EVOPEDIA

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Reinsurance

A form of insurance contract which protects insurance firms from risks relating to the policies they underwrite: reinsurers contract with insurers to cover all or part of the cost of certain policies, for a cash payment or a share of the premiums (src:wp:reinsurance); in Kopf's 1929 definition, the practice where an original insurer, for a definite premium, contracts with another insurer to carry a part or the whole of a risk it has assumed (src:kopf-1929). Walked as reinsurers, actuaries, supervisors and insurance economists describe it: insurers' books of risk taken in through treaties and facultative placements, priced by contract form and catastrophe model, pooled across perils, lines and countries, backed by traditional and capital-market capital and passed on again by retrocession and cat bonds, and paid back to insurers after large losses; from the 1370 Genoa-Bruges contract and the German fire treaties of the 1820s to Munich Re, the LMX spiral, Bermuda and the catastrophe bond market.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born at1370 (first contract on record); 1825 (first automatic treaty); 1846/1852 (first independent reinsurer)
born precisionyear
boundaryInside: the reinsurer's side of the bargain with insurers (treaties and facultative certificates, retention and layer structures, pricing and accepting ceded risk, the reinsurer's diversified book, its capital and collateral, its own retrocession and cat-bond programmes, the payment of recoveries) and the cedents' outward reinsurance programmes while the contracts run; the special-purpose reinsurers that carry capital-market money. Outside: the primary insurers' own books and policyholders (they are insurance), the perils, the capital markets as a whole, regulators and courts, the brokers' firms and the modelling vendors as firms.
nested levelA part of insurance (insurers use it as part of their risk and capital management, src:wp:reinsurance), one layer above the primary market; a global market of about 50 large professional reinsurers and groups plus many smaller ones (src:fio-2014-reinsurance), joined to the capital markets through alternative reinsurance (src:oecd-2018-reinsurance).
scalesocial

Measures (30) published science

characteristic clock: renewal and notice period90 days notice on continuous treaties; January property catastrophe renewals days / yearly
characteristic clock: cat bond maturity3 (some up to 5) years (average)
underwriting cycle periodseveral years, sometimes around a decade
lag from founding to first business, Cologne Re6 (1846 to 1852) years
long-tail lag, asbestos exposure to claimabout 30 (exposure 1960s, illness 20 years later, claim 1990s)
market concentration: share of top 5 / top 20 reinsurersabout 50% / about 83% % of non-affiliated non-life GWP (since 2011)
share of non-life premiums ceded to non-affiliated reinsurers8-10 %
share of reinsurance premium retrocededabout 12 (large reinsurers); about 8 (top five, 2017) % of gross written non-life reinsurance premium
traditional share of global reinsurance capital85-88 % (since 2012)
alternative reinsurance capital growth rate15-34 % a year
volatility of catastrophe reinsurance pricing (5-yr coefficient of variation)from 50% to around 10%
loss ratio, property catastrophe reinsurance67.9 (primary non-life: 73.5) % claims paid / premiums written, 2014-2016
cross-border share of assumed premiumabout 34 (all); 92 (Asia and Australasia ceded abroad); 26 (North America); 9 (Europe) %, 2016
reinsurer failures 1980-201129 failures, USD 1.8 billion, 0.43% of premiums ceded count / USD / %
reinsurance failure as cause of US non-life impairments 1969-20143.0 %
diversification benefit, worked example2,000 of capital, just over 10% capital units / %
reinsured share of large US catastrophe lossesKatrina-Rita-Wilma: about $59bn of about $90bn paid by non-US reinsurers; 9/11: about 60%; Sandy: about 40% of $19bn USD / %
US P/C premiums ceded to unaffiliated reinsurers, 2013about 46 (28.4 to non-US) billion USD
US P/C reinsurance utilisation, 2013about 19 (12 unaffiliated) %
catastrophe bond market size, end 202343.1 (record 15.4 issued in 2023) billion USD
historical catastrophe bond loss rate2.69-3.00 (models: 2.00-3.00) %
diversification gain from global over regional poolingup to 65 %
first-year premium decline from state health reinsurance programmes10-13 bronze, 5-19 silver, 11-17 gold %
global insured NatCat losses, 2024over 100 (fifth consecutive year) billion USD
solvency capital standardVaR 99.5% (Solvency II); ES 99% (Swiss Solvency Test) one-year tail measure
loss on capacity, Gooda Walker 298 (1989 account)650 (Feltrim 550) %
Equitas cost and NICO coverabout 21 (Equitas); 7 new cover on 8.7 reserves (NICO, 2006) billion USD
Hamburg fire damage, 1842more than 35,000,000 USD (as estimated then)
Munich Re premium income 1914 and 1922204,000,000 gold marks; 50,000,000 marks
cat bond spread variability explained by offering details (random forest)93 (linear regression 47) %

Open contentions (6) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (24) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Reinsurance. Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (12) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (10)

Sits inside / holds (3)

expressed by (24)

floor filled by (16)

Kinds (16)

wired (1)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

reinsurance as reinsurers, actuaries and insurance economists describe it: insurers' books of risk passed on, priced, pooled worldwide and backed by capital, up to catastrophe losses spread across borders (reader's view)

  1. L1: Insurers' books of policies exposed to large and catastrophic losses, beyond what one carrier's capital can prudently hold
  2. L2: Intake: treaty submissions and facultative offers through brokers; claims reported; cat model output
  3. L3: The contract: quota share, surplus, per-risk, catastrophe and aggregate excess of loss, stop loss; retention, layers and limits; lead and following reinsurers
  4. L4: The reinsurer's diversified book
  5. L5: Capital, collateral, retrocession and cat bonds
  6. L6: Market frame: cycle, regulation, concentration, counterparty choice
  7. L7: Insuring the insurance business: capacity freed, results smoothed, catastrophe losses spread across borders

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: The reinsurer's book: risks pooled from many cedents across perils, regions and lines, giving a further layer of diversification at lower cost than insurers achieve individually; it works only while losses are asynchronous
  2. L5: Capital, collateral and onward transfer: traditional reinsurers' equity (about 85-88% of reinsurance capital since 2012) and fully funded alternative capital; retrocession and cat bonds for the tail; reinsurance as the cedent's alternative to holding reserves and capital
  3. L6: The market frame: hard and soft cycles driven by catastrophes, regulation of cross-border cessions, concentration (top 5 about 50%), counterparty choice, the underwriters' cycle narratives
  4. L7: Insuring the insurance business: insurers' capacity freed and results smoothed, catastrophe losses spread across borders to international markets and investors, so recovery is funded and economic disruption reduced

way in: Capital-market investors (alternative capital)

  1. L1: Hedge funds, ILS funds, pension funds, asset managers and (re)insurers seeking uncorrelated, high-yield returns
  2. L2: Subscriptions to cat bonds, sidecars and collateralised reinsurers through special-purpose reinsurers
  3. L3: Spreads set at issue from offering-circular details; ratings by attachment probability from third-party cat models

way in: Cessions: business offered by insurers (treaty submissions, facultative offers)

  1. L1: Insurers' books of policies (property, casualty, life), with limits above what their capital can prudently retain; public cedents too (sovereign pools, state programmes)
  2. L2: Submissions placed by brokers: a treaty for a book, or a facultative offer for one large or unusual risk; the treaty grants automatic capacity
  3. L3: Underwriting: lead reinsurer sets premium and conditions, followers subscribe; proportional or excess-of-loss form; retention and layer chosen

way in: Climate and exposure trends

  1. L1: Climate change contributing to severity and frequency of weather events; asset growth in hazard-prone regions
  2. L2: Long-running NatCat loss assessments by leading reinsurers; insured NatCat losses above $100bn a year
  3. L3: Climate scenarios (IPCC RCP/SSP) and added tipping-point stress tests; temperature-dependent catastrophe intensity in pricing

way in: Counterparty strength (ratings, collateral, credit risk)

  1. L1: Reinsurers' balance sheets and their ability to pay; reinsurer failures
  2. L2: Financial strength ratings (S&P, A.M. Best) and aggregated exposures monitored by risk managers
  3. L3: Insurance risk exchanged for credit risk: reinsurers chosen with care

way in: Hazard science and catastrophe models

  1. L1: Perils: hurricanes, earthquakes, severe convective storms, floods, windstorms, wildfires, terrorism, cyber
  2. L2: Exposure data (geocoding, construction, financial terms) run through cat models joining actuarial science, engineering, meteorology and seismology
  3. L3: Loss distributions: probable maximum losses and average annual losses; deterministic scenarios

way in: Losses and claims reported by cedents (recoveries)

  1. L1: Losses to the cedent from fires, storms, earthquakes and other events, many policies in one event for catastrophe covers
  2. L2: Claims reported to the reinsurer on the contract's basis (losses occurring, risks attaching, claims-made)
  3. L3: Recovery computed: the share (proportional) or the part above the retention up to the layer's limit (excess of loss)

way in: Regulators and supervisors

  1. L1: Supervisors in home and host jurisdictions; credit-for-reinsurance laws; solvency regimes
  2. L2: Requirements on cessions to foreign reinsurers (collateral, local assets); stress tests of reinsurer failure
  3. L3: Capital requirement set by a tail measure: VaR 99.5% (Solvency II), Expected Shortfall 99% (Swiss Solvency Test)

way in: Retrocession market (peer reinsurers)

  1. L1: Other reinsurers, capital-market investors and even primary insurers acting as retrocessionaires
  2. L2: Retrocession offered, typically for catastrophe or tail risk; arrangements often not look-through
  3. L3: Retro priced on a portfolio-wide or pillar basis

way in: Rival reinsurers and new capital (prices at renewal)

  1. L1: Rival reinsurers and new entrants (Bermuda classes after large losses)
  2. L2: Renewal pricing (January property catastrophe renewals), the rate-on-line index
  3. L3: Competition drives down pricing; loadings fall at each layer of the chain

way in: Underwriters' and managers' expectations (inner)

  1. L1: Underwriters' and executives' attitudes to risk, career incentives and memories of losses
  2. L2: After heavy losses, caution; as time passes without losses, memories fade
  3. L3: Narratives about where the market is in the cycle; herd behaviour

way out: Capacity and surplus relief to cedents

  1. L1: More and larger policies written to households and firms
  2. L3: Quota share lets a cedent sell four times what its capital alone allows
  3. L7: Liabilities assumed no longer count against the cedent's capacity

way out: Cover withdrawn from high-risk areas

  1. L1: Insurers drop policyholders; homes become uninsurable or unaffordable
  2. L3: Retail insurers not covered there
  3. L6: Areas deemed too high risk

way out: Recoveries paid to cedents

  1. L1: Money reaches the cedent and, through it, rebuilding: an external inflow of capital after catastrophes
  2. L3: Recovery above retention up to the layer limit, or the agreed share
  3. L5: Paid from the reinsurer's reserves and capital, or from collateral of a special-purpose reinsurer
  4. L7: Cover owed under the treaty for a covered loss

way out: Reinsurance prices and terms

  1. L1: Higher reinsurance prices reinforce primary insurers' incentives to restrict cover or raise rates
  2. L3: Rates and conditions quoted at renewal
  3. L6: Hard or soft market position

way out: Risk passed on (retrocession, cat bonds, sidecars)

  1. L1: Peers and investors carry the higher layers
  2. L3: Retrocession bought or a cat bond issued through a special-purpose entity
  3. L5: Tail and catastrophe exposure above the reinsurer's appetite

way out: Underwriting and claims philosophy imposed on cedents; risk expertise

  1. L1: How cedents offer cover in the market
  2. L3: Contract terms and exclusions applied to cedents' books
  3. L6: Reinsurer underwriting and claims philosophies; expertise on risk quantification

Sources (21) published science

Reinsurance (Wikipedia)
OECD (2018). The Contribution of Reinsurance Markets to Managing Catastrophe Risk. OECD, Paris (behind its links)
Klages-Mundt A, Minca A (2020). Cascading losses in reinsurance networks. arXiv:1805.12222 (Management Science) (behind its links)
Thompson MP, Calkin DE, MacGregor DM et al. (2025). Wildfires have created instability within risk transfer markets. Here's a path forward. PNAS 122:e2530050122. doi:10.1073/pnas.2530050122 (behind its links)
Albrecher H, Loisel S (2026). The insurance of climate-related physical risks: challenges and opportunities for actuaries. Eur Actuar J. doi:10.1007/s13385-026-00462-x (behind its links)
Catastrophe bond (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Catastrophe modeling (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Underwriting cycle (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Kopf EW (1929). Notes on the origin and development of reinsurance. Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society 16:22-91 (behind its links)
Lloyd's of London (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Federal Insurance Office, US Treasury (2014). The Breadth and Scope of the Global Reinsurance Market and the Critical Role Such Market Plays in Supporting Insurance in the United States (behind its links)
Ciullo A, Strobl E, Meiler S, Martius O, Bresch DN (2023). Increasing countries' financial resilience through global catastrophe risk pooling. Nat Commun 14:922. doi:10.1038/s41467-023-36539-4 (behind its links)
Oyeka O, Wehby GL (2023). Effects of state reinsurance programs on health insurance exchange premiums and insurer participation. Health Serv Res. doi:10.1111/1475-6773.14205 (behind its links)
Makariou D, Barrieu P, Chen Y (2020). A random forest based approach for predicting spreads in the primary catastrophe bond market. arXiv:2001.10393 (behind its links)
Richter A, Wilson TC (2020). Covid-19: implications for insurer risk management and the insurability of pandemic risk. Geneva Risk Insur Rev 45:171-199. doi:10.1057/s10713-020-00054-z (behind its links)
IAIS (2017). Core Curriculum for Insurance Supervisors, Module 5.1.1 Reinsurance (v2.0) (behind its links)
Wang K, Liu W, Jin Z, Wang W (2026). Equilibrium analysis in a multi-agent reinsurance chain. arXiv:2607.15962 (behind its links)
Sahin S, Boado-Penas MC, Constantinescu C, Eisenberg J (2020). COVID-19 in a social reinsurance framework: forewarned is forearmed. arXiv:2004.04835 (behind its links)
Loreau M, Barbier M, Filotas E et al. 2021. Biodiversity as insurance: from concept to measurement and application. Biol Rev 96:2333. doi:10.1111/brv.12756 (behind its links)
Jang J, Laub PJ, Siu TK, Zhao H (2025). Arbitrage-free catastrophe reinsurance valuation for compound dynamic contagion claims. arXiv:2502.13325 (behind its links)
Medina A, Wei W (2026). Optimal catastrophe bond design and its applications to climate change risk. arXiv:2610.03793 (behind its links)