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Information warfare

Contests over information and belief between states and groups: manipulating information a target trusts so it decides against its own interest, assuring one's own information and denying or degrading the opponent's; walked as the competition and its practice at the level the research describes: propaganda, disinformation, military deception, psychological warfare and influence operations, from leaflets and radio to bots, troll offices, deepfakes and AI swarms, with the defences against them (jamming, censorship, detection, prebunking).

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born atdeception in warfare from early history (Sun Tzu); the word propaganda from 1622; the term 'information war' from 1970 (Minor) and as a capability from 1976 (Rona)
born precisionmillennia (practice); year (term)
boundaryInside: the deliberate contest over what a target believes and decides: the operators (propaganda and deception staffs, troll offices, cyber troops, bots), their craft, delivery and amplification, the defences run against them (jamming, censorship, detection, prebunking), and the feedback each side reads. Outside: the media and platforms it rides on, the minds it targets, the states and parties that sponsor it, the wars it serves, and honest error (misinformation without intent).
nested levelA practice of states and groups in contest; built from propaganda, disinformation, military deception and psychological operations; rides on mass media, social networks and the radio spectrum; its output runs into the decisions of states, armies and electorates.
scalesocial

Measures (23) published science

characteristic clock: lifetime of a troll office (IRA)about 10 years (founded mid-2013; shutdown announced 1 July 2023)
clock: Soviet jamming of Western radio1948 to 1987 (RFE/RL into 1988) years
clock: RTLM broadcasting8 July 1993 to 31 July 1994 days
countries with organised social media manipulation70 (2019); 48 (2018); 28 (2017) countries
bots' share of low-credibility spreading6% of accounts spread 31% of tweets linking low-credibility content and 34% of articles
countries using human-run accounts / bots60 of 70 / 50 of 70 (87% / 80%) countries
messages studied14 million messages, 400 thousand articles, ten months in 2016-2017 count
concentration of IRA exposure1% of users: 70% of exposures; 10%: 98%
IRA posts against domestic sources in timelines25 times more national news posts, 9 times more politicians' posts ratio
bots among pro-Russian spreaders (2022)20.28%
bots among Catalan referendum usersnearly one in three fraction
reach of pro-Russian messages (2022)about 251,000 retweets; about 14.4 million users
sharing per out-group word+67% odds of being shared
diffusion per moral-emotional word+20%
share who shared fake news on Facebook (2016)8.5%; over-65s nearly seven times the youngest group
inoculation in the field (YouTube)technique recognition up about 5%; about $0.05 per ad view; n = 22,632
leafletsalmost 26 million (MI7b, WWI); one billion (Korean War); 31 million (Iraq War) count
RTLM share of genocide violence (contested)an estimated 10%
Gulf War surrenders aided by leaflets87,000 (1991) troops
German divisions held in Norway by Fortitude North13 (late spring 1944) divisions
Ghost Army1,100 men; more than 20 deception campaigns count
IRA staffmore than 1,000 in one building (2015) people
troll location switching1% of trolls change their country against 16% of a baseline

Open contentions (5) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (16) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Information warfare. Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (18) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (7)

Sits inside / holds (2)

expressed by (20)

floor filled by (21)

Kinds (7)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

information warfare as propaganda, deception and influence-operation researchers describe it: the information environment up to the advantage it is fought for (reader's view)

  1. L1: The information environment: the media, networks and spectrum through which publics and decision makers learn about the world
  2. L2: Access and delivery: transmitters, leaflets, double agents, outlets set up in advance, fake and hacked accounts, jammers
  3. L3: Craft: propaganda, disinformation, deception stories and manipulation techniques; deepfakes
  4. L4: Spread: reprints, broadcasts, bots and super-spreaders, echo chambers, the language that travels
  5. L5: The target's minds: exposure, repetition, emotion and belief
  6. L6: Decisions and cohesion: what commanders, voters and governments decide; morale, trust and unity
  7. L7: Advantage: an information advantage over the opponent, for national or party objectives

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L3: Message craft and planning: stories, techniques and deception plans; troll offices and deception staffs (London Controlling Section, Ops (B), the IRA's departments)
  2. L4: Amplification and spread: broadcast, reprints, bots, troll networks, super-spreaders, echo chambers
  3. L5: The target's minds: exposure, repetition and fluency, emotion, belief; who is reached
  4. L6: Decisions and cohesion: commanders' dispositions, voters' choices, morale, trust and unity
  5. L7: Strategic advantage: an information advantage over the opponent in service of national or party objectives

way in: Audience response: shares, retweets, replies, engagement

  1. L1: Retweets rebroadcast to all of a sharer's followers; replies reach far fewer
  2. L2: Engagement read in real time by the operating accounts (AI swarms adapt to it)
  3. L3: Engagement tells which language spreads: out-group terms and moral-emotional words

way in: Defenders' detection: platform takedowns and classifiers

  1. L1: Platforms detect coordinated activity and take accounts down; content carries a signature
  2. L2: Felt by the operator as takedowns, pushing it toward real or hacked accounts

way in: Intelligence on the adversary: what the target believes and plans

  1. L1: The adversary's own communications and commanders' views
  2. L2: Signals intelligence: Ultra decrypts; listening on an enemy who piggybacks on one's own network

way in: New media technology: print, radio, television, the web, generative AI

  1. L1: Each new medium carries propaganda: paintings to websites
  2. L2: Taken up as new capability: agentic AI and LLMs, deepfake generation

way in: Political direction: the state's or party's objectives and doctrine

  1. L1: A government sets up the effort (the CPI in 1917; China's three warfares in 2003)
  2. L2: Doctrine and strategy: public opinion, psychological and legal warfare; cognitive domain operations

way in: The opponent's information operations (broadcasts, campaigns)

  1. L1: Western shortwave broadcasts into the Soviet Union, from 1948 met by jamming
  2. L2: Detected and answered: jammers matched to frequencies, power raised in turn

way in: The target audience's media and news diet

  1. L1: What the target already sees: national news, politicians, broadcasts; foreign posts are a small share of it
  2. L2: Monitored by the operator: which outlets and accounts the audience follows (state outlets like RT pushed into it)

way in: The target person's senses and judgement (sight, hearing, thought, emotion)

  1. L1: A headline, a post, a voice on the radio, a video
  2. L2: Seen and heard on Human's sight and hearing channels
  3. L3: Felt: moral-emotional and out-group language spreads further
  4. L4: Processed with fluency: repetition eases processing, which is read as truth

way in: The target society's divisions: identities, culture wars, grievances

  1. L1: Existing identity-driven controversies and culture wars
  2. L2: Read as targets: identity and narrative, historical memory (NATO's 'weaponize narratives')

way out: Broadcast, print and leaflets

  1. L1: The enemy populace reached directly
  2. L4: Radio programmes, posters, films; leaflets dropped by air
  3. L7: Aim: influence public opinion for the war

way out: Defence: prebunking, fact-checking and digital literacy

  1. L1: Audiences before and after exposure
  2. L2: Short videos run as ads; fact-checks after the fact
  3. L5: Inoculation: forewarning plus a weakened dose with a refutation

way out: Defensive control: censorship and surveillance at home

  1. L1: What the domestic audience can reach
  2. L2: Legal policies and filtering (Golden Shield)
  3. L7: Information control

way out: Denial: jamming and hijacking broadcasts

  1. L1: Noise on the shortwave bands, hitting untargeted stations too
  2. L2: Jamming transmitters: skywave over wide areas, groundwave near cities
  3. L7: Deny the opponent's message to one's population

way out: Fake, automated, cyborg and hacked accounts (computational propaganda)

  1. L1: Public perceptions on the platforms
  2. L2: Posts, replies and mentions aimed at influential users
  3. L4: Cyber troops run bots, human-run accounts, cyborgs and hacked accounts

way out: Leaks through double agents and diplomatic channels

  1. L1: The adversary's intelligence picture
  2. L2: Double agents under the Double Cross System (Garbo)
  3. L3: Story pieces fed in order

way out: Physical and wireless deception (dummies, fake radio traffic)

  1. L1: Inflatable tanks, sound trucks and fake radio before the enemy's sensors
  2. L2: Dummy landing craft, night lighting, simulated wireless traffic
  3. L3: A deception story: phantom armies

way out: Planting stories in friendly or set-up outlets for others to reprint

  1. L1: Reprints in other countries' papers
  2. L2: An outlet set up long before (Patriot, 1962)
  3. L3: A story with forged or 'scientific' backing

Sources (38) published science

Information warfare (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01)
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Radio jamming (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Pennycook G, Cannon TD, Rand DG. 2018. Prior exposure increases perceived accuracy of fake news. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 147:1865-1880. doi:10.1037/xge0000465 (PMC6279465, author manuscript) (behind its links)
Operation Fortitude (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Rathje S, Van Bavel JJ, van der Linden S. 2021. Out-group animosity drives engagement on social media. PNAS 118:e2024292118. doi:10.1073/pnas.2024292118 (PMC8256037, CC BY) (behind its links)
Lee H, Lee C, Farhat K, Qiu L, Geluso S, Kim A, Etzioni O. 2024. The Tug-of-War Between Deepfake Generation and Detection. arXiv:2407.06174v4 (behind its links)
Schroeder DT, Kunst JR, et al. 2026. How malicious AI swarms can threaten democracy. Science (doi:10.1126/science.adz1697); author version arXiv:2506.06299v4 (behind its links)
Roozenbeek J, van der Linden S, Goldberg B, Rathje S, Lewandowsky S. 2022. Psychological inoculation improves resilience against misinformation on social media. Science Advances 8:eabo6254. doi:10.1126/sciadv.abo6254 (PMC9401631, CC BY) (behind its links)
Propaganda (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Disinformation (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Military deception (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Psychological warfare (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Bradshaw S, Howard PN. 2019. The Global Disinformation Order: 2019 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation. Oxford Internet Institute, Computational Propaganda Project (working paper 2019.3) (behind its links)
Chinese information operations and information warfare (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Internet Research Agency (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Eady G, et al. 2023. Exposure to the Russian Internet Research Agency foreign influence campaign on Twitter in the 2016 US election. Nature Communications 14:62. doi:10.1038/s41467-022-35576-9 (PMC9829855, CC BY) (behind its links)
Geissler D, Bär D, Pröllochs N, Feuerriegel S. Russian propaganda on social media during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. arXiv:2211.04154 (EPJ Data Science 2023) (behind its links)
Stella M, Ferrara E, De Domenico M. 2018. Bots increase exposure to negative and inflammatory content in online social systems. PNAS 115:12435-12440. doi:10.1073/pnas.1803470115 (PMC6298098) (behind its links)
Brady WJ, et al. 2017. Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks. PNAS 114:7313-7318. doi:10.1073/pnas.1618923114 (PMC5514704) (behind its links)
Guess A, Nagler J, Tucker J. 2019. Less than you think: prevalence and predictors of fake news dissemination on Facebook. Science Advances 5:eaau4586. doi:10.1126/sciadv.aau4586 (PMC6326755) (behind its links)
Airborne leaflet propaganda (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Ghost Army (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Zannettou S, et al. 2019. Disinformation Warfare: Understanding State-Sponsored Trolls on Twitter and Their Influence on the Web. WWW '19 Companion; arXiv:1801.09288v2 (behind its links)
Alizadeh M, Shapiro JN, Buntain C, Tucker JA. 2020. Content-based features predict social media influence operations. Science Advances 6:eabb5824. doi:10.1126/sciadv.abb5824 (PMC7439640, CC BY-NC) (behind its links)
Firehose of falsehood (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Operation INFEKTION (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, Cook 2012, Misinformation and its correction: continued influence and successful debiasing, Psychol. Sci. Public Interest 13(3):106-131, doi:10.1177/1529100612451018 (PMID 26173286) (behind its links)
Cold War (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Pierri, Luceri, Jindal, Ferrara 2023. Propaganda and misinformation on Facebook and Twitter during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. arXiv:2212.00419 (ACM WebSci 2023) (behind its links)
Del Vicario M, et al. 2016. The spreading of misinformation online. PNAS 113:554-559. doi:10.1073/pnas.1517441113 (PMC4725489) (behind its links)
Deppe C, Schaal GS. 2024. Cognitive warfare: a conceptual analysis of the NATO ACT cognitive warfare exploratory concept. Frontiers in Big Data 7:1452129. doi:10.3389/fdata.2024.1452129 (PMC11565700, CC BY) (behind its links)
Committee on Public Information (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Russo-Ukrainian war (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Cognitive warfare (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Active measures (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Nilsson, Haga, Hellström. 2026. Definitional ambiguity in cognitive warfare: a critical and systematic conceptual review through ideal-type analysis. Frontiers in Big Data. doi:10.3389/fdata.2026.1762571 (PMC13218914, CC BY) (behind its links)