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Cryptography

Cryptography, or cryptology, is the practice and study of techniques for secure communication in the presence of adversarial behavior (src:wp:cryptography). Until modern times it meant encryption: converting readable plaintext into unintelligible ciphertext that only holders of the key can turn back; since the 1970s it also covers integrity, authentication, signatures and secure computation. Walked here as the practice (codemakers and codebreakers, their machines and procedures, from antiquity to now) together with the mathematical structure it rests on (finite arithmetic, hard problems, one-way and trap-door functions).

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born atcirca 1900 BC (non-standard hieroglyphs in an Old Kingdom Egyptian tomb, the earliest known case)
born precisioncentury; earliest known case, not a sharp birth
boundaryInside: the techniques for keeping messages secret and genuine (codes, ciphers, keys, protocols, signatures), the people and machines that make and run them (cryptographers, cipher clerks, code talkers, cipher machines, cryptographic software), the codebreakers who attack them (cryptanalysis, the other half of cryptology), and the mathematics they rest on. Outside: the messages' content and senders, the channels that carry them (couriers, radio, the Internet), the computers and networks they protect, and the states, armies, firms and people who use them. Hiding that a message exists at all (steganography) is a sibling practice, not counted inside: Shannon set concealment systems apart as 'primarily a psychological problem' (src:shannon-1949).
nested levelA practice carried by people (rung 11) and, since the 1940s, by machines and computers (rung 12); a part of information and computer security (src:diffie-hellman-1976); built on writing and language and on number theory, algebra and complexity theory. Runs on human L7 output and on computers.
scalesocial

Measures (22) published science

characteristic clock: Enigma key change1 day (settings generally changed daily)
characteristic clock: attackers' computing doubling time (Moore's law as used for key sizing)18 months
unicity distance, simple substitution on Englishabout 30 letters
factoring time for a 200-digit n, as estimated in 19783.8 x 10^9 years (Schroeppel's method, one microsecond per operation)
cost to factor RSA-240 (795 bits)about 1000 core-years
cost to factor RSA-250, of which linear algebraabout 2700 (250 for the linear algebra step) core-years
DES key search by Deep Crack56 hours
minimum symmetric key length for 20 years (1996)90 bits
extra key length to stay ahead of Moore's lawabout 14 bits
AES key and block sizeskeys 128, 192, 256; block 128 bits
GC&CS decrypts at peakabout 4,000 messages per day
Navajo code talkers at Iwo Jima, first two daysover 800 (six code talkers), no errors messages
TLS hosts whose RSA private keys were computed (2012 scan)64,000 (0.50%) hosts
popular HTTPS sites initially vulnerable to Heartbleed24-55 %
TLS certificates sharing keys from insufficient entropy0.75 %
Heartbleed: share of still-vulnerable sites that replaced certificates within a month10 (of those, 14% kept the same private key)
PGP 5.0 users who signed and encrypted correctly within 90 minutesone third (of 12) participants
QKD repeaterless key-rate limit (PLOB) at high lossabout 1.44 x eta secret bits per channel use (eta = channel transmissivity)
standard fibre loss used for QKD rate plots0.2 dB per km
Copiale cipher size105 pages, about 75,000 handwritten characters pages / characters
drongo rejection of near-perfect cuckoo forgeries (comparison case, biology)93.7 % of cuckoo eggs predicted rejected
post-quantum migration target (US federal)2035 year

Open contentions (6) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (14)

Sits inside / holds (4)

Trades with (valence) (30)

expressed by (21)

floor filled by (34)

represents (1)

Kinds (9)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

cryptography as cryptographers describe it: the open channel up to the purposes secret writing serves (reader's view)

  1. L1: The open channel: courier, telegraph, telephone, radio, network; anyone may intercept and record what passes
  2. L2: The message as symbols: plaintext letters, words or bits and the ciphertext that replaces them
  3. L3: The key and its randomness: a secret shared only by the communicants, drawn at random
  4. L4: The cipher: substitution and transposition, rotor machines, block and stream ciphers (DES, AES), Feistel networks
  5. L5: Protocols and key management: key delivery (courier, public directory), modes of operation, signatures, hybrid schemes, standards
  6. L6: What 'secure' means: Kerckhoffs's rule, perfect secrecy, computational security, the indistinguishability notions; resting on unproven hardness
  7. L7: Purposes: secrecy for spies, commanders and diplomats; then integrity, authentication, signatures and secure computation; private and signed electronic mail, payments

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: The cipher at work: encryption and decryption, by hand, machine or program
  2. L4: The attack: cryptanalysis proper
  3. L5: Protocols, modes and key management: the session the cipher runs in
  4. L5: The codebreaking operation at scale (Bletchley Park's huts and machines; research groups with core-years)
  5. L6: The security goal: what 'secure' means and the assumptions it rests on
  6. L6: Intelligence: what the decrypts mean (Ultra); in open research, a published break
  7. L7: The purposes: secrecy, integrity, authentication, signatures; for states, armies, firms and people
  8. L7: Motive and use: command decisions, state interest, the open science of breaking

the codebreaker's side (cryptanalysis): intercepted traffic up to the decisions it informs (secondary stack)

  1. L1: Enemy traffic on the air or the wire, enciphered (Enigma, Lorenz)
  2. L2: Interception and collection: intercept stations, captured material, Internet-wide scans
  3. L3: Statistics and cribs: letter frequencies, probable words, indices; known plaintext
  4. L4: The attack: frequency analysis, permutation theory, bombes and Colossus, factoring algorithms, side channels
  5. L5: The cryptanalytic operation: huts, shifts and machines at industrial scale
  6. L6: Intelligence: decrypts turned into a product (Ultra), with its secrecy guarded
  7. L7: Use: commanders' and states' decisions

the mathematical structure it rests on: numbers and operations up to reductions (secondary stack)

  1. L1: Finite symbol sets and numbers: alphabets, integers modulo n, finite fields such as GF(2^8) and GF(q)
  2. L2: Operations: permutations, modular exponentiation, invertible matrices, polynomial arithmetic modulo m(x)
  3. L3: Hard problems: factoring, discrete logarithms, lattice problems (learning with errors)
  4. L4: One-way and trap-door functions
  5. L5: Reductions: breaking a scheme shown at least as hard as a named problem

way in: Captured or betrayed cipher material

  1. L1: Cipher materials obtained by a spy, including daily keys
  2. L2: Used with traffic to solve the unknown rotor wiring
  3. L3: Reconstructed machines and techniques handed on

way in: Ciphertext arriving for the legitimate receiver

  1. L1: Cryptogram on the open channel
  2. L2: Received blocks; transmission errors spread by some modes
  3. L3: The receiver's key, shared only with intended recipients

way in: Intercepted traffic

  1. L1: Enemy traffic intercepted and recorded
  2. L2: Collected at volume
  3. L3: Letter statistics read through the cipher

way in: Keys arriving from correspondents (courier, public directory)

  1. L1: Keys sent in advance by courier or registered mail, or published
  2. L2: The correspondent's enciphering key read from a public directory
  3. L3: The protected public file as the port
  4. L4: Encipher in the receiver's public key; decipher with one's own secret key

way in: Known and probable plaintext (cribs)

  1. L1: Corresponding plaintext and ciphertext in the analyst's hands
  2. L2: Indexed: preambles, persons, ships, jargon
  3. L3: The crib laid against the ciphertext, using the machine's own rule that no letter encrypts to itself

way in: Mathematical results (hard problems, one-way functions)

  1. L1: Problems worked on for centuries (factoring since Fermat and Legendre)
  2. L2: Hardness assumptions chosen as foundations
  3. L3: One-way and trap-door functions as the designer's port

way in: Messages to protect (plaintext)

  1. L1: Messages people write, to be kept private and signed
  2. L2: Encoded into the cipher's alphabet: letters for classical ciphers, any binary data for computer ciphers
  3. L3: Plaintext blocks at the cipher's input

way in: Physical leakage (timing)

  1. L1: Time taken by private-key operations
  2. L2: Measured, even by passive eavesdropping on a protocol
  3. L3: Timing measurements exploited to recover the whole key

way in: Public keys gathered at Internet scale

  1. L1: Public keys and certificates offered by Internet hosts
  2. L2: Repeated keys found
  3. L3: Shared factors computed, giving private keys

way in: Published breaks and records

  1. L1: Breaks and records published (RSA-240 and a 795-bit discrete logarithm, 2019-2020)
  2. L2: Cost measured in core-years
  3. L3: Compared against key lengths under Moore's law
  4. L4: Designs re-evaluated and adapted

way in: Randomness and keys

  1. L1: Physical randomness at the device (events, noise); scarce on first boot of embedded devices
  2. L2: The operating system's random number generator
  3. L3: The key, chosen uniformly at random

way in: Spoken codes over telephone and radio (code talkers)

  1. L1: Voice on military telephone and radio nets
  2. L2: Agreed words standing for letters, in the speaker's own language
  3. L3: The trained code talker on each end

way in: The user's and cryptographer's thought (keys remembered, procedures followed)

  1. L1: The key held in memory, without written notes
  2. L2: Working the system without mental strain or a long list of rules
  3. L3: Understanding what to do at the interface (encrypt, sign, publish and fetch keys) and avoiding dangerous errors

way out: Breaks published in the open

  1. L1: Published for all, including the designers
  2. L6: A break or record written up

way out: Ciphertext sent

  1. L1: The cryptogram goes out where anyone may record it
  2. L4: The cipher enciphers
  3. L5: The mode chains or counts the blocks

way out: Ciphertext stored for later decryption

  1. L2: Ciphertext held
  2. L7: Collect now, decrypt when quantum technology matures

way out: Intelligence disseminated

  1. L1: Commanders act on it
  2. L6: Decrypts summarised under cover names

way out: Patches and replaced keys deployed

  1. L1: Patches installed on servers
  2. L5: Patched software and new certificates chosen

way out: Plaintext delivered to the reader

  1. L1: The recovered message in front of the intended reader (Human sight)
  2. L4: Decryption reverses the cipher

way out: Public key placed in a directory

  1. L1: The entry in the public directory, waiting to be used
  2. L5: Key pair made; the enciphering half published

way out: Signed messages and contracts

  1. L1: The signed document checked by anyone with the public key
  2. L5: Signature computed with the private key

way out: Standards and migration targets

  1. L1: Algorithms deprecated and disallowed on dates in products
  2. L5: Standards issued (AES 2001; ML-KEM in FIPS 203)
  3. L7: A national target for migrating away from quantum-vulnerable public keys

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