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Malware
Malware (a portmanteau of malicious software) is any software intentionally designed to cause disruption or destruction to a computer, server, client, or computer network, leak private information, gain unauthorized access to information or systems, deprive access to information, or interfere with the user's computer security and privacy without their knowledge (src:wp:malware). Walked as the software together with its life as the research literature describes it: how it arrives (media, email, scanning, credentials), runs and hides on its host, spreads or takes orders, what its payload does (ransom, theft, denial of service, fraud, sabotage), the operators and markets that make and sell it, and the defenders (antivirus, patches, segregation) it runs against.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | 1971 (Creeper); first PC virus in the wild 1982; first malicious worm 1988 |
| born precision | year |
| boundary | Inside: the malicious program in all its kinds (virus, worm, Trojan horse, rootkit, backdoor, dropper, ransomware, spyware, botnet bot...), its life on a host (delivery, execution, trigger, concealment, persistence), its spread (copying into files, scanning networks, removable media, user deception) or its command channel (C&C, P2P), its payload (encryption for ransom, theft, denial of service, click fraud, mining, sabotage), and the toolchain and market built around it (kits, crypters and repacking, pay-per-install, rental). Outside: the hosts (software, operating systems, hardware, networks) it runs on; the vulnerabilities it exploits; the people who write, run, buy, pay and are harmed; the defenders (antivirus, intrusion detection, firewalls, patching) and the law. |
| nested level | A kind of software (software walk: 'kind by intent'), running on hosts' operating systems and hardware at rung 12, carried across networks and media; made and steered by people (operators, markets) whose purposes sit at its top floor; one of the parts computer security is built against. |
| scale | technological |
Measures (36) published science
| characteristic clock: lifetime of a virus strain in the wild | ~14 (boot and macro); 6-9 (file) months |
| Code Red population doubling time | 37 minutes |
| Mirai early doubling time | 76 minutes |
| Slammer: share of vulnerable hosts infected in 10 minutes | >90 percent |
| Slammer full scanning rate | >55 million (reached in ~3 minutes) scans per second |
| Slammer code size | 376 (404-byte UDP packet) bytes |
| Slammer hosts infected | >=75,000 hosts |
| Code Red hosts infected on 19 July 2001 | >359,000 in <14 h hosts |
| Code Red epidemic cost | >2.6 billion USD |
| Code Red peak infection rate | >2,000 hosts per minute |
| Mirai peak infections | 600,000 devices |
| Mirai credentials list | 62 (10 tried per device) username/password pairs |
| Mirai first attack on Krebs | >600 Gbps |
| Mirai attacks launched | >15,000 attacks |
| repacking interval (all families) | >=1 per 11 (top ten families: 6.5) days |
| pay-per-install price, US and Great Britain | 100-180 USD per thousand installs |
| cybercrime commodity revenue on anonymous markets 2011-2017 | >=15 million USD |
| known DOS viruses, 1994 | ~2,000 (2-3 new a day) viruses |
| malware variants counted in 2017 | 669,947,865 (twice 2016) variants |
| share of malware not detected by antivirus | ~33 percent |
| antivirus label flips that revert next day | >50 percent of flips |
| email share of malware delivery (2018) | 96 percent |
| infections via Windows 10, Jan-Mar 2020 | ~83 percent |
| Android apps over-privileged (sample of 940) | one third share |
| fileless attacks share, 2018 | 35 (432% increase in 2017) percent of attacks |
| share of W32/Simile given to its metamorphic engine | 90 of >14,000 lines percent |
| ransomware payments | 1.1 bn (2019), 999 m (2020), 1.25 bn (2023), 813 m (2024) USD |
| ransomware revenue via cryptocurrency 2015-2017 (one study, as cited) | 16 million USD |
| ratio of victims' direct losses to ransom revenue | 10-100 (one to two orders of magnitude) ratio |
| health-care ransomware attacks (US, 2016-2021) | 374 attacks; annual count more than doubled; ~42 million patients' records exposed |
| WannaCry lost NHS activity (infected trusts) | 5.9 (about 6% fewer admissions per infected hospital per day) million GBP |
| annual growth of malware research publications 2005-2015 | 34.1 percent per year |
| click fraud share of active malware (2012 estimate) | 60-70 percent |
| key generators carrying malware | up to 55 (36% of those undetected) percent |
| cybercrime cost forecast 2021 (contested) | 6 trillion USD |
| cuckoo eggs predicted rejected by drongos (cross-domain) | 93.7 percent |
Open contentions (7) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-1523 Is cybercrime a full 'crime as a service' economy?
booked: The map keeps both: paid malware distribution grew dominant, and the wider market is thinner than often claimed.
the other reading: a full crime-as-a-service economy; a thin market with restricted outsourcing - C-1527 How much does cybercrime cost the world?
booked: The map keeps both: a widely quoted forecast of US$6 trillion, and researchers' smaller estimates built item by item.
the other reading: forecast figure; measured components only - C-1528 Can a computer virus die out on its own?
booked: The map keeps both readings: a spread threshold below which outbreaks die, and networks with no such threshold where viruses linger at low levels.
the other reading: threshold epidemics; no threshold, endemic low prevalence - C-1530 Is grayware (adware, spyware) malware?
booked: The map keeps it as a disputed kind, with both readings listed.
the other reading: grayware is malware; grayware is goodware with bad practices - C-1534 Are computer viruses a form of artificial life?
booked: The map keeps the researchers who call them artificial life beside the view that people, not the code, make the choices.
the other reading: Kephart 1994: computer viruses as 'the first and only form of artificial life to have had a measurable impact on society'; Forrest et al. 1997: computer viruses as a form of artificial life - C-1535 When was the first malware?
booked: The map keeps the candidates: Creeper (1971), Elk Cloner (1982), Brain (1986) and the Morris worm (1988).
the other reading: 1982 Elk Cloner (first PC virus in the wild); 1986 (c)Brain (first IBM PC virus in the wild); 1988 Morris worm ('the first malicious worm', Moore et al.); 1966 von Neumann's theory as the idea's birth (rung 11) - C-1549 Who made Stuxnet?
booked: The map books the attack as reported, and keeps who did it as a contested question.
the other reading: US and Israel (Operation Olympic Games); unattributed
Cross-scale patterns seen here (15) our proposal
Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Malware. Each links to every other system that shows it.
- causal ceiling (structural)
No algorithm can perfectly detect all possible viruses (Cohen 1987): a limit on any detector set by computability, not by its means. - lightning (structural)
A stored difference released at once: Slammer reached its full 55-million-scans-per-second rate in about three minutes and infected over 90% of vulnerable hosts in ten, 'precluding any human-based response'; a dormant virus discharges on its trigger. - red-queen (structural)
Virus authors and anti-virus developers both improve, and in 1994 the race was 'roughly even': signatures answered by packing and repacking (a family repacked at least every 11 days), detectors that decay over time (TESSERACT), and in 2017 still about a third undetected. Both running, neither winnin - runaway from an unstable balance (structural)
An epidemic threshold: a strain that infects 0.9 others dies out, 1.1 spreads (Kephart); on scale-free networks the threshold vanishes and viruses persist at low prevalence (Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani). - same role, different builds (structural)
One job, telling a dangerous mimic from self and beating it by diversity, done by unrelated builds: the vertebrate immune system's self/nonself discrimination (Forrest's computer immune systems); drongos whose varied egg 'signatures' reject 93.7% of near-perfect cuckoo mimics; and the computing rule - same shape, opposite sign (structural)
One process run both ways: Welchia exploited the same Blaster flaw to spread and installed the patch that closed it; Reaper was a self-replicating program written to delete Creeper; the on-access scanner hooks into the kernel 'in a manner similar to how certain malware itself would attempt to operat - templating (structural)
One module reused unchanged: Mirai's released source became the base of dozens of competing variants; crypters ship a stub plus an encrypted blob for any payload; malware grows more standardised, in step with mainstream software engineering. - The Payment to Entropy (structural)
Extortion hands on value with a large toll: victims' direct losses (lost data and systems, time to recover) run one to two orders of magnitude above the ransom revenue the operators receive, so per hand-off efficiency is about 0.01-0.1 (form: material/value). Worms pay in wasted probes: random scann - trade one property for another (structural)
Harm traded for persistence: destroying the host is 'suicidal' for a virus, so most keep the host working; cryptominers cap their load to stay hidden; at the other end wipers destroy everything and do not persist. Transposable elements make the same trade in genomes, persisting 'while limiting harm - Umwelt: each system carves its own slice of one shared medium (structural)
Each kind carves its own slice of one shared network: Mirai's world was Telnet ports 23 and 2323 and a list of 62 credentials, so its device composition followed a few manufacturers' defaults; Stuxnet's world was Step7 and particular PLCs, dormant elsewhere; a worm sees only the address space and on - who opens the door (structural)
At every entry the receiver opened the door ahead of time: a listening service (a port installed by the vendor) for worms, the autorun handling of media for USB malware, the user's own click for Trojans. - holding / entrainment (partial)
The host sets when a virus replicates (it spreads only when the user runs the infected program) and a botnet's controller sets when its bots attack; a reboot ends a Mirai bot. - seed (partial)
Possible: Mirai's released source unpacked into dozens of variants; von Neumann's self-reproduction result opened the whole kind. Whether this is 'vast combinatorics' is not shown by the sources. - The carry (partial)
The wait and its lookahead: Code Red's threads each waited on a TCP connection (latency-limited), while Slammer's single UDP packet skipped the handshake and ran at the pace of the links (bandwidth-limited); then the links filled and growth slowed, the next place waiting for capacity. - coordination-before-mapping (surface)
A worm population covers the whole address space with no map and no messages between copies: random scanning, 'eventually finding and infecting all susceptible hosts'. Coordination here is only statistical.
Valence: what it trades, and with whom (24) published science
Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.
- Software via sys:written-record · Malware gain
- Operating system via sys:operating-system · Malware gain
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:human · Malware gain
- Internet via sys:internet · Malware gain
- Electrical grid via sys:electrical-grid · Malware gain
- Money via sys:money · Malware gain
- Cryptography via sys:written-record · Malware gain
- Access control via sys:operating-system · Malware gain
- Intrusion detection system via sys:written-record · Malware mixed
- Threat actor via sys:cybercrime · Malware gain
- Information security via sys:written-record · Malware loss
- Organization via sys:organization · Malware gain
- Computer hardware via sys:computer-hardware · Malware gain
- Firewall (computing) via sys:internet · Malware loss
- Software vulnerability via sys:software · Malware gain
- Antivirus / anti-malware software via sys:operating-system · Malware mixed
- Security operations center (SOC) via sys:electromagnetic-field · Malware loss
- Incident response via sys:operating-system · Malware loss
- Botnet via sys:computer · Malware gain
- Denial-of-service attack via sys:computer · Malware gain
- Security information and event management (SIEM) via sys:written-record · Malware gain
- Cyberwarfare via sys:computer-network · Malware gain
- Cybercrime and its underground economy via sys:cybercrime · Malware gain
- Cyber threat intelligence via sys:malware · Malware loss
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (17)
- Computer security
- Exploit
- Payload
- Rootkit (concealment)
- Command and control (C&C)
- Crypter / packer
- Dropper / loader
- Botnet
- Competition for control of a running program (exploit vs patch)
- Malware evasion against machine-learning detection
- Attacking programs against kernel isolation (Meltdown)
- Cyberwarfare
- Cybercrime and its underground economy
- Competition for undetected presence on hosts (malware vs antivirus)
- Concealment against the log record
- RowHammer attacks against memory isolation
- Competition for control of the call stack (stack-smashing malware against the running program)
Sits inside / holds (4)
expressed by (26)
- Generation/Synthesis
- Recombination/Composition
- Scaffolding/Enablement (Meta-Tooling)
- Templating / Standardization
- Amplification/Scale-Up (Manufacture & Distribution)
- Symbiosis/Co-Creation (Collaborative Specialization)
- Evolvability/Plasticity Engineering (Design for Future Variation)
- Distributed Autonomy/Decentralized Execution (Subsidiarity)
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Sensing/Scanning
- Search/Foraging
- Trail-Marking / Externalized Memory (Stigmergy)
- Evade Detection
- Overcome Barrier
- Speed
- Precision Attack
- Neutralize Defenses
- Resource Denial/Attrition
- Subversion & Co-optation
- Prepositioning & Latency
- Leverage Host/Amplification
- Cascade Induction
- Physical/Virtual Barrier
- Deception
- Resilience & Repair
- Redundancy & Diversity
floor filled by (20)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Internet
- Operating system
- Electronic mail
- Cryptography
- Threat actor
- Botnet
- Computer hardware
- Software vulnerability
- Exploit
- Payload
- Rootkit (concealment)
- Command and control (C&C)
- Crypter / packer
- Dropper / loader
- Cybercrime and its underground economy
- pay per install
- removable media
- Denial-of-service attack
- Cyberwarfare
Kinds (17)
- Computer virus (a program that writes itself into other programs)
- Software
- Computer worm
- Trojan horse
- Ransomware
- Botnet
- Rootkit (concealment)
- Backdoor
- Wiper
- Click-fraud malware
- Crimeware and infostealers
- Cryptominer (cryptojacking)
- Fileless malware (living off the land)
- Polymorphic and metamorphic malware
- Grayware (spyware, adware, PUPs)
- Keylogger
- Logic bomb
wired (4)
Notes published science
- Digitally signed malware was already in the wild in 2003. Copying a legitimate file's signature onto known malware made some anti-virus products stop flagging it, even though the signature didn't match the file, and only about 20% of the certificates used to sign malware were likely revoked over 15 years. (src:kim-2017-certified-malware)
- Slammer, a worm just 376 bytes long, infected over 90% of the vulnerable machines on the Internet in about ten minutes, faster than any person could react, and with no harmful payload at all still cancelled airline flights and broke ATMs (src:moore-2003-slammer).
- The first antivirus program was itself a self-replicating program: Reaper was written to hunt down Creeper in 1971, and in 2003 the Welchia worm broke in through the Blaster hole only to install the patch that closed it (src:wp:computer-virus, src:wp:computer-worm).
- Computers and birds solve the same problem the same way: a monoculture of one operating system lets one worm take them all, while drongos whose eggs each carry a different 'signature' reject 93.7% of cuckoo eggs even though the cuckoos copy them almost perfectly (src:lund-2023-drongo, src:wp:malware).
- Pulling the plug can be the trigger: NIST warns that a compromised host may ping another host, and when responders disconnect it 'the subsequent pings will fail' and the malware 'may overwrite or encrypt all the data on the host's hard drive' (src:nist-sp800-61r2). The textbook first move of containment is, against some malware, exactly what sets it off.
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
malware as malware analysts describe it: the host world it lands in, up to the operator's purpose (reader's view)
- L1: The host world: computers, servers, devices, networks, media and their users
- L2: Delivery: email attachments, downloads, USB and floppy media, network scans, guessed logins; droppers bring the rest
- L3: Execution on the host: a flaw exploited or the user runs it; privileges taken
- L4: Control on the host: triggers, environment checks, concealment, dormancy, persistence
- L5: Propagation and command: copies onward or C&C; whole lineages by code reuse
- L6: Payload and monetisation: ransom, theft, DDoS, fraud, mining, sabotage
- L7: Purpose: profit, espionage, sabotage, experiments and pranks
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L4: Control on the host: trigger and environment checks, concealment, persistence, dormancy (the virus life cycle's dormant and triggering phases)
- L5: Propagation and command: copying onward, or reporting to and taking orders from a controller; repacked builds pushed out
- L6: Payload and monetisation: ransom, theft, denial of service, click fraud, mining, sabotage; sold or rented in a market that hinges on access to compromised systems
- L7: The operator's purpose: profit, espionage, sabotage with political aims, experiments and pranks
way in: Being detected
- L1: Detection by static signatures and dynamic behaviour
- L2: Engines' labels on a sample, which flip and copy each other
- L3: Read by distributors: repacking tracks the concern about signatures
way in: Competing infections
- L1: Processes bound to the infection ports and other malware on the device
- L2: Process list read
- L3: Rivals identified (other Mirai variants, .anime, QBot)
way in: Login prompts: default passwords
- L1: Telnet ports 23 and 2323 on IoT devices
- L2: Login tried: 10 pairs from a list of 62 default credentials
- L3: Success reported to a report server; a loader infects
way in: Network scanning: who answers
- L1: The address space and its hosts; a constant background of scanning already fills it
- L2: Probe and answer: random scanning picks addresses; a vulnerable service answers
- L3: The flaw triggered: the worm runs as its own process on the new host
way in: Orders from the controller
- L1: DNS names, some generated by algorithm, pointing at the controller
- L2: The C&C channel: client-server or peer-to-peer
- L3: The order received: attack commands with targets (Mirai's 15,000+ attacks)
way in: Ransom payments
- L1: Cryptocurrency as the carrier that let ransomware flourish
- L2: Payments made: $1.25bn record in 2023, $813m in 2024
- L3: Received by the operators ($16m in cryptocurrency 2015-2017, one study)
- L5: Cashed out: cash-out services the most listed, highest-earning
way in: Removable media
- L1: Media carried between machines, across air gaps
- L2: Boot sector or autorun read when the medium is attached
- L3: Infection passed on in the same way
way in: Supply from the market
- L1: Online marketplaces and forums
- L2: Tools offered: kits (the 1994 Virus Creation Laboratory), crimeware
- L3: Installs bought: 12 of the top 20 families bought infections
- L4: Botnets rented as commodities
way in: The host's own state
- L1: The host system: OS, files, registry, processes, attached controllers
- L2: Fingerprinting the environment when executed
- L3: Conditions checked: Stuxnet looks for Step7; miners watch for idle time
way in: The user opens it
- L1: Email (96% of delivery in 2018), downloads, pirated tools
- L2: The disguise read by the user: a benign-looking program or attachment
- L3: Run by the user: a virus needs its host program run
way in: Time and counters
- L1: The clock and counts kept on the host (the Barrote virus triggered on 5 January 1994)
- L2: A count read: copies made, uses, events
- L3: Trigger compared: 50th use, boot time, user actions
way out: Burn the host's resources
- L1: Slower machine, heat and fan noise
- L6: Click fraud and mining for revenue
way out: Copies sent onward
- L1: Packets on the network: Slammer's 376-byte scanner in one UDP packet
- L3: Copies written into programs or files (virus)
- L5: Decision to spread: every infected host scans
way out: Denial-of-service traffic
- L1: Traffic over 600 Gbps at the target
- L6: Attacks launched (15,000+ by Mirai)
way out: Drive out rivals, close the door
- L1: Competing processes killed; infection ports closed behind it
- L4: Rivals identified
way out: Hide and hold
- L1: The OS modified: processes and files hidden
- L4: Concealment decided
way out: Sabotage physical processes
- L1: Centrifuges made to tear themselves apart
- L3: PLCs reprogrammed
- L7: Sabotage with political aims
way out: Steal and send out
- L1: Data leaving, even from air-gapped machines by emissions
- L6: Data stolen; accounts accessed
way out: Withhold files for ransom
- L1: The screen: a ransom note or false 'cyber police' accusation the victim reads
- L6: Files withheld until paid
- L7: Purpose: extortion; health care, pipelines hit