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Information warfare
Contests over information and belief between states and groups: manipulating information a target trusts so it decides against its own interest, assuring one's own information and denying or degrading the opponent's; walked as the competition and its practice at the level the research describes: propaganda, disinformation, military deception, psychological warfare and influence operations, from leaflets and radio to bots, troll offices, deepfakes and AI swarms, with the defences against them (jamming, censorship, detection, prebunking).
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | deception in warfare from early history (Sun Tzu); the word propaganda from 1622; the term 'information war' from 1970 (Minor) and as a capability from 1976 (Rona) |
| born precision | millennia (practice); year (term) |
| boundary | Inside: the deliberate contest over what a target believes and decides: the operators (propaganda and deception staffs, troll offices, cyber troops, bots), their craft, delivery and amplification, the defences run against them (jamming, censorship, detection, prebunking), and the feedback each side reads. Outside: the media and platforms it rides on, the minds it targets, the states and parties that sponsor it, the wars it serves, and honest error (misinformation without intent). |
| nested level | A practice of states and groups in contest; built from propaganda, disinformation, military deception and psychological operations; rides on mass media, social networks and the radio spectrum; its output runs into the decisions of states, armies and electorates. |
| scale | social |
Measures (23) published science
| characteristic clock: lifetime of a troll office (IRA) | about 10 years (founded mid-2013; shutdown announced 1 July 2023) |
| clock: Soviet jamming of Western radio | 1948 to 1987 (RFE/RL into 1988) years |
| clock: RTLM broadcasting | 8 July 1993 to 31 July 1994 days |
| countries with organised social media manipulation | 70 (2019); 48 (2018); 28 (2017) countries |
| bots' share of low-credibility spreading | 6% of accounts spread 31% of tweets linking low-credibility content and 34% of articles |
| countries using human-run accounts / bots | 60 of 70 / 50 of 70 (87% / 80%) countries |
| messages studied | 14 million messages, 400 thousand articles, ten months in 2016-2017 count |
| concentration of IRA exposure | 1% of users: 70% of exposures; 10%: 98% |
| IRA posts against domestic sources in timelines | 25 times more national news posts, 9 times more politicians' posts ratio |
| bots among pro-Russian spreaders (2022) | 20.28% |
| bots among Catalan referendum users | nearly one in three fraction |
| reach of pro-Russian messages (2022) | about 251,000 retweets; about 14.4 million users |
| sharing per out-group word | +67% odds of being shared |
| diffusion per moral-emotional word | +20% |
| share who shared fake news on Facebook (2016) | 8.5%; over-65s nearly seven times the youngest group |
| inoculation in the field (YouTube) | technique recognition up about 5%; about $0.05 per ad view; n = 22,632 |
| leaflets | almost 26 million (MI7b, WWI); one billion (Korean War); 31 million (Iraq War) count |
| RTLM share of genocide violence (contested) | an estimated 10% |
| Gulf War surrenders aided by leaflets | 87,000 (1991) troops |
| German divisions held in Norway by Fortitude North | 13 (late spring 1944) divisions |
| Ghost Army | 1,100 men; more than 20 deception campaigns count |
| IRA staff | more than 1,000 in one building (2015) people |
| troll location switching | 1% of trolls change their country against 16% of a baseline |
Open contentions (5) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-413 Where do thoughts come from?
booked: No theory is proven, so the map lists the main ones side by side and doesn't pick one. It shows where thinking is handled in the brain, not where thoughts start.
the other reading: see C-413 - C-1754 How much do influence campaigns actually change minds?
booked: The map rules nothing: some studies find no measurable effect, others large effects in war.
the other reading: small: no measurable effect of IRA exposure on attitudes, polarization or vote (Eady 2023; Bail 2020); trolls bore very small influence on virality (Zannettou 2019); large in some settings: Fortitude held 13 divisions in Norway; leaflets contributed to 87,000 surrenders in 1991; RTLM estimated at 10% of genocide violence (contested); the measures may miss effects: Bail's study could not determine whether IRA accounts influenced the 2016 election - C-1755 Is information warfare as old as war, or a computer-age thing?
booked: The map dates it with deception and propaganda in war, and keeps the modern computer-era reading alongside.
the other reading: rung 12: information warfare as the battlespace use of ICT, a military capability named in 1976; cognitive warfare as a new domain beyond land, sea and air (NATO); cognitive warfare as a reframing of long-standing practices with a political function (Nilsson et al. 2026) - C-1756 Does 'prebunking' people against misinformation work in real life?
booked: The map keeps it contested: it helps in lab and one field study, and the effect vanished in a realistic feed.
the other reading: in a realistic feed with real tweets or other techniques the effect on engagement vanished (Wang et al. 2025) - C-1769 How much of the Rwandan genocide did hate radio cause?
booked: The map books the estimate of 10% of the violence, and keeps the paper questioning it.
the other reading: a 2018 paper (Danning, Civil Wars) questions the study's findings
Cross-scale patterns seen here (16) our proposal
Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Information warfare. Each links to every other system that shows it.
- red-queen (structural)
Three races where both sides improve and neither gains ground: the Cold War 'power race' (broadcasters and jammers alike kept raising transmitter power and frequencies until the Soviets stopped in 1987, by decision, not defeat); deepfake creators against detectors (a 'tug-of-war'); detectors against - same role, different builds (structural)
One job, a voice in the crowd that isn't what it seems, done by unrelated builds: bots, human-run accounts, cyborgs, hacked accounts, AI swarms; and one job, a phantom army, built from dummy landing craft, sound trucks, fake radio traffic and double agents' reports. - same shape, opposite sign (structural)
One process, exposure to a manipulation technique such as emotional language, run as attack (the technique in misinformation) and, weakened and forewarned, as protection (inoculation's 'weakened (micro)dose'); McGuire's vaccine analogy. - trade one property for another (structural)
Jamming trades coverage for effect: skywave covered a large area with limited effectiveness, groundwave was more effective over a small area and was used near major cities. The firehose trades truth and consistency for volume and speed. - Umwelt: each system carves its own slice of one shared medium (structural)
On one platform each user sees a slice: selective exposure makes echo chambers with their own cascade dynamics; 1% of users had 70% of exposures to IRA posts while the median weekly exposure was zero. Each side of the contest has its own channels (intercepts, engagement, takedowns). - who opens the door (structural)
The doors deceivers walk through were installed by the receiver ahead of time: the Abwehr's own agent network in Britain, all turned (Double Cross); a newspaper set up years earlier to publish what it was given; the platform's retweet that rebroadcasts to all followers. - causal ceiling (partial)
Non-attribution: online identity may not serve as proof of real-world identity (Moonlight Maze could not be confirmed as Russian); and it is not clear when information warfare begins or ends or how strong it is. Whether this is a structural limit or a practical one is not settled. - lightning (partial)
A cascade fired out of the blue: a simple military exercise (Jade Helm 15) read as the start of a civil war; bots push in the early moments before an article goes viral; cascade size set by homogeneity and polarization. - same toolkit, independent builds (partial)
Organised manipulation in 70 countries built from the same parts (bots, human accounts, cyborgs, hacked accounts) by governments and parties; independence of the builds not shown. - templating (partial)
Manipulation techniques are modules reused across content: inoculation against a technique works 'without prior knowledge of specific misleading content'; industrial production leaves a signature that carries across months, countries and platforms. - The carry (partial)
Two faces: overflow (finite attention and information overload; the firehose floods channels) and the lookahead (prebunking before exposure skips the wait for fact-checks, which arrive after the spread and miss many who saw the original). No settling time sourced. - The Payment to Entropy (partial)
Signal form: of what is sent, little arrives usable. 786,634 IRA posts reached a panel's timelines, but exposure concentrated in 1% of users and no measurable change in attitudes followed; trolls bore 'very small influence' on virality; jamming noise spilled onto untargeted stations; surrender leafl - the whole sets the local reference (partial)
Each echo chamber has its own cascade dynamics, and moral contagion is bounded by group membership: what reads true and spreads is set group by group, and the readings do not close into one public picture. - borrowed-then-held (surface)
States borrowed the press's and journalists' craft (Creel was a journalist; propaganda rode commercial media), then held it in standing bodies (the CPI 1917-1919, IW squadrons since the 1980s, the IRA 2013-2023). The hand-over itself is not traced in the sources read. - not-diluting wins (surface)
Seen from its reverse: foreign posts were diluted about 25 to 1 by national news and 9 to 1 by politicians in timelines, and showed no measurable effect; a component that holds its density against the rest is not shown. - runaway from an unstable balance (surface)
Cascades in a percolation model: whether a rumour spreads far turns on homogeneity and polarization, a threshold-like setting; the balance point itself is not shown in the part read.
Valence: what it trades, and with whom (18) published science
Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.
- Radio via sys:electromagnetic-field · Information warfare gain
- Public opinion via sys:human-society · Information warfare gain
- Cold War via sys:human-society · Information warfare gain
- Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) via sys:information-environment · Information warfare gain
- Electromagnetic field via sys:electromagnetic-field · Information warfare mixed
- Social contagion via sys:social-network · Information warfare gain
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:human · Information warfare gain
- State (polity); the nation state its predominant modern form via sys:state · Information warfare gain
- Internet via sys:internet · Information warfare gain
- Large language model via sys:social-network · Information warfare gain
- Social network via sys:social-network · Information warfare mixed
- Mass media via sys:mass-media · Information warfare gain
- Democracy via sys:public-opinion · Information warfare mixed
- World wars (the two world wars of the 20th century: World War I, 1914-1918, and World War II, 1939-1945) via sys:war · Information warfare gain
- Psychology (the mind and behaviour as psychology describes them) via sys:human · Information warfare gain
- Signals intelligence via sys:intelligence-information · Information warfare gain
- Rhetoric (speech and argument) via sys:human · Information warfare gain
- Cyberwarfare via sys:internet · Information warfare gain
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (7)
- Propaganda
- Disinformation
- Military deception
- Psychological warfare (PSYOPs)
- Computational propaganda
- Cyber troops
- Social bots
Sits inside / holds (2)
expressed by (20)
- Amplification/Scale-Up (Manufacture & Distribution)
- Sensing/Scanning
- Evade Detection
- Speed
- Precision Attack
- Ranged Attack
- Resource Denial/Attrition
- Subversion & Co-optation
- Prepositioning & Latency
- Battlespace Shaping
- Leverage Host/Amplification
- Divide & Isolate
- Cascade Induction
- Proactive Defense
- Physical/Virtual Barrier
- Technique-Based Identification (a.k.a. Technique-Based Detection)
- Validation of Effectiveness
- Deception
- Redundancy & Diversity
- Quality Control & Error Correction
floor filled by (21)
- Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022)
- Electromagnetic field
- Social contagion
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- State (polity); the nation state its predominant modern form
- Government
- Social network
- Mass media
- Echo chamber
- Political party
- Democracy
- War
- Psychology (the mind and behaviour as psychology describes them)
- Rhetoric (speech and argument)
- Cyber troops
- Social bots
- Deepfake
- Airborne leaflet propaganda
- Internet Research Agency
- London Controlling Section
- Double Cross System
Kinds (7)
- Propaganda
- Hybrid warfare
- Military deception
- Cognitive warfare
- Active measures
- Three warfares
- Radio jamming
Notes published science
- One of the first Soviet radio jammers just broadcast the roar of the diesel generator that powered it; later, Western broadcasters and Soviet jammers got into a decades-long 'power race', each turning up the wattage, until the Soviets simply stopped in 1987 (src:wp:radio-jamming).
- The 2016 Russian troll campaign on Twitter was very lopsided: 1% of users saw 70% of its posts, people saw 25 times more posts from national news than from the trolls, and researchers found no measurable change in attitudes or votes (src:eady-2023-ira-exposure).
- Researchers fight misinformation the way vaccines fight disease: short videos that show a weakened dose of a manipulation trick raised people's ability to spot it by about 5% on YouTube, for about 5 cents a view; but a 2025 study found the effect vanished in a realistic social media feed (src:roozenbeek-2022-inoculation, src:wang-2025-inoculation-feed).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
information warfare as propaganda, deception and influence-operation researchers describe it: the information environment up to the advantage it is fought for (reader's view)
- L1: The information environment: the media, networks and spectrum through which publics and decision makers learn about the world
- L2: Access and delivery: transmitters, leaflets, double agents, outlets set up in advance, fake and hacked accounts, jammers
- L3: Craft: propaganda, disinformation, deception stories and manipulation techniques; deepfakes
- L4: Spread: reprints, broadcasts, bots and super-spreaders, echo chambers, the language that travels
- L5: The target's minds: exposure, repetition, emotion and belief
- L6: Decisions and cohesion: what commanders, voters and governments decide; morale, trust and unity
- L7: Advantage: an information advantage over the opponent, for national or party objectives
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L3: Message craft and planning: stories, techniques and deception plans; troll offices and deception staffs (London Controlling Section, Ops (B), the IRA's departments)
- L4: Amplification and spread: broadcast, reprints, bots, troll networks, super-spreaders, echo chambers
- L5: The target's minds: exposure, repetition and fluency, emotion, belief; who is reached
- L6: Decisions and cohesion: commanders' dispositions, voters' choices, morale, trust and unity
- L7: Strategic advantage: an information advantage over the opponent in service of national or party objectives
way in: Audience response: shares, retweets, replies, engagement
- L1: Retweets rebroadcast to all of a sharer's followers; replies reach far fewer
- L2: Engagement read in real time by the operating accounts (AI swarms adapt to it)
- L3: Engagement tells which language spreads: out-group terms and moral-emotional words
way in: Defenders' detection: platform takedowns and classifiers
- L1: Platforms detect coordinated activity and take accounts down; content carries a signature
- L2: Felt by the operator as takedowns, pushing it toward real or hacked accounts
way in: Intelligence on the adversary: what the target believes and plans
- L1: The adversary's own communications and commanders' views
- L2: Signals intelligence: Ultra decrypts; listening on an enemy who piggybacks on one's own network
way in: New media technology: print, radio, television, the web, generative AI
- L1: Each new medium carries propaganda: paintings to websites
- L2: Taken up as new capability: agentic AI and LLMs, deepfake generation
way in: Political direction: the state's or party's objectives and doctrine
- L1: A government sets up the effort (the CPI in 1917; China's three warfares in 2003)
- L2: Doctrine and strategy: public opinion, psychological and legal warfare; cognitive domain operations
way in: The opponent's information operations (broadcasts, campaigns)
- L1: Western shortwave broadcasts into the Soviet Union, from 1948 met by jamming
- L2: Detected and answered: jammers matched to frequencies, power raised in turn
way in: The target audience's media and news diet
- L1: What the target already sees: national news, politicians, broadcasts; foreign posts are a small share of it
- L2: Monitored by the operator: which outlets and accounts the audience follows (state outlets like RT pushed into it)
way in: The target person's senses and judgement (sight, hearing, thought, emotion)
- L1: A headline, a post, a voice on the radio, a video
- L2: Seen and heard on Human's sight and hearing channels
- L3: Felt: moral-emotional and out-group language spreads further
- L4: Processed with fluency: repetition eases processing, which is read as truth
way in: The target society's divisions: identities, culture wars, grievances
- L1: Existing identity-driven controversies and culture wars
- L2: Read as targets: identity and narrative, historical memory (NATO's 'weaponize narratives')
way out: Broadcast, print and leaflets
- L1: The enemy populace reached directly
- L4: Radio programmes, posters, films; leaflets dropped by air
- L7: Aim: influence public opinion for the war
way out: Defence: prebunking, fact-checking and digital literacy
- L1: Audiences before and after exposure
- L2: Short videos run as ads; fact-checks after the fact
- L5: Inoculation: forewarning plus a weakened dose with a refutation
way out: Defensive control: censorship and surveillance at home
- L1: What the domestic audience can reach
- L2: Legal policies and filtering (Golden Shield)
- L7: Information control
way out: Denial: jamming and hijacking broadcasts
- L1: Noise on the shortwave bands, hitting untargeted stations too
- L2: Jamming transmitters: skywave over wide areas, groundwave near cities
- L7: Deny the opponent's message to one's population
way out: Fake, automated, cyborg and hacked accounts (computational propaganda)
- L1: Public perceptions on the platforms
- L2: Posts, replies and mentions aimed at influential users
- L4: Cyber troops run bots, human-run accounts, cyborgs and hacked accounts
way out: Leaks through double agents and diplomatic channels
- L1: The adversary's intelligence picture
- L2: Double agents under the Double Cross System (Garbo)
- L3: Story pieces fed in order
way out: Physical and wireless deception (dummies, fake radio traffic)
- L1: Inflatable tanks, sound trucks and fake radio before the enemy's sensors
- L2: Dummy landing craft, night lighting, simulated wireless traffic
- L3: A deception story: phantom armies
way out: Planting stories in friendly or set-up outlets for others to reprint
- L1: Reprints in other countries' papers
- L2: An outlet set up long before (Patriot, 1962)
- L3: A story with forged or 'scientific' backing