← all systems · see it in The System
Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022)
The armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine that began in February 2014 with the Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea, continued as the war in Donbas with Russian-backed separatists and covert Russian forces, and became a full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, the largest conflict in Europe since World War II; ongoing. Walked as a competition (QUEUE-BRIEF addendum 7): the sides, their means (ground forces, strikes, sea, occupation), the information and cyber fronts, how the war is sensed (drones, satellites, OSINT) and what it costs. Start date, causes, loss figures and the proxy question are contested and kept so.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| aliases | Russo-Ukrainian war (top-level competition) |
| born at | February 2014 (27 February: storming of the Crimean parliament) |
| born precision | days (start date contested) |
| boundary | Inside: the armed conflict between Russia (with its proxies and suppliers) and Ukraine (with its supporters) from February 2014: the fighting, strikes, occupation, information and cyber fronts, and the decisions that drive them. Outside: the states themselves, their societies and economies, the allies and the world markets the war acts on. |
| compete fns | fn:resource-denial-attrition |
| nested level | Built from states, armed forces, proxies, weapons and the people mobilised; embedded in the post-Soviet conflicts and the European security order; a part of human society's acts. |
| scale | social |
Measures (40) published science
| War span | February 2014 to ongoing (snapshot 2026-11-01) dates |
| Full-scale phase start | 24 February 2022 date |
| Ceasefire lifetime, 2014-2022 | 29 ceasefires, none longer than two weeks count; days |
| Ceasefire violations in 2021 (OSCE) | more than 90,000 count |
| Donbas war deaths 2014-2022 | 14,200-14,400 deaths |
| Estimated casualties, 24 February 2022 to June 2026 | 1,274,000 to 2 million casualties |
| Civilian casualties recorded by OHCHR to 31 August 2026 | 17,257 killed, 53,693 injured (minimum) people |
| Russian pre-invasion ground force lost by December 2023 (US assessment) | 315,000 of 360,000 troops; 2,200 of 3,500 tanks troops; tanks |
| Excess male deaths in Russia aged 15-49, 2022-2023 | 58,500 ± 2,500 (range of models about 46,600 to 64,100; a lower bound) deaths |
| Ukrainian soldiers injured or killed (study's estimate) | about 210,000 people |
| Refugees from Ukraine | over 1 million in the first week; over 8 million by February 2023 people |
| Civilians deported to Russia (OSCE) | over 1.3 million people |
| Ukraine GDP change 2022 | -30% percent |
| Cost of rebuilding Ukraine (World Bank, 2026) | US$588 billion USD |
| Direct cost of the war to Russia | over US$450 billion (other estimates) USD |
| Aid to Ukraine tracked, January 2022-January 2024 (Kiel Institute) | $380 billion USD |
| Environmental damage | more than $56.4 billion USD |
| Land contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance | 30% of Ukraine percent of area |
| War-related emissions, first 12 months | 21.9 million tCO2e from war activities plus 17.7 million from war fires |
| Kakhovka reservoir volume lost | 18.2 km3 |
| Dnipro level drop after the dam's destruction | 8 m |
| People without safe drinking water after the dam | about 1.25 million people |
| Ukrainian energy capacity damaged or occupied | 40% thermal, 90% wind, over 40% solar and nuclear percent |
| Cold injuries in surveyed households, winter 2022-2023 | 3.76% overall; 10% of older adults; respiratory infections 75.2% percent of participants |
| Shahed drones destroyed, 30 September-6 October 2022 | 24 of 46 launched count |
| Russian refineries hit more than once by late October 2025 | about 50% of 38 percent |
| Russian oil production drop | 10-15% percent |
| Russian gas to Europe | 157 bcm (2021) to 54 bcm (2024) bcm per year |
| Russia and Ukraine share of calories traded | nearly 12% percent |
| Milblogger Telegram posts in the two weeks before 24 February 2022 | +8,925% (images +5,352%) percent change |
| Russian propaganda posts removed by Facebook and Twitter | about 8-15% percent |
| Populated areas with new building damage in the month of control change | 70.5% gained by Russia; 43.9% regained by Ukraine percent |
| Sentinel-1 radar period | 12 days |
| VIIRS Nightfire cadence | one file per day |
| Russian tank losses (forecast from OSINT) | 3-5 per day vehicles per day |
| CPTSD among combat-exposed Ukrainian personnel | 21.5% percent |
| Drone damage to Ukrainian hospitals | 137 (2024) to 296 (2025), +116% incidents |
| Attacks on Ukrainian medical infrastructure (WHO) to 21 December 2023 | 1,422 attacks |
| Partial mobilisation, 21 September 2022 | 300,000 reservists people |
| Operation Spiderweb damage claims | 41 aircraft (Ukraine) against 20 hit and 10 destroyed (US officials) |
Open contentions (5) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-1803 Who blew up the Nord Stream pipelines?
booked: The map books sabotage with no perpetrator identified, and the later arrest alongside.
the other reading: Swedish and Danish investigations closed without perpetrators (February 2024); a Ukrainian national arrested in August 2025 on suspicion of involvement - C-1807 What caused the Russo-Ukrainian war?
booked: The map lists the causes scholars give and the governments' own claims, and rules none.
the other reading: NATO expansion and broken promises (Putin; Lavrov's 'proxy war started by NATO'); the encyclopedia notes no such agreements or promises were made; Putin invaded because he believed NATO weak and Kyiv easy to take (ISW); control of natural resources (Black Sea gas, Donbas minerals, lithium, grain); Russian claims of genocide and 'denazification', rejected as baseless by the ICJ and historians - C-1808 How many people has the Russo-Ukrainian war killed?
booked: The map gives each source's figures with who gives them, since they differ several-fold.
the other reading: Russian forces killed: 352,000 (Mediazona and Meduza, to end 2025); 512,278-626,118 (BBC Russian and Mediazona, to 20 October 2026); Russian excess male deaths 2022-2023: 58,500 ± 2,500, a lower bound (Kobak et al. 2025); Ukrainian forces killed: 46,000+ (Zelenskyy, February 2025); 125,000-150,000 (CSIS, to July 2026); 200,000 (BBC estimate, to February 2026); Russia's Ministry of Defence: Ukraine's casualties over 1,500,000; Operation Spiderweb: 41 aircraft (Ukraine) vs 20 hit, 10 destroyed (US officials) - C-1809 Is the Russo-Ukrainian war a proxy war?
booked: The map books the international courts' finding of a war between Russia and Ukraine, with the proxy readings alongside.
the other reading: a proxy war started by NATO (Lavrov); 'without question' a proxy war (Panetta); the proxy label wrongly implies Ukrainians fight only because NATO put them up to it (Freedman); NATO: not at war with Russia, supporting Ukraine's self-defence - C-1810 When did the Russo-Ukrainian war begin?
booked: The map dates it to February 2014 in Crimea, with the other proposed start dates alongside.
the other reading: 20 February 2014 (orders to prepare; the date on the Russian Crimea medal; Umland); 26 February 2014 (Ukraine's Day of Resistance); 27 February 2014 (storming of the Crimean parliament; Plokhy); before 2014: Russia subverting Ukrainian sovereignty earlier (Baudet); 24 February 2022 as the start of a second, much less limited war (D'Anieri's two-stage reading)
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (7)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Russia
- Ukraine
- Donetsk People's Republic (proxy)
- Luhansk People's Republic (proxy)
- Wagner Group
- Drones
Sits inside / holds (3)
Trades with (valence) (14)
- Large Hadron Collider (LHC) via sys:human-society · Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) even
- Nationalism via sys:international-system · Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) loss
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:human-society · Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) gain
- River via sys:water-cycle · Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) even
- Electrical grid via sys:electricity · Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) gain
- United States (the country across time) via sys:human-society · Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) gain
- Economy via sys:human-society · Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) loss
- Nuclear power plant via sys:human-society · Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) gain
- Cyberwarfare via sys:internet · Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) mixed
- Information warfare via sys:information-environment · Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) mixed
- Critical infrastructure via sys:infrastructure · Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) gain
- European Union via sys:energy · Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) loss
- Russia via sys:human-society · Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) mixed
- Ukraine via sys:human-society · Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) mixed
expressed by (27)
- Amplification/Scale-Up (Manufacture & Distribution)
- Symbiosis/Co-Creation (Collaborative Specialization)
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Sensing/Scanning
- Mapping/Modeling
- Multi-Scale Data Fusion / Triangulation
- Trail-Marking / Externalized Memory (Stigmergy)
- Evade Detection
- Encirclement
- Precision Attack
- Ranged Attack
- Neutralize Defenses
- Resource Denial/Attrition
- Subversion & Co-optation
- Prepositioning & Latency
- Battlespace Shaping
- Leverage Host/Amplification
- Divide & Isolate
- Cascade Induction
- Reactive Response
- Proactive Defense
- Physical/Virtual Barrier
- Deception
- Resilience & Repair
- Redundancy & Diversity
- Deterrence
- Bridging Supply Gaps (Store & Dormancy)
floor filled by (15)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- State (polity); the nation state its predominant modern form
- Government
- Internet
- Ocean
- River
- Electrical grid
- Collective memory
- Military alliances and coalitions (Triple Alliance, Triple Entente; Allies, Axis)
- Armed forces (armies, navies, air forces)
- Open-source intelligence
- Earth observation satellite
- Belarus
- Information warfare
- Drones
Kinds (4)
Notes published science
- Two weeks before the full-scale invasion, 989 Russian military bloggers on Telegram posted 8,925% more than before (and 5,352% more images): an avalanche of posts that ran ahead of the tanks (src:theisen-2024-telegram-avalanche).
- In Ukraine, how often the air raid sirens sounded each month tracked leptospirosis cases in 2023: people caught the rat-borne infection in the bomb shelters they ran to (src:petakh-2024-leptospirosis).
- Free radar satellites can date a war: the Sentinel-1 method spots a destroyed building within its 12-day window from as few as eight earlier images, and joined with front-line maps it shows towns taken by Russia were newly damaged in 70.5% of cases in the month they changed hands, against 43.9% for towns Ukraine took back (src:racek-2025-sar-destruction, src:sticher-2026-satellite-conflict).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
the Russo-Ukrainian war as historians and open-source analysts describe it: Ukraine, Russia and the Black Sea to decisions of war and peace (reader's view; periods in `periods`)
- L1: The world the war touches: Ukraine's land, cities, people, grain and energy, Russia's border regions and the Black Sea
- L2: The doors: reconnaissance drones, satellites, intercepts, front reports, civilians' reports, OSINT
- L3: Routing: command chains, staging areas, satellite and phone networks, Telegram
- L4: Integration: fronts and campaigns, conventional forces against comparable opposition
- L5: Institutions: governments, armed forces, the separatist proxies, coalitions and courts
- L6: Meaning: war aims, causes and narratives (contested)
- L7: Decisions of war and peace
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L5: Commands and general staffs on each side, with allied intelligence: where reconnaissance, satellite, signals, front, civilian, OSINT, cyber and diplomatic inputs meet
- L5: Governments and home fronts: martial law and mobilisation, war economies and budgets, censorship, aid and energy
- L6: War aims, narratives and alignments: Russia's aims and claims, Ukraine's sovereignty and Peace Formula, NATO and the coalitions
- L7: Decisions of war and peace: to occupy, invade, annex, mobilise, continue, negotiate or refuse a ceasefire
way in: Bodies and minds under fire and alarms (soldiers and civilians)
- L1: Air raid alarms and blasts; shelters
- L2: Wounds: polytrauma from blast, brain and spinal injuries
- L3: Threat rises; confidence falls
- L4: Minds: CPTSD in soldiers; partial adaptation in civilians
way in: Civilian reports from occupied and front areas
- L1: Civilians in the path of the invasion, many resisting
- L2: A Telegram chatbot and the Diia government app take position reports
- L3: Mobile networks carry them; Russian forces cut networks and search phones
way in: Cyber intrusions and attacks
- L1: Defacements and DDoS from low-level actors, and state operations, on both countries' networks
- L4: Assessment: volunteers' role minor and short-lived; state operations persistent
way in: Diplomacy, treaties and demands
- L1: Treaties and guarantees: Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons (1994)
- L2: Demands: Russia's security demands of NATO and Ukraine (2021)
- L3: Pressure on agreements: the EU association agreement withdrawn (2013)
- L4: Framings: 'a proxy war started by NATO' against 'a vicious invasion'
way in: Drone and battlefield reconnaissance (light, heat and radio over the front)
- L1: Light, heat and radio links over the front, contested by electronic warfare
- L2: Reconnaissance and strike drones (UAVs) flown by both sides
- L3: Satellite and network links that carry the feed (Starlink; Telegram for coordination)
way in: Economy, trade and food exports
- L1: Grain and oilseed exports: nearly 12% of calories traded
- L2: Neighbouring markets close to Ukrainian grain except for transit
- L3: Markets price the risk: traders reluctant, wheat and nickel hit
- L4: National accounts: Ukraine's GDP down 30% in 2022
- L5: Sanctions remake dependencies: Russia leans on China
way in: Energy revenues and supplies
- L1: Gas and oil flows: Russia supplied about 40% of EU gas imports in 2021; transit through Ukraine
- L2: Volumes and production as read: gas to Europe down from 157 to 54 bcm; Russian oil production down 10-15%
way in: History, identity and grievance (inner)
- L1: Narratives of shared and separate history
- L2: The Great Patriotic War frame
- L3: Identity as answered: 91% of Ukrainians reject 'one people'; a church calls it holy war
way in: Military aid, munitions and foreign fighters
- L1: Aid flows: $380 billion tracked to January 2024; North Korean troops for Russia
- L2: Shortfalls felt at the receiving end (Patriot interceptors)
- L3: The Ukraine Defence Contact Group routes it
way in: Open-source intelligence (photographs, videos, loss databases)
- L1: Frontline photographs and videos posted for attention
- L2: Verification platforms (WarSpotting, Oryx) log losses one image at a time
- L3: Sampling bias: striking systems over-represented
- L4: Combined with territorial-control and damage data, patterns appear that single sources hide
way in: Public opinion at home and among allies
- L1: Citizens of Russia, Ukraine and the supporting states
- L2: Survey experiments in five Western countries
- L3: Opinion split by orientation and by access to other information
- L4: Opinion as a limit on governments
way in: Satellite imagery (optical, radar and night-time infrared)
- L1: Radar echoes and night-time heat from the ground; radar works through cloud and dark
- L2: Satellites and their revisit: Sentinel-1 in 12-day periods; VIIRS Nightfire once a day
- L3: Change detection: interferometric coherence for destroyed buildings; thermal anomalies for urban combat
- L4: Intelligence products: published satellite photographs of the buildup (US, December 2021)
way in: Signals intelligence and intercepts
- L1: Radio and telephone traffic of the forces
- L4: Finished signals intelligence shared by the US for targeting
way in: Social media and news (Telegram, Facebook, X/Twitter, state media)
- L1: Posts and images: milbloggers' Telegram surged before the invasion
- L2: Accounts and channels, bot-like and human, on both sides
- L3: Platform moderation lets most propaganda through
- L4: Leaderships read the reaction: milbloggers as a barometer
way in: The front line: reports and losses
- L1: The line of contact: trenches, fire and losses
- L2: Observers and unit reports of fire (OSCE monitors before 2022)
- L3: Loss counts held as state secrets
- L4: Loss estimates: each side's claims, allies' assessments, excess-death demography
way in: Winter and weather
- L1: Ukrainian winters: typically -3 to -6 °C, down to -20 or -30 °C
- L2: Cold meets a damaged grid: cold injury and respiratory illness
- L3: Measured: household surveys across 24 oblasts
way out: Ceasefires, talks and deals
- L1: Ceasefires on the ground, none longer than two weeks; the grain corridor while it lasted
- L6: Draft terms: neutrality and limits for guarantees and withdrawal (2022)
- L7: A 'permanent ceasefire' announced and recanted (2014)
way out: Cyber operations
- L1: Government, media and social sites taken down (2014)
- L4: Leaks as reply: the Surkov e-mails
- L7: Hybrid war extended to Europe
way out: Ground war: invasion, offensives, sieges and counteroffensives
- L1: The ground taken and lost, and the damage to it
- L2: Assault troops: Wagner's prison recruits
- L3: Staging through Belarus
- L4: Manoeuvre: encirclement attempts (Bakhmut)
- L5: Covert and open forces: Russian troops behind the separatists
- L6: Massing as threat
- L7: Decision to use force
way out: Long-range strikes: missiles and drones on infrastructure and bases
- L1: Grids, plants, refineries, hospitals and homes hit
- L2: Salvoes thinned by air defence: 24 of 46 Shaheds destroyed in one week
- L4: Deep strikes with smuggled drones (Operation Spiderweb)
- L5: Target and weapon shifts: harder-to-hit missiles; power stations instead of distribution
- L6: Doctrine: SODCIT, to demoralise and force capitulation
- L7: Both sides choose each other's energy as a target
way out: Occupation and annexation
- L1: People moved out: deportations and refugees
- L3: Passportisation
- L4: Unmarked soldiers seize Crimea
- L7: Annexation of four partially occupied provinces
way out: Propaganda, denial and threats
- L2: Foreign-language state media
- L3: False flags before the invasion
- L4: Denial: 'local self-defense units'
- L6: The information war as a front
- L7: Nuclear threats
way out: The Black Sea: blockade, strikes on the fleet, the grain corridor
- L1: The straits closed to Russian warships (Montreux)
- L2: Port closure pushes exports to land and river routes
- L3: Payment after passage: the corridor as a gate