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Cybercrime and its underground economy
Criminal activities carried out using digital devices and/or networks: crimes against computers (unauthorised access, damage to data or programs, sabotage, interception, espionage) and older crimes done with them (fraud, theft, extortion, illegal content, harassment) (src:wp:cybercrime); and the economy behind them, 'a loose federation of specialists selling capabilities, services, and resources explicitly tailored to the abuse ecosystem', where profit centers draw money from victims and support centers sell to other criminals (src:thomas-2015-underground). Walked as criminologists and security economists describe it: offences, support services, markets and forums, networks and roles, cash-out, and the purposes and costs, with law enforcement and defence as the partners that push back.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | 1970s (computer fraud; the Union Dime embezzlement began 1970); the economy from about 2004 |
| born precision | decade |
| boundary | Inside: the offences done with or against computers and networks, the support services sold for them (infrastructure, malware, access, credentials, labour), the markets and forums where they are traded, the networks of people and roles who run them, and the cash-out that turns proceeds into usable money. Outside: the victims (people, firms, states), the legitimate infrastructure and payment systems it rides on, and the partners that push back (computer law, police, defenders, threat intelligence). |
| nested level | Runs on the Internet's services (L6) and on people (offenders' and victims' decisions, Human L7); a part of crime as a whole (about half of property crime is now online, src:anderson-2019-cost); the market its threat actors, malware, phishing, botnets and booters are sold and cashed out in. |
| scale | social |
Measures (45) published science
| Share of property crime now online (by volume and value) | about half fraction |
| Cost per citizen, traditional crimes now computer crimes (tax, welfare fraud) | low hundreds EUR or USD per year |
| Cost per citizen, transitional crimes (payment fraud) | tens EUR or USD per year |
| Cost per citizen, new computer crimes | tens of cents EUR or USD per year |
| Viagra-spam botnet revenue against the cost it caused | about $3m a year earned; about a hundred times that cost USD per year; ratio |
| Euro-area card fraud, 2016 | 1.8 (0.041% of transactions; card-not-present 1.32) billion EUR |
| Silk Road sellers' revenue (2012) | slightly over 1.2 million USD per month |
| Silk Road operators' commission (2012) | about 92,000 USD per month |
| Silk Road items examined | over 24,400 items |
| Item listing life (most items) | less than three weeks |
| Seller life (majority) | roughly three months; a core of 112 present throughout |
| Top 100 sellers' share of feedback | approximately 60 % |
| Anonymous marketplace daily volume | up to 650,000; generally 300,000-500,000 USD per day (30-day average) |
| Cannabis, ecstasy and cocaine products' share of marketplace sales | about 70 % |
| Silk Road lifetime gross (US government calculation) | 214 million USD |
| Fake antivirus revenue, 2008-2010 | upwards of 130 million USD |
| Fake antivirus conversion: victims shown warnings who bought | 2.2 % |
| Liberty Reserve: alleged laundered funds | 6 billion USD |
| Compromised host price, US and UK | 100-180 USD per thousand hosts |
| Compromised host price, rest of world | less than 10 USD per thousand hosts |
| Share of pharmaceutical-affiliate payments by Visa and MasterCard | 95 % |
| Banks accepting payments for 95% of spam sales | 3 banks |
| ATM cash-out with duplicate cards | over 45 million in a matter of hours USD |
| Fake accounts back on sale after a platform purge | within two weeks |
| MegaD botnet back after takedown | within one month months |
| Advertised price, stolen card (2008) | 0.40-20.00 USD per card |
| Advertised price, bank account credentials (2008) | 10-100 USD per account |
| Advertised price, full identity (2008) | 1-15 USD per set |
| Phishing site life, known to the takedown firm vs unknown | 17 vs 112 hours (mean) |
| Spam fall after McColo was cut off (November 2008) | almost 70 (temporary) % |
| Networks with three layers (core, enablers, mules) | 30 of 40 networks |
| Networks grown mainly through online forums | 10 of 40 (29 through offline ties) networks |
| Ransomware payments, 2013 to mid-2017 (lower bound, 35 families) | 12,768,536 (22,967.54 BTC) USD |
| Booter attacks after the HackForums market closure | reduced for 13 weeks globally |
| Booter attacks after FBI Xmas2018 | down a third for at least 10 weeks |
| Countries nominated by at least one expert (World Cybercrime Index) | 97 countries |
| WCI overall score, Russia (rank 1) | 58.39 index (0-100) |
| Fraud and computer misuse share of the crime estimate, England and Wales, year to March 2021 | 53 % |
| Change on pre-pandemic: fraud / computer misuse / other crime (England and Wales) | +24 / +85 / -19 % |
| IC3 complaints and losses, 2018 | 351,937 complaints; 2.7 billion USD complaints; USD |
| Vulnerabilities across online devices, 2008-2014 | +17.75 % |
| Countries hit by ransomware, 2024 | 153 countries |
| Budapest Convention ratifications (August 2025) | 81 states |
| UN Convention against Cybercrime: signatories; ratifications | 95; 3 (Qatar, Azerbaijan, Vietnam) states |
| Dutch panel surveyed on offender risk factors | 1,240 (aged 16-25) respondents |
Open contentions (6) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-413 Where do thoughts come from?
booked: No theory is proven, so the map lists the main ones side by side and doesn't pick one. It shows where thinking is handled in the brain, not where thoughts start.
the other reading: situational opportunity (routine activity); personality and self-control; social ties and subculture - C-1527 How much does cybercrime cost the world?
booked: The map keeps both: a widely quoted forecast of US$6 trillion, and researchers' smaller estimates built item by item.
the other reading: estimated costs ranging from the hundreds of millions to the trillions (WCI's framing) - C-1568 Is cybercrime organised crime?
booked: The map keeps both readings: companies like Conti look like organised crime, and much of the market is looser than that.
the other reading: up to 80% of cybercrime is organised crime (McGuire 2012 report, as cited); some operators organised as firms - C-1750 Which international treaty governs cybercrime?
booked: The map books two competing treaties: the Budapest Convention and the newer UN convention.
the other reading: Budapest Convention (2001): 81 ratifications by August 2025; UN Convention against Cybercrime (adopted December 2024): 95 signatories, 3 ratifications - C-1790 Did crime fall, or just move online?
booked: The map keeps both: researchers who reject the online explanation, and those who say crime merely moved.
the other reading: the crime drop was partly an illusion: crime moved online (Caneppele and Aebi; Tcherni et al., as quoted); cybercrime could not have caused the crime drop (Farrell and Birks) - C-1804 Did the pandemic raise cybercrime?
booked: The map keeps both findings: no change in the US early on, large rises in England and Wales.
the other reading: the pandemic did not change cybervictimisation; the pandemic raised cybercrime sharply; the change was mostly in reporting (Correia, citing a study that found no major change in victimisation)
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (7)
- Malware
- Threat actor
- Money mule
- Underground forums
- Online anonymous marketplaces (cryptomarkets)
- Profit centers
- Support centers
Sits inside / holds (7)
Trades with (valence) (16)
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:internet · Cybercrime and its underground economy gain
- State (polity); the nation state its predominant modern form via sys:state · Cybercrime and its underground economy mixed
- Internet via sys:internet · Cybercrime and its underground economy gain
- Money via sys:money · Cybercrime and its underground economy gain
- Market and trade via sys:market · Cybercrime and its underground economy gain
- Police via sys:internet · Cybercrime and its underground economy loss
- Economy via sys:economy · Cybercrime and its underground economy gain
- Malware via sys:cybercrime · Cybercrime and its underground economy gain
- Threat actor via sys:cybercrime · Cybercrime and its underground economy gain
- Botnet via sys:cybercrime · Cybercrime and its underground economy gain
- Phishing via sys:internet · Cybercrime and its underground economy gain
- Denial-of-service attack via sys:cybercrime · Cybercrime and its underground economy gain
- Information security via sys:internet · Cybercrime and its underground economy loss
- Cyber threat intelligence via sys:internet · Cybercrime and its underground economy loss
- Digital forensics via sys:internet · Cybercrime and its underground economy loss
- Computer law via sys:internet · Cybercrime and its underground economy loss
expressed by (17)
- Recombination/Composition
- Scaffolding/Enablement (Meta-Tooling)
- Templating / Standardization
- Amplification/Scale-Up (Manufacture & Distribution)
- Symbiosis/Co-Creation (Collaborative Specialization)
- Distributed Autonomy/Decentralized Execution (Subsidiarity)
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Trail-Marking / Externalized Memory (Stigmergy)
- Optimal Stopping & Patch-Switching
- Evade Detection
- Overcome Barrier
- Subversion & Co-optation
- Leverage Host/Amplification
- Validation of Identity/Intention
- Resilience & Repair
- Redundancy & Diversity
- Quality Control & Error Correction
floor filled by (19)
- Malware
- Phishing
- Denial-of-service attack
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Internet
- Money
- Bitcoin (cryptocurrency)
- Threat actor
- Ransomware
- Botnet
- Money mule
- Cybercriminal group
- Underground forums
- pay per install
- Liberty Reserve
- Bulletproof hosting
- Online anonymous marketplaces (cryptomarkets)
- Crime
- Social engineering
Kinds (18)
- Ransomware
- Phishing
- Cyberwarfare
- Cyberterrorism
- Identity theft
- Online anonymous marketplaces (cryptomarkets)
- Computer fraud
- Cyberextortion (including ransomware)
- Ad fraud
- Fraud factory
- Digital arrest scam
- Cybersex trafficking
- Online harassment and cyberstalking
- Illegal online content
- Pure-technology cybercrime
- Cyber-advanced crime
- Technical products and services (WCI type)
- Cashing out and money laundering (WCI type)
Notes published science
- A law professor's 2003 article found its way into the Supreme Court 18 years later: Orin Kerr argued that computer crime laws should only cover getting past a real gate in the code, the Court cited his brief when it ruled 6-3 in 2021 that 'exceeds authorized access' is a gates-up-or-down question, and the Justice Department then said it would not charge good-faith security research (src:kerr-2003-cybercrimes-scope; src:scotus-2021-van-buren; src:xiao-2025-anti-fraud-research).
- Cybercrime's money is the weak spot, not its computers: when researchers traced spam-advertised pharmacy sales, just three banks handled payments for 95% of them, and when banks froze payments in 2011 the whole fake-antivirus industry, which had grossed over $130 million, stopped almost overnight (src:thomas-2015-underground).
- Crime pays far less than it costs: a spam botnet that earned its owners about $3 million a year was costing everyone else about a hundred times that, and about half of all property crime, by volume and by value, now happens online (src:anderson-2019-cost).
- Shutting down a darknet market is like cutting a hydra's head: Silk Road's takedown in 2013 'spawned an entire, dynamic' ecosystem of successors within weeks, and when police took down Silk Road 2 a year later, buyers immediately moved to Evolution and Agora (src:soska-christin-2015-marketplaces).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
cybercrime as criminologists and security economists describe it: the computers, data, money and people online it preys on, up to the profits and purposes it serves (reader's view)
- L1: The world it preys on: computers, networks, data, money and people online
- L2: The offences: unauthorised access, damage, sabotage, interception, espionage; fraud, theft, extortion, illegal content, harassment
- L3: Support services: infrastructure, malware and kits, installs, credentials, human labour (CAPTCHA solvers, mules)
- L4: Markets and forums: the underground economy where profit and support centers trade, with escrow, feedback and reviewers
- L5: Networks and roles: core members, enablers, money mules
- L6: Cash-out and laundering: proceeds turned into usable money
- L7: Profit and purpose; cybercrime's place in all crime and its cost to society
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L4: The underground economy's exchange floor: profit centers selling to victims and support centers selling to other criminals, through forums and anonymous marketplaces (Silk Road sellers about $1.2 million a month in 2012; marketplaces later $300,000-500,000 a day)
- L5: Networks and roles: core members who start and steer attacks, enablers who sell to many networks, money mules who are easily replaced; few strict hierarchies, mostly not organised crime by the formal definitions
- L6: Value realisation: cashiers, mules, exchangers and laundering services turn proceeds into money usable outside (Liberty Reserve allegedly laundered $6 billion)
- L7: Profit and purpose, and cybercrime's place in crime: petty crime on a global and industrial scale; about half of property crime now online; offenders whose risk factors partly differ from traditional offenders'
way in: Defenders: filters, blocklists, takedowns
- L1: Defenders' actions: spam filtering, takedown contractors, account purges
- L2: Takedown speed: sites the contractor knew of gone in 17 hours on average; unknown ones lasted 112 hours
- L3: The answer: purged accounts back on sale within two weeks; fast-flux hosting moves a site every few minutes
way in: Exposed systems and their vulnerabilities
- L1: Computer systems and networks with exploitable weaknesses; vulnerabilities across online devices rose 17.75% from 2008 to 2014
- L2: Exploitation: unauthorised access, damage, sabotage, interception, espionage (the UN Congress's five categories)
- L3: A compromised host with extractable value: bandwidth, IP address, CPU, storage, stored credentials and card numbers
way in: Forums, reputation and trust
- L1: Public IRC channels and black market forums where services, prices and deals are posted; markets self-police
- L2: Listings and mandatory buyer feedback, read as a record of past sales
- L3: Vetting: trusted reviewers check new products; newcomers interviewed and asked for references
- L4: Position in the forum's conversation network: high betweenness comes before vendor success
way in: Hosting, domains and cloud
- L1: Hosting and domain providers, including negligent ones that ignore abuse reports (the Russian Business Network until 2007)
- L2: Concentrated hosting for control servers: cutting McColo off (November 2008) dropped world spam almost 70 percent, for a while
- L3: Cheap cloud mail and computing replace dedicated servers and skills
way in: Law enforcement: investigations, takedowns, arrests
- L1: Investigations that start from an IP trace and the logs ISPs must keep
- L2: Takedowns and arrests: Silk Road shut October 2013; Operation Onymous November 2014; HackForums' booter market closed; FBI Xmas2018 operation
- L3: Read as a signal: volumes dip, then rebound to other markets (a botnet back within one month; booter attacks down a third for at least 10 weeks)
way in: Laws, treaties and safe havens
- L1: National laws, weak or absent in some countries; offenders abroad avoid extradition
- L2: Location hidden: offenders mask where they are behind nicknames and technical protections
- L3: Treaty cooperation, two regimes: the Budapest Convention (2001; 81 ratifications by August 2025) and the UN Convention against Cybercrime (adopted December 2024)
- L4: Geography: a relatively small number of countries house the greatest threats (Russia, Ukraine, China, the US, Nigeria, Romania top the index)
way in: Offline social ties
- L1: Places people already know each other: the same neighbourhood, church, soccer club, prison
- L2: Recruitment through existing contacts; offline ties crucial to how networks start and grow
- L3: Online meeting places used even by offline-tied networks to recruit specialists
- L4: Forums: ten of forty networks grew mainly through them
way in: Payment rails
- L1: Banks, card networks, digital currencies and crypto currencies, all regulated to some degree
- L2: The bottleneck: few acquiring banks accept black-market payments (three banks for 95% of spam sales)
- L3: Bitcoin and pre-paid vouchers: ransoms of $100-400 (CryptoLocker); ransomware payments at least USD 12.8 million, 2013-mid 2017
- L4: Escrow held by the market: buyers pay the market, which pays the seller and takes its commission
- L5: Mules disguise the trail to core members
way in: People online as targets
- L1: People going about their online routines; routine activity theory predicts who is victimised (anyone who uses the Internet can be a victim)
- L2: Contact: scams, lures and harassment reach them; the computer is the tool, enlarging the pool of victims
- L3: A response that exploits human weakness: money paid, data handed over, a click (IC3: 351,937 complaints, $2.7 billion lost, 2018)
way in: Platform shifts
- L1: Platform change: mobile replacing the PC, Android replacing Windows, services moving to the cloud, social networks
- L2: New openings: cloud misconfiguration may cause as many breaches as phishing
- L3: New crimes: business email compromise, cryptocurrency crime
way in: Recruits and mules
- L1: Job ads in spam and on job sites offering work from home as a 'transaction processor'
- L2: Mules typically duped into accepting and forwarding stolen money
- L3: Easily replaceable; networks could use hundreds
- L4: The underground's labour market: affiliates paid by commission, free to move between programs
way in: Stolen data: cards, credentials, identities
- L1: Card and account data that businesses store for accounting and customer convenience; credentials people enter
- L2: Taken by breach, phishing or malware ('computer as target' as well as 'computer as tool')
- L3: Advertised in bulk to brokers: $0.40-$20 per card, $10-$100 per bank account, $1-$15 per identity (2008)
way in: The offender's own thought and emotion
- L1: The cyber places a person spends attention in
- L2: Movement: attention shifting from one cyber place to another (a cybercrime journey)
- L3: Online situational influences and risk factors (school, work, leisure, personality)
- L6: Different for cybercrime: higher self-control, protective against traditional offending, may open cybercrime opportunities
way in: Tools and labour supplied by other criminals
- L1: Code and capacity offered for sale: exploit kits, malware, botnets, pay-per-install, manual CAPTCHA solvers
- L2: Bought à la carte; installs priced by region ($100-180 per thousand US and UK hosts, under $10 elsewhere)
- L3: Combined with other bought components into a new scheme
way in: World events
- L1: Events that change daily routines (COVID-19 stay-at-home orders)
- L2: Routines online: not radically altered in early pandemic US data
- L3: Crime counts: in England and Wales fraud up 24% and computer misuse up 85% on pre-pandemic, other crime down 19%
way out: Cash-out into the legitimate economy
- L1: Proceeds spent in the legitimate economy
- L3: Mules forward stolen money; duplicate cards withdraw $45 million in hours
- L6: Laundering chosen: mules, exchangers, digital currencies
way out: Displacement: move market, method or country
- L1: New markets and hosts appear (Silk Road 2.0 by early November 2013)
- L3: Vendors and buyers move to other marketplaces; vendors keep shops on several; attackers shift across borders
- L4: Market participants read a takedown or block
way out: Extortion: ransomware and DDoS
- L1: Victims locked out; 153 countries hit by ransomware in 2024
- L2: Files encrypted or services flooded until paid; first documented ransomware 1989 (the AIDS trojan)
- L5: Decision to extort
way out: Illegal content and harassment
- L1: People harmed; laws differ by country (41 US states criminalise extreme online harassment)
- L3: Harassment, threats, offensive or illegal content
- L5: Content published or aimed at a person
way out: Recruitment
- L1: People drawn in, often duped
- L3: Job ads in spam and on job sites; forum recruitment
- L5: Networks need mules and specialists
way out: Sales to customers
- L1: Goods and services reach buyers: cannabis, ecstasy and cocaine products about 70% of marketplace sales
- L3: Spam-advertised products, fake antivirus, drugs shipped by post
- L4: Listings and storefronts
way out: Theft and fraud against victims
- L1: Money and data taken from people, firms and governments
- L3: Fraud executed: phishing, malware, bank fraud, carding, identity theft
- L5: A network commits to an attack on a financial institution or its customers (core members initiate)