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Denial-of-service attack

A cyberattack in which the perpetrator seeks to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users by exhausting a finite resource it depends on (src:wp:denial-of-service-attack; RFC 4732). Walked as the DoS measurement and protocol literature describes it: the finite resources a networked service runs on (link bandwidth, connection state, CPU, memory, application sessions); the attack sources (single hosts, botnets, reflectors and amplifiers, volunteers, hijacked browsers); the kinds of attack traffic (volumetric floods, reflection and amplification, protocol-state exhaustion, application-layer, low-and-slow, algorithmic-complexity, low-rate shrew, crash and permanent attacks, telephony DoS); the exhaustion at the bottleneck and the denial to legitimate users; the attack's command; the booter market and extortion campaigns; the motives; and the defenders it meets (filtering, SYN cookies, blackholing, scrubbing, police takedowns). History from Saltzer and Schroeder's 1975 'denial of use' to the 22.2 Tbit/s record of 2025.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born at1975 (named); 1996 (first publicised SYN-flood attacks); 1999 (first documented botnet DDoS)
born precisionyear
boundaryInside: the attack while it runs: the attacker's command (target, vector, start and duration), the sources sending on its behalf while they send (bots, reflectors, volunteers' machines, hijacked browsers, rented servers), the attack traffic itself, and the exhaustion it causes at the target's bottleneck. Outside: the target and its legitimate users (they are what is denied), the Internet and its protocols that carry the traffic, the botnet as a standing infrastructure (its own walk), the booter business and the operators as people (threat actor), and the defenders (filtering, scrubbing, blackholing, police). A reflector belongs to the attack only for the packets it is tricked into sending; its operator is outside.
nested levelRun by threat actors over the Internet; built from attack sources and attack traffic; a kind of cyberattack (Saltzer and Schroeder's third class of violation, unauthorized denial of use); sold as a service in the cybercrime economy; part of cyberwarfare when states use it.
scaletechnological

Measures (37) published science

characteristic clock: TCP half-open state reclamation timer (example)75 s
characteristic clock: TCP minimum retransmission timeout (shrew period)1 s
characteristic clock: attack duration, share under 10 minutes (2001-2004)60 %
average delay to blackhole an attack at a major IXP1.16 minutes
market suppression after the HackForums booter ban13 weeks
time for a seized booter to reappear on a new domain3 days
NTP amplifier reduction after notification campaign92 % over 13 weeks
half-open connection memory (Linux 2.6.10 sock structure)>1300 bytes
typical default TCP backloga half-dozen to several dozen connections
bandwidth amplification factor, worst case (NTP monlist)4670 x
amplification factor, memcachedup to 50000 x
amplification factor, NTP (US-CERT table)556.9 x
protocols found susceptible to amplification14 protocols
ASes found lacking egress filtering2692 ASes
attacks seen by backscatter, 2001-200468000 attacks
attacks seen 2015-2017 (telescope plus honeypots)20000000 attacks
Web sites in .com/.net/.org involved with attacks daily3 %
targets migrating to a DDoS protection service after attack4.3 %
amplification attacks in one day at one IXP2608 attacks/day
share of IXP attacks blackholed3.82 %
longest attack seen at the IXP (SSDP)7.5 days
attacks on one cloud provider in 20213000000 attacks
SYN-flood share of attacks at OVHcloud, 202145 %
booter price for a month of attacks10-20 USD
booter VIP vs basic package (booter B)178.84 vs 19.83 USD
delivered vs advertised booter VIP rate25 %
reflectors per booter attack100-1000 reflectors
attack reduction after FBI Xmas2018 operation27-37 % for 10 weeks
attacks on the Netherlands after Webstresser takedown+146 %
DDoS mitigation market, 20181.94 billion USD
record attack bandwidth (Cloudflare claim, 23 September 2025, 40 seconds)22.2 Tbit/s
record HTTP request rate (Google, October 2023)398 million requests/s
shrew throughput cut (WAN, 909 kb/s attack)9.8 to 1.2 Mb/s
IDS traffic dropped after six minutes of algorithmic attack71 %
cost to break Tor's directory protocol by DDoS53.28 USD per month
phones needed in simulation to block a US state's 911 for days<6000 bots
first documented botnet DDoS (Trin00, University of Minnesota)1999 year

Open contentions (4) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (19) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Denial-of-service attack. Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (17) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (9)

Sits inside / holds (3)

expressed by (16)

floor filled by (17)

Kinds (19)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: The bottleneck at the target: the finite resource (link, backlog of half-open connections, CPU, connection pool, phone lines) where attack traffic, legitimate traffic and defences meet; whichever fills it decides who is served
  2. L5: The attack command: target, vector, start and duration, given by the attacker's own client, Stacheldraht's handlers (up to a thousand agents each), a botnet's command and control, a booter's panel, or a date hard-coded in malware (MyDoom)
  3. L6: Campaigns and the market: booters and their customers, extortion schemes, diversions and weeks-long campaigns, and the protection market that answers them ($1.94 billion in 2018)
  4. L7: The purpose: extortion, rivalry between game servers and shops, protest, censorship, revenge and vendettas, war, or nothing beyond being able to; carried by the attacker (runsOn threat actor)

the denial-of-service attack as DoS researchers describe it: the finite resources a service runs on, up to the attacker's purpose (reader's view)

  1. L1: The finite resources a networked service runs on: link bandwidth, router and server CPU, memory, connection tables, disk, application sessions, phone lines
  2. L2: Attack sources: a single well-connected host, botnets of thousands, reflectors and amplifiers, volunteers' machines, bystanders' browsers
  3. L3: Attack traffic by vector: volumetric floods (UDP, SYN, ICMP), reflection and amplification with spoofed sources, application-layer requests, low-and-slow connections, algorithmic-complexity inputs, low-rate bursts, malformed packets, automated calls
  4. L4: Exhaustion at the bottleneck: the link saturates, the backlog fills, the CPU livelocks, the connection pool is held; legitimate requests are crowded out and the service is denied
  5. L5: The attack command: target, vector, start, duration; client and handlers, botnet command and control, booter panels, a hard-coded date
  6. L6: Campaigns and the market: booter services at tens of dollars a month, extortion schemes, diversions, multi-week campaigns; the protection market answering them
  7. L7: The purpose: extortion, rivalry, protest, censorship, revenge, war, or none beyond being able to

way in: Attack sources: the machines that can send

  1. L1: Internet-connected machines with bandwidth: PCs, IoT devices, servers, browsers; attack capacity easier to gain than defensive capacity
  2. L2: Enlisted: infected with malware (botnets of thousands of hosts), volunteered (LOIC in Operation Payback), or hijacked in passing (the Great Cannon programming bystanders' browsers)
  3. L3: Each source sends: TCP, UDP or ICMP packets, HTTP requests; the Cannon injected its script in about 1.75% of requests

way in: Customers' orders (booter market)

  1. L1: Booter websites with simple web front-ends; payment by PayPal or cryptocurrency
  2. L2: Packages: $10-20 a month typical; a VIP package at $178.84 against $19.83, promising 80-100 Gbps
  3. L3: The order: target, method and duration (researchers' self-attacks configured to last 5 minutes)

way in: Defenders' responses

  1. L1: The defended path: the target's stack, its ISP and IXP, DDoS protection services and their scrubbing centres
  2. L2: Detection: the service notices it is under attack; detection and remediation often in different places by different providers
  3. L3: Response: blackholing (3.82% of IXP attacks, 1.16 min average delay), scrubbing, firewall rules, rate limits, SYN cookies, universal hashing

way in: Law and police action

  1. L1: Laws: 156 countries (80%) with cybercrime laws; the UK's 10-year maximum for DoS
  2. L2: Actions: arrests, domain seizures, police visits and warnings, search adverts aimed at young users
  3. L3: Effect on supply: seven booters offline at once in December 2018; one back on a new domain three days later

way in: Legitimate load and flash crowds

  1. L1: Legitimate users' requests to the same service
  2. L2: Peaks: flash crowds (the Slashdot effect, Michael Jackson's death in 2009), evening peaks 5-11 pm; in principle indistinguishable from a subtle attack
  3. L3: The cover: pulsing floods and disguised application requests look like heavy legitimate load

way in: New attack vectors from protocol design

  1. L1: Protocols whose responses exceed their requests, or which hold state for unverified clients
  2. L2: A vector found: 14 protocols in 2014; OpenVPN, ARMS, Ubiquiti discovery rising 500% in 2020-21; HTTP/2 Rapid Reset in October 2023
  3. L3: Added to tools: booter method menus name DNS, NTP, SNMP, LDAP, PORTMAP

way in: Permission to forge the source address

  1. L1: Edge routers that forward packets whatever their source address
  2. L2: No source address validation: up to 2,692 ASes without egress filtering; deploying it only helps other networks
  3. L3: Forged-source packets carried to reflectors and victims; the largest attacks all rely on spoofing

way in: Reflectors and amplifiers

  1. L1: Public UDP services: open DNS resolvers, NTP, SNMP, memcached, CLDAP, SSDP, game and P2P protocols
  2. L2: Amplifiers: millions of public hosts; a notification campaign cut NTP amplifiers by more than 92%, yet exploited protocols stay a threat for decades
  3. L3: Amplified replies to the spoofed victim: up to 4670 times (NTP), up to 50,000 (memcached); booter attacks use about 100-1,000 reflectors

way in: The target's own protocol settings

  1. L1: The target's protocol implementation: TCP's unbound LISTEN, the backlog, reclamation timers, the retransmission timeout, hash tables
  2. L2: The parameter: backlog of a half-dozen to several dozen; a 75 s reclamation timer (511 s in 4.4BSD-Lite); minimum RTO of 1 s; predictable hash functions
  3. L3: The attack tuned to it: a barrage no larger than the backlog, renewed as state is reclaimed; bursts at the RTO period; inputs that all collide

way in: World events

  1. L1: World events: wars, summits, holidays
  2. L2: The trigger: Russia's invasion of Ukraine (February 2022); Zelensky at Davos (January 2024); school holidays
  3. L3: Targets chosen to match: Ukrainian government and finance, then UK, US and German allies; Swiss federal websites

way out: Application-layer and low-and-slow

  1. L1: The server software unable to serve
  2. L3: Requests that over-exercise a function; bodies sent at 1 byte per 110 s; inputs that collide in hash tables
  3. L4: Connection pool, sessions or CPU held while bandwidth stays free
  4. L5: Function or connection type chosen

way out: Cascade to what depends on the target

  1. L1: Networks unreachable; sites behind Dyn unreachable for hours; the Tor network brought down
  2. L3: Routing churn trips route flap damping; directory votes fail
  3. L5: A shared dependency targeted: a DNS provider, routers, Tor's directory authorities

way out: Collateral damage and backscatter

  1. L1: Other services degraded; backscatter lands across the address space, where network telescopes sample it
  2. L3: Replies and attack traffic share congested links
  3. L4: The victim answers each spoofed packet

way out: Crash

  1. L1: The operating system crashes (WinNuke's blue screen)
  2. L3: One malformed packet: a fragmented ICMP echo over 65,535 bytes, overlapping fragments, out-of-band data to port 139
  3. L5: A known crash bug chosen

way out: Extortion message

  1. L1: An e-mail read by the target's staff
  2. L5: The demand composed
  3. L6: Low-level attack then a warning: pay in bitcoin or a larger attack follows

way out: Permanent DoS

  1. L1: The device bricked until repaired or replaced (BrickerBot)
  2. L3: Corrupt firmware flashed
  3. L5: Device chosen through its remote management flaw

way out: Protocol-state exhaustion (SYN flood)

  1. L1: Server memory: over 1300 bytes per half-open connection (Linux 2.6.10)
  2. L3: SYNs from unresponsive spoofed addresses
  3. L4: Backlog of half-open connections kept full
  4. L5: Barrage size, frequency and spoofed addresses chosen

way out: Telephony flood

  1. L1: The victim cannot make or receive calls, emergency calls included; in simulation under 6,000 phones block a state's 911 for days
  2. L3: Repeated automated calls; spoofed caller ID
  3. L4: Lines occupied
  4. L5: Number chosen

way out: Volumetric flood

  1. L1: The target's links saturated: terabit attacks on Krebs and Dyn in 2016; 22.2 Tbit/s for 40 seconds in September 2025
  2. L3: Sources and reflectors send; a VIP booter delivered about 25% of the advertised rate; traffic thins with distance across congested links
  3. L5: Attack started for a set duration

Sources (22) published science

Saltzer and Schroeder, The Protection of Information in Computer Systems, Proceedings of the IEEE 63(9), 1975 (doi:10.1109/PROC.1975.9939)
Denial-of-service attack (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise)
Rossow 2014, Amplification Hell: Revisiting Network Protocols for DDoS Abuse, NDSS 2014 (doi:10.14722/ndss.2014.23233) (behind its links)
Collier, Thomas, Clayton, Hutchings 2019, Booting the Booters: Evaluating the Effects of Police Interventions in the Market for Denial-of-Service Attacks, IMC 2019 (doi:10.1145/3355369.3355592) (behind its links)
Cyberwarfare (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Handley, Rescorla (eds.), IAB 2006, RFC 4732: Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations (doi:10.17487/RFC4732) (behind its links)
Fernandez, Dowdy, Conner 2022, High duty cycle moth sounds jam bat echolocation: bats counter with compensatory changes in buzz duration, J Exp Biol 225 (doi:10.1242/jeb.244187; PMC9637272) (behind its links)
Jones, Conner 2019, The jamming avoidance response in echolocating bats, Commun Integr Biol 12 (doi:10.1080/19420889.2019.1568818; PMC6419628) (behind its links)
Eddy 2007, RFC 4987: TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common Mitigations (doi:10.17487/RFC4987) (behind its links)
Kuzmanovic, Knightly 2003, Low-Rate TCP-Targeted Denial of Service Attacks (The Shrew vs. the Mice and Elephants), SIGCOMM 2003 (doi:10.1145/863955.863966) (behind its links)
Moore, Shannon, Brown, Voelker, Savage 2006, Inferring Internet Denial-of-Service Activity, ACM TOCS 24(2) (doi:10.1145/1132026.1132027) (behind its links)
Kopp, Dietzel, Hohlfeld 2021, DDoS Never Dies? An IXP Perspective on DDoS Amplification Attacks, PAM 2021 (arXiv:2103.04443) (behind its links)
Kopp et al. 2019, DDoS Hide & Seek: On the Effectiveness of a Booter Services Takedown, IMC '19 (arXiv:1909.07455) (behind its links)
Kuhrer, Hupperich, Rossow, Holz 2014, Exit from Hell? Reducing the Impact of Amplification DDoS Attacks, USENIX Security 2014 (behind its links)
Jonker, King, Krupp, Rossow, Sperotto, Dainotti 2017, Millions of Targets Under Attack: a Macroscopic Characterization of the DoS Ecosystem, IMC 2017 (doi:10.1145/3131365.3131383) (behind its links)
Boin, Guillaume, Grimaud, Groleat, Hauspie 2022, One Year of DDoS Attacks Against a Cloud Provider: an Overview (arXiv:2208.14205) (behind its links)
Osterweil, Stavrou, Zhang 2019, 20 Years of DDoS: a Call to Action (arXiv:1904.02739) (behind its links)
Crosby, Wallach 2003, Denial of Service via Algorithmic Complexity Attacks, USENIX Security 2003 (behind its links)
Luo, Zhang, Neerati, Kate 2026, Five Minutes of DDoS Brings down Tor: DDoS Attacks on the Tor Directory Protocol and Mitigations, EuroSys 2026 (arXiv:2509.10755; doi:10.1145/3767295.3803607) (behind its links)
Guri, Mirsky, Elovici 2016, 9-1-1 DDoS: Threat, Analysis and Mitigation (arXiv:1609.02353) (behind its links)
Ferguson, Senie 2000, RFC 2827 / BCP 38: Network Ingress Filtering (doi:10.17487/RFC2827) (behind its links)
Marczak, Weaver, Dalek, Ensafi, Fifield, McKune, Rey, Scott-Railton, Deibert, Paxson 2015, China's Great Cannon (Citizen Lab research brief; FOCI 2015) (behind its links)