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Risk management
The identification, evaluation and prioritisation of risks, followed by the minimisation, monitoring and control of their impact or probability (src:wp:risk-management); in NIST's framing a comprehensive, organisation-wide process to frame, assess, respond to and monitor risk with a feedback loop for continuous improvement (src:nist-sp800-39). Walked as risk analysts, risk managers and risk scientists describe it: threat sources, hazards and vulnerabilities taken in, likelihood and impact weighed, risks ranked against tolerance and appetite, treated (avoid, reduce, share or transfer, retain) and monitored, inside the organisations whose objectives it serves; with security risk (information security risk management) as one practice inside the wider one, and the human perception of risk as one of its incoming channels.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| aliases | Information risk management |
| born at | c. 1755-1750 BC (Law 238) or the 1950s (formal science) |
| born precision | contested |
| boundary | Inside: the risk process (establishing context, identification, analysis, evaluation, treatment, monitoring and review, communication), its records (the risk register, risk models, assessments), the people and roles that run it (risk managers, risk analysts, risk owners, the risk executive function or chief risk officer) and the frame they set (assumptions, constraints, risk tolerance and appetite, priorities). Outside: the threat sources and hazards themselves, the assets and objectives it protects (the organisation's), the controls it selects once they run (information security, engineering), the insurers and markets risk is shared with, regulators and standard setters, and the people exposed to the risks, whose perception, trust and sense of fairness come in as a channel. |
| nested level | A practice inside organisations (part of management's decision and control), carried out across NIST's three tiers (organisation, mission/business process, information system); information security risk management is one of its kinds; standards bodies and law shape it from outside. |
| scale | social |
Measures (19) published science
| characteristic clock: annual risk-factor disclosure (form 10-K) | 1 year |
| characteristic clock: likelihood assessment time frame (examples) | 6 or 12 months |
| voluntary vs involuntary risk accepted (Starr 1969) | 1000 times |
| risk-seeking whole-brain experiments in meta-analysis | 43 experiments |
| risk-aversion whole-brain experiments in meta-analysis | 22 experiments |
| field experiment size, masks and interpersonal distance | >4500 interactions |
| risk-matrix comparison participants | 75 healthcare professionals |
| interval between matrix rounds | 14 days |
| cyber insurance premiums, 2023 | 16.6 billion US$ |
| share of 2023 cyber premiums spent in the US | nearly 60 % |
| cyber insurance premiums in Europe, 2024 | 3.9 billion US$ |
| SMEs targeted in the ERM study (Czech Republic) | 300 firms |
| integrated safety and security risk assessment methods found | 7 methods |
| houses destroyed in the Great Fire of London (origin of property insurance) | >13000 houses |
| Codex Hammurabi Law 238: share of ship value owed by a captain who saved it | 0.5 of ship value |
| start of formal risk-management science | 1950s decade |
| ISO 31000 first published | 2009-11 date |
| germination spread within one Lobelia inflata plant (bet-hedging analogue) | 52 days |
| reverse risk register case studies coded | 21 events |
Open contentions (8) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-1656 Does enterprise risk management improve how companies do?
booked: The map keeps the evidence that it helps indirectly and the criticism that some standards add confidence without measurable benefit.
the other reading: ERM improves financial performance (indirectly, through culture and strategic risk performance; Syrova & Spicka); standards criticised for no measurable improvement on risk, only more confidence ('pretend ERM') - C-1674 What is risk?
booked: The map keeps both: likelihood times impact, and consequences under uncertainty judged with how much is known.
the other reading: risk is an objective (C,p) with frequentist probabilities to be estimated; risk is (C,U): probability is a tool for uncertainty, with strength of knowledge as important as the number (Flage, Aven & Glette-Iversen); risk is the chance or probability of loss (the older ISO wording) - C-1675 Do separate 'hot' and 'cold' minds drive risky choices?
booked: The map books the two-system reading with the single-system alternative alongside.
the other reading: risk seeking driven by an emotional (hot) system, risk aversion by a cognitive (cold) system (Ding et al. 2025); hot and cold modes are rule-based selections within one unitary system (Kruglanski and Gigerenzer; Mega et al., as cited) - C-1676 Do people take back the safety a protection gives them?
booked: The map books partial compensation as measured (masks: people stood closer but stayed protected) and keeps full 'risk homeostasis' as contested.
the other reading: risk homeostasis: people act to restore a preferred level of perceived risk; risk compensation as a matter of degree, never cancelling the protection in the mask study - C-1677 When did risk management begin?
booked: The map keeps both: written risk-sharing rules nearly 4,000 years ago, and the formal science from the 1950s.
the other reading: the practice begins with written risk-sharing rules: Law 238 (c. 1755-1750 BC), Rhodian general average (about 1000-800 BC), bottomry; risk management begins as a named, formal science in the 1950s (literature from the 1920s) - C-1678 Are risk matrices a good tool?
booked: The map books them as widely used and as criticised for inconsistent ratings that hide uncertainty.
the other reading: matrices are clear, easy to communicate and adaptable, and standards rely on them; matrices cannot capture uncertainty and give inconsistent ratings (Cox; Flage & Roed; Kutej et al.) - C-1679 Does insurance transfer risk?
booked: The map books insurance as risk sharing and keeps the reading that it only compensates after the event.
the other reading: insurance transfers risk to the insurer; the buyer keeps legal responsibility; insurance compensates after the event, and risk reverts if the insurer fails - C-1684 Do people accept far greater risks when they choose them?
booked: The map books Starr's 1,000-fold ratio and the later finding that the gap is much smaller.
the other reading: people accept risks 1,000 times greater if voluntary (Starr 1969, revealed preferences); the gap was not nearly as great; most risks seen as unacceptably high (psychometric paradigm, expressed preferences)
Cross-scale patterns seen here (18) our proposal
Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Risk management. Each links to every other system that shows it.
- same role, different builds (structural)
Surviving an unpredictable catastrophe by not staking everything on one outcome: organisations pool and share losses (risk-retention pools, insurance, Law 238's split of a ship's value); plants spread germination so some seeds sit out a drought, as antibiotic-tolerant bacteria sit out a drug (Abley - the whole sets the local reference (structural)
Tier 1 sets the organisation's risk tolerance and communicates it; every Tier 2 and Tier 3 decision is measured against it. Whether the local readings close into one organisational risk is the open part: compliance-focused practice misses interdependence between risks (Sheth & Sinfield). - trade one property for another (structural)
Avoidance buys safety and pays with the gain; quantitative assessment buys rigour and pays in expert time and tools; banks along the risk-appetite dial: higher appetite went with higher default probability in 2020; wild plants keep variable germination (survival) while crops are bred for uniform ger - Umwelt: each system carves its own slice of one shared medium (structural)
Risk management's eleven channels are its Umwelt over the shared world of uncertain events; the slice differs by field (methods, definitions and goals vary) and by role (clinicians reported more uncertainty than administrators on the same scenarios). - who opens the door (structural)
The receiving system opens its doors ahead of time: an anonymous risk reporting channel, information-sharing practices with ISACs and CERTs, the risk register as the port incoming risks land in (a port, built by the receiver). - causal ceiling (partial)
Wild (fat-tailed) risk: infinite mean or variance makes the law of large numbers invalid, so prediction is limited by the risk's own structure, not the assessor's tools; unknown unknowns are unknown to anyone. The second half sits near the dark twin (a knowledge limit). - lightning (partial)
A major risk event reshapes the frame after it: Three Mile Island led to stricter nuclear regulation; 9/11 and the 2010 Yemen plot prompted the EU customs risk review; Challenger brought a major shift in NASA safety culture. - namespace completeness (the map predicts its gaps) (partial)
Risk charting lists resources, threats, modifying factors and consequences so any combination can be checked; taxonomy-based identification compiles a questionnaire from a breakdown of risk sources; the reverse risk register finds systemic factors missing from quality indicators. The move (A) is sho - red-queen (partial)
Threat shifting: adversaries change time, target, resources or method in response to controls; cyber insurers must frequently issue new policy versions as threats evolve. Both sides move; the stalemate is not measured in the sources read. - same shape, opposite sign (partial)
One response decision run with the sign of the uncertain outcome reversed: avoid / mitigate / transfer / accept for risks, exploit / enhance / share / ignore for opportunities ("the opposite of these strategies"). Risk seeking and risk aversion are NOT booked here: they use distinct brain regions (t - templating (partial)
The risk matrix and the identify-assess-treat-monitor process are carried unchanged across healthcare, critical infrastructure, construction and devices, reflected in ISO 31000 and ISO 22301; whether the module still works when swapped is contested (C-1678). - The carry (partial)
Overflow passed on: loss above the insured amount is retained by the insured; insurers reserve and reinsure against their own excess, and when reinsurers hold back, capacity falls. No settling time given. - The Payment to Entropy (partial)
Value form: each transfer pays a fee, and the risk may revert anyway; a chain of transfers (insurer to reinsurer) raises premiums and lowers capacity when loss expectations are not shared. Signal form: a risk squeezed into a matrix's fixed classes loses its bandwidth (the classic matrix cannot depic - conservation law plus closure (surface)
A risk level (likelihood with impact) decides nothing until a second rule closes it: the tolerance or appetite that says which levels are acceptable. - nested ladder (surface)
Acceptance and tolerance as graded judgments: tolerance a weaker, more conditional stance than acceptance; outcomes tolerated, conditionally accepted, contested or rejected. A ladder of implication is not shown. - partner-becomes-part (surface)
Information security risk, once a stovepipe independent of organisational risk, is placed inside it (NIST 800-39). Inheritance in the biological sense does not apply; a fusion reading is weak. - same toolkit, independent builds (surface)
Seven integrated safety-and-security risk assessment methods built from the same parts in two orders (sequential and non-sequential); PMI, NIST, actuarial societies and ISO each developed standards. Independence of the builds is not shown. - symmetry breaking (name the cut) (surface)
Uncertain events cut by the sign of their outcome into risks and opportunities; ISO moved the definition from 'chance or probability of loss' to 'effect of uncertainty on objectives' (the cut taken back into one concept, the reverse direction).
Valence: what it trades, and with whom (17) published science
Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.
- Insurance via sys:insurance · Risk management mixed
- Security policy and governance via sys:risk-management · Risk management gain
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:mental-representation · Risk management gain
- Law (rules and law) via sys:law · Risk management mixed
- Written law code (the casuistic IF-crime-THEN-penalty template and its entry-generating rules) via sys:written-record · Risk management gain
- Market and trade via sys:written-record · Risk management mixed
- Probability: weighing chances, in brains and in people's mathematics, and the structure it works on via sys:mental-representation · Risk management gain
- Security operations center (SOC) via sys:organization · Risk management gain
- Incident response via sys:written-record · Risk management gain
- Threat actor via sys:threat-actor · Risk management loss
- Information security via sys:organization · Risk management gain
- Organization via sys:organization · Risk management gain
- Cyber threat intelligence via sys:threat-actor · Risk management gain
- Vulnerability management via sys:software-vulnerability · Risk management gain
- Business continuity via sys:organization · Risk management gain
- Reinsurance via sys:risk-management · Risk management gain
- Security audit and compliance via sys:organization · Risk management gain
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (10)
- Information security
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Risk assessment (identification, analysis, evaluation)
- Risk treatment / response
- Risk register / risk database
- Risk matrix
- Risk executive (function) / chief risk officer
- Risk spending against other uses of resources
- Adversaries against controls (threat shifting)
- Compliance-driven against risk-driven security spending
Sits inside / holds (4)
expressed by (21)
- Templating / Standardization
- Symbiosis/Co-Creation (Collaborative Specialization)
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Sensing/Scanning
- Hypothesis/Goal Selection
- Mapping/Modeling
- Uncertainty Reduction/Learning
- Risk-managed Exploration
- Multi-Scale Data Fusion / Triangulation
- Trail-Marking / Externalized Memory (Stigmergy)
- Surprise / Change-Point Detection
- Offline Simulation & Replay-Guided Planning
- Social Learning / Public Information Use
- Proactive Defense
- Self-Monitoring
- Validation of Effectiveness
- Resilience & Repair
- Redundancy & Diversity
- Triage & Prioritized Allocation
- Quality Control & Error Correction
- Bridging Supply Gaps (Store & Dormancy)
floor filled by (18)
- Insurance
- Security policy and governance
- Information security
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Law (rules and law)
- Human brain
- Statistics: the practice of collecting and reasoning from data, the intuitive statistics it grows from, and the structure (samples, distributions, estimators) it works on
- Probability: weighing chances, in brains and in people's mathematics, and the structure it works on
- Threat actor
- Organization
- Cyber threat intelligence
- Vulnerability management
- Risk register / risk database
- Risk matrix
- Risk executive (function) / chief risk officer
- Hazard
- Business continuity
- Reinsurance
Kinds (12)
- Vulnerability management
- Enterprise risk management
- Financial risk management
- IT / information security risk management
- Project risk management
- Medical device risk management (ISO 14971)
- Disaster risk reduction
- Customs risk management
- Enterprise security risk management (ESRM)
- Contractual risk management
- Personal risk management (e.g. retail traders)
- Opportunity management
wired (2)
- Security controls (physical, technical, administrative)
- Standards (ISO/IEC 27000 family, NIST FIPS and SPs, Common Criteria, PCI DSS)
Notes published science
- Nearly 3,800 years ago Codex Hammurabi Law 238 already split a risk: a captain who saved a ship from total loss owed the owner only half its value, a written rule for sharing what goes wrong at sea (src:wp:insurance).
- Put a face mask on people and they stand closer to each other, more so if they believe the mask protects them. In a field study of more than 4,500 real interactions the extra closeness never cancelled the mask's protection: people take back some of the safety, not all of it (src:mask-2023-riskcomp).
- When 75 healthcare professionals rated the same risk scenarios twice, two weeks apart, once on a standard risk matrix and once on one that let them draw their uncertainty, the two sets of ratings disagreed consistently, whatever the profession; clinicians also reported more uncertainty than administrators (src:kutej-2025-matrix).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
risk management as risk analysts and managers describe it: uncertain events and the organisation's exposure to them, up to the objectives it pursues (reader's view)
- L1: Uncertain events and exposure: threat sources (attacks, errors, structural failures, disasters), hazards and opportunities, and the organisation's assets, operations and objectives exposed to them
- L2: Identification: risks found from their sources or their consequences, by objectives, scenarios, taxonomies, checklists, risk charting, threat information and reports
- L3: Analysis: likelihood (for a stated time frame) and impact estimated, qualitatively, semi-quantitatively or quantitatively, with uncertainty and strength of knowledge
- L4: Evaluation and prioritisation: risks compared and ranked; the risk register and the risk matrix
- L5: Treatment: accept, avoid, mitigate, share or transfer; plans with controls, owners and schedules
- L6: Framing and governance: assumptions, constraints, risk tolerance and appetite, priorities; risk executive function; culture; three tiers
- L7: Purpose: objectives pursued under uncertainty; value created and protected
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L4: Evaluation and prioritisation: risk levels compared against criteria, ranked (highest loss and probability first), kept in the risk register; risk matrices or quantitative models
- L5: Treatment decision: alternative courses of action developed, evaluated and chosen consistent with risk tolerance; accept, avoid, mitigate, share or transfer; decided at the level the risk warrants
- L6: Framing and governance: risk assumptions, constraints, tolerance and appetite, priorities and trade-offs; the risk executive function; culture; the three tiers
- L7: Purpose: the organisation's objectives pursued under uncertainty; value created and protected (mitigation should cost less than inaction)
way in: Adversarial threats: threat information about attackers
- L1: Hostile cyber or physical attacks by adversaries with intent and method
- L2: Threat information taken in from external entities in a risk relationship, ISACs, CERTs and threat intelligence
- L3: Threat events and scenarios characterised: likelihood from adversary intent, capability and targeting; threat shifting expected
way in: Loss history: incidents, near misses, realised risk events and their records
- L1: Realised risk events and losses (Three Mile Island 1979, Challenger 1986, Deepwater Horizon 2010...), own and others'
- L2: The risk database or register: each risk with opening date, title, short description, probability and importance
- L3: Rates of occurrence estimated, scanty for rare catastrophes; a reverse risk register works back from realised events to systemic factors
way in: Market signals: insurance cover, premiums and capacity
- L1: Insurers and reinsurers offering cover for a premium; cyber premiums US$16.6 billion in 2023; capacity limited by correlated (systemic) losses
- L2: Quotes, proposal forms and underwriting questions read back by the insured; insurers ask about the client's dependencies
- L3: Cost of transfer compared with retention: retention viable when insuring would cost more over time than the losses
way in: Monitoring: controls and treatments in operation, and changes in the environment
- L1: Risk responses as implemented (controls, insurance in force, avoided activities) and the environments of operation
- L2: Compliance verified: planned responses implemented and requirements satisfied
- L3: Ongoing effectiveness of the responses determined
- L4: Risk-impacting changes to systems and environments identified
way in: Non-adversarial hazards: errors, structural failures, disasters and accidents
- L1: Human errors, structural failures of hardware, software and environmental controls, natural and man-made disasters
- L2: Identification: objectives-based, scenario-based, taxonomy-based and common-risk checking; hazard analysis, FTA, FMEA, HAZOP for devices
- L3: Likelihood estimated from historical evidence and empirical data, for a stated time frame
way in: Risk perception and expert judgment (inner): the assessors' own sense of danger
- L1: The hazard as experienced: dread, catastrophic potential, familiarity, voluntariness, controllability, visibility or delay of harm
- L2: Affect: immediate positive or negative impressions; aversion makes hazards seem riskier and less beneficial
- L3: Neural valuation: the insula integrates risk information and codes risk prediction errors; risk seeking with right insula and left caudate, risk aversion with left MTG and ACC
way in: Rules from outside: law, regulators and standards
- L1: Standards and regulation: ISO 31000 (2009, updated 2018), COSO ERM (2004, updated 2017), NIST SP 800-30/39, ISO 14971, SEC disclosure, the EU CER directive
- L2: Requirements adopted: evidence of risk management demanded by regulators (e.g. the FDA for devices); critical-entity operators must assess uncertainty and interdependencies
- L3: Regulatory oversight with gaps and overlaps; industry-funded assessments (lead in gasoline) can steer the frame
way in: Staff reports: people at the front line voicing risks
- L1: Team members who foresee problems; individuals on the front lines operating the systems
- L2: An anonymous risk reporting channel open to every team member; a risk officer with healthy scepticism
- L3: Filtered by voice and safety: calling dissenters 'whistleblowers' de-normalises speaking up; Challenger's communication failures
way in: Stakeholders and the public: how those exposed judge the risk
- L1: The people who bear the risk; voluntary risks accepted far more readily than involuntary ones (Starr 1969, contested)
- L2: News and public statements ('the risk is real'), concern and consultation
- L3: Acceptability judged through perceived threat, trust (competence and integrity) and fairness (distribution and procedure)
way in: The organisation's missions, assets and objectives (context)
- L1: Missions and business functions, assets, operations, people; the environment of the organisation
- L2: Context established: social scope, identity and objectives of stakeholders, the basis on which risks will be evaluated
- L3: Assets valued; mission/business processes defined with the criticality of their information
- L4: Tier 1 prioritisation of missions and business functions, driving investment and controls
way in: Vulnerabilities and predisposing conditions
- L1: Vulnerabilities in information systems and in governance structures, processes, architecture, facilities, equipment, supply chain and service providers
- L2: Vulnerability assessment of critical assets against specific threats (scans and the vulnerability management programme feed it)
- L3: Severity in context: predisposing conditions raise or lower likelihood (a flood-prone site, an air-gapped system)
way out: Avoid: withdraw from or never start the activity
- L1: Exposure gone, and the gain with it; hospitals avoiding higher-risk patients
- L3: The activity dropped or refused (not buying the property, closing the business area)
- L5: Avoidance chosen
way out: Communicate and disclose: reports up the tiers, to investors, regulators and the public
- L1: Risk factors disclosed annually in form 10-K (Sections 1A and 7); public risk communication
- L3: Analysts share findings with managers; risk reported to the board and regulators
- L6: Risk strategy and decisions made traceable and transparent; inter-tier communication
way out: Opportunities: exploit, share, enhance, ignore
- L1: Positive uncertain events pursued (in project management literature since the 1990s)
- L5: Opportunity response chosen
way out: Reduce: controls that lower likelihood or severity
- L1: Likelihood or severity lowered; residual risk; a control can add its own loss (sprinkler water damage)
- L2: Controls operating on the assets
- L3: Controls implemented: sprinklers, antivirus, iterative delivery, layered defences
- L4: Risk treatment plan: controls selected, schedule and responsible persons; Statement of Applicability (ISO/IEC 27001)
- L5: Mitigation chosen and approved at the level the risk warrants
way out: Retain: accept and budget, self-insure, pool
- L1: Losses absorbed, including the excess over cover and uninsurable risks such as war
- L3: Budgeted; self-insurance; risk-retention pools spread losses across members
- L5: Acceptance chosen, or the default for what is not avoided or transferred
way out: Share or transfer: insure, outsource, contract
- L1: Financial consequence carried by another party, which may revert if it fails; insurance as post-event compensation
- L3: Policy bought or work outsourced, usually for a fee; contract clauses (indemnity, limitation of liability)
- L5: Sharing chosen