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Malware

Malware (a portmanteau of malicious software) is any software intentionally designed to cause disruption or destruction to a computer, server, client, or computer network, leak private information, gain unauthorized access to information or systems, deprive access to information, or interfere with the user's computer security and privacy without their knowledge (src:wp:malware). Walked as the software together with its life as the research literature describes it: how it arrives (media, email, scanning, credentials), runs and hides on its host, spreads or takes orders, what its payload does (ransom, theft, denial of service, fraud, sabotage), the operators and markets that make and sell it, and the defenders (antivirus, patches, segregation) it runs against.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born at1971 (Creeper); first PC virus in the wild 1982; first malicious worm 1988
born precisionyear
boundaryInside: the malicious program in all its kinds (virus, worm, Trojan horse, rootkit, backdoor, dropper, ransomware, spyware, botnet bot...), its life on a host (delivery, execution, trigger, concealment, persistence), its spread (copying into files, scanning networks, removable media, user deception) or its command channel (C&C, P2P), its payload (encryption for ransom, theft, denial of service, click fraud, mining, sabotage), and the toolchain and market built around it (kits, crypters and repacking, pay-per-install, rental). Outside: the hosts (software, operating systems, hardware, networks) it runs on; the vulnerabilities it exploits; the people who write, run, buy, pay and are harmed; the defenders (antivirus, intrusion detection, firewalls, patching) and the law.
nested levelA kind of software (software walk: 'kind by intent'), running on hosts' operating systems and hardware at rung 12, carried across networks and media; made and steered by people (operators, markets) whose purposes sit at its top floor; one of the parts computer security is built against.
scaletechnological

Measures (36) published science

characteristic clock: lifetime of a virus strain in the wild~14 (boot and macro); 6-9 (file) months
Code Red population doubling time37 minutes
Mirai early doubling time76 minutes
Slammer: share of vulnerable hosts infected in 10 minutes>90 percent
Slammer full scanning rate>55 million (reached in ~3 minutes) scans per second
Slammer code size376 (404-byte UDP packet) bytes
Slammer hosts infected>=75,000 hosts
Code Red hosts infected on 19 July 2001>359,000 in <14 h hosts
Code Red epidemic cost>2.6 billion USD
Code Red peak infection rate>2,000 hosts per minute
Mirai peak infections600,000 devices
Mirai credentials list62 (10 tried per device) username/password pairs
Mirai first attack on Krebs>600 Gbps
Mirai attacks launched>15,000 attacks
repacking interval (all families)>=1 per 11 (top ten families: 6.5) days
pay-per-install price, US and Great Britain100-180 USD per thousand installs
cybercrime commodity revenue on anonymous markets 2011-2017>=15 million USD
known DOS viruses, 1994~2,000 (2-3 new a day) viruses
malware variants counted in 2017669,947,865 (twice 2016) variants
share of malware not detected by antivirus~33 percent
antivirus label flips that revert next day>50 percent of flips
email share of malware delivery (2018)96 percent
infections via Windows 10, Jan-Mar 2020~83 percent
Android apps over-privileged (sample of 940)one third share
fileless attacks share, 201835 (432% increase in 2017) percent of attacks
share of W32/Simile given to its metamorphic engine90 of >14,000 lines percent
ransomware payments1.1 bn (2019), 999 m (2020), 1.25 bn (2023), 813 m (2024) USD
ransomware revenue via cryptocurrency 2015-2017 (one study, as cited)16 million USD
ratio of victims' direct losses to ransom revenue10-100 (one to two orders of magnitude) ratio
health-care ransomware attacks (US, 2016-2021)374 attacks; annual count more than doubled; ~42 million patients' records exposed
WannaCry lost NHS activity (infected trusts)5.9 (about 6% fewer admissions per infected hospital per day) million GBP
annual growth of malware research publications 2005-201534.1 percent per year
click fraud share of active malware (2012 estimate)60-70 percent
key generators carrying malwareup to 55 (36% of those undetected) percent
cybercrime cost forecast 2021 (contested)6 trillion USD
cuckoo eggs predicted rejected by drongos (cross-domain)93.7 percent

Open contentions (7) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (15) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Malware. Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (24) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (17)

Sits inside / holds (4)

expressed by (26)

floor filled by (20)

Kinds (17)

wired (4)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

malware as malware analysts describe it: the host world it lands in, up to the operator's purpose (reader's view)

  1. L1: The host world: computers, servers, devices, networks, media and their users
  2. L2: Delivery: email attachments, downloads, USB and floppy media, network scans, guessed logins; droppers bring the rest
  3. L3: Execution on the host: a flaw exploited or the user runs it; privileges taken
  4. L4: Control on the host: triggers, environment checks, concealment, dormancy, persistence
  5. L5: Propagation and command: copies onward or C&C; whole lineages by code reuse
  6. L6: Payload and monetisation: ransom, theft, DDoS, fraud, mining, sabotage
  7. L7: Purpose: profit, espionage, sabotage, experiments and pranks

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: Control on the host: trigger and environment checks, concealment, persistence, dormancy (the virus life cycle's dormant and triggering phases)
  2. L5: Propagation and command: copying onward, or reporting to and taking orders from a controller; repacked builds pushed out
  3. L6: Payload and monetisation: ransom, theft, denial of service, click fraud, mining, sabotage; sold or rented in a market that hinges on access to compromised systems
  4. L7: The operator's purpose: profit, espionage, sabotage with political aims, experiments and pranks

way in: Being detected

  1. L1: Detection by static signatures and dynamic behaviour
  2. L2: Engines' labels on a sample, which flip and copy each other
  3. L3: Read by distributors: repacking tracks the concern about signatures

way in: Competing infections

  1. L1: Processes bound to the infection ports and other malware on the device
  2. L2: Process list read
  3. L3: Rivals identified (other Mirai variants, .anime, QBot)

way in: Login prompts: default passwords

  1. L1: Telnet ports 23 and 2323 on IoT devices
  2. L2: Login tried: 10 pairs from a list of 62 default credentials
  3. L3: Success reported to a report server; a loader infects

way in: Network scanning: who answers

  1. L1: The address space and its hosts; a constant background of scanning already fills it
  2. L2: Probe and answer: random scanning picks addresses; a vulnerable service answers
  3. L3: The flaw triggered: the worm runs as its own process on the new host

way in: Orders from the controller

  1. L1: DNS names, some generated by algorithm, pointing at the controller
  2. L2: The C&C channel: client-server or peer-to-peer
  3. L3: The order received: attack commands with targets (Mirai's 15,000+ attacks)

way in: Ransom payments

  1. L1: Cryptocurrency as the carrier that let ransomware flourish
  2. L2: Payments made: $1.25bn record in 2023, $813m in 2024
  3. L3: Received by the operators ($16m in cryptocurrency 2015-2017, one study)
  4. L5: Cashed out: cash-out services the most listed, highest-earning

way in: Removable media

  1. L1: Media carried between machines, across air gaps
  2. L2: Boot sector or autorun read when the medium is attached
  3. L3: Infection passed on in the same way

way in: Supply from the market

  1. L1: Online marketplaces and forums
  2. L2: Tools offered: kits (the 1994 Virus Creation Laboratory), crimeware
  3. L3: Installs bought: 12 of the top 20 families bought infections
  4. L4: Botnets rented as commodities

way in: The host's own state

  1. L1: The host system: OS, files, registry, processes, attached controllers
  2. L2: Fingerprinting the environment when executed
  3. L3: Conditions checked: Stuxnet looks for Step7; miners watch for idle time

way in: The user opens it

  1. L1: Email (96% of delivery in 2018), downloads, pirated tools
  2. L2: The disguise read by the user: a benign-looking program or attachment
  3. L3: Run by the user: a virus needs its host program run

way in: Time and counters

  1. L1: The clock and counts kept on the host (the Barrote virus triggered on 5 January 1994)
  2. L2: A count read: copies made, uses, events
  3. L3: Trigger compared: 50th use, boot time, user actions

way out: Burn the host's resources

  1. L1: Slower machine, heat and fan noise
  2. L6: Click fraud and mining for revenue

way out: Copies sent onward

  1. L1: Packets on the network: Slammer's 376-byte scanner in one UDP packet
  2. L3: Copies written into programs or files (virus)
  3. L5: Decision to spread: every infected host scans

way out: Denial-of-service traffic

  1. L1: Traffic over 600 Gbps at the target
  2. L6: Attacks launched (15,000+ by Mirai)

way out: Drive out rivals, close the door

  1. L1: Competing processes killed; infection ports closed behind it
  2. L4: Rivals identified

way out: Hide and hold

  1. L1: The OS modified: processes and files hidden
  2. L4: Concealment decided

way out: Sabotage physical processes

  1. L1: Centrifuges made to tear themselves apart
  2. L3: PLCs reprogrammed
  3. L7: Sabotage with political aims

way out: Steal and send out

  1. L1: Data leaving, even from air-gapped machines by emissions
  2. L6: Data stolen; accounts accessed

way out: Withhold files for ransom

  1. L1: The screen: a ransom note or false 'cyber police' accusation the victim reads
  2. L6: Files withheld until paid
  3. L7: Purpose: extortion; health care, pipelines hit

Sources (36) published science

Li, Li, Ye and Xu, Arms Race in Adversarial Malware Detection: A Survey (arXiv:2005.11671)
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Kephart 1994, A Biologically Inspired Immune System for Computers (Artificial Life IV) (behind its links)
Pastor-Satorras, Vazquez and Vespignani, Dynamical and correlation properties of the Internet, PRL 87, 2001 (arXiv cond-mat/0105161) (behind its links)
Moore, Paxson, Savage, Shannon, Staniford and Weaver, Inside the Slammer Worm, IEEE Security & Privacy 1(4), 2003 (doi:10.1109/MSECP.2003.1219056) (behind its links)
Moore, Shannon, Brown 2002, Code-Red: a case study on the spread and victims of an Internet worm (IMW) (behind its links)
Abbou et al. 2024, When all computers shut down: the clinical impact of a major cyber-attack on a general hospital (Frontiers in Digital Health) doi:10.3389/fdgth.2024.1321485 (behind its links)
Anderson, Barton, Boehme, Clayton, Ganan, Grasso, Levi, Moore and Vasek, Measuring the Changing Cost of Cybercrime, WEIS 2019 (behind its links)
Caballero, Grier, Kreibich, Paxson 2011, Measuring Pay-per-Install: The Commoditization of Malware Distribution (USENIX Security) (behind its links)
Antonakakis, M. et al. (2017) Understanding the Mirai Botnet. 26th USENIX Security Symposium (behind its links)
van Wegberg et al. 2018, Plug and Prey? Measuring the Commoditization of Cybercrime via Online Anonymous Markets (USENIX Security) (behind its links)
Zhu et al. 2020, Measuring and Modeling the Label Dynamics of Online Anti-Malware Engines (USENIX Security) (behind its links)
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Neprash, McGlave, Cross, Virnig, Puskarich, Huling, Rozenshtein and Nikpay, Trends in Ransomware Attacks on US Hospitals, Clinics, and Other Health Care Delivery Organizations, 2016-2021, JAMA Health Forum 3(12), 2022 (doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2022.4873; PMC9856685) (behind its links)
Ghafur et al. 2019, A retrospective impact analysis of the WannaCry cyberattack on the NHS (npj Digital Medicine) doi:10.1038/s41746-019-0161-6 (behind its links)
Lund et al. 2023, When perfection isn't enough: host egg signatures are an effective defence against high-fidelity African cuckoo mimicry (Proc R Soc B) doi:10.1098/rspb.2023.1125 (behind its links)
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Vanlyssel 2024, Securing U.S. Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from Stuxnet and the Ukraine Power Grid Attacks (arXiv:2510.14185) (behind its links)
Thomas K, Huang DY, Wang D, Bursztein E, Grier C, Holt TJ, Kruegel C, McCoy D, Savage S, Vigna G (2015) Framing Dependencies Introduced by Underground Commoditization. WEIS 2015 (behind its links)
MASCOT: Analyzing Malware Evolution Through A Well-Curated Source Code Dataset (arXiv 2512.00741, 2025) (behind its links)
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Lipp et al. 2018, Meltdown, arXiv:1801.01207 (behind its links)
Scarfone, K. & Mell, P. (2007). Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS). NIST Special Publication 800-94. doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-94 (behind its links)
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