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Critical infrastructure
Infrastructure considered essential by governments for the functioning of a society and economy and deserving of special protection for national security (src:wp:critical-infrastructure): the power, water, fuel, transport, communications, health, food and finance systems whose 'incapacity or destruction ... would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety' (US Patriot Act definition, src:wp:critical-infrastructure). Walked as the whole those sectors make together: assets that sense and act on the physical world through control systems (SCADA, PLCs), operators who supervise them, the interdependencies that couple the sectors into one system of systems (src:huang-2018-ici, src:buldyrev-2010-interdependent), and the protection programmes (designation, risk management, information sharing, resilience) that governments and owners run over them (src:nist-csf-2, src:wp:critical-infrastructure-protection).
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | contested (see C-1749); US programme from 1996, PDD-63 May 1998 |
| born precision | contested |
| boundary | Inside: the assets and networks of the designated sectors (energy, water and wastewater, transportation, communications and IT, health, food and agriculture, finance, chemical, dams, emergency services, government facilities and the rest of each country's list), their control systems (field sensors and actuators, PLCs and RTUs, SCADA and distributed control, control centres and their operators), the dependency links between sectors, and the protection programmes run over them (designation, sector lead agencies, operator security plans, risk management, information sharing and analysis centres, stress tests). Outside: the people and firms who use the services (each with their own walk), the natural hazards and attackers that strike it, markets and legislatures that fund and regulate it, and foreign infrastructure it depends on. |
| nested level | A system of systems: built from sector infrastructures (the electrical grid, the internet and telecommunications, pipelines, water systems, transport networks) coupled by physical, cyber, geographic and logical dependencies; embedded in the state that designates and protects it and the economy and society that run on its services. |
| scale | social |
Measures (24) published science
| characteristic clock: control loop cycle time | milliseconds to minutes cycle |
| characteristic clock: real-time operating data exchange between control centres | 2 to 4 s |
| operator screen refresh during the 2003 cascade | normally 1-3; up to 59 s |
| US critical infrastructure sectors (PPD-21, NIPP 2013) | 16 sectors |
| August 2003 blackout: people affected | 50 million (61,800 MW of load) people |
| Canadian critical infrastructure sectors | 10 sectors |
| August 2003 blackout: US cost | 4-10 billion USD |
| August 2003 blackout: load shed that might have averted it | >= 1,500 MW |
| Ukraine grid attack 2015: people without power | about 230,000 for 1-6 hours (30 substations) people |
| Ukraine grid attack 2015: energy not supplied | up to 73 (0.015% of daily consumption) MWh |
| Texas 2021: homes and businesses without power | > 4.5 million customers |
| Colonial pipeline share of East Coast fuel | about 45 % |
| Texas 2021: deaths | >= 246 (estimates to 702) people |
| Texas 2021: time from complete grid failure when shutdowns began | 4 min 37 s time |
| critical average degree, two interdependent ER networks | 2.445 (vs 1 for a single network) <k> |
| Hurricane Maria excess deaths (survey estimate) | 4645 (95% CI 793-8498); official count 64 deaths |
| reduction in large-cascade probability from interconnection | 70 (p from 0.0005 to 0.075) % |
| CI types in the global Critical Infrastructure Spatial Index | 39 types in 7 systems |
| share of mapped CI elements by income class | high 60.8; upper-middle 21.4; lower-middle 14.5; low 3.3 % |
| annual cost of infrastructure service disruption in LMICs | >= 390 billion USD per year |
| share of transoceanic digital communications on subsea cables | nearly 99 % |
| Ever Given in the Suez Canal, 2021 | 6 days; $9.6 billion of trade held up per day |
| share of most advanced semiconductors from one firm | 92 % |
| per-hand-off yield of operator view (2003, signal toll) | 1-3 s refresh stretched to 59 s |
Open contentions (6) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-1739 Why do blackout sizes follow a power law?
booked: The map books power grids tuning themselves to a critical point through supply and demand, and lists the other explanations.
the other reading: SOC: competition of supply and demand tunes grids to a critical point (Odor 2023); highly optimized tolerance (HOT), probably for failures without cascades; city-size power law carried into load; competition of service capacity and failures giving power-law repair times - C-1743 Does linking infrastructure networks make them stronger or weaker?
booked: The map books both: some linking stops local cascades, and too much makes rare large ones bigger.
the other reading: interconnection strengthens: more efficient and perhaps stronger (CIP); some interconnectivity cuts large-cascade chance by 70% (Brummitt); interconnection weakens: interdependent networks collapse abruptly, broader degree distributions more vulnerable (Buldyrev); single points of failure cascade (CIP); an optimum p* exists, but networks mitigating their own cascades may unwittingly enlarge global ones (Brummitt) - C-1744 Who runs critical infrastructure, government or private owners?
booked: The map books both: governments designate and coordinate, private owners operate.
the other reading: under the scope of government for its strategic importance; privatised, with the private sector contributing to essential services; public-private collaboration as the necessary structure - C-1749 When did 'critical infrastructure' become a thing?
booked: The map dates the designation to the US programme of 1996-98, with infrastructure itself much older.
the other reading: the designation: the US programme from 1996, PDD-63 1998 (encyclopedia); the dependency: when sectors became automated and interlinked by computers and communications (encyclopedia, CIP); infrastructure itself: public works long older (1987 NRC term; encyclopedia) - C-1759 How many died in Puerto Rico from Hurricane Maria?
booked: The map books the survey estimate of about 4,600 beside the official count of 64.
the other reading: official count 64; household survey: 4645 excess deaths, likely an underestimate from survivor bias (Kishore 2018) - C-1780 How many died in the 2021 Texas power crisis?
booked: The map books at least 246, with estimates up to 702.
the other reading: 246 (official-type count); up to 702 (other estimates)
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (15)
- Attackers against defenders for control of computing
- Ransomware extortion of victims
- Operation Olympic Games: Stuxnet against Natanz (campaign, about 2005-2010)
- Attacks on Ukraine's power grid (campaign, 2015 and 2016)
- Internet
- Electrical grid
- Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)
- Water and wastewater systems
- Transportation systems (roads, railways, airports, ports, pipelines)
- Oil and gas pipelines
- Owners and operators (utilities, pipeline companies, control-room operators)
- Sector lead agencies and protection programmes (DHS, DOE, EPA..., KRITIS, EPCIP)
- Industrial control system
- Efficiency and low cost against resilience
- Protesters against pipelines, and laws against protest
Sits inside / holds (3)
Trades with (valence) (14)
- Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-; full-scale phase from 2022) via sys:infrastructure · Critical infrastructure loss
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:infrastructure · Critical infrastructure gain
- Government via sys:infrastructure · Critical infrastructure mixed
- Law (rules and law) via sys:infrastructure · Critical infrastructure gain
- Internet via sys:infrastructure · Critical infrastructure mixed
- Electrical grid via sys:infrastructure · Critical infrastructure mixed
- Weather via sys:weather · Critical infrastructure loss
- City via sys:infrastructure · Critical infrastructure gain
- Economy via sys:infrastructure · Critical infrastructure gain
- Climate change via sys:infrastructure · Critical infrastructure loss
- Threat actor via sys:infrastructure · Critical infrastructure loss
- Cyberwarfare via sys:infrastructure · Critical infrastructure loss
- Business continuity via sys:infrastructure · Critical infrastructure gain
- Globally critical infrastructure via sys:infrastructure · Critical infrastructure mixed
expressed by (26)
- Templating / Standardization
- Interoperability/Transduction (Bridging)
- Encapsulation & Modularity (Abstraction)
- Amplification/Scale-Up (Manufacture & Distribution)
- Symbiosis/Co-Creation (Collaborative Specialization)
- Distributed Autonomy/Decentralized Execution (Subsidiarity)
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Sensing/Scanning
- Mapping/Modeling
- Trail-Marking / Externalized Memory (Stigmergy)
- Surprise / Change-Point Detection
- Social Learning / Public Information Use
- Quick Harm Avoidance
- Reactive Response
- Proactive Defense
- Physical/Virtual Barrier
- Self-Monitoring
- Validation of Identity/Intention
- Validation of Effectiveness
- Enclave/Segregation
- Resilience & Repair
- Redundancy & Diversity
- Triage & Prioritized Allocation
- Deterrence
- Quality Control & Error Correction
- Bridging Supply Gaps (Store & Dormancy)
floor filled by (13)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- State (polity); the nation state its predominant modern form
- Government
- Internet
- Electrical grid
- Weather
- Economy
- Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)
- Business continuity
- Oil and gas pipelines
- Owners and operators (utilities, pipeline companies, control-room operators)
- SCADA
- Industrial control system
Kinds (4)
- Critical maritime infrastructure (CMI)
- Critical terrestrial infrastructure (CTI)
- Globally critical infrastructure
- European critical infrastructure (ECI)
Notes published science
- Coupling two networks makes them break all at once: two random networks that each need the other collapse together below an average of about 2.4 links per node, where either alone survives down to 1, and the collapse comes with no advance warning, as a jump rather than a slide (src:buldyrev-2010-interdependent, src:wp:interdependent-networks).
- There is a best amount of connection between power grids: linking two grids cut the chance of a big blackout in one by 70%, but past a sweet spot more links made the biggest cascades worse, and grids that connect to protect themselves can make the whole system's blackouts bigger without knowing it (src:brummitt-2012-cascades).
- The 2003 blackout that hit 50 million people began with an alarm that went silent: the control room's alarm software failed at 14:14 and nobody knew, operators' screens slowed from refreshing every 1-3 seconds to every 59, and power lines touching overgrown trees did the rest (src:task-force-2004-blackout).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
critical infrastructure as infrastructure-protection practitioners and resilience researchers describe it: the physical world its assets sit in and the commodities they carry, up to the essential services a society and economy cannot do without (reader's view)
- L1: The physical world and the commodities carried: power, water, fuel, goods, people, signals, and the hazards around the assets
- L2: Field devices: sensors and final control elements (Level 0)
- L3: Controllers (PLCs, RTUs) and the networks that link them, with dependency links to other sectors
- L4: Supervision: SCADA control centres, HMIs, alarms, data exchange between control centres every 2 to 4 s
- L5: The operator's risk management and cross-sector operation (identify, protect, detect, respond, recover)
- L6: Protection programmes and governance: designation, lead agencies, national plans, mandatory standards, information sharing
- L7: Essential services and the national critical functions they enable
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L4: Supervision and situational awareness: SCADA control centres, HMIs, alarms, historians; operators see process status and set set points
- L5: The operator’s risk management and cross-sector operation: identify, protect, detect, respond, recover; reliability coordination between control areas; dependencies on other sectors weighed
- L6: Protection programmes and governance: designation of sectors, lead agencies, national plans (NIPP, KRITIS, EPCIP), mandatory standards, stress tests, information sharing; CSF GOVERN
- L7: The essential services a society and economy run on: national security, economic security, public health and safety; threat-agnostic resilience of critical functions
way in: Cyber intrusions: malware, ransomware, compromised accounts
- L1: Networks that reach the operator: email, VPNs, the internet
- L2: Corporate IT compromised: spear-phishing (Ukraine 2015), a password for an inactive VPN account without MFA (Colonial 2021)
- L3: Control systems reached: SCADA seized and substations switched off (Ukraine); PLCs reprogrammed (Stuxnet)
- L4: Seen or missed at supervision: HMIs and logs; detection is CSF DETECT
way in: Demand: the load that homes, firms and other sectors draw
- L1: Society's demand for the services, expected 'at the flick of a switch'
- L2: Load arrives as power drawn, gas burned, water used, read by meters and by the process sensors
- L3: Supply balanced against demand; their competition tunes power systems to a critical point
way in: Foreign and globally critical infrastructure the country depends on
- L1: Canals, subsea cables, GPS, advanced chip fabs outside the border
- L2: Dependence felt without authority over the facility
- L3: Lists of foreign dependencies (Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative)
- L4: Foreign affairs, trade and defence ministries brought in
- L5: International cooperation, funding and monitoring as options
way in: Inputs from other infrastructures: power, fuel, communications, water, transport (the interdependency channel)
- L1: Another sector's commodity or data: power for pumps and controls, gas for generators, telemetry over telecom links
- L2: Dependency links of four kinds: physical, cyber, geographic, logical
- L3: A node loses its function when the node it depends on fails
- L4: Seen at supervision only partly: operators lack a view of systems outside their control
way in: Law and policy: designations, directives, standards and penalties
- L1: Directives and statutes: PDD-63 (1998), HSPD-7 (2003), PPD-21 (2013), the Patriot Act definition, EU EPCIP, KRITIS
- L2: Designation of sectors and assets; lead agencies assigned
- L3: Requirements on operators: assess vulnerabilities, plan, detect, alert and rebuild; Operator Security Plans
- L4: Standards and frameworks taken up (NIST CSF, NERC reliability standards)
- L5: Compliance enforced: reliability standards made mandatory with penalties
way in: Lessons from incidents: investigations, task forces, after-action reports
- L1: The record of a failure: sequence of events, logs, interviews
- L2: Investigators gather and analyse it (task force working groups)
- L3: Causes grouped (four groups for 2003)
- L4: Recommendations issued
- L5: Taken up, or ignored for cost (Texas 2011)
way in: Markets and money: prices, deregulation, investment budgets
- L1: Wholesale markets and capital: deregulation from the 1990s
- L2: Prices and costs read by owners: the cost of winterising, of redundancy
- L3: Investment choices: efficiency and low cost over resilience
- L4: Budgets set against risk
way in: Natural hazards and stressors: storms, cold, heat, floods, earthquakes, wildfire, vegetation
- L1: Earthquakes, landslides, floods, tsunami, wildfires, climate change effects, explosions
- L2: Assets take the hit: lines sag into overgrown trees; unwinterised gas wellheads and plants freeze
- L3: Protection trips the faulted element; the loss shows up in the process data and alarms
way in: Physical attack and sabotage: gunfire on substations, damage to subsea cables and pipelines
- L1: Physical assets in reach: substations, subsea cables and pipelines
- L2: The asset damaged; its loss arrives as process data and alarms
- L3: Protection isolates the damage
way in: Protective relays and safety systems acting on local readings (a reflex lane)
- L1: Faults and overloads in the process
- L2: Safety systems and relays trip the element locally, within seconds, before supervision acts
way in: The assets' own state: age, wear, maintenance backlog, component failure rates (interoceptive)
- L1: Ageing plant: the US graded D+ by civil engineers
- L2: Initial component failure rates
- L3: Inspection and report cards (16 categories every 2-4 years)
- L4: Vulnerability assessed (fault trees, Bayesian networks)
way in: The people who run it: operators, engineers, maintainers (inner channel)
- L1: Operators and maintainers as people: present or absent (holiday skeleton crews), commuting, making errors
- L2: Their senses and judgement at the HMI; internal communication between computer support and operations staff
- L3: Their availability gates repair: maintainers' commute slows power recovery
way in: The process itself: flows, pressures, frequencies, voltages, levels and temperatures of the commodity carried
- L1: The controlled process: electricity, gas, water, fuel and traffic in motion through the physical plant
- L2: Field devices (Purdue Level 0): flow and temperature sensors measure a physical property; many cannot be authenticated
- L3: Controllers (PLCs, RTUs; Level 1) run the local control algorithm against set points and report up to supervisory level
way in: The public: customers, citizens, protesters, voters
- L1: People who use the services and judge them
- L2: Their calls and reports reach the operator (call centres; jammed in Ukraine 2015)
- L3: Their behaviour returns as load and shortage (panic buying)
- L4: Public confidence, part of what the finance sector protects
- L5: Political pressure and blame after failures (Texas 2021); protest and laws against it
way in: Threat information shared by governments, ISACs and peers
- L1: Alerts and advisories from ICS-CERT, ISACs, sector agencies
- L2: Received by members of the ISAC
- L3: Shared information across systems lowers overall failure risk
- L4: Folded into IDENTIFY and DETECT
way out: Control actions back on the process: set points, valves, breakers, switches, motors
- L1: The process changes; logic in OT acts directly on the physical world
- L2: Actuators move
- L3: Controllers compute manipulated variables
- L4: Operators configure set points at the HMI
way out: Designation and law back on the world: lists of sectors and assets, penalties (including on protest)
- L1: Land, pipelines and people bound by it
- L5: Statutes: felony penalties for trespass on designated land
- L6: Sectors and assets designated
way out: Essential services delivered: power, water, fuel, communications, transport, care
- L1: Arrives at homes, firms, hospitals and other sectors
- L3: Carried by the networks
- L5: Operated and dispatched by owners and operators
- L7: Services that society depends on for nearly all aspects of modern life
way out: Failure passed on to dependent sectors and people
- L1: Dependent sectors and people lose service: water, health care, transport
- L3: Carried over dependency links into other sectors
- L5: A failure that is not contained
way out: Hardening and resilience building: redundancy, diversity, modularity, segmentation, winterising, authentication
- L1: Built into assets: redundant components, diverse sources, network segmentation
- L5: PROTECT safeguards chosen; five resilience principles applied
- L6: Programmes and standards require protection
way out: Repair and recovery: restoration of assets and operations
- L1: Service restored (4 days in parts of the US in 2003; months in Puerto Rico 2017)
- L3: Repair resources allocated to nodes
- L5: RECOVER: restoration of normal operations; repair policies set long-term performance
way out: Shed, shut down or island: load shedding, partial grid shutdowns, halting a pipeline
- L1: Customers cut; the rest held up
- L4: Judicious disconnection of parts from supervision
- L5: Decision to shed or halt (Texas partial shutdowns; Colonial halts all operations; 1,500 MW not shed in 2003)
way out: Warnings and coordination out: information sharing, emergency declarations, public communication
- L1: Fuel lines kept open; members act
- L3: Shared through ISACs and agencies
- L6: Emergency declarations and alerts issued (FMCSA for 17 states and DC, 2021)