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Firewall (computing)

A network security system that monitors and controls incoming and outgoing network traffic based on configurable security rules, typically a barrier between a trusted and an untrusted network (src:wp:firewall-computing); 'a device or group of devices that enforces an access control policy between networks' (src:rfc2647). Walked as the device or program and its practice: kinds (packet filter, stateful, application and proxy, host and personal, distributed, web application, next-generation), rules and their keeping, and history, with the Great Firewall booked as a contested national-scale variant.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

aliasesFirewall
born at1980s; first paper 1987 (DEC)
born precisionyears
boundaryInside: the point where traffic between networks or hosts of differing trust is intercepted, what is read there (headers, connection state, content, user, process), the match against the rule set or state table, the action (pass, drop, reject, relay, rewrite) and its record, and the rule set with its administration. Outside: the networks it sits between and their hosts; the organisation and its policy; the people who write rules and answer warnings; intrusion detection systems (sibling; the edge is blurred in UTMs and next-generation firewalls); NAT (often in the same box, a routing function per NIST); VPN and encryption (carried, terminated or blind to).
nested levelA device or program (rung 12) in computer networks, run by organisations and people; one of the controls of network, computer and information security; access control applied between networks.
scalesocial

Measures (18) published science

characteristic clock: packets to classify per second on a 10 Gb/s link (40-byte packets)31.25 million per second (about 32 ns per decision) packets per second
state-table lifetime of an idle established TCP connection (Linux default)432000 s (5 days)
state-table lifetime of an idle UDP flow (Linux default)30 s (120 s for a detected stream)
residual blocking after a trigger (Great Firewall, fully encrypted traffic)180 s (120 or 180 s observed)
rules per rule set (Wool 2004 sample, 37 Check Point rule sets, 2000-2001)5 to 2,671, average 144 rules
rule-set complexity RC = rules + objects + interfaces(interfaces-1)/230 to 8,521, average 1,121 RC
configuration errors against rule-set complexityabout ln(RC) + 1.5 errors (of 12 checked)
configuration errors per rule setaverage 9.63 (versions 3.0/4.0) and 7.17 (4.1/NG) errors
configuration errors against firewall complexity (Wool 2010, 84 rule sets, 2003-2005)about 8 log10(FC) - 10: 14 errors at FC 1,000, 22 at FC 10,000 (of 36)
share of rule sets with any-to-any allow rulesmore than 60%
real-world iptables rules analysed (Diekmann et al.)about 20k rules from over 15 firewalls
packet classification: storage and worst-case lookup (HiCuts, 40 classifiers up to 1,700 rules)under 1 MB; 20 memory accesses worst case MB; accesses
Slammer: time to infect 90% of vulnerable hosts; time to widespread firewall filtering10 minutes; about an hour
share of connections the GFW's encrypted-traffic filter acts on26% (to chosen data-centre ranges)
collateral blocking of normal connections if applied broadlyabout 0.6% % of connections
domains censored by the GFW's DNS filter (nine months)411M tested per day; 311K censored; 41K innocuous overblocked domains
added request latency from a web application firewallup to 4x ratio
electricity cost of a single-board firewallunder $2.5 per device per year USD/yr

Open contentions (3) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (10)

Sits inside / holds (4)

Trades with (valence) (14)

expressed by (24)

floor filled by (19)

Kinds (14)

wired (1)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

firewall kinds by how deep into the TCP/IP layers they read (secondary stack)

  1. L1: Hardware (data link) layer: frames on the interface; firewall policies rarely concern themselves with it
  2. L2: IP layer: stateless packet filters, the first generation (routers in the 1980s; DEC's paper, 1987)
  3. L3: Transport layer: circuit-level gateways and stateful inspection, the second generation (AT&T Bell Labs, 1989-1990)
  4. L4: Application layer: application firewalls and proxies (FWTK, 1993), web application firewalls, next-generation firewalls (2012)

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L5: Decision carried out: pass to the next hop, drop silently, reject with ICMP or TCP reset, relay through a proxy or rewrite; a state entry made; the event logged, an alert raised
  2. L6: The rule set and its keeping: ordered rules over zones, addresses, ports, protocols, applications and users, with a default deny; written, compiled, reviewed, audited; complex and error-prone
  3. L7: Purpose: an external security policy at the boundary between differing security postures; shield buggy and legacy services from hostile connections; meet mandates; stay transparent to legitimate use

the firewall as network engineers describe it: traffic at the boundary between networks of differing trust, up to the security policy it enforces (reader's view)

  1. L1: Traffic at the boundary: packets on the links between networks or hosts with differing security postures (a LAN and the Internet, zones, VLANs, virtual machines)
  2. L2: Interception at an interface: every crossing packet taken in on an interface (inside, outside, DMZ) with its direction; placed at the ingress point, often in the router or switch
  3. L3: Inspection: what is read from each packet (headers, connection state, application content, the user behind an address, the local process)
  4. L4: Match: the packet compared with the ordered rule set (first match, a default at the end) or with the state table
  5. L5: Action carried out and recorded: pass, drop, reject, relay or rewrite; logged and alerted
  6. L6: The rule set and its keeping: rules written from the policy, zones and DMZ, change management, reviews, audits
  7. L7: Purpose: the organisation's security policy at its boundaries (block what is not expressly permitted; shield buggy and legacy services; meet mandates; do not break legitimate use)

way in: Administrators' rules (the policy written down)

  1. L1: The organisation's decision on which traffic it needs, from risk analysis
  2. L2: Entered through a management interface (a GUI or a policy file)
  3. L3: Written as rules: the collection that decides which packets are forwarded and which rejected
  4. L4: Compiled into the enforcing format and shipped to the devices
  5. L5: Reviewed and tested under change management

way in: Application content (commands, attachments, payload bytes)

  1. L1: Application data in the packets: HTTP, FTP, DNS, SMTP, SQL, VoIP, or encrypted bytes
  2. L2: Reassembled into a stream; a proxy ends the client's connection and opens its own
  3. L3: Protocol parsed: commands, arguments, attachments, active content; for the GFW, the first payload's bits and printable characters
  4. L4: Compared with profiles of benign protocol activity, protocol state machines, or exemption heuristics

way in: Connection state (handshakes, sequence numbers, replies)

  1. L1: The packets of a TCP stream, UDP exchange or ICMP message, both ways
  2. L2: Seen at the firewall going out and coming back
  3. L3: TCP flags and sequence numbers read against the protocol's state machine
  4. L4: Looked up in the state table (addresses, ports, connection state)

way in: Idle time (silence on a connection)

  1. L1: Time passing with no packets on a tracked connection
  2. L2: A timer per state-table entry, longer for detected streams
  3. L3: Timeout set by protocol and state (Linux: 5 days for an established TCP connection, 30 s for UDP)
  4. L4: Entry expires and is removed; the next packet is treated as new

way in: Inside applications asking for open ports (UPnP)

  1. L1: An application on a PC behind the firewall that wants two-way traffic
  2. L4: Honoured only when dynamic reconfiguration is on (mostly off by default)

way in: Load (traffic volume against memory and tables)

  1. L1: Traffic volume and the memory and processor time it takes
  2. L2: Entries counted as they are allocated
  3. L3: Compared with a ceiling (tracking entries, reassembly memory)
  4. L4: Over the high mark, packets tossed until the low mark is reached

way in: Local process (which program wants the network)

  1. L1: A process on the host opening or accepting a connection
  2. L2: The socket call hooked
  3. L3: The process identity read
  4. L4: Compared with the list of authorised applications

way in: Packet headers (addresses, protocol, ports, interface)

  1. L1: IP packets arriving on the links from either side, each with addresses, protocol and ports in its headers
  2. L2: Taken in on an interface, inbound (ingress) or outbound (egress)
  3. L3: Header fields read: source and destination address, protocol, ports, fragment flags
  4. L4: Compared rule by rule against the access control list until a match; the classification problem

way in: Remote device health (network access control)

  1. L1: The remote computer's patch level, antimalware and security configuration
  2. L2: Collected by agent software the firewall controls
  3. L3: Reported together with the user's credentials
  4. L4: Checked against organisational policy; a failing device gets limited access

way in: The user's answer to a warning (allow or block)

  1. L1: The user, interrupted at work by a warning
  2. L2: The warning answered: allow or block this connection
  3. L3: The answer kept in the list of authorised applications
  4. L4: The answer becomes the configuration

way in: User identity (who is behind an address)

  1. L1: Logins recorded by directory services (Active Directory, LDAP, RADIUS, TACACS+)
  2. L2: Authentication logs read by the firewall
  3. L3: Each login tied to an IP address
  4. L4: Group membership looked up for the rule

way out: Drop silently

  1. L1: Nothing goes further; the sender hears nothing
  2. L5: Not expressly permitted, so blocked

way out: Log and alert

  1. L1: Administrators alerted (rule changes, reboots, disk shortages)
  2. L5: Event logged locally and centrally

way out: Pass (forward to the next hop)

  1. L1: Routed onto the protected side or the DMZ
  2. L3: Passed through unchanged
  3. L5: Permitted by a rule or a state entry

way out: Reject with notice (ICMP or TCP reset)

  1. L3: An ICMP message or a TCP reset sent back
  2. L5: Refused

way out: Relay or rewrite (proxy, NAT, decrypt and re-encrypt)

  1. L3: Sent on from the proxy's own address; inside addresses hidden
  2. L4: Content possibly decrypted, examined, re-encrypted
  3. L5: Relay decided by the proxy agent against the rule set

way out: Warn the user (personal firewall)

  1. L1: A pop-up asking allow or block
  2. L5: Warning raised

Sources (33) published science

Computer network (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01)
Firewall (computing) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01)
Stateful firewall (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Wool A. A Quantitative Study of Firewall Configuration Errors. IEEE Computer 37(6):62-67, 2004 (doi:10.1109/MC.2004.2); author's copy (behind its links)
Moore, Paxson, Savage, Shannon, Staniford and Weaver, Inside the Slammer Worm, IEEE Security & Privacy 1(4), 2003 (doi:10.1109/MSECP.2003.1219056) (behind its links)
Scarfone K, Hoffman P. Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy. NIST Special Publication 800-41 Revision 1, 2009 (doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-41r1) (behind its links)
Wu M, Sippe J, Sivakumar D, Burg J, Anderson P, Wang X, Bock K, Houmansadr A, Levin D, Wustrow E. How the Great Firewall of China Detects and Blocks Fully Encrypted Traffic. 32nd USENIX Security Symposium, 2023 (open access) (behind its links)
Raja F, Hawkey K, Hsu S, Wang K-LC, Beznosov K. A Brick Wall, a Locked Door, and a Bandit: A Physical Security Metaphor for Firewall Warnings. SOUPS 2011 (behind its links)
Newman D. Benchmarking Terminology for Firewall Performance. RFC 2647, IETF, August 1999 (doi:10.17487/RFC2647) (behind its links)
Gupta P, McKeown N. Algorithms for Packet Classification. IEEE Network 15(2):24-32, 2001 (doi:10.1109/65.912717); authors' copy (behind its links)
Linux kernel documentation: Netfilter Conntrack Sysfs variables (nf_conntrack-sysctl), docs.kernel.org, read 2026-11-13 (behind its links)
Wool A. Trends in Firewall Configuration Errors: Measuring the Holes in Swiss Cheese. IEEE Internet Computing 14(4):58-65, 2010 (doi:10.1109/MIC.2010.29); author's copy (preprint arXiv:0911.1240) (behind its links)
Diekmann C, Hupel L, Michaelis J, Haslbeck M, Carle G. Verified iptables Firewall Analysis and Verification. Journal of Automated Reasoning 61:191-242, 2018 (doi:10.1007/s10817-017-9445-1), CC BY (behind its links)
Hoang NP, Niaki AA, Dalek J, Knockel J, et al. How Great is the Great Firewall? Measuring China's DNS Censorship. arXiv:2106.02167 (USENIX Security 2021) (behind its links)
Brandner L, Vanbever L. Rethinking Web Application Firewalls. arXiv:2609.25892, 2026 (behind its links)
Nabi Z. A $35 Firewall for the Developing World. arXiv:1405.2517, 2014 (behind its links)
Bellovin SM. Distributed Firewalls. ;login: (USENIX) November 1999, pp. 37-39; author's copy (behind its links)
Freed N. Behavior of and Requirements for Internet Firewalls. RFC 2979, IETF, October 2000 (doi:10.17487/RFC2979) (behind its links)
Eddy W. TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common Mitigations. RFC 4987, IETF, August 2007 (doi:10.17487/RFC4987) (behind its links)
Langley, A. et al. (2017) The QUIC Transport Protocol: Design and Internet-Scale Deployment. Proc. ACM SIGCOMM 2017, doi:10.1145/3098822.3098842 (behind its links)
Malware (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Intrusion detection system (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Denial-of-service attack (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
González-Granadillo, G., González-Zarzosa, S. & Diaz, R. (2021). Security Information and Event Management (SIEM): Analysis, Trends, and Usage in Critical Infrastructures. Sensors 21(14):4759. doi:10.3390/s21144759 (PMC8309804, CC BY) (behind its links)
DMZ (computing) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Great Firewall (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Vendrell Farreny J, Jorda Roca M, Cornudella Gaya M, Fernandez Baon R. Introducing the Generative Application Firewall (GAF). arXiv:2601.15824, 2026 (behind its links)
Zeppelzauer M, Ringot A, Taurer F. SoniControl - A Mobile Ultrasonic Firewall. arXiv:1807.07617, 2018 (behind its links)
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Firewall (construction) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Schmidt M, Kubyshkin V. How To Quantify a Genetic Firewall? A Polarity-Based Metric for Genetic Code Engineering. ChemBioChem 22(7):1268-1284, 2021 (doi:10.1002/cbic.202000758), CC BY-NC-ND (behind its links)
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Balmer ML, Slack E, de Gottardi A, et al. The liver may act as a firewall mediating mutualism between the host and its gut commensal microbiota. Sci Transl Med 6(237):237ra66, 2014 (doi:10.1126/scitranslmed.3008618) (behind its links)