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Risk management

The identification, evaluation and prioritisation of risks, followed by the minimisation, monitoring and control of their impact or probability (src:wp:risk-management); in NIST's framing a comprehensive, organisation-wide process to frame, assess, respond to and monitor risk with a feedback loop for continuous improvement (src:nist-sp800-39). Walked as risk analysts, risk managers and risk scientists describe it: threat sources, hazards and vulnerabilities taken in, likelihood and impact weighed, risks ranked against tolerance and appetite, treated (avoid, reduce, share or transfer, retain) and monitored, inside the organisations whose objectives it serves; with security risk (information security risk management) as one practice inside the wider one, and the human perception of risk as one of its incoming channels.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

aliasesInformation risk management
born atc. 1755-1750 BC (Law 238) or the 1950s (formal science)
born precisioncontested
boundaryInside: the risk process (establishing context, identification, analysis, evaluation, treatment, monitoring and review, communication), its records (the risk register, risk models, assessments), the people and roles that run it (risk managers, risk analysts, risk owners, the risk executive function or chief risk officer) and the frame they set (assumptions, constraints, risk tolerance and appetite, priorities). Outside: the threat sources and hazards themselves, the assets and objectives it protects (the organisation's), the controls it selects once they run (information security, engineering), the insurers and markets risk is shared with, regulators and standard setters, and the people exposed to the risks, whose perception, trust and sense of fairness come in as a channel.
nested levelA practice inside organisations (part of management's decision and control), carried out across NIST's three tiers (organisation, mission/business process, information system); information security risk management is one of its kinds; standards bodies and law shape it from outside.
scalesocial

Measures (19) published science

characteristic clock: annual risk-factor disclosure (form 10-K)1 year
characteristic clock: likelihood assessment time frame (examples)6 or 12 months
voluntary vs involuntary risk accepted (Starr 1969)1000 times
risk-seeking whole-brain experiments in meta-analysis43 experiments
risk-aversion whole-brain experiments in meta-analysis22 experiments
field experiment size, masks and interpersonal distance>4500 interactions
risk-matrix comparison participants75 healthcare professionals
interval between matrix rounds14 days
cyber insurance premiums, 202316.6 billion US$
share of 2023 cyber premiums spent in the USnearly 60 %
cyber insurance premiums in Europe, 20243.9 billion US$
SMEs targeted in the ERM study (Czech Republic)300 firms
integrated safety and security risk assessment methods found7 methods
houses destroyed in the Great Fire of London (origin of property insurance)>13000 houses
Codex Hammurabi Law 238: share of ship value owed by a captain who saved it0.5 of ship value
start of formal risk-management science1950s decade
ISO 31000 first published2009-11 date
germination spread within one Lobelia inflata plant (bet-hedging analogue)52 days
reverse risk register case studies coded21 events

Open contentions (8) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (18) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Risk management. Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (17) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (10)

Sits inside / holds (4)

expressed by (21)

floor filled by (18)

Kinds (12)

wired (2)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

risk management as risk analysts and managers describe it: uncertain events and the organisation's exposure to them, up to the objectives it pursues (reader's view)

  1. L1: Uncertain events and exposure: threat sources (attacks, errors, structural failures, disasters), hazards and opportunities, and the organisation's assets, operations and objectives exposed to them
  2. L2: Identification: risks found from their sources or their consequences, by objectives, scenarios, taxonomies, checklists, risk charting, threat information and reports
  3. L3: Analysis: likelihood (for a stated time frame) and impact estimated, qualitatively, semi-quantitatively or quantitatively, with uncertainty and strength of knowledge
  4. L4: Evaluation and prioritisation: risks compared and ranked; the risk register and the risk matrix
  5. L5: Treatment: accept, avoid, mitigate, share or transfer; plans with controls, owners and schedules
  6. L6: Framing and governance: assumptions, constraints, risk tolerance and appetite, priorities; risk executive function; culture; three tiers
  7. L7: Purpose: objectives pursued under uncertainty; value created and protected

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: Evaluation and prioritisation: risk levels compared against criteria, ranked (highest loss and probability first), kept in the risk register; risk matrices or quantitative models
  2. L5: Treatment decision: alternative courses of action developed, evaluated and chosen consistent with risk tolerance; accept, avoid, mitigate, share or transfer; decided at the level the risk warrants
  3. L6: Framing and governance: risk assumptions, constraints, tolerance and appetite, priorities and trade-offs; the risk executive function; culture; the three tiers
  4. L7: Purpose: the organisation's objectives pursued under uncertainty; value created and protected (mitigation should cost less than inaction)

way in: Adversarial threats: threat information about attackers

  1. L1: Hostile cyber or physical attacks by adversaries with intent and method
  2. L2: Threat information taken in from external entities in a risk relationship, ISACs, CERTs and threat intelligence
  3. L3: Threat events and scenarios characterised: likelihood from adversary intent, capability and targeting; threat shifting expected

way in: Loss history: incidents, near misses, realised risk events and their records

  1. L1: Realised risk events and losses (Three Mile Island 1979, Challenger 1986, Deepwater Horizon 2010...), own and others'
  2. L2: The risk database or register: each risk with opening date, title, short description, probability and importance
  3. L3: Rates of occurrence estimated, scanty for rare catastrophes; a reverse risk register works back from realised events to systemic factors

way in: Market signals: insurance cover, premiums and capacity

  1. L1: Insurers and reinsurers offering cover for a premium; cyber premiums US$16.6 billion in 2023; capacity limited by correlated (systemic) losses
  2. L2: Quotes, proposal forms and underwriting questions read back by the insured; insurers ask about the client's dependencies
  3. L3: Cost of transfer compared with retention: retention viable when insuring would cost more over time than the losses

way in: Monitoring: controls and treatments in operation, and changes in the environment

  1. L1: Risk responses as implemented (controls, insurance in force, avoided activities) and the environments of operation
  2. L2: Compliance verified: planned responses implemented and requirements satisfied
  3. L3: Ongoing effectiveness of the responses determined
  4. L4: Risk-impacting changes to systems and environments identified

way in: Non-adversarial hazards: errors, structural failures, disasters and accidents

  1. L1: Human errors, structural failures of hardware, software and environmental controls, natural and man-made disasters
  2. L2: Identification: objectives-based, scenario-based, taxonomy-based and common-risk checking; hazard analysis, FTA, FMEA, HAZOP for devices
  3. L3: Likelihood estimated from historical evidence and empirical data, for a stated time frame

way in: Risk perception and expert judgment (inner): the assessors' own sense of danger

  1. L1: The hazard as experienced: dread, catastrophic potential, familiarity, voluntariness, controllability, visibility or delay of harm
  2. L2: Affect: immediate positive or negative impressions; aversion makes hazards seem riskier and less beneficial
  3. L3: Neural valuation: the insula integrates risk information and codes risk prediction errors; risk seeking with right insula and left caudate, risk aversion with left MTG and ACC

way in: Rules from outside: law, regulators and standards

  1. L1: Standards and regulation: ISO 31000 (2009, updated 2018), COSO ERM (2004, updated 2017), NIST SP 800-30/39, ISO 14971, SEC disclosure, the EU CER directive
  2. L2: Requirements adopted: evidence of risk management demanded by regulators (e.g. the FDA for devices); critical-entity operators must assess uncertainty and interdependencies
  3. L3: Regulatory oversight with gaps and overlaps; industry-funded assessments (lead in gasoline) can steer the frame

way in: Staff reports: people at the front line voicing risks

  1. L1: Team members who foresee problems; individuals on the front lines operating the systems
  2. L2: An anonymous risk reporting channel open to every team member; a risk officer with healthy scepticism
  3. L3: Filtered by voice and safety: calling dissenters 'whistleblowers' de-normalises speaking up; Challenger's communication failures

way in: Stakeholders and the public: how those exposed judge the risk

  1. L1: The people who bear the risk; voluntary risks accepted far more readily than involuntary ones (Starr 1969, contested)
  2. L2: News and public statements ('the risk is real'), concern and consultation
  3. L3: Acceptability judged through perceived threat, trust (competence and integrity) and fairness (distribution and procedure)

way in: The organisation's missions, assets and objectives (context)

  1. L1: Missions and business functions, assets, operations, people; the environment of the organisation
  2. L2: Context established: social scope, identity and objectives of stakeholders, the basis on which risks will be evaluated
  3. L3: Assets valued; mission/business processes defined with the criticality of their information
  4. L4: Tier 1 prioritisation of missions and business functions, driving investment and controls

way in: Vulnerabilities and predisposing conditions

  1. L1: Vulnerabilities in information systems and in governance structures, processes, architecture, facilities, equipment, supply chain and service providers
  2. L2: Vulnerability assessment of critical assets against specific threats (scans and the vulnerability management programme feed it)
  3. L3: Severity in context: predisposing conditions raise or lower likelihood (a flood-prone site, an air-gapped system)

way out: Avoid: withdraw from or never start the activity

  1. L1: Exposure gone, and the gain with it; hospitals avoiding higher-risk patients
  2. L3: The activity dropped or refused (not buying the property, closing the business area)
  3. L5: Avoidance chosen

way out: Communicate and disclose: reports up the tiers, to investors, regulators and the public

  1. L1: Risk factors disclosed annually in form 10-K (Sections 1A and 7); public risk communication
  2. L3: Analysts share findings with managers; risk reported to the board and regulators
  3. L6: Risk strategy and decisions made traceable and transparent; inter-tier communication

way out: Opportunities: exploit, share, enhance, ignore

  1. L1: Positive uncertain events pursued (in project management literature since the 1990s)
  2. L5: Opportunity response chosen

way out: Reduce: controls that lower likelihood or severity

  1. L1: Likelihood or severity lowered; residual risk; a control can add its own loss (sprinkler water damage)
  2. L2: Controls operating on the assets
  3. L3: Controls implemented: sprinklers, antivirus, iterative delivery, layered defences
  4. L4: Risk treatment plan: controls selected, schedule and responsible persons; Statement of Applicability (ISO/IEC 27001)
  5. L5: Mitigation chosen and approved at the level the risk warrants

way out: Retain: accept and budget, self-insure, pool

  1. L1: Losses absorbed, including the excess over cover and uninsurable risks such as war
  2. L3: Budgeted; self-insurance; risk-retention pools spread losses across members
  3. L5: Acceptance chosen, or the default for what is not avoided or transferred

way out: Share or transfer: insure, outsource, contract

  1. L1: Financial consequence carried by another party, which may revert if it fails; insurance as post-event compensation
  2. L3: Policy bought or work outsourced, usually for a fee; contract clauses (indemnity, limitation of liability)
  3. L5: Sharing chosen

Sources (28) published science

Information security (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot)
Risk management (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01)
Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative (2011). NIST SP 800-39, Managing Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission, and Information System View. doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-39 (behind its links)
People interact closer when a face mask is worn but risk compensation is at best partial (2023). Eur J Public Health. doi:10.1093/eurpub/ckad161 (behind its links)
Hanson & Straub (2026). Cyber insurance, audit, and policy: review, analysis and recommendations. arXiv:2602.03127 (behind its links)
Risk perception (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Tang, Wei & Ren (2026). Acceptable risk as a psychological judgment: risk perception, trust, and fairness. Front Psychol. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1868729 (behind its links)
Skeoch & Ioannidis (2023). The barriers to sustainable risk transfer in the cyber-insurance market. arXiv:2303.02061 (behind its links)
Insurance (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Business continuity planning (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Bet-hedging and variability in plant development: seed germination and beyond (2024). Phil Trans R Soc B (behind its links)
Sheth & Sinfield (2024). Advancing the complex adaptive systems approach to enterprise risk management with quantified risk networks. Sci Rep. doi:10.1038/s41598-024-71764-x (behind its links)
Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative (2012). NIST SP 800-30 Rev. 1, Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments. doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-30r1 (behind its links)
Ding et al. (2025). Common and distinct neural mechanisms underlying risk seeking and risk aversion: neuroimaging meta-analysis. Hum Brain Mapp. doi:10.1002/hbm.70295 (behind its links)
Kutej, Rass, Alexandrowicz et al. (2025). Comparing traditional and graphical risk matrices: a case study in healthcare. Risk Analysis. doi:10.1111/risa.70104 (behind its links)
Syrova & Spicka (2022). Exploring the indirect links between enterprise risk management and the financial performance of SMEs. Risk Management. doi:10.1057/s41283-022-00107-9 (behind its links)
Chockalingam, Hadziosmanovic, Pieters, Teixeira & van Gelder (2017). Integrated safety and security risk assessment methods: a survey of key characteristics and applications. arXiv:1707.02140 (behind its links)
ISO 31000 (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Thekdi & Aven (2026). The reverse risk register approach to understanding systemic factors in risk analysis and management case studies. Risk Analysis. doi:10.1111/risa.70332 (behind its links)
Flage, Aven & Glette-Iversen (2025). On the use of the term "real risk". Risk Analysis 45. doi:10.1111/risa.15073 (behind its links)
Alshaikh, Maynard, Ahmad & Chang (2015). Information Security Policy: A Management Practice Perspective. ACIS 2015. arXiv:1606.00890 (behind its links)
Reinsurance (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
NIST (2022). SP 800-53A Rev. 5: Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Information Systems and Organizations. doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53Ar5 (behind its links)
Enterprise risk management (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Nurse, Axon, Erola, Agrafiotis, Goldsmith & Creese (2020). The data that drives cyber insurance: a study into the underwriting and claims processes. arXiv:2008.04713 (behind its links)
Klumpes et al. (2023). Coordination of cybersecurity risk management in the U.K. insurance sector. Geneva Papers. doi:10.1057/s41288-023-00287-9 (behind its links)
Souppaya M, Scarfone K. Guide to enterprise patch management planning: preventive maintenance for technology. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, 2022 (doi:10.6028/NIST.SP.800-40r4) (behind its links)
IT risk management (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)