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Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022)

The armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine that began in February 2014 with the Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea, continued as the war in Donbas with Russian-backed separatists and covert Russian forces, and became a full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, the largest conflict in Europe since World War II; ongoing. Walked as a competition (QUEUE-BRIEF addendum 7): the sides, their means (ground forces, strikes, sea, occupation), the information and cyber fronts, how the war is sensed (drones, satellites, OSINT) and what it costs. Start date, causes, loss figures and the proxy question are contested and kept so.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

aliasesRusso-Ukrainian war (top-level competition)
born atFebruary 2014 (27 February: storming of the Crimean parliament)
born precisiondays (start date contested)
boundaryInside: the armed conflict between Russia (with its proxies and suppliers) and Ukraine (with its supporters) from February 2014: the fighting, strikes, occupation, information and cyber fronts, and the decisions that drive them. Outside: the states themselves, their societies and economies, the allies and the world markets the war acts on.
compete fnsfn:resource-denial-attrition
nested levelBuilt from states, armed forces, proxies, weapons and the people mobilised; embedded in the post-Soviet conflicts and the European security order; a part of human society's acts.
scalesocial

Measures (40) published science

War spanFebruary 2014 to ongoing (snapshot 2026-11-01) dates
Full-scale phase start24 February 2022 date
Ceasefire lifetime, 2014-202229 ceasefires, none longer than two weeks count; days
Ceasefire violations in 2021 (OSCE)more than 90,000 count
Donbas war deaths 2014-202214,200-14,400 deaths
Estimated casualties, 24 February 2022 to June 20261,274,000 to 2 million casualties
Civilian casualties recorded by OHCHR to 31 August 202617,257 killed, 53,693 injured (minimum) people
Russian pre-invasion ground force lost by December 2023 (US assessment)315,000 of 360,000 troops; 2,200 of 3,500 tanks troops; tanks
Excess male deaths in Russia aged 15-49, 2022-202358,500 ± 2,500 (range of models about 46,600 to 64,100; a lower bound) deaths
Ukrainian soldiers injured or killed (study's estimate)about 210,000 people
Refugees from Ukraineover 1 million in the first week; over 8 million by February 2023 people
Civilians deported to Russia (OSCE)over 1.3 million people
Ukraine GDP change 2022-30% percent
Cost of rebuilding Ukraine (World Bank, 2026)US$588 billion USD
Direct cost of the war to Russiaover US$450 billion (other estimates) USD
Aid to Ukraine tracked, January 2022-January 2024 (Kiel Institute)$380 billion USD
Environmental damagemore than $56.4 billion USD
Land contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance30% of Ukraine percent of area
War-related emissions, first 12 months21.9 million tCO2e from war activities plus 17.7 million from war fires
Kakhovka reservoir volume lost18.2 km3
Dnipro level drop after the dam's destruction8 m
People without safe drinking water after the damabout 1.25 million people
Ukrainian energy capacity damaged or occupied40% thermal, 90% wind, over 40% solar and nuclear percent
Cold injuries in surveyed households, winter 2022-20233.76% overall; 10% of older adults; respiratory infections 75.2% percent of participants
Shahed drones destroyed, 30 September-6 October 202224 of 46 launched count
Russian refineries hit more than once by late October 2025about 50% of 38 percent
Russian oil production drop10-15% percent
Russian gas to Europe157 bcm (2021) to 54 bcm (2024) bcm per year
Russia and Ukraine share of calories tradednearly 12% percent
Milblogger Telegram posts in the two weeks before 24 February 2022+8,925% (images +5,352%) percent change
Russian propaganda posts removed by Facebook and Twitterabout 8-15% percent
Populated areas with new building damage in the month of control change70.5% gained by Russia; 43.9% regained by Ukraine percent
Sentinel-1 radar period12 days
VIIRS Nightfire cadenceone file per day
Russian tank losses (forecast from OSINT)3-5 per day vehicles per day
CPTSD among combat-exposed Ukrainian personnel21.5% percent
Drone damage to Ukrainian hospitals137 (2024) to 296 (2025), +116% incidents
Attacks on Ukrainian medical infrastructure (WHO) to 21 December 20231,422 attacks
Partial mobilisation, 21 September 2022300,000 reservists people
Operation Spiderweb damage claims41 aircraft (Ukraine) against 20 hit and 10 destroyed (US officials)

Open contentions (5) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (7)

Sits inside / holds (3)

Trades with (valence) (14)

expressed by (27)

floor filled by (15)

Kinds (4)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

the Russo-Ukrainian war as historians and open-source analysts describe it: Ukraine, Russia and the Black Sea to decisions of war and peace (reader's view; periods in `periods`)

  1. L1: The world the war touches: Ukraine's land, cities, people, grain and energy, Russia's border regions and the Black Sea
  2. L2: The doors: reconnaissance drones, satellites, intercepts, front reports, civilians' reports, OSINT
  3. L3: Routing: command chains, staging areas, satellite and phone networks, Telegram
  4. L4: Integration: fronts and campaigns, conventional forces against comparable opposition
  5. L5: Institutions: governments, armed forces, the separatist proxies, coalitions and courts
  6. L6: Meaning: war aims, causes and narratives (contested)
  7. L7: Decisions of war and peace

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L5: Commands and general staffs on each side, with allied intelligence: where reconnaissance, satellite, signals, front, civilian, OSINT, cyber and diplomatic inputs meet
  2. L5: Governments and home fronts: martial law and mobilisation, war economies and budgets, censorship, aid and energy
  3. L6: War aims, narratives and alignments: Russia's aims and claims, Ukraine's sovereignty and Peace Formula, NATO and the coalitions
  4. L7: Decisions of war and peace: to occupy, invade, annex, mobilise, continue, negotiate or refuse a ceasefire

way in: Bodies and minds under fire and alarms (soldiers and civilians)

  1. L1: Air raid alarms and blasts; shelters
  2. L2: Wounds: polytrauma from blast, brain and spinal injuries
  3. L3: Threat rises; confidence falls
  4. L4: Minds: CPTSD in soldiers; partial adaptation in civilians

way in: Civilian reports from occupied and front areas

  1. L1: Civilians in the path of the invasion, many resisting
  2. L2: A Telegram chatbot and the Diia government app take position reports
  3. L3: Mobile networks carry them; Russian forces cut networks and search phones

way in: Cyber intrusions and attacks

  1. L1: Defacements and DDoS from low-level actors, and state operations, on both countries' networks
  2. L4: Assessment: volunteers' role minor and short-lived; state operations persistent

way in: Diplomacy, treaties and demands

  1. L1: Treaties and guarantees: Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons (1994)
  2. L2: Demands: Russia's security demands of NATO and Ukraine (2021)
  3. L3: Pressure on agreements: the EU association agreement withdrawn (2013)
  4. L4: Framings: 'a proxy war started by NATO' against 'a vicious invasion'

way in: Drone and battlefield reconnaissance (light, heat and radio over the front)

  1. L1: Light, heat and radio links over the front, contested by electronic warfare
  2. L2: Reconnaissance and strike drones (UAVs) flown by both sides
  3. L3: Satellite and network links that carry the feed (Starlink; Telegram for coordination)

way in: Economy, trade and food exports

  1. L1: Grain and oilseed exports: nearly 12% of calories traded
  2. L2: Neighbouring markets close to Ukrainian grain except for transit
  3. L3: Markets price the risk: traders reluctant, wheat and nickel hit
  4. L4: National accounts: Ukraine's GDP down 30% in 2022
  5. L5: Sanctions remake dependencies: Russia leans on China

way in: Energy revenues and supplies

  1. L1: Gas and oil flows: Russia supplied about 40% of EU gas imports in 2021; transit through Ukraine
  2. L2: Volumes and production as read: gas to Europe down from 157 to 54 bcm; Russian oil production down 10-15%

way in: History, identity and grievance (inner)

  1. L1: Narratives of shared and separate history
  2. L2: The Great Patriotic War frame
  3. L3: Identity as answered: 91% of Ukrainians reject 'one people'; a church calls it holy war

way in: Military aid, munitions and foreign fighters

  1. L1: Aid flows: $380 billion tracked to January 2024; North Korean troops for Russia
  2. L2: Shortfalls felt at the receiving end (Patriot interceptors)
  3. L3: The Ukraine Defence Contact Group routes it

way in: Open-source intelligence (photographs, videos, loss databases)

  1. L1: Frontline photographs and videos posted for attention
  2. L2: Verification platforms (WarSpotting, Oryx) log losses one image at a time
  3. L3: Sampling bias: striking systems over-represented
  4. L4: Combined with territorial-control and damage data, patterns appear that single sources hide

way in: Public opinion at home and among allies

  1. L1: Citizens of Russia, Ukraine and the supporting states
  2. L2: Survey experiments in five Western countries
  3. L3: Opinion split by orientation and by access to other information
  4. L4: Opinion as a limit on governments

way in: Satellite imagery (optical, radar and night-time infrared)

  1. L1: Radar echoes and night-time heat from the ground; radar works through cloud and dark
  2. L2: Satellites and their revisit: Sentinel-1 in 12-day periods; VIIRS Nightfire once a day
  3. L3: Change detection: interferometric coherence for destroyed buildings; thermal anomalies for urban combat
  4. L4: Intelligence products: published satellite photographs of the buildup (US, December 2021)

way in: Signals intelligence and intercepts

  1. L1: Radio and telephone traffic of the forces
  2. L4: Finished signals intelligence shared by the US for targeting

way in: Social media and news (Telegram, Facebook, X/Twitter, state media)

  1. L1: Posts and images: milbloggers' Telegram surged before the invasion
  2. L2: Accounts and channels, bot-like and human, on both sides
  3. L3: Platform moderation lets most propaganda through
  4. L4: Leaderships read the reaction: milbloggers as a barometer

way in: The front line: reports and losses

  1. L1: The line of contact: trenches, fire and losses
  2. L2: Observers and unit reports of fire (OSCE monitors before 2022)
  3. L3: Loss counts held as state secrets
  4. L4: Loss estimates: each side's claims, allies' assessments, excess-death demography

way in: Winter and weather

  1. L1: Ukrainian winters: typically -3 to -6 °C, down to -20 or -30 °C
  2. L2: Cold meets a damaged grid: cold injury and respiratory illness
  3. L3: Measured: household surveys across 24 oblasts

way out: Ceasefires, talks and deals

  1. L1: Ceasefires on the ground, none longer than two weeks; the grain corridor while it lasted
  2. L6: Draft terms: neutrality and limits for guarantees and withdrawal (2022)
  3. L7: A 'permanent ceasefire' announced and recanted (2014)

way out: Cyber operations

  1. L1: Government, media and social sites taken down (2014)
  2. L4: Leaks as reply: the Surkov e-mails
  3. L7: Hybrid war extended to Europe

way out: Ground war: invasion, offensives, sieges and counteroffensives

  1. L1: The ground taken and lost, and the damage to it
  2. L2: Assault troops: Wagner's prison recruits
  3. L3: Staging through Belarus
  4. L4: Manoeuvre: encirclement attempts (Bakhmut)
  5. L5: Covert and open forces: Russian troops behind the separatists
  6. L6: Massing as threat
  7. L7: Decision to use force

way out: Long-range strikes: missiles and drones on infrastructure and bases

  1. L1: Grids, plants, refineries, hospitals and homes hit
  2. L2: Salvoes thinned by air defence: 24 of 46 Shaheds destroyed in one week
  3. L4: Deep strikes with smuggled drones (Operation Spiderweb)
  4. L5: Target and weapon shifts: harder-to-hit missiles; power stations instead of distribution
  5. L6: Doctrine: SODCIT, to demoralise and force capitulation
  6. L7: Both sides choose each other's energy as a target

way out: Occupation and annexation

  1. L1: People moved out: deportations and refugees
  2. L3: Passportisation
  3. L4: Unmarked soldiers seize Crimea
  4. L7: Annexation of four partially occupied provinces

way out: Propaganda, denial and threats

  1. L2: Foreign-language state media
  2. L3: False flags before the invasion
  3. L4: Denial: 'local self-defense units'
  4. L6: The information war as a front
  5. L7: Nuclear threats

way out: The Black Sea: blockade, strikes on the fleet, the grain corridor

  1. L1: The straits closed to Russian warships (Montreux)
  2. L2: Port closure pushes exports to land and river routes
  3. L3: Payment after passage: the corridor as a gate

Sources (32) published science

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