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Digital identity

A digital identity is data stored on computer systems relating to an individual, organization, application, or device (src:wp:digital-identity). NIST: 'the unique representation of a subject engaged in an online transaction', always unique in the context of a digital service but not necessarily across contexts, and 'the online persona of a subject', whose single definition 'is widely debated internationally' (src:nist-sp800-63-3). Walked as the whole practice of representing and recognising people, organisations, devices and software online: attributes and footprints, identifiers, credentials, identity proofing and assertion, the providers, federations, registries and ledgers that vouch, the persona a service, a state or a crowd takes the subject to be, and its failures: re-identification, Sybil identities and identity theft.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born atthe 1960s, with time-shared computers and the first password logins (authentication walk, CTSS 1961); the term identity theft coined 1964
born precisiondecade
boundaryInside: the subject's digital representation and everything that makes and keeps it: attributes, preferences, traits and the footprints of activity; identifiers unique within a scope (usernames, email addresses, URIs, UUIDs, DIDs, subject identifiers); credentials that bind an identifier to authenticators; identity proofing (who someone is), authentication (control of the authenticators) and federation (assertions conveyed to relying parties), as NIST separates them into IAL, AAL and FAL; the providers, registries, federations, wallets and ledgers that issue, hold and vouch for identities; the profile or data double assembled from scattered footprints; and the persona the subject is taken to be. Outside, as neighbours: authentication as its own system (walked; this walk points at its layers), access control (what an identified subject may do), the cryptography it borrows (digital signatures, public-key cryptography, hash functions), privacy as a value and a field (not walked), the people and machines represented, the thieves and trackers who use the representation without consent, and the law that gives identities legal effect.
nested levelA technology (rung 12) carried by people, firms and states (rung 11) on computers and the internet. Part of information security and identity and access management; leans on authentication, digital signatures and public-key cryptography; feeds access control, commerce, government services and social life online.
scaletechnological

Measures (16) published science

characteristic clock: browser fingerprint drift45.52% of fingerprints changed within one day; a device linked for 51.8 days on average; 26% tracked over 100 days
per-hand-off efficiency: fingerprint carried from one day to the next unchanged54.48% (100% - 45.52%) fraction unchanged after one day
unique browser fingerprints, Panopticlick 201083.6% (94.2% with Flash or Java), of 470,161 fraction
unique browser fingerprints, 2018 (about 2 million from one French site)33.6% (18.5% on mobile) fraction
mobility unicity: points needed to single out 95% of 1.5 million people4 spatio-temporal points (2 points: over 50%)
uniqueness against resolutiondecays approximately as the 1/10 power exponent
re-identification with 15 demographic attributes (US)99.98% fraction correctly re-identified
likely unique on 5-digit ZIP, sex and birth date (US, 1990 census)87% (216 of 248 million) fraction
identity theft prevalence, US adultsabout 10% in 2016; 7% in 2012 fraction per year
victims with severe emotional distress1 in 10 (about 2.6 million) fraction
FTC identity theft reports, 2024over 1.1 million; 18% of all Consumer Sentinel reports reports per year
breach-to-theft yield in one card breachabout 1,800 instances from four million records (about 0.045%) fraction
people without a valid identity credentialabout 850 million people
people for whom official ID is problematicabout 1.1 billion (2017 estimate cited) people
UUID size128 bits
behavioural identity accuracy (encyclopedia claim)up to 95% accuracy

Open contentions (4) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (7)

Sits inside / holds (3)

Trades with (valence) (17)

expressed by (17)

floor filled by (18)

represents (1)

Kinds (6)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

digital identity as practitioners describe it: subjects in the world up to the persona a service, a state or a crowd takes them to be (reader's view)

  1. L1: Subjects in the world: people, organisations, devices, networks, software and services, unseen at the other end of the wire
  2. L2: Data about the subject: attributes, preferences, traits, the footprints of activity
  3. L3: Identifiers unique within a scope: usernames, email addresses, URIs, UUIDs, DIDs, subject identifiers; public or pairwise, resolvable or not
  4. L4: Credentials and certificates binding identifiers and attributes to authenticators
  5. L5: Assurance and profile: identity proofed (IAL), authenticated (AAL), asserted (FAL), scored; the data double
  6. L6: Trust networks: identity providers, federations, certification authorities, national systems and decentralised ledgers
  7. L7: The persona: who the subject is taken to be, by a service, a state or a crowd; legal and social identity

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L5: Assurance: how sure the service is about who or what is asking (proofing, authentication and federation strengths, risk scores, Sybil checks), and how much it needs to know (pseudonymous where possible)
  2. L5: The record and the profile: database identity, transaction identity and the data double assembled from footprints, fingerprints, linked datasets and self-presentation
  3. L6: Trust networks: identity providers, federations, certification authorities, national systems and ledgers that vouch for subjects to relying parties (C vouches to A for B)
  4. L7: The persona: who the subject is taken to be online, by services (one identity per context), by states (a legal identity) and by crowds (a social identity)

way in: Assertions from an identity provider (federation, single sign-on, OpenID Connect, SAML)

  1. L1: An authentication event at the identity provider
  2. L2: Packed into an assertion signed by the IdP (FAL1)
  3. L3: Carried to the relying party; one ticket trusted across many systems; the subject identifier local to its issuer
  4. L4: The relying party checks signature, issuer and subject; at FAL3 also proof of a key

way in: Authenticators presented at each return visit (the authentication walk's channels)

  1. L1: An authenticator the subscriber holds (a secret, a token, a key, a body feature)
  2. L2: Proved in an authentication protocol
  3. L3: Return visits tied to the same subscriber
  4. L4: Checked against the credential that binds the authenticator to the identity

way in: Behaviour and footprints (logins, purchases, locations, histories)

  1. L1: The subject's activity: searches, purchases, logins, places
  2. L2: Logged as events with device and environment variables
  3. L3: Entity relationships of a new event compared with past events
  4. L4: Scored against tolerances into a transaction risk score

way in: Device and browser fingerprints

  1. L1: The device's configuration: headers, fonts, screen, plugins, graphics
  2. L2: Read by scripts, storing nothing on the device; defenders add noise
  3. L3: Combined into a fingerprint that drifts (45.52% changed within a day)
  4. L4: Matched against fingerprints seen before (83.6% unique in 2010, 33.6% in 2018)

way in: Identity evidence (passports, licences, civil records) for identity proofing

  1. L1: Documents and registers issued by states and other issuing sources; about 850 million people have none valid
  2. L2: Presented remotely or in person; IAL3 needs physical presence
  3. L3: Validated with the issuing source
  4. L4: Proofing decision: the applicant is who they claim to be; enrolled as a subscriber

way in: Law, regulation and guidelines (GDPR, eIDAS, anti-money-laundering, NIST)

  1. L1: The state's sovereign responsibility for identity systems
  2. L2: Statutes and rules: anti-money-laundering reliance, GDPR, eIDAS
  3. L3: Guidelines that set requirements per area
  4. L4: Rights exercised: data deleted on request

way in: Machine and service identities (UUIDs, device keys, certificates)

  1. L1: Devices and services that act as subjects, often in several roles
  2. L2: An identifier minted without a registry (UUID) or a key pair generated
  3. L3: A certificate binding the key to a name
  4. L4: Checked when a server signs in with its certificate

way in: Other datasets and outside information (quasi-identifiers, mobility traces)

  1. L1: Datasets released after de-identification and sampling
  2. L2: Quasi-identifiers: ZIP code, sex, date of birth; places and times
  3. L3: Joined with outside information; hashing identifiers is the common mitigation
  4. L4: Unicity: a few points single a person out (4 points, 95%; 15 attributes, 99.98%)

way in: Other people vouching (proof of personhood, social graphs)

  1. L1: Other members who know the subject
  2. L2: Vouches that one living person stands behind one identity, against many virtual personas
  3. L3: Recorded on a registry, disputes taken to a court
  4. L4: Checked for uniqueness and singularity: one human, one identity

way in: Self-presentation and group membership (profiles, posts, avatars)

  1. L1: The person's offline and online group memberships and sense of self
  2. L2: Shown as a profile, posts, a username or an avatar, from verified match to role-play
  3. L3: Shaped by the platform: anonymity, pseudonymity and verification
  4. L4: Read by audiences at once (context collapse)

way in: Signs of misuse (accounts and charges a subject never made; breach notices; reports)

  1. L1: Another person uses the identity: accounts, charges, tax returns, care in the victim's name
  2. L2: Noticed on statements and credit reports, often late; victims often do not know how their data was obtained
  3. L3: Reported to agencies (FTC Sentinel: over 1.1 million identity theft reports in 2024); hours spent resolving
  4. L4: A theft report and plan: accounts reviewed, multi-factor authentication used

way in: Verifiable credentials and decentralised identifiers presented from a wallet

  1. L1: An issuer attests to attributes of the subject
  2. L2: Held by the subject in a personal wallet
  3. L3: Presented with a DID that resolves to its document
  4. L4: Verified against keys in the DID document

way in: What the subject says about itself (names, usernames, attributes, passwords)

  1. L1: The subject's own name, choices and secrets, held in memory (or a fabricated set: synthetic identities)
  2. L2: Typed into a registration or profile form; kept up by the subject (changing passwords is protective)
  3. L3: Stored as attributes bound to an account identifier
  4. L4: Accepted as self-asserted at IAL1: no link to a real-life identity required

way out: Access and transactions for the identified subject

  1. L1: Limited access granted on the subject's behalf
  2. L3: Handed to authorization: what this identity may do
  3. L5: Assurance enough for the risk: access allowed

way out: Assertions sent to relying parties

  1. L1: Carried to the relying party
  2. L3: Only what is needed: a property asserted, a pairwise identifier per relying party
  3. L6: The identity provider issues an assertion

way out: Duplicate and false identities rejected

  1. L1: Fewer false personas on the network
  2. L4: The duplicate removed; its vouchers lose their deposit
  3. L5: A duplicate found

way out: Identities and credentials issued

  1. L1: A DID and its document published
  2. L4: The credential binds identifier, attributes and authenticator
  3. L6: A trusted party issues the credential or certificate

way out: Repair after misuse: accounts closed, credentials revoked, data deleted

  1. L1: Data deleted on request; accounts closed after death
  2. L4: Recovery work; distress for one victim in ten
  3. L5: Misuse recognised

way out: Tracking and re-identification

  1. L1: A named person found in a released dataset
  2. L4: A device followed across fingerprint changes (51.8 days on average)
  3. L5: The profile linked across services

way out: What the subject is shown (personalised content and offers)

  1. L1: Shown on the subject's screen
  2. L4: Offers and content tailored
  3. L5: The profile read

Sources (23) published science

Digital identity (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01)
Burnes, DeLiema and Langton 2020, Risk and protective factors of identity theft victimization in the United States, Prev Med Rep 17:101058, doi:10.1016/j.pmedr.2020.101058 (PMC7013169) (behind its links)
Laperdrix, Bielova, Baudry and Avoine 2020, Browser Fingerprinting: A Survey, arXiv:1905.01051v2 (behind its links)
Siddarth, Ivliev, Siri and Berman 2020, Who Watches the Watchmen? A Review of Subjective Approaches for Sybil-Resistance in Proof of Personhood Protocols, Frontiers in Blockchain 3:590171, doi:10.3389/fbloc.2020.590171, arXiv:2008.05300 (behind its links)
Grassi, Garcia and Fenton 2017, NIST SP 800-63-3 Digital Identity Guidelines, doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63-3 (behind its links)
Identity theft (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
de Montjoye, Hidalgo, Verleysen and Blondel 2013, Unique in the Crowd: the privacy bounds of human mobility, Sci Rep 3:1376, doi:10.1038/srep01376 (PMC3607247) (behind its links)
Rocher, Hendrickx and de Montjoye 2019, Estimating the success of re-identifications in incomplete datasets using generative models, Nat Commun 10:3069, doi:10.1038/s41467-019-10933-3 (PMC6650473) (behind its links)
Sweeney 2000, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely, Carnegie Mellon University Data Privacy Working Paper 3 (behind its links)
Ibor, Hooper, Maple, Crowcroft and Epiphaniou 2025, Considerations for trustworthy cross-border interoperability of digital identity systems in developing countries, AI & Society, doi:10.1007/s00146-024-02008-9 (PMC12078359) (behind its links)
Davis, Peabody et al. 2024, RFC 9562 Universally Unique IDentifiers (UUIDs), doi:10.17487/RFC9562 (behind its links)
Sakimura, Bradley, Jones, de Medeiros and Mortimore, OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 2 (2023) (behind its links)
Sporny, Longley, Sabadello, Reed, Steele and Allen (eds.) 2022, Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0, W3C Recommendation 19 July 2022 (behind its links)
Bingley, Worthy, Wiles and Haslam 2026, A Social Identity Theory of Digital Identity, Perspectives on Psychological Science, doi:10.1177/17456916261419813 (PMC13323923) (behind its links)
Giannopoulou 2023, Digital Identity Infrastructures: a Critical Approach of Self-Sovereign Identity, Digital Society, doi:10.1007/s44206-023-00049-z (PMC10172062) (behind its links)
Self-sovereign identity (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Thomas K, Li F, Zand A, et al. (2017) Data Breaches, Phishing, or Malware? Understanding the Risks of Stolen Credentials. ACM CCS 2017 (behind its links)
Phishing (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Surveillance (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Federated identity (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Mühle, Grüner, Gayvoronskaya and Meinel 2018, A Survey on Essential Components of a Self-Sovereign Identity, arXiv:1807.06346 (behind its links)
Hardt (ed.) 2012, RFC 6749 The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework, doi:10.17487/RFC6749 (behind its links)
Douceur 2002, The Sybil Attack, IPTPS 2002 (Microsoft Research copy) (behind its links)