EVOPEDIA

← all systems · see it in The System

Cyberwarfare

The use of cyberattacks by one state (or state-backed actors) against another, with harm the sources compare to traditional warfare: espionage, sabotage, denial of service, propaganda and economic disruption carried through computer networks (src:wp:cyberwarfare). Walked as a competition between states (QUEUE-BRIEF addendum 7): the networked infrastructure both sides depend on (the pool), the access and exploits that reach it, the operations and campaigns, the forces and proxies that run them, the attribution, signalling and escalation between states, the norms and law that frame it, and the policy it serves. Whether it is 'war' at all is contested (C-1710).

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born at2003 (Titan Rain probes); 2007 (Estonia); 2010 (Stuxnet uncovered)
born precisionyear
boundaryInside: the operations states (and actors they sponsor, tolerate or lean on) run through networks against another state: the access they hold, the cyber weapons they stockpile and use, the forces and proxies that run them, the attribution and signalling between the sides, and the policy each operation serves. Outside: the networked infrastructure itself (Internet, power grids, industrial control systems, hospitals' computers), which is the pool both sides draw on and fight over; the people who live on it; ordinary cybercrime and hacktivism that is not aligned with a state (they cross in, CIARS); conventional war, of which cyber operations are sometimes a part; and the law and institutions that try to bound it.
nested levelRun by states through cyber commands, intelligence agencies and proxies; built from cyberattacks (DoS, malware, espionage, propaganda); carried on the Internet and the infrastructure that hangs off it; part of a war when run alongside armed conflict (Georgia 2008, Ukraine 2022), otherwise in the 'unpeace' or grey zone below war (contested).
scaletechnological

Measures (24) published science

characteristic clock: WannaCry outbreak until the kill switch07:45 to 15:03 UTC, 12 May 2017 (about 7 h 18 min)
Stuxnet development before discoverysince at least 2005; uncovered 17 June 2010 years
volunteer interest half-life (Russia-Ukraine 2022)a few weeks
Kyiv outage, Industroyer 2016just over an hour
Ukraine 2015 grid attack, people without powermore than 200,000 (encyclopedia); approximately 225,000 (Vanlyssel); 230,000 customers (encyclopedia, controversy section) people
Turkey outage attributed (possibly) to Iranian hackers12 hours, 44 of 81 provinces, 40 million people
Stuxnet attack frequency1,064 Hz raised to 1,410 Hz for 15 minutes; attacks only drives at 807-1,210 Hz
Natanz centrifuges destroyed (ISIS estimate)up to 1,000 (10 percent), November 2009 to late January 2010 centrifuges
zero-days in Stuxnet4 exploits
NHS: lost activity5.9 GBP million
WannaCry reachmore than 300,000 computers across 150 countries
NHS: admissions at infected hospitalsabout 6% fewer per infected hospital per day (4% emergency, 9% elective); no mortality difference
NHS organisations affectedover 600, including 34 infected hospital trusts organisations
countries developing the Internet as a weaponapproximately 120 countries
Locked Shields 20191200 participants from 30 countries
China's 'hacker army' (Foreign Policy estimate)50,000 to 100,000 people
OPM breach4 million announced; 18 million (Comey) records
North Korea's cyber income2 USD billion (revealed August 2019)
France's cyber corps (2016 plan)2600 cyber-soldiers, 440 million euros; 4400 reservists from 2019 people
BND share of German internet traffic under surveillance5% to 20% (the legal maximum)
Russia-Ukraine low-level activity measured358k defacements, 1.7M UDP amplification DDoS attacks, 1,764 posts by 372 users, 441 Telegram announcements events
cyberterrorism conjoint experiment21,238 observations (US, UK, Israel)
hacktivist water outage (Ireland, 2023 per CISA 2024)180 customers for two days
offence-defence arguments collected9 offensive, 9 defensive, 48 character propositions; 44 expected AI effects arguments

Open contentions (6) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (19) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Cyberwarfare. Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (18) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (8)

Sits inside / holds (3)

expressed by (25)

floor filled by (15)

Kinds (15)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

cyberwarfare as cyber-conflict scholars and military doctrine describe it: the networked infrastructure states depend on, up to the policy the operations serve (reader's view)

  1. L1: The pool: networked infrastructure and information both sides depend on: backbones, ISPs, servers, enterprise systems, desktops, electrical grids, financial networks, telecommunications, ICS
  2. L2: Access and exploits: vulnerabilities, zero-day stockpiles and markets, implants left in place, phishing and stolen credentials, USB across air gaps
  3. L3: Operations and effects: espionage, sabotage, denial of service, propaganda, economic disruption
  4. L4: Forces and campaigns: cyber commands as a fourth force, intelligence agencies, proxies and volunteers, war games; about 120 countries
  5. L5: Interaction between states: attribution and blame, signalling, tit-for-tat, escalation and de-escalation
  6. L6: Norms and law: IHL and jus ad bellum read for cyber (Tallinn Manual), rival definitions, sanctions, cyberpeace
  7. L7: Policy: weaken rivals, coerce, delay a weapons programme, fund the state, shape opinion

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L3: Operations: the effects delivered through access and exploits: espionage, sabotage (Stuxnet, the Ukraine grid), denial of service (Estonia, Georgia), propaganda, economic disruption
  2. L4: Forces and campaigns: cyber commands and units (USCYBERCOM, France's fourth corps, about 120 countries), intelligence agencies, proxies; stockpiles held and timed; war games
  3. L5: Interaction between states: attribution and blame, signalling, tit-for-tat, escalation and de-escalation (Pressure Release, Spark, Pull Out the Big Guns, Escalation Inversion)
  4. L6: Norms and law: IHL and jus ad bellum as read for cyber (Tallinn Manual), rival definitions (SCO and US), thresholds (below and above the line), sanctions regimes, the in-between zone
  5. L7: Policy and strategy: what states use it for (to weaken rivals cheaply, coerce, delay a nuclear programme, fund weapons, influence opinion), war as policy by other means

way in: Espionage take: what collection reveals about the rival

  1. L1: The rival's data: defence contractors (Titan Rain), personnel records (OPM, 4 to 18 million), diplomatic channels
  2. L2: Implants and collection: up to 5% then 20% of German internet traffic for the BND; Snake/Ouroboros CNE in Ukraine

way in: Law and norms coming in

  1. L1: International humanitarian law and jus ad bellum; UN affirmations that IHL principles apply
  2. L2: Rival definitions: the SCO's (information harmful to spiritual and cultural spheres) against the US focus on physical and economic damage
  3. L4: Interpretation: only cyber operations causing injury or material damage count as 'attacks'; espionage and psychological operations do not

way in: Proxies: hacktivists, volunteers, criminals aligned with a side

  1. L1: Volunteers and groups called up through channels (IT Army of Ukraine on Telegram; Hack Forums posts)
  2. L2: Their actions: defacements, DDoS, and since 2022 operational technology
  3. L3: Spoilers: third parties who want the conflict to continue can undermine de-escalation

way in: Public fear and opinion

  1. L1: People meet attacks as outages, news and leaks
  2. L3: Classification: the public labels attacks that disseminate sensitive data as terrorism more than explosive attacks; attack traits that evoke moralistic vengeance
  3. L4: Threat perception and fear: the terrorism label heightens perceived threat
  4. L5: Support for retaliation: needs physical destruction

way in: Removable media across the air gap

  1. L1: USB drives carried by people between networks
  2. L2: Plugged into air-gapped computers inside the facility (Natanz); air-gapping 'a false sense of security'

way in: The defender's moves: patching, detection, segmentation

  1. L1: Defenders determine the digital terrain: their own networks and settings
  2. L2: Changes: patches, updates, segmentation, disconnection (run the grid on droop speed control only)
  3. L3: Effect on the attacker: one or a few defensive changes can make an offensive tool useless; attackers need only one success

way in: The geopolitical and battlefield situation

  1. L1: Conditions between states: relative peace, tension, frequent crises, acute crisis
  2. L2: Kinetic events: a drone shot down (Strait of Hormuz, June 2019); military operations in South Ossetia (2008); the 2022 invasion

way in: The other side's operations against oneself

  1. L1: The rival's intrusions, espionage and attacks on one's own networks (both sides obey the same imperatives)
  2. L2: Seen or unseen: most cyber capabilities need no visible mobilisation, so alert status cannot be read
  3. L3: Effects felt: data taken (OPM), services down (Estonia), power cut (Ukraine)
  4. L4: Taken up by cyber forces and leaders (tit-for-tat military cyber actions)

way in: The target's networked infrastructure and its dependence on it

  1. L1: The target's networked infrastructure: e-government, banks and media (Estonia), power grids, ICS, hospitals; the more of a state's services run online, the more an attack reaches
  2. L2: Reconnaissance and access: spear-phishing employees, stolen VPN credentials into SCADA (Ukraine 2015); implants left in a grid for later use (reports on the US grid, 2009)

way in: Traces and attribution

  1. L1: Traces left by an operation and claims by news organisations and firms (Stuxnet: Operation Olympic Games, unadmitted)
  2. L2: Technical attribution: the victim's knowledge level; asymmetric attribution capabilities
  3. L3: The attribution problem: figuring out who is behind an attack can be very difficult
  4. L4: Formal assertion by governments (US and UK on WannaCry, December 2017), denied by the accused

way in: Vulnerabilities and exploits (the weapons' raw material)

  1. L1: New vulnerabilities in computer systems, constantly discovered
  2. L2: Stockpiles and markets: nations accumulate zero-day exploits; black markets sell cyber weapons to the highest bidder; Stuxnet spent four zero-days

way out: Denial of service

  1. L1: Sites and services unavailable
  2. L3: Floods on government, bank and media sites (Estonia 2007, Georgia 2008, Ukraine 2022), volunteers' DDoS

way out: Espionage: data taken

  1. L1: The rival's records and communications copied
  2. L3: Exfiltration (OPM records of 4 million, later put at 18 million)
  3. L4: Tasked collection (Titan Rain since 2003; Shady RAT, at least 72 organisations)

way out: Hardening and passive precautions

  1. L1: One's own networks changed
  2. L2: Separate civilian from military infrastructure; disconnect essential systems from the Internet; plan repair
  3. L6: Tallinn Manual precautions; cyber defence centres (CCD CoE 2008); war games

way out: Income: theft and ransom

  1. L1: Money moved
  2. L3: Cyber attacks, including ransomware, generate income
  3. L7: Fund a weapons programme while evading sanctions (North Korea, $2 billion)

way out: Kinetic response

  1. L1: A building destroyed
  2. L3: IDF strike on a building associated with an ongoing cyberattack, 5 May 2019
  3. L5: A decision to answer a cyber attack with force

way out: Proliferation: weapons and exploits escape

  1. L1: Hits far beyond any intended target: more than 300,000 computers in 150 countries
  2. L2: Reused: WannaCry and NotPetya repurposed it; groups share exploits as arms proliferation
  3. L4: A state's exploit (EternalBlue, NSA) stolen and leaked by the Shadow Brokers

way out: Propaganda and influence

  1. L1: Public opinion acted on
  2. L3: Social media, fake news websites, hack-and-leak
  3. L7: Aim: shape perceptions and opinion

way out: Sabotage of physical and industrial systems

  1. L1: The physical world acted on: centrifuges spun to 1,410 Hz; power cut to about 225,000 people (2015) and to Kyiv for just over an hour (2016); hospital admissions down about 6% per infected hospital per day
  2. L2: Control code subverted: PLC rootkit; breakers opened through SCADA; false data shown to operators
  3. L3: The operation runs (Stuxnet, BlackEnergy 3, Industroyer, NotPetya)

way out: Sanctions and blame

  1. L1: Sanctions on states and individuals
  2. L6: Executive Orders 13694 (2015) and 13757 (2016); Iran Cyber Sanctions Act 2016; public blame

way out: Signals and de-escalation

  1. L1: The rival's reading of intent
  2. L5: A less intense reply (generous tit-for-tat); quiet punishment; not acknowledging an attack; hotlines (US-Russia 2013)

Sources (20) published science

Cyberwarfare (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot)
Healey & Jervis 2020, The Escalation Inversion and Other Oddities of Situational Cyber Stability, Texas National Security Review 3(4):30-53, doi:10.26153/tsw/10962 (behind its links)
Axelrod & Iliev 2014, Timing of cyber conflict, PNAS 111(4):1298-1303, doi:10.1073/pnas.1322638111 (PMC3910638) (behind its links)
Axelrod 2022, How to De-Escalate a Cyber Conflict (arXiv:2202.07085) (behind its links)
Edwards, Furnas, Forrest & Axelrod 2017, Strategic aspects of cyberattack, attribution, and blame, PNAS 114(11):2825-2830, doi:10.1073/pnas.1700442114 (PMC5358372) (behind its links)
Shandler, Kostyuk & Oppenheimer 2023, Public Opinion and Cyberterrorism, Public Opinion Quarterly 87(1):92-119, doi:10.1093/poq/nfad006 (PMC10127534) (behind its links)
WannaCry ransomware attack (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Vu, Thomas, Collier, Hutchings, Clayton & Anderson 2024, Getting Bored of Cyberwar: Exploring the Role of Low-level Cybercrime Actors in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict, WWW '24, doi:10.1145/3589334.3645401 (arXiv:2208.10629) (behind its links)
Vanlyssel 2024, Securing U.S. Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from Stuxnet and the Ukraine Power Grid Attacks (arXiv:2510.14185) (behind its links)
Derbyshire, Selck-Paulsson, van der Walt & Burton 2025, From Protest to Power Plant: Interpreting the Role of Escalatory Hacktivism in Cyber Conflict (arXiv:2509.05104) (behind its links)
Harsora & Khoyani 2022, A systematic literature review of cyberwarfare and state-sponsored hacking teams (arXiv:2212.05166) (behind its links)
Stuxnet (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Ghafur, Kristensen, Honeyford, Martin, Darzi & Aylin 2019, A retrospective impact analysis of the WannaCry cyberattack on the NHS, npj Digital Medicine 2:98, doi:10.1038/s41746-019-0161-6 (PMC6775064) (behind its links)
Lohn 2025, The Impact of AI on the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance and the Character of Cyber Conflict (arXiv:2504.13371) (behind its links)
Hamdan, Al-Rai & Khater 2026, Cyber Military Operations under International Humanitarian Law: Interpreting the Concept of 'Attack' and Challenges in Protecting Civilians, F1000Research 15:505, doi:10.12688/f1000research.182654.2 (PMC13316166) (behind its links)
National Security Agency (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Bradshaw S, Howard PN. 2019. The Global Disinformation Order: 2019 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation. Oxford Internet Institute, Computational Propaganda Project (working paper 2019.3) (behind its links)
2015 Ukraine power grid hack (Wikipedia, via WME) (behind its links)
Cybercrime (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Russo-Ukrainian war (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)