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Firewall (computing)
A network security system that monitors and controls incoming and outgoing network traffic based on configurable security rules, typically a barrier between a trusted and an untrusted network (src:wp:firewall-computing); 'a device or group of devices that enforces an access control policy between networks' (src:rfc2647). Walked as the device or program and its practice: kinds (packet filter, stateful, application and proxy, host and personal, distributed, web application, next-generation), rules and their keeping, and history, with the Great Firewall booked as a contested national-scale variant.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| aliases | Firewall |
| born at | 1980s; first paper 1987 (DEC) |
| born precision | years |
| boundary | Inside: the point where traffic between networks or hosts of differing trust is intercepted, what is read there (headers, connection state, content, user, process), the match against the rule set or state table, the action (pass, drop, reject, relay, rewrite) and its record, and the rule set with its administration. Outside: the networks it sits between and their hosts; the organisation and its policy; the people who write rules and answer warnings; intrusion detection systems (sibling; the edge is blurred in UTMs and next-generation firewalls); NAT (often in the same box, a routing function per NIST); VPN and encryption (carried, terminated or blind to). |
| nested level | A device or program (rung 12) in computer networks, run by organisations and people; one of the controls of network, computer and information security; access control applied between networks. |
| scale | social |
Measures (18) published science
| characteristic clock: packets to classify per second on a 10 Gb/s link (40-byte packets) | 31.25 million per second (about 32 ns per decision) packets per second |
| state-table lifetime of an idle established TCP connection (Linux default) | 432000 s (5 days) |
| state-table lifetime of an idle UDP flow (Linux default) | 30 s (120 s for a detected stream) |
| residual blocking after a trigger (Great Firewall, fully encrypted traffic) | 180 s (120 or 180 s observed) |
| rules per rule set (Wool 2004 sample, 37 Check Point rule sets, 2000-2001) | 5 to 2,671, average 144 rules |
| rule-set complexity RC = rules + objects + interfaces(interfaces-1)/2 | 30 to 8,521, average 1,121 RC |
| configuration errors against rule-set complexity | about ln(RC) + 1.5 errors (of 12 checked) |
| configuration errors per rule set | average 9.63 (versions 3.0/4.0) and 7.17 (4.1/NG) errors |
| configuration errors against firewall complexity (Wool 2010, 84 rule sets, 2003-2005) | about 8 log10(FC) - 10: 14 errors at FC 1,000, 22 at FC 10,000 (of 36) |
| share of rule sets with any-to-any allow rules | more than 60% |
| real-world iptables rules analysed (Diekmann et al.) | about 20k rules from over 15 firewalls |
| packet classification: storage and worst-case lookup (HiCuts, 40 classifiers up to 1,700 rules) | under 1 MB; 20 memory accesses worst case MB; accesses |
| Slammer: time to infect 90% of vulnerable hosts; time to widespread firewall filtering | 10 minutes; about an hour |
| share of connections the GFW's encrypted-traffic filter acts on | 26% (to chosen data-centre ranges) |
| collateral blocking of normal connections if applied broadly | about 0.6% % of connections |
| domains censored by the GFW's DNS filter (nine months) | 411M tested per day; 311K censored; 41K innocuous overblocked domains |
| added request latency from a web application firewall | up to 4x ratio |
| electricity cost of a single-board firewall | under $2.5 per device per year USD/yr |
Open contentions (3) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-1497 Do networks still need a firewall at their edge?
booked: The map books edge firewalls as still needed beside host and application firewalls, and keeps the view that their job has moved elsewhere.
the other reading: firewalls are obsolete or not needed if cryptography is used (the view Bellovin reports and rejects); the perimeter's job has moved into hosts and applications and the perimeter firewall is a legacy layer - C-1498 Is the Great Firewall of China a firewall?
booked: The map books firewalls as rule-based traffic screens, and keeps the Great Firewall as a disputed national-scale kind.
the other reading: NAT is a firewall technology (a common reading NIST and RFC 2979 reject); the Great Firewall is a firewall in the same sense (it filters traffic at a boundary by rules); the Great Firewall is a different system (laws plus technologies; censorship, not protection) that borrowed the name; application-only 'firewalls' (email firewalls, generative application firewalls) are firewalls (NIST SP 800-41 leaves them out) - C-1499 Where does the word 'firewall' come from?
booked: The map books the building's fire wall, and keeps a 1971 computing use and the 1983 film WarGames as other origins.
the other reading: the network term came from the film; the network term came from earlier computing usage (protection between modules); from engineering (the engine firewall in vehicles and aircraft)
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (10)
- Attackers against defenders for control of computing
- Access control list
- Network interfaces
- Packet filter
- State table
- Proxy agents
- Logs and alerts
- Computer network
- Intruders against firewalls for the protected network
- Slammer against human-mediated filtering
Sits inside / holds (4)
Trades with (valence) (14)
- Internet protocol suite (TCP/IP): the layered datagram protocols every host and router runs, the RFC record that specifies them, and the community that keeps them via sys:electromagnetic-field · Firewall (computing) gain
- Malware via sys:internet · Firewall (computing) gain
- Intrusion detection system via sys:electromagnetic-field · Firewall (computing) gain
- Denial-of-service attack via sys:internet · Firewall (computing) mixed
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:human-society · Firewall (computing) mixed
- Internet via sys:electromagnetic-field · Firewall (computing) mixed
- Operating system via sys:computer-hardware · Firewall (computing) gain
- Cryptography via sys:written-record · Firewall (computing) mixed
- Access control via sys:human-society · Firewall (computing) gain
- Organization via sys:human-society · Firewall (computing) gain
- Computer network via sys:electromagnetic-field · Firewall (computing) gain
- Intruder (burglar and trespasser) via sys:electromagnetic-field · Firewall (computing) gain
- Network address translation (often in the same box) via sys:electromagnetic-field · Firewall (computing) gain
- Security information and event management (SIEM) via sys:written-record · Firewall (computing) mixed
expressed by (24)
- Generation/Synthesis
- Recombination/Composition
- Templating / Standardization
- Interoperability/Transduction (Bridging)
- Encapsulation & Modularity (Abstraction)
- Distributed Autonomy/Decentralized Execution (Subsidiarity)
- Sensing/Scanning
- Hypothesis/Goal Selection
- Mapping/Modeling
- Uncertainty Reduction/Learning
- Trail-Marking / Externalized Memory (Stigmergy)
- Quick Harm Avoidance
- Reactive Response
- Proactive Defense
- Physical/Virtual Barrier
- Technique-Based Identification (a.k.a. Technique-Based Detection)
- Self-Monitoring
- Validation of Identity/Intention
- Validation of Effectiveness
- Enclave/Segregation
- Deception
- Redundancy & Diversity
- Triage & Prioritized Allocation
- Quality Control & Error Correction
floor filled by (19)
- Security operations center (SOC)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Internet
- router
- Intrusion detection system
- Information security
- Organization
- Computer hardware
- Computer network
- Access control list
- Network interfaces
- Packet filter
- State table
- Proxy agents
- Network address translation (often in the same box)
- Packet classification
- Directory service
- Deep packet inspection
- Security information and event management (SIEM)
Kinds (14)
- Packet filter
- Stateful firewall
- Circuit-level gateway
- Application firewall
- Application-proxy gateway
- Web application firewall
- Next-generation firewall
- Unified threat management
- Host-based and personal firewall
- Distributed firewall
- Firewall for virtual infrastructures
- Great Firewall (national-scale filtering)
- Generative application firewall
- Ultrasonic firewall
wired (1)
Notes published science
- A firewall is mostly as good as the people who write its rules: when 37 real corporate rule sets were audited in 2000-2001, only one had just a single mistake, and the number of errors grew with the logarithm of the rule set's size, about ln(RC) + 1.5; a repeat study of 84 rule sets found more than 60% still had rules of the form 'from somewhere to any, allow any service' (src:wool-2004, src:wool-2010).
- Your own gut has firewalls in depth: gut microbes carried off by immune cells are stopped at the mesenteric lymph nodes, 'the firewall that stops constant systemic penetration', and anything that leaks into the blood meets a second, vascular firewall in the liver, where Kupffer cells clear it (src:macpherson-smith-2006, src:balmer-2014).
- In November 2021 China's Great Firewall started spotting fully encrypted traffic that tries to 'look like nothing' not by decrypting it but by counting its bits and printable characters, and it acts on only 26% of connections to chosen data-centre ranges, probably to limit collateral damage; applied to everything, its rule would block about 0.6% of normal connections (src:wu-2023-gfw).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
firewall kinds by how deep into the TCP/IP layers they read (secondary stack)
- L1: Hardware (data link) layer: frames on the interface; firewall policies rarely concern themselves with it
- L2: IP layer: stateless packet filters, the first generation (routers in the 1980s; DEC's paper, 1987)
- L3: Transport layer: circuit-level gateways and stateful inspection, the second generation (AT&T Bell Labs, 1989-1990)
- L4: Application layer: application firewalls and proxies (FWTK, 1993), web application firewalls, next-generation firewalls (2012)
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L5: Decision carried out: pass to the next hop, drop silently, reject with ICMP or TCP reset, relay through a proxy or rewrite; a state entry made; the event logged, an alert raised
- L6: The rule set and its keeping: ordered rules over zones, addresses, ports, protocols, applications and users, with a default deny; written, compiled, reviewed, audited; complex and error-prone
- L7: Purpose: an external security policy at the boundary between differing security postures; shield buggy and legacy services from hostile connections; meet mandates; stay transparent to legitimate use
the firewall as network engineers describe it: traffic at the boundary between networks of differing trust, up to the security policy it enforces (reader's view)
- L1: Traffic at the boundary: packets on the links between networks or hosts with differing security postures (a LAN and the Internet, zones, VLANs, virtual machines)
- L2: Interception at an interface: every crossing packet taken in on an interface (inside, outside, DMZ) with its direction; placed at the ingress point, often in the router or switch
- L3: Inspection: what is read from each packet (headers, connection state, application content, the user behind an address, the local process)
- L4: Match: the packet compared with the ordered rule set (first match, a default at the end) or with the state table
- L5: Action carried out and recorded: pass, drop, reject, relay or rewrite; logged and alerted
- L6: The rule set and its keeping: rules written from the policy, zones and DMZ, change management, reviews, audits
- L7: Purpose: the organisation's security policy at its boundaries (block what is not expressly permitted; shield buggy and legacy services; meet mandates; do not break legitimate use)
way in: Administrators' rules (the policy written down)
- L1: The organisation's decision on which traffic it needs, from risk analysis
- L2: Entered through a management interface (a GUI or a policy file)
- L3: Written as rules: the collection that decides which packets are forwarded and which rejected
- L4: Compiled into the enforcing format and shipped to the devices
- L5: Reviewed and tested under change management
way in: Application content (commands, attachments, payload bytes)
- L1: Application data in the packets: HTTP, FTP, DNS, SMTP, SQL, VoIP, or encrypted bytes
- L2: Reassembled into a stream; a proxy ends the client's connection and opens its own
- L3: Protocol parsed: commands, arguments, attachments, active content; for the GFW, the first payload's bits and printable characters
- L4: Compared with profiles of benign protocol activity, protocol state machines, or exemption heuristics
way in: Connection state (handshakes, sequence numbers, replies)
- L1: The packets of a TCP stream, UDP exchange or ICMP message, both ways
- L2: Seen at the firewall going out and coming back
- L3: TCP flags and sequence numbers read against the protocol's state machine
- L4: Looked up in the state table (addresses, ports, connection state)
way in: Idle time (silence on a connection)
- L1: Time passing with no packets on a tracked connection
- L2: A timer per state-table entry, longer for detected streams
- L3: Timeout set by protocol and state (Linux: 5 days for an established TCP connection, 30 s for UDP)
- L4: Entry expires and is removed; the next packet is treated as new
way in: Inside applications asking for open ports (UPnP)
- L1: An application on a PC behind the firewall that wants two-way traffic
- L4: Honoured only when dynamic reconfiguration is on (mostly off by default)
way in: Load (traffic volume against memory and tables)
- L1: Traffic volume and the memory and processor time it takes
- L2: Entries counted as they are allocated
- L3: Compared with a ceiling (tracking entries, reassembly memory)
- L4: Over the high mark, packets tossed until the low mark is reached
way in: Local process (which program wants the network)
- L1: A process on the host opening or accepting a connection
- L2: The socket call hooked
- L3: The process identity read
- L4: Compared with the list of authorised applications
way in: Packet headers (addresses, protocol, ports, interface)
- L1: IP packets arriving on the links from either side, each with addresses, protocol and ports in its headers
- L2: Taken in on an interface, inbound (ingress) or outbound (egress)
- L3: Header fields read: source and destination address, protocol, ports, fragment flags
- L4: Compared rule by rule against the access control list until a match; the classification problem
way in: Remote device health (network access control)
- L1: The remote computer's patch level, antimalware and security configuration
- L2: Collected by agent software the firewall controls
- L3: Reported together with the user's credentials
- L4: Checked against organisational policy; a failing device gets limited access
way in: The user's answer to a warning (allow or block)
- L1: The user, interrupted at work by a warning
- L2: The warning answered: allow or block this connection
- L3: The answer kept in the list of authorised applications
- L4: The answer becomes the configuration
way in: User identity (who is behind an address)
- L1: Logins recorded by directory services (Active Directory, LDAP, RADIUS, TACACS+)
- L2: Authentication logs read by the firewall
- L3: Each login tied to an IP address
- L4: Group membership looked up for the rule
way out: Drop silently
- L1: Nothing goes further; the sender hears nothing
- L5: Not expressly permitted, so blocked
way out: Log and alert
- L1: Administrators alerted (rule changes, reboots, disk shortages)
- L5: Event logged locally and centrally
way out: Pass (forward to the next hop)
- L1: Routed onto the protected side or the DMZ
- L3: Passed through unchanged
- L5: Permitted by a rule or a state entry
way out: Reject with notice (ICMP or TCP reset)
- L3: An ICMP message or a TCP reset sent back
- L5: Refused
way out: Relay or rewrite (proxy, NAT, decrypt and re-encrypt)
- L3: Sent on from the proxy's own address; inside addresses hidden
- L4: Content possibly decrypted, examined, re-encrypted
- L5: Relay decided by the proxy agent against the rule set
way out: Warn the user (personal firewall)
- L1: A pop-up asking allow or block
- L5: Warning raised