the forgers, guessers and phishers it guards against; and the cryptography it borrows. The edge with identification and with identity proofing is drawn as NIST draws it: proofing establishes who someone is, authentication that they control the authenticators bound to that identity.
nested levelA practice carried by people and institutions (rung 11), since 1961 largely run by computers and networks (rung 12). Part of access control (identification, authentication, authorization) inside information and computer security; uses cryptography, hash functions and public-key cryptography; feeds authorization, signatures and trust.
scalesocial

Measures (26) published science

password-replacement benefits and schemes rated25 benefits; 35 schemes count
characteristic clock: reauthentication at AAL212 h; 30 min idle hours / minutes
reauthentication at AAL130 days
lifetime of a military challenge and response3 days (D-Day 1944); 24 h (TRIAD) days / hours
Roman watchword cycledaily: issued at sunset, tablets back before dark day
time per password guess (PDP-11/70, first scheme)1.25 ms
salt multiplier on bulk guessing (Unix crypt)4,096 (12-bit salt) factor
DES iterations in Unix crypt25 iterations
user-chosen passwords in easily searched classes (Unix, 1979)2,831 of 3,289 (86%) passwords
guessing resistance of user-chosen passwordsfewer than 10 bits online (trawling); about 20 bits offline
most common password's share (Yahoo!, 2011)1.08 %
users observed (Yahoo! corpus)69,301,337 unique users in 48 h
passwords per user and sites per password (2006)6.5 passwords; 3.9 sites each; about 25 accounts; 8 entries a day per user
average password bit strength (2006)40.54 bits
monthly password forgetting rateat least 1.5% of Yahoo users a month share of users
phishing: users typing passwords at verified phishing sites0.4 % of users per year
break-even daily burden of security advice0.98 s per user per day (1% victims a year, 10 h each)
throttling wait after failed attempts30 s up to 1 h (example) time
failed-attempt limit per account100 consecutive failures
minimum memorized secret length8 (subscriber-chosen); 6 (random, may be numeric) characters
risk reduction from multi-factor authentication99.22% (population); 98.56% (leaked credentials); compromise 0.0079% with MFA vs 1.0071% without
passport officers' false acceptance of fraudulent photos14 %
required biometric false match rate (AAL2+)1 in 1000 or better; presentation-attack resistance at least 90% (should) rate
Kerberos default portUDP 88 port
oldest stamp sealsat least the 6th millennium BC (Halaf culture) date
drongo hosts: cuckoo eggs predicted rejected (sibling system)93.7 %

Open contentions (3) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (14)

Sits inside / holds (5)

Trades with (valence) (18)

expressed by (22)

floor filled by (24)

Kinds (15)

wired (4)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

authentication as practitioners describe it: a claimant and its evidence up to the assurance that lets access, signatures and trust follow (reader's view)

  1. L1: A claimant and its claim: a person, device or object asserting an identity or origin, and the media its evidence lives on (memory, objects held, the body, wax and paper, the network)
  2. L2: The evidence offered: something one knows, has or is; seals and signatures; attestations
  3. L3: The protocol that carries it: challenge and response, tickets, signed and scoped assertions, the sealed container
  4. L4: Verification: the evidence compared with the stored reference (hash, template, public key, known mark)
  5. L5: Decision and session: accept or block, throttle, open or end a session
  6. L6: Binding and trust: enrollment, identity proofing, lifecycle, assurance levels, trusted third parties and webs of trust
  7. L7: Purpose: the one asking now is the one bound before, so access, transactions, signatures and chains of authority can follow

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L5: The decision: evidence from the factors combined, accepted or rejected, attempts throttled, a session opened or ended
  2. L6: Binding and trust: enrollment and identity proofing, the credential's lifecycle, assurance levels chosen by risk, trusted third parties (certificate authorities, Kerberos KDC) or a web of trust
  3. L7: Purpose: assurance that the one asking now is the one bound before, so that access can be granted, transactions approved, documents signed and authority passed on

way in: A face checked against a photo (human verifier's sight)

  1. L1: A live face and a photo on an ID card
  2. L2: Seen by the officer (Human sight)
  3. L4: Unfamiliar-face matching: poor, and no better with training or experience

way in: A voice heard (watchwords, shibboleths, callers)

  1. L1: A spoken word or voice
  2. L2: Heard by the listener (Human hearing)
  3. L4: Judged same or different identity; AI clones pass as the real speaker

way in: An object's own attributes (style, materials, age, tags)

  1. L1: The object's materials and markings, some invisible to the eye
  2. L2: Examined: style, signature placement, carbon dating, chemical and spectroscopic analysis
  3. L4: Compared with what is known of objects of that origin

way in: Attestations and records (witnesses, certificates, chain of custody)

  1. L1: A witness's testimony or a written record, itself open to forgery and perjury
  2. L2: Proof of identity given by a credible person with first-hand evidence
  3. L3: A chain of custody kept by evidence log or testimony
  4. L4: Courts' rules of evidence require the chain to be established

way in: Evidence of compromise (breach corpora, leaked credentials)

  1. L1: Collections of real passwords and leaked credentials
  2. L2: Attackers' guessing lists: dictionaries, names, spellings backwards
  3. L4: A newly chosen secret compared against the list of compromised values

way in: How one acts (touch, keystrokes, gait, writing style)

  1. L1: Behaviour read throughout the session, not only at log-in
  2. L2: Phone sensors extract touch dynamics, keystroke dynamics and gait
  3. L4: Users verified implicitly and continuously

way in: Marks on documents and packages (seals, signatures, watermarks)

  1. L1: A medium that takes an impression: wax, clay, paper
  2. L2: A hard-to-reproduce artifact: seal, signature, watermark, stationery, fingerprint
  3. L3: Carried with the document or closing the container, which must be broken to open it
  4. L4: Checked by trained receivers against what genuine marks look like

way in: Public-key credentials (digital signatures, WebAuthn, TLS)

  1. L1: A key pair held in an authenticator; only the public half is known to the relying party
  2. L2: The authenticator signs only with the user's consent
  3. L3: The credential is scoped to one relying party, so it answers only the site it was made for
  4. L4: Proof of possession of a key through a cryptographic protocol

way in: Something one has (cards, tokens, phones, one-time codes)

  1. L1: A physical or software object in the claimant's possession
  2. L2: The object produces its output: a one-time code from a seed and a hash, a card read
  3. L3: Carried in band or out of band (a display, an SMS or voice call over the phone network)
  4. L4: The verifier checks proof of possession and control; a used code is no longer valid

way in: Something one is or does (biometrics, read by a sensor)

  1. L1: The body's traits: fingerprint, retinal pattern, DNA, face, voice, bio-electric signals
  2. L2: A sensor captures a sample; the sensor itself must be authenticated first
  3. L3: One-to-one comparison against the template named by a card, user name or PIN (verification mode)
  4. L4: A probabilistic match score against a threshold; false matches traded against false non-matches

way in: Something one knows (passwords, PINs, watchwords)

  1. L1: A secret held in the claimant's memory, chosen by people under their limits of memory
  2. L2: Asked for and typed or spoken: the challenge asks for the password; the sentry asks for the watchword
  3. L3: Carried to the verifier over an authenticated protected channel
  4. L4: Compared, salted and hashed, against the stored one-way form

way in: The record of attempts (failed tries, risk signals)

  1. L1: Every authenticator ever bound and every attempt kept on record
  2. L2: The information needed for throttling is kept
  3. L4: Consecutive failures counted against a limit of 100

way in: Tickets from a trusted third party (Kerberos)

  1. L1: An open network where packets can be read, modified and inserted at will
  2. L2: The client asks the authentication server for credentials for a given server
  3. L3: A ticket and a session key come back, encrypted in the client's key
  4. L4: The server decrypts the ticket in its own key; the shared session key authenticates the client

way out: Access granted and a session opened

  1. L1: Handed on to authorization: what the authenticated party may do
  2. L3: A session key shared, usable to protect what follows
  3. L5: Accepted: access or a transaction allowed to proceed

way out: Authenticators issued and references stored (enrollment)

  1. L1: The claimant holds it and must maintain it
  2. L2: The subscriber receives an authenticator: a token and credentials
  3. L4: The stored reference: salted, slow one-way hash with a cost factor
  4. L6: The applicant proven and made a subscriber

way out: Change forced on evidence of compromise

  1. L1: Everyone's password changed, often all at once, after a lapse
  2. L6: Evidence of compromise ruled on

way out: Rejected, slowed or locked out

  1. L1: Access stays blocked
  2. L4: Waits that grow as the account nears its limit; a CAPTCHA before the next try
  3. L5: Rejected with the same answer whether the name or the password was wrong

way out: Seals pressed and signatures applied (the issuing side)

  1. L1: The mark on clay, wax or paper, or a label on trade goods
  2. L2: The matrix pressed; the impression is a mirror of the die
  3. L7: An author gives readers a way to authenticate that a message came from them

way out: Session ended; reauthentication demanded

  1. L1: Logged out when a limit is reached
  2. L5: Time limits on a session regardless of activity

Who fills each layer

Sources (31) published science

Saltzer and Schroeder, The Protection of Information in Computer Systems, Proceedings of the IEEE 63(9), 1975 (doi:10.1109/PROC.1975.9939)
Authentication (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot)
Grassi et al. 2017, NIST SP 800-63B Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Lifecycle Management, doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63b (behind its links)
Morris and Thompson 1979, Password security: a case history, Communications of the ACM 22(11):594-597, doi:10.1145/359168.359172 (behind its links)
Herley 2009, So long, and no thanks for the externalities: the rational rejection of security advice by users, NSPW 2009, doi:10.1145/1719030.1719050 (behind its links)
Password (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
NIST (2023) FIPS 186-5: Digital Signature Standard (DSS). doi:10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5 (behind its links)
Bonneau, Herley, van Oorschot and Stajano 2012, The quest to replace passwords: a framework for comparative evaluation of web authentication schemes, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, doi:10.1109/SP.2012.44 (behind its links)
Bonneau 2012, The science of guessing: analyzing an anonymized corpus of 70 million passwords, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, doi:10.1109/SP.2012.49 (behind its links)
Florencio and Herley, A Large-Scale Study of Web Password Habits, WWW 2007 (doi:10.1145/1242572.1242661) (behind its links)
Meyer et al. 2023, How effective is multifactor authentication at deterring cyberattacks? arXiv:2305.00945 (behind its links)
White, Kemp, Jenkins, Matheson and Burton 2014, Passport officers' errors in face matching, PLoS ONE 9(8):e103510, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0103510 (behind its links)
Kerberos (protocol) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Seal (emblem) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Lund et al. 2023, When perfection isn't enough: host egg signatures are an effective defence against high-fidelity African cuckoo mimicry, Proc R Soc B, doi:10.1098/rspb.2023.1125 (behind its links)
Challenge-response authentication (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Grassi, Garcia and Fenton 2017, NIST SP 800-63-3 Digital Identity Guidelines, doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63-3 (behind its links)
W3C 2021, Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials, Level 2 (Recommendation) (behind its links)
Neuman, Yu, Hartman and Raeburn 2005, RFC 4120 The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5), doi:10.17487/RFC4120 (behind its links)
Barrington, Cooper and Farid 2025, People are poorly equipped to detect AI-powered voice clones, Scientific Reports (Europe PMC PMC11958761) (behind its links)
Digital signature (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Computer access control (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Phishing (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Technical art history (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Multi-factor authentication (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
One-time password (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Biometrics (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Shibboleth (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Caves, Stevens, Iversen and Spottiswoode 2015, Hosts of avian brood parasites have evolved egg signatures with elevated information content, Proc R Soc B 282:20150598, doi:10.1098/rspb.2015.0598 (behind its links)
Information security (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Cohen, Inbar and Privman 2025, Genomic architecture of nestmate recognition cues in the desert ant (Europe PMC PMC12723442) (behind its links)