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Phishing

A form of social engineering and a scam in which attackers deceive people into revealing sensitive information or installing malware (src:wp:phishing); in practice an attack with a life cycle: infrastructure obtained, a phishing website configured (often from a kit), lures distributed, victims visiting, detection and mitigation, monetisation of what was stolen, and the site going offline (src:oest-2020-sunrise). Walked as security researchers describe it: its forms (bulk, spear, whaling, voice, SMS, QR, adversary-in-the-middle, lateral), its scale, its economics (kits, markets, the commons), its defences (filters, blocklists, takedown, training, phishing-resistant authentication) and its history since 1995.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born atAOHell released 1994; phishing of AOL accounts reported 1995; term in print by March 1997
born precisionyear
boundaryInside: one phishing attack's life cycle and the machinery it runs on: the domain and hosting, the kit or reverse proxy, the lure and its distribution, the counterfeit page, the victim's submission, the harvest and its route to the phisher, and the monetisation of what was taken. Outside: the people deceived (Human), the brands imitated and the organisations hit, the phisher as an actor (threat actor), the underground markets, and the defences that answer it (awareness, filters, blocklists, takedown, authentication, law).
nested levelRuns on people (the victim's senses and decisions, Human L5-L7) and on networks (email, SMS, telephone, the web, Internet services L6); a variant of social engineering and a tool of the threat actor; one of the commonest first steps into larger intrusions and frauds.
scaletechnological

Measures (39) published science

Peak browser mitigation after detectionabout 7 hours
Campaign duration, first to last victim (average)21 hours
Detection after first victim visit (average)about 9 hours
Visitor to fraud yield (lower bound)7.42 % of visitors
Victims lured before detection62.73 %
Victim traffic after detection37.73 %
Share of victims taken by the top 10% of attacks89.13 %
Average date range of a campaign's compromised visitors13.55 days
Bulk lure click-through (as cited)5-8 %
Credential hand-over by targeted users (as cited)9 %
Lure to click to dangerous action (per hand-off yield)sent to click 0.0567; click to dangerous action 0.7313 fraction
Time to employee reports of a campaignabout 10% within 5; 20% within 15; 30-40% within 30 minutes after delivery
Phishing site lifetime, free hosting, brand owner aware (mean / median)4.3 / 0 hours
Simulated phishing click rate, US health care14.2 (422,062 of 2,971,945); median 16.7 %
Odds of clicking after repeated campaigns (adjusted OR)0.511 (6-10 campaigns); 0.335 (more than 10) odds ratio
Phishing site lifetime, free hosting, brand owner missed (mean / median)114.7 / 29 hours
Rock-phish domain lifetime (mean / median)70.3 / 33 hours
Fast-flux domain lifetime (mean / median)96.1 / 25.5 hours
Fast-flux IP rotation5-10 addresses, changed as often as every 20 minutes IPs; minutes
Participants fooled by the best phishing sitemore than 90 %
Participants who never looked at browser security cues23 (5 of 22) %
Overstatement of survey loss estimates (Herley and Florêncio)up to 50 times
Potential phishing-kit victims, March 2016 to March 201712.4 million people
Hijacking odds ratio, phishing-kit victims against a random user463.4 (over 400x) odds ratio
Exposed phishing passwords matching the victim's current Google password24.8 %
Kits collecting geolocation / phone / user agent83 / 18 / 16 %
Gmail share of kit exfiltration addresses72.3 %
Distinct phishing kits behind a year's active attacks4,069 kits
MITM phishing domains / IPs on blocklists43.7 / 18.9 %
MITM phishing websites found in a year1,220 sites
MITM domains registered in the week of detection45.3 %
MITM site ready after its TLS certificateall within one day; over 90% immediately time
Lateral phishers who compromise another employeeover 11 %
Lateral attacks in the hijacked account's working hoursover 80 %
Click-through: control / human experts / fully AI / AI with human in loop12 / 54 / 54 / 56 %
Profitability gain from AI for larger audiencesup to 50 times
Phishing attacks counted by APWG3.76 million (2024); 3.8 million (2025) unique reported phishing websites per year
FBI IC3 phishing and spoofing complaints, 2025191,561; reported losses about US$215.8 million complaints; dollars
Phishing share of initial access (ENISA 2025, as cited)about 60 %

Open contentions (5) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (9)

Sits inside / holds (3)

Trades with (valence) (15)

expressed by (8)

floor filled by (15)

Kinds (12)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

phishing as security researchers describe it: the networks and brands it imitates, up to the phisher's return (reader's view)

  1. L1: The networks people trust and the brands they recognise: email, SMS, telephone, the web; banks, email and cloud providers, streaming services
  2. L2: Infrastructure and kit: a domain obtained (look-alike, compromised, free host, fast-flux) and a phishing site configured, often by installing a kit
  3. L3: Distribution: lures sent broadly or aimed (spear, whaling), by email, SMS, voice, QR code, or from a hijacked account
  4. L4: The counterfeit at the screen: impersonated sender, look-alike or homograph link, urgency, a copied or live-mirrored login page
  5. L5: The victim's judgement and act: click and submit credentials, or not (at least 7.42% of visitors go on to fraud)
  6. L6: The harvest: credentials, codes, session cookies and risk profiles collected and mailed to a drop, or relayed live
  7. L7: Monetisation: hijack, fraud, resale, further intrusion; at the scale of all phishers, a commons whose return falls to opportunity cost

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: The running campaign: kit, domain, lure and counterfeit page as one operation, from configuration to the last victim (on average 21 hours); a few campaigns take most victims
  2. L5: The recipient's judgement and act: perceive the lure, judge it, click and submit, or not. Runs on the person (Human's board: thoughts, feelings, emotions)
  3. L6: The harvest: credentials, codes, cookies and risk profiles collected and moved to the phisher's drop, or relayed live
  4. L7: The phisher's return: accounts hijacked, fraudulent transactions, resale, further intrusion or espionage; in open access, the average return driven down to the phisher's opportunity cost

way in: Current events

  1. L1: The news and calendar: a pandemic, a sales day, tax time
  2. L2: Read: campaign peaks checked against the timelines of pandemic measures and events
  3. L3: Themed: old schemes adapted to the event rather than reinvented

way in: Detection met on the way: filters, blocklists, crawlers, takedown notices

  1. L1: The anti-phishing ecosystem: clearinghouses, crawlers, browser blocklists, brand owners' takedown requests
  2. L2: Felt as a gap closing: blocklists are reactive; one changed character makes a URL unknown; cloaking tells crawlers from victims
  3. L3: Mitigation lands: warnings halve effectiveness within two hours of detection; MITM sites mostly escape (43.7% of domains listed)

way in: Domains and hosting

  1. L1: The domain-name and hosting world: free web-hosting, compromised machines, newly registered and look-alike domains, TLS certificates
  2. L2: Obtained: a look-alike or meaningless domain registered (45.3% of MITM domains in the week they were detected), a legitimate site compromised, or a fast-flux name resolving to 5-10 changing IPs
  3. L3: Configured: the kit installed on the infrastructure; a MITM site answers within a day of its certificate

way in: Emotion: urgency and threat

  1. L1: Urgency and threats written into the message (closing or seizing an account)
  2. L2: Threat and urgency cues are looked at first
  3. L3: Threatening language lowers rated trust

way in: Experience: simulated campaigns and training

  1. L1: Simulated phishing sent by the organisation; training material shown after a click
  2. L2: Repeated exposure: more campaigns, lower odds of clicking (aOR 0.335 after more than ten)
  3. L3: Embedded training can make people more susceptible

way in: Hearing: a voice on the phone

  1. L1: A telephone or VoIP call, often automated text-to-speech
  2. L2: A spoofed caller number and interactive voice response
  3. L3: Trust: voice telephony trusted more than email

way in: Relay: the real service's live session

  1. L1: The legitimate service answering a login that the victim thinks is direct
  2. L2: The reverse proxy forwards requests and responses, valid TLS certificate in place
  3. L3: Credentials, one-time codes and the session cookie (a bearer secret) extracted in transit

way in: Sight: the lure and the page on a screen

  1. L1: The lure in the inbox or on the screen: the From: header the recipient sees, not the unchecked envelope sender
  2. L2: The eyes fixate on threat and urgency before misspellings; indicators looked at often but briefly; a QR code's destination unreadable
  3. L3: Cues read or missed: 23% never looked at the address bar or security indicators; homograph domains are visually identical
  4. L4: Judged: emails with misspellings or threats rated least trustworthy, yet good phishing sites fooled 90%

way in: Submissions: what the victim types

  1. L1: The victim's username, password and codes, posted from the counterfeit page
  2. L2: Received by the kit's script on the phishing host
  3. L3: Enriched with the victim's risk profile: geolocation (83% of kits), phone (18%), user agent (16%)
  4. L4: Packed into a message template and mailed with PHP's mail()
  5. L5: Sent to the drop: Gmail 72.3% of kit exfiltration addresses; free kits copy it covertly to their authors

way in: Targets: address lists, profiles, hijacked contacts

  1. L1: People reachable by email, text and phone, and their public traces
  2. L2: Collected: bulk lists for general phishing; personal or organisational information for spear phishing; a hijacked account's contacts for lateral phishing
  3. L3: Chosen: sent broadly, or aimed at a person, a group, or senior leaders (whaling)

way in: The imitated brand: its look and its live pages

  1. L1: The impersonated brand's real website and resources (images, scripts); banks, email and cloud providers, streaming services are common targets
  2. L2: Copied: static copies fetched from the target website, or mirrored live by a reverse proxy; many phishing pages still request resources from the site they impersonate
  3. L3: A counterfeit page: a 'perfect' copy in MITM kits, branded templates in phishing-as-a-service

way in: The market: what stolen access is worth

  1. L1: A black market with specialisations: phishing software for payment, credentials and accounts for sale
  2. L2: Offers and prices read; services sold by those who found phishing unprofitable
  3. L3: Perceived return: survey estimates overstated up to fifty-fold keep new entrants coming

way in: Thought: knowing what the indicators mean

  1. L1: The browser's chrome and security indicators, and page content designers (or phishers) can fill freely
  2. L2: Knowledge: many users do not understand security indicators
  3. L3: Content-only judgement: 5 of 22 judged by the page content alone

way in: Tools: kits, platforms, language models

  1. L1: Kits and phishing-as-a-service advertised, sold or given away; language models
  2. L2: Taken up: complete phishing sites in an easy-to-deploy format, configured by changing one line
  3. L3: Playbooks largely unchanged since the mid-2000s; AI-written spear phishing on par with experts

way out: Distribution: lures sent

  1. L1: Lures in inboxes and on phones
  2. L3: Distributed by email (dominant, helped by bulk-messaging services), SMS, calls, QR stickers
  3. L4: The campaign launched

way out: Further intrusion or espionage

  1. L1: Further systems, records and people
  2. L4: Phished subcontractor account used against Target (110 million records, 2013); SecurID data taken from RSA (2011); political campaigns spear phished (2016)
  3. L7: Access used for a larger objective

way out: Lateral: the hijacked account sends the next lures

  1. L1: Colleagues' inboxes
  2. L3: Shared-document and account-warning lures sent to colleagues, over 80% in the account's working hours
  3. L6: A harvested enterprise account

way out: Monetisation: accounts hijacked, fraud committed

  1. L1: Fraudulent transactions; accounts taken over (phishing victims 400x likelier to be hijacked)
  2. L6: Stolen credentials tested against the platforms; risk profiles used to impersonate the victim
  3. L7: Use the take

way out: Resale and the kit author's cut

  1. L1: Accounts and credentials sold on darknet markets
  2. L6: Backdoored free kits send the take to their authors
  3. L7: Sell rather than use

way out: The counterfeit page served

  1. L1: The page on the victim's screen
  2. L2: Served to victims, cloaked from crawlers; MITM kits mirror the live site with a valid certificate
  3. L4: Site live

Sources (23) published science

Dhamija, Tygar and Hearst, Why Phishing Works, CHI 2006 (doi:10.1145/1124772.1124861)
Phishing (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01)
Cova M, Kruegel C, Vigna G (2008) There is No Free Phish: An Analysis of 'Free' and Live Phishing Kits. USENIX WOOT 2008 (behind its links)
Kondracki B, Azad BA, Starov O, Nikiforakis N (2021) Catching Transparent Phish: Analyzing and Detecting MITM Phishing Toolkits. ACM CCS 2021, doi:10.1145/3460120.3484765 (behind its links)
Moore T, Clayton R. The Impact of Incentives on Notice and Take-down. Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge (data to early 2008) (behind its links)
Thomas K, Li F, Zand A, et al. (2017) Data Breaches, Phishing, or Malware? Understanding the Risks of Stolen Credentials. ACM CCS 2017 (behind its links)
Marshall DC, Hill KB (2009) Versatile aggressive mimicry of cicadas by an Australian predatory katydid. PLoS One 4:e4185, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004185 (behind its links)
Herley C, Florêncio D (2008) A Profitless Endeavor: Phishing as Tragedy of the Commons. New Security Paradigms Workshop, doi:10.1145/1595676.1595686 (behind its links)
Moser C, Buckner W, Sarian M, Winking J (2023) Aggressive Mimicry and the Evolution of the Human Cognitive Niche. Hum Nat, doi:10.1007/s12110-023-09458-y (behind its links)
Oest A, Zhang P, Wardman B, Nunes E, Burgis J, Zand A, Thomas K, Doupé A, Ahn G-J (2020) Sunrise to Sunset: Analyzing the End-to-end Life Cycle and Effectiveness of Phishing Attacks at Scale. 29th USENIX Security Symposium (behind its links)
Lain D, Kostiainen K, Čapkun S (2022) Phishing in Organizations: Findings from a Large-Scale and Long-Term Study. IEEE S&P 2022; arXiv:2112.07498 (behind its links)
Gordon WJ, Wright A, Aiyagari R, et al. (2019) Assessment of Employee Susceptibility to Phishing Attacks at US Health Care Institutions. JAMA Netw Open, doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2019.0393 (behind its links)
Ho G, Cidon A, Gavish L, Schweighauser M, Paxson V, Savage S, Voelker GM, Wagner D (2019) Detecting and Characterizing Lateral Phishing at Scale. 28th USENIX Security Symposium, 1273-1290 (behind its links)
Heiding F, Lermen S, Kao A, Schneier B, Vishwanath A (2024) Evaluating Large Language Models' Capability to Launch Fully Automated Spear Phishing Campaigns: Validated on Human Subjects. arXiv:2412.00586 (behind its links)
Email spoofing (business email compromise section) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Grassi et al. 2017, NIST SP 800-63B Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Lifecycle Management, doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63b (behind its links)
Cybercrime (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Xiao M, Sellars A, Scheffler S (2025). When Anti-Fraud Laws Become a Barrier to Computer Science Research. arXiv:2502.02767 (preprint). (behind its links)
Altwlkany et al. 2026, Robocalls: A Worldwide or US-only Problem? Analyzing Spam and Fraud in International Phone Calls (arXiv:2606.31790) (behind its links)
Hoheisel R, van Capelleveen G, Sarmah DK, Junger M (2023) The development of phishing during the COVID-19 pandemic: An analysis of over 1100 targeted domains. Comput Secur, doi:10.1016/j.cose.2023.103158 (behind its links)
Catal C, Giray G, Tekinerdogan B, et al. (2022) Applications of deep learning for phishing detection: a systematic literature review. Knowl Inf Syst, doi:10.1007/s10115-022-01672-x (behind its links)
McAlaney J, Hills PJ (2020) Understanding Phishing Email Processing and Perceived Trustworthiness Through Eye Tracking. Front Psychol, doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01756 (behind its links)
Voice phishing (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)