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Cyberwarfare
The use of cyberattacks by one state (or state-backed actors) against another, with harm the sources compare to traditional warfare: espionage, sabotage, denial of service, propaganda and economic disruption carried through computer networks (src:wp:cyberwarfare). Walked as a competition between states (QUEUE-BRIEF addendum 7): the networked infrastructure both sides depend on (the pool), the access and exploits that reach it, the operations and campaigns, the forces and proxies that run them, the attribution, signalling and escalation between states, the norms and law that frame it, and the policy it serves. Whether it is 'war' at all is contested (C-1710).
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | 2003 (Titan Rain probes); 2007 (Estonia); 2010 (Stuxnet uncovered) |
| born precision | year |
| boundary | Inside: the operations states (and actors they sponsor, tolerate or lean on) run through networks against another state: the access they hold, the cyber weapons they stockpile and use, the forces and proxies that run them, the attribution and signalling between the sides, and the policy each operation serves. Outside: the networked infrastructure itself (Internet, power grids, industrial control systems, hospitals' computers), which is the pool both sides draw on and fight over; the people who live on it; ordinary cybercrime and hacktivism that is not aligned with a state (they cross in, CIARS); conventional war, of which cyber operations are sometimes a part; and the law and institutions that try to bound it. |
| nested level | Run by states through cyber commands, intelligence agencies and proxies; built from cyberattacks (DoS, malware, espionage, propaganda); carried on the Internet and the infrastructure that hangs off it; part of a war when run alongside armed conflict (Georgia 2008, Ukraine 2022), otherwise in the 'unpeace' or grey zone below war (contested). |
| scale | technological |
Measures (24) published science
| characteristic clock: WannaCry outbreak until the kill switch | 07:45 to 15:03 UTC, 12 May 2017 (about 7 h 18 min) |
| Stuxnet development before discovery | since at least 2005; uncovered 17 June 2010 years |
| volunteer interest half-life (Russia-Ukraine 2022) | a few weeks |
| Kyiv outage, Industroyer 2016 | just over an hour |
| Ukraine 2015 grid attack, people without power | more than 200,000 (encyclopedia); approximately 225,000 (Vanlyssel); 230,000 customers (encyclopedia, controversy section) people |
| Turkey outage attributed (possibly) to Iranian hackers | 12 hours, 44 of 81 provinces, 40 million people |
| Stuxnet attack frequency | 1,064 Hz raised to 1,410 Hz for 15 minutes; attacks only drives at 807-1,210 Hz |
| Natanz centrifuges destroyed (ISIS estimate) | up to 1,000 (10 percent), November 2009 to late January 2010 centrifuges |
| zero-days in Stuxnet | 4 exploits |
| NHS: lost activity | 5.9 GBP million |
| WannaCry reach | more than 300,000 computers across 150 countries |
| NHS: admissions at infected hospitals | about 6% fewer per infected hospital per day (4% emergency, 9% elective); no mortality difference |
| NHS organisations affected | over 600, including 34 infected hospital trusts organisations |
| countries developing the Internet as a weapon | approximately 120 countries |
| Locked Shields 2019 | 1200 participants from 30 countries |
| China's 'hacker army' (Foreign Policy estimate) | 50,000 to 100,000 people |
| OPM breach | 4 million announced; 18 million (Comey) records |
| North Korea's cyber income | 2 USD billion (revealed August 2019) |
| France's cyber corps (2016 plan) | 2600 cyber-soldiers, 440 million euros; 4400 reservists from 2019 people |
| BND share of German internet traffic under surveillance | 5% to 20% (the legal maximum) |
| Russia-Ukraine low-level activity measured | 358k defacements, 1.7M UDP amplification DDoS attacks, 1,764 posts by 372 users, 441 Telegram announcements events |
| cyberterrorism conjoint experiment | 21,238 observations (US, UK, Israel) |
| hacktivist water outage (Ireland, 2023 per CISA 2024) | 180 customers for two days |
| offence-defence arguments collected | 9 offensive, 9 defensive, 48 character propositions; 44 expected AI effects arguments |
Open contentions (6) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-1706 Who carried out the famous cyberattacks?
booked: The map books attributions as its sources give them, marked unadmitted or denied.
the other reading: Stuxnet: US-Israeli per news organisations, never admitted; WannaCry: asserted North Korean by the US and UK in December 2017, denied; US grid implants 2009: reported China and Russia, China denies; Turkey outage: 'possibly' the Iranian Cyber Army; Estonia 2007: largest part from Russia and official Russian servers; state direction not shown - C-1707 Did a hacked artillery app destroy most of Ukraine's D-30 howitzers?
booked: The map keeps the security company's claim beside the Ukrainian army's denial.
the other reading: Ukrainian army: the number is incorrect, losses 'way below those reported' and 'have nothing to do with the stated cause' - C-1708 Do cyber operations make conflicts escalate?
booked: The map books the situational reading and keeps the pessimists and optimists alongside.
the other reading: pessimists: a two-decade ratchet; 'the most escalatory kind of conflict'; optimists: no cyber attack has ever drawn a kinetic armed response; cyber reduces crises; persistent engagement brings negative feedback (as summarised by Healey and Jervis) vs. creates positive feedback - C-1709 What was the first act of cyberwarfare?
booked: The map keeps the candidates contested: espionage from 2003, Estonia 2007, Stuxnet 2010.
the other reading: Stuxnet is 'not the first publicly known intentional act of cyberwarfare'; Titan Rain 2003 or Shady RAT 2006 (espionage); Estonia 2007 ('the 2007 cyberwar waged against Estonia') - C-1710 Is cyberwarfare really war?
booked: The map uses the definition by harm comparable to war and keeps the view that no cyberattack yet has been a war.
the other reading: a misnomer: no cyberattack to date could be described as a war; Rid 2011: sabotage, espionage, subversion; cyber war will not take place; a suitable label only for attacks that cause physical damage to people and objects; cyberterrorism, not cyberwar (Kaspersky); 'there is no cyberwar... a terrible metaphor' (Schmidt); unpeace (Kello): neither warlike nor peace-like; an in-between zone with very unclear borders (Boeken, after Walzer); definitions that include non-state actors (Shakarian et al.) against state-only ones (Clarke) - C-1711 How much damage did Stuxnet do?
booked: The map books up to about 1,000 centrifuges, a tenth of the plant, with the other estimates alongside.
the other reading: 'nearly 1,000' (Vanlyssel); IAEA cameras recorded removal of about 900-1,000 (Washington Post); 'extremely effective in delaying Iran's nuclear program' (encyclopedia); the same preprint also says '10 centrifuges' at one point
Cross-scale patterns seen here (19) our proposal
Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Cyberwarfare. Each links to every other system that shows it.
- same role, different builds (structural)
One job, punishing a state for a cyber attack, done by unrelated builds: a cyber attack back (US on Iranian weapons systems, June 2019), economic sanctions (EO 13694, 13757), a kinetic strike (IDF, 5 May 2019), quiet punishment known only to the rival's leaders, or public blame. - templating (structural)
One module swapped between systems and still working: the NSA's EternalBlue, leaked, ran inside WannaCry and inside NotPetya; Equation Group zero-days used before in 'fanny' reappear in Stuxnet. - who opens the door (structural)
At the crossing into a target, the receiver opened the door ahead of time: the distribution companies' own VPN into SCADA (Ukraine 2015), the facility's own USB ports and employees (Natanz). A port, not an open field. - borrowed-then-held (partial)
States borrowed capacity from patriotic hackers and the private sector (2008 'nationalist hackers'; 'harvesting the talents of its private sector') and then held it in standing cyber commands (US, France's fourth corps 2013, many others). Both phases shown across states, not traced within one state - causal ceiling (partial)
Most cyber capabilities need no visible mobilisation, so an outsider cannot read the rival's alert status at all; attribution is very difficult. Read as practical by some (the victim's knowledge level), so partial. - lightning (partial)
A stored capability released all at once: exploits stockpiled and implants prepositioned for years, then fired in one operation after which the weapon is spent and the target changed (Stuxnet's four zero-days; the Escalation Inversion's surprise first use). - red-queen (partial)
Offence and defence both improve (exploits and patches, AI on both sides) while the literature finds no single answer on who gains; a 'Digital Cold War' of prolonged low-intensity conflict 'while a play balance is pursued'. - runaway from an unstable balance (partial)
Situational stability: in relative peace cyber operations act as a pressure-release valve (balance); in acute crises positive feedback lets tiny inputs induce wild swings that take on a life of their own. - same shape, opposite sign (partial)
One exploit (EternalBlue) built for outward use by one state, its direction reversed when leaked: it hit that state's ally's health service and its own companies (Merck). - same toolkit, independent builds (partial)
About 120 countries build cyber forces from the same parts (exploits, malware, DDoS, propaganda) into separate national forces; independence not shown (copying is likely), so partial. - The Payment to Entropy (partial)
Form here: a secrecy toll. Each use of a cyber weapon hands part of its value to the defender: use makes the exploit visible ('and thus simultaneously make visible'), defenders patch, and the capability is gone; leaked weapons pay a further toll as effects land far from any target (WannaCry on the N - the whole sets the local reference (partial)
Each side's escalation reading is true locally but the readings do not close into one frame: 'two adversaries may have very different conceptions of what counts as a significant escalation'; norms and law are attempts to set a shared reference that does not yet exist. - trade one property for another (partial)
Connectivity bought, exposure paid: Estonia's online government made the 2007 attack effective; the counter-move trades it back (disconnect the grid, run on droop control only; air gaps), paying in coordination. - Umwelt: each system carves its own slice of one shared medium (partial)
Each state carves its own slice of one shared medium: the SCO counts information 'harmful to the spiritual, moral and cultural spheres' as cyberwar; the US counts physical and economic damage; publics count data leaks as terrorism more than explosions; two adversaries read different escalation ladde - holding / entrainment (surface)
The war times its cyber operations: Georgia 2008 alongside military operations; cyber matters most at a war's beginning when aligned with non-cyber operations; volunteers' attacks surge with the invasion. Shared driver more than a whole holding parts. - nested ladder (surface)
The escalation ladder and CIARS's below/above-the-line impacts order cyber acts by intensity; sources say the ladder has no clear breaks, and it is an ordering, not rungs that imply the ones below. - partner-becomes-part (surface)
Hacktivist partners drawn into the state's side (state-backed IT Army; CIARS's host-state involvement); no inheritance or fusion shown. - seed (surface)
Stuxnet's release and leaked tools let 'lesser hackers' mount attacks only a few could before; spread of a technique, no combinatorics shown. - symmetry breaking (name the cut) (surface)
Stuxnet as a cut: 'For the first time, it became clear that not only could cyber weapons be defensive but they could be offensive'; a before and after named by the source, no symmetric state shown.
Valence: what it trades, and with whom (18) published science
Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.
- Signals intelligence via sys:internet · Cyberwarfare gain
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:internet · Cyberwarfare mixed
- State (polity); the nation state its predominant modern form via sys:internet · Cyberwarfare gain
- Law (rules and law) via sys:law · Cyberwarfare loss
- Internet via sys:internet · Cyberwarfare gain
- Electrical grid via sys:electrical-grid · Cyberwarfare gain
- United Nations via sys:law · Cyberwarfare even
- Malware via sys:computer-network · Cyberwarfare gain
- Threat actor via sys:internet · Cyberwarfare gain
- Botnet via sys:internet · Cyberwarfare gain
- Denial-of-service attack via sys:internet · Cyberwarfare gain
- Organization via sys:computer-network · Cyberwarfare gain
- Software vulnerability via sys:computer-network · Cyberwarfare gain
- Hacktivist via sys:hacktivist · Cyberwarfare mixed
- Cyber threat intelligence via sys:internet · Cyberwarfare loss
- Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) via sys:internet · Cyberwarfare gain
- Information warfare via sys:internet · Cyberwarfare gain
- Critical infrastructure via sys:infrastructure · Cyberwarfare gain
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (8)
- Malware
- Denial-of-service attack
- Propaganda
- Zero-day vulnerability
- Hacktivist
- Cyber espionage
- Cyber commands and cyber forces
- Operation Olympic Games: Stuxnet against Natanz (campaign, about 2005-2010)
Sits inside / holds (3)
expressed by (25)
- Amplification/Scale-Up (Manufacture & Distribution)
- Symbiosis/Co-Creation (Collaborative Specialization)
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Sensing/Scanning
- Hypothesis/Goal Selection
- Offline Simulation & Replay-Guided Planning
- Social Learning / Public Information Use
- Evade Detection
- Overcome Barrier
- Precision Attack
- Ranged Attack
- Resource Denial/Attrition
- Subversion & Co-optation
- Prepositioning & Latency
- Battlespace Shaping
- Leverage Host/Amplification
- Cascade Induction
- Reactive Response
- Proactive Defense
- Physical/Virtual Barrier
- Validation of Identity/Intention
- Enclave/Segregation
- Deception
- Resilience & Repair
- Deterrence
floor filled by (15)
- State (polity); the nation state its predominant modern form
- Law (rules and law)
- Internet
- Electrical grid
- United Nations
- Malware
- Threat actor
- Denial-of-service attack
- Propaganda
- Organization
- Software vulnerability
- Zero-day vulnerability
- Hacktivist
- Cyber threat intelligence
- Cyber commands and cyber forces
Kinds (15)
- Cybercrime and its underground economy
- Hybrid warfare
- Cyber espionage
- Cyber sabotage
- Cyber propaganda
- Economic disruption
- Income generation
- Escalatory (state-aligned) hacktivism
- Cyber war (protracted back-and-forth between warring states)
- Unpeace (Kello)
- Cyberterrorism
- Cyber sanctions
- Cyber war games (Locked Shields, Waking Shark 2, Cyber-ShockWave)
- Cyberpeace and cyber peacekeeping
- Cyber counterintelligence
Notes published science
- Stuxnet was picky: it only touched motors spinning between 807 and 1,210 times a second, then pushed Iran's centrifuges from 1,064 to 1,410 Hz for 15 minutes while showing the operators normal readings. The ISIS estimate is up to 1,000 centrifuges broken, a tenth of the plant. (src:wp:stuxnet, src:vanlyssel-2024-ics)
- A cyber weapon is spent by firing it: using an exploit makes it visible and the other side patches it, so states keep stockpiles and face the same choice as a hoarder of one-shot arrows, use it now or save it for higher stakes. Stuxnet burning four zero-days at once was itself a tell. (src:axelrod-iliev-2014-timing, src:wp:stuxnet)
- The 2022 'cyber army' of volunteers got bored: after the invasion, defacements and DDoS against Russia and Ukraine surged, then interest fell away within a few weeks; meanwhile the public, asked in three countries, rated attacks that leak sensitive data as more like terrorism than attacks that blow things up. (src:vu-2024-bored-cyberwar, src:shandler-2023-cyberterrorism)
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
cyberwarfare as cyber-conflict scholars and military doctrine describe it: the networked infrastructure states depend on, up to the policy the operations serve (reader's view)
- L1: The pool: networked infrastructure and information both sides depend on: backbones, ISPs, servers, enterprise systems, desktops, electrical grids, financial networks, telecommunications, ICS
- L2: Access and exploits: vulnerabilities, zero-day stockpiles and markets, implants left in place, phishing and stolen credentials, USB across air gaps
- L3: Operations and effects: espionage, sabotage, denial of service, propaganda, economic disruption
- L4: Forces and campaigns: cyber commands as a fourth force, intelligence agencies, proxies and volunteers, war games; about 120 countries
- L5: Interaction between states: attribution and blame, signalling, tit-for-tat, escalation and de-escalation
- L6: Norms and law: IHL and jus ad bellum read for cyber (Tallinn Manual), rival definitions, sanctions, cyberpeace
- L7: Policy: weaken rivals, coerce, delay a weapons programme, fund the state, shape opinion
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L3: Operations: the effects delivered through access and exploits: espionage, sabotage (Stuxnet, the Ukraine grid), denial of service (Estonia, Georgia), propaganda, economic disruption
- L4: Forces and campaigns: cyber commands and units (USCYBERCOM, France's fourth corps, about 120 countries), intelligence agencies, proxies; stockpiles held and timed; war games
- L5: Interaction between states: attribution and blame, signalling, tit-for-tat, escalation and de-escalation (Pressure Release, Spark, Pull Out the Big Guns, Escalation Inversion)
- L6: Norms and law: IHL and jus ad bellum as read for cyber (Tallinn Manual), rival definitions (SCO and US), thresholds (below and above the line), sanctions regimes, the in-between zone
- L7: Policy and strategy: what states use it for (to weaken rivals cheaply, coerce, delay a nuclear programme, fund weapons, influence opinion), war as policy by other means
way in: Espionage take: what collection reveals about the rival
- L1: The rival's data: defence contractors (Titan Rain), personnel records (OPM, 4 to 18 million), diplomatic channels
- L2: Implants and collection: up to 5% then 20% of German internet traffic for the BND; Snake/Ouroboros CNE in Ukraine
way in: Law and norms coming in
- L1: International humanitarian law and jus ad bellum; UN affirmations that IHL principles apply
- L2: Rival definitions: the SCO's (information harmful to spiritual and cultural spheres) against the US focus on physical and economic damage
- L4: Interpretation: only cyber operations causing injury or material damage count as 'attacks'; espionage and psychological operations do not
way in: Proxies: hacktivists, volunteers, criminals aligned with a side
- L1: Volunteers and groups called up through channels (IT Army of Ukraine on Telegram; Hack Forums posts)
- L2: Their actions: defacements, DDoS, and since 2022 operational technology
- L3: Spoilers: third parties who want the conflict to continue can undermine de-escalation
way in: Public fear and opinion
- L1: People meet attacks as outages, news and leaks
- L3: Classification: the public labels attacks that disseminate sensitive data as terrorism more than explosive attacks; attack traits that evoke moralistic vengeance
- L4: Threat perception and fear: the terrorism label heightens perceived threat
- L5: Support for retaliation: needs physical destruction
way in: Removable media across the air gap
- L1: USB drives carried by people between networks
- L2: Plugged into air-gapped computers inside the facility (Natanz); air-gapping 'a false sense of security'
way in: The defender's moves: patching, detection, segmentation
- L1: Defenders determine the digital terrain: their own networks and settings
- L2: Changes: patches, updates, segmentation, disconnection (run the grid on droop speed control only)
- L3: Effect on the attacker: one or a few defensive changes can make an offensive tool useless; attackers need only one success
way in: The geopolitical and battlefield situation
- L1: Conditions between states: relative peace, tension, frequent crises, acute crisis
- L2: Kinetic events: a drone shot down (Strait of Hormuz, June 2019); military operations in South Ossetia (2008); the 2022 invasion
way in: The other side's operations against oneself
- L1: The rival's intrusions, espionage and attacks on one's own networks (both sides obey the same imperatives)
- L2: Seen or unseen: most cyber capabilities need no visible mobilisation, so alert status cannot be read
- L3: Effects felt: data taken (OPM), services down (Estonia), power cut (Ukraine)
- L4: Taken up by cyber forces and leaders (tit-for-tat military cyber actions)
way in: The target's networked infrastructure and its dependence on it
- L1: The target's networked infrastructure: e-government, banks and media (Estonia), power grids, ICS, hospitals; the more of a state's services run online, the more an attack reaches
- L2: Reconnaissance and access: spear-phishing employees, stolen VPN credentials into SCADA (Ukraine 2015); implants left in a grid for later use (reports on the US grid, 2009)
way in: Traces and attribution
- L1: Traces left by an operation and claims by news organisations and firms (Stuxnet: Operation Olympic Games, unadmitted)
- L2: Technical attribution: the victim's knowledge level; asymmetric attribution capabilities
- L3: The attribution problem: figuring out who is behind an attack can be very difficult
- L4: Formal assertion by governments (US and UK on WannaCry, December 2017), denied by the accused
way in: Vulnerabilities and exploits (the weapons' raw material)
- L1: New vulnerabilities in computer systems, constantly discovered
- L2: Stockpiles and markets: nations accumulate zero-day exploits; black markets sell cyber weapons to the highest bidder; Stuxnet spent four zero-days
way out: Denial of service
- L1: Sites and services unavailable
- L3: Floods on government, bank and media sites (Estonia 2007, Georgia 2008, Ukraine 2022), volunteers' DDoS
way out: Espionage: data taken
- L1: The rival's records and communications copied
- L3: Exfiltration (OPM records of 4 million, later put at 18 million)
- L4: Tasked collection (Titan Rain since 2003; Shady RAT, at least 72 organisations)
way out: Hardening and passive precautions
- L1: One's own networks changed
- L2: Separate civilian from military infrastructure; disconnect essential systems from the Internet; plan repair
- L6: Tallinn Manual precautions; cyber defence centres (CCD CoE 2008); war games
way out: Income: theft and ransom
- L1: Money moved
- L3: Cyber attacks, including ransomware, generate income
- L7: Fund a weapons programme while evading sanctions (North Korea, $2 billion)
way out: Kinetic response
- L1: A building destroyed
- L3: IDF strike on a building associated with an ongoing cyberattack, 5 May 2019
- L5: A decision to answer a cyber attack with force
way out: Proliferation: weapons and exploits escape
- L1: Hits far beyond any intended target: more than 300,000 computers in 150 countries
- L2: Reused: WannaCry and NotPetya repurposed it; groups share exploits as arms proliferation
- L4: A state's exploit (EternalBlue, NSA) stolen and leaked by the Shadow Brokers
way out: Propaganda and influence
- L1: Public opinion acted on
- L3: Social media, fake news websites, hack-and-leak
- L7: Aim: shape perceptions and opinion
way out: Sabotage of physical and industrial systems
- L1: The physical world acted on: centrifuges spun to 1,410 Hz; power cut to about 225,000 people (2015) and to Kyiv for just over an hour (2016); hospital admissions down about 6% per infected hospital per day
- L2: Control code subverted: PLC rootkit; breakers opened through SCADA; false data shown to operators
- L3: The operation runs (Stuxnet, BlackEnergy 3, Industroyer, NotPetya)
way out: Sanctions and blame
- L1: Sanctions on states and individuals
- L6: Executive Orders 13694 (2015) and 13757 (2016); Iran Cyber Sanctions Act 2016; public blame
way out: Signals and de-escalation
- L1: The rival's reading of intent
- L5: A less intense reply (generous tit-for-tat); quiet punishment; not acknowledging an attack; hotlines (US-Russia 2013)