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Formal security policy model

A mathematically precise statement of a security policy: it represents the initial state of a system, the way the system moves from one state to another, and a definition of a 'secure' state, supported by a proof that if the system starts secure and the model's assumptions hold, every later state is secure (src:tcsec-1985). The field calls such a scheme for specifying and enforcing security policies a computer security model (src:wp:computer-security-model). Walked as the practice and the structure together: security modellers who take an informal policy (military classification, commercial accounting controls, financial-market walls) and a target system, state 'secure' formally (access-control rules such as Bell-LaPadula's, or pure statements such as noninterference), prove that the rules keep it, map the model onto a real design (Multics, seL4) and hand it to engineers and evaluators (TCSEC classes B2 to A1, Common Criteria EAL6-7).

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

aliasesFormal security policy model (computer security policy), sys:security-model, Formal security models (reference monitor, Bell-LaPadula)
born at1972-1973 (MITRE task begun summer 1972; first volume 1973)
born precisionabout a year
boundaryInside: the model itself (its vocabulary of subjects, objects, access modes and labels or domains and observations; its definition of a secure state or of allowed information flow; its rules or commands for every change of state; its theorems and proofs) and the modelling practice that makes, refines, interprets and proves it (modellers, the formalisms they borrow, proof tools, the interpretation onto a target design). Outside: the informal policy it formalises (military classification, commercial integrity controls, financial regulation), the computer system it describes (Multics, seL4, a cloud authorizer), the mechanisms that enforce it once built (reference monitors, access-control code, data diodes), the attackers and covert channels that test it, and the evaluators and acquirers who rely on it.
nested levelPart of computer security's policy-and-models floor and of access control's 'who may do what' floor; the machine sense of 'security policy' (a kind on security policy's shelf). Built from mathematics (set theory, lattices, automata, logic) and borrowed policies; carried into practice by operating-system design and certification.
scaletechnological

Measures (17) published science

characteristic clock: first modelling burstabout 3 (1972 to 1975) years
seL4 information-flow proof duration21 months
seL4 information-flow proof effortabout 51 person-months
seL4 information-flow proof size27,756 lines of Isabelle/HOL
seL4 C code covered8,830 lines of C
seL4 functional correctness proof effortabout 25 person-years
rules in Bell-LaPadula volume II10 rules, each proved to preserve the security properties
Clark-Wilson rules9 (5 certification, 4 enforcement) rules
Graham-Denning protection rules8 rules
covert channel bandwidth counted high (TCSEC guideline)more than 100 bits per second
Cedar authorizer speed against OpenFGA28.7-35.2 times faster
Cedar authorizer speed against Rego42.8-80.8 times faster
data diode transfer speed (CC EAL7+ product)1-10 Gbit/s
minimum analysts for a Chinese Wall (Brewer-Nash theorem T3)the number of company datasets in the largest conflict-of-interest class (more if analysts choose the same dataset) subjects
take-grant safety decision time (specific systems)linear time complexity
birth of the formal model (MITRE task)summer 1972 date
lag from Bell-LaPadula unified exposition to noninterferenceabout 6 (1976 to 1982) years

Open contentions (4) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (23) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Formal security policy model. Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (13) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (8)

Sits inside / holds (3)

expressed by (14)

floor filled by (22)

Kinds (10)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

formal security policy models as security modellers describe them: the computer system and the policy it must keep, up to the assurance and design guidance others act on (reader's view)

  1. L1: The computer system and the world it holds: subjects (users, processes) and objects (files, segments, devices, connections), information at different sensitivities, and the informal policy people want kept
  2. L2: Abstraction: entities named as subjects and objects, access modes (r, w, a, e, c; later view and alter), labels in a partial order, the state as current accesses, matrix, level function and object hierarchy; for noninterference, domains with inputs and outputs
  3. L3: The definition of 'secure': a secure state (simple security, the *-property, discretionary security), or a flow statement (noninterference: low outputs independent of high inputs), or certification and enforcement rules (Clark-Wilson), or walls between conflict-of-interest classes (Brewer-Nash)
  4. L4: Rules for every change of state: get and release access, give and rescind access, create and delete objects, change levels (ten rules in Bell-LaPadula's second volume); commands over the access matrix (HRU); eight protection rules (Graham-Denning); four graph-rewriting rules (take-grant)
  5. L5: The theorem and its proof: the Basic Security Theorem (each rule preserves security, so security is inductive); unwinding theorems for noninterference; machine-checked proofs (Isabelle/HOL, Lean); decidability of safety (undecidable in general, decidable for restricted systems)
  6. L6: Interpretation and correspondence: the model mapped onto a real design (the Multics interpretation; hosts and connections for a network), a descriptive or formal top-level specification shown consistent with the model, and in seL4 a refinement proof down to 8,830 lines of C
  7. L7: Assurance and guidance others act on: a certified rating (B2 to A1 under TCSEC, EAL6-7 under the Common Criteria) that acquirers rely on; a conceptual toolbox and vocabulary for designing secure systems; analyses that show a policy change keeps permissions the same

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L3: What 'secure' means: a secure state defined over subjects, objects and labels (Bell-LaPadula, Biba), a flow statement over inputs and outputs (noninterference), integrity by certified transformations (Clark-Wilson), walls set by access history (Brewer-Nash)
  2. L4: The rules for every change of state, each answering one class of request, no two rules answering the same request; refined by engineering experience (trusted subjects, current level, object hierarchy) and tailored to a target system
  3. L5: The proof that the rules keep the definition: the Basic Security Theorem by induction over states, unwinding theorems for noninterference, machine-checked proofs, decidability results for safety
  4. L6: The model mapped onto a real design: interpretations (Multics, Trusted Xenix, Blacker's hosts and connections), top-level specifications shown consistent with the model, refinement to code
  5. L7: Assurance and guidance others act on: evaluators judge the developer's understanding through the model; acquirers rely on the rating; designers use the toolbox; policy authors rely on analyses

way in: Attacks, counterexamples and leaks (tiger teams, perverse interpretations, covert channels)

  1. L1: Systems under attack: tiger teams penetrating every system they tried; back doors that persist through recompilation
  2. L2: A gap found in a model: perverse interpretations that satisfy the letter of an access-control model but not its intent; covert channels left out of scope; a published unwinding theorem shown incorrect

way in: Engineers building prototypes from the model

  1. L1: Engineering tasks building secure prototypes on the model, and the difficulties they hit
  2. L2: Questions brought back to the modeller (what level for the scheduler that must read and write every level?)
  3. L3: Refinements proposed from the workbench: Schiller's 'current security level' shortcut; trusted subjects exempt from the *-property; the object hierarchy for Multics directories

way in: Evaluation criteria (TCSEC 1985, Common Criteria Part 3)

  1. L1: Published evaluation criteria that grade systems by assurance: the TCSEC classes D to A1 (1985), the Common Criteria assurance levels EAL1-EAL7
  2. L2: The class requirement read: an informal statement of the model at B1; a formal model proven consistent with its axioms from B2; ADV_SPM.1 formal TOE security policy model at EAL6 and EAL7
  3. L3: The requirement turned into deliverables: a model with a proof, a top-level specification (descriptive below A1, formal at A1) and a correspondence argument

way in: Mathematics: set theory, lattices, automata, logic

  1. L1: The mathematical stock the modeller draws on: set theory, partial orders and lattices (Birkhoff's text), automata, traces, logics
  2. L2: A formalism chosen: state transition models, temporal logic models, denotational semantics models or algebraic specification models; automata with inputs and outputs (noninterference); sets of trace sets (hyperproperties)

way in: Questions about a written policy set (does this refactoring change who may do what?)

  1. L1: A policy set written in a policy language (Cedar, Rego, OpenFGA) and a question about it from its authors
  2. L2: The policies and question compiled symbolically to SMT

way in: The informal policy to be formalised (military classification, commercial integrity controls, financial-market walls)

  1. L1: A policy people already keep on paper: the DoD multilevel classification policy; accounting's well-formed transactions and separation of duty; the UK Stock Exchange's Chinese Wall rules, which have the authority of law
  2. L2: The policy read for its goal and its terms: disclosure for the military policy, integrity ('preventing fraud and error') for the commercial one; 'security' defined before anything else

way in: The proof tool: obligations discharged or refused (inner)

  1. L1: The proof state held in a verification system or proof assistant (Isabelle/HOL, an LCF-style prover for higher-order logic; earlier verification tools that needed manual stubs)
  2. L2: Obligations reported proved or stuck: unwinding conditions checked step by step; a failed obligation exposes a leak (the original seL4 scheduler)

way in: The target system (Multics, Unix, a network of hosts, a microkernel)

  1. L1: The real system the model must describe: Multics segments and directories, Unix files, a network of hosts, the seL4 kernel
  2. L2: The system learned from its documentation (Organick's book on Multics) or its specification and code
  3. L3: The system's entities mapped to the model's: segments and files as objects with a hierarchy; at network level 'hosts' as subjects and 'connections' as resources

way out: Answers about policy sets back to their authors

  1. L1: Policies changed by their authors; requests decided by the evaluation engine
  2. L3: Validation reported back while policies are written
  3. L5: An analysis result: the refactored policy set authorises exactly what the old one did, or a difference is found

way out: Design guidance to engineers (rules into system calls and specifications)

  1. L1: Systems built: KSOS, PSOS, KVM, Multics; later SCOMP, GEMSOS, XTS-300/400; seL4 extended with a partition scheduler
  2. L3: A top-level specification of the trusted computing base written against the model
  3. L4: Rules cast in a constructive form to guide the core system calls

way out: Evidence to evaluators, ratings to acquirers

  1. L1: A rating acquirers rely on: SCOMP at A1, Multics at B2; data diodes certified to CC EAL7+
  2. L6: The evaluator's judgement of how well the developer understood the security functionality
  3. L7: The model and its correspondence to the functional specification handed over as assurance evidence (ADV_SPM)

way out: Models, theorems and vocabulary published to the field

  1. L1: A shared vocabulary and toolbox the field designs with
  2. L3: Reports and papers (MITRE volumes, symposium papers, journal articles)
  3. L5: Results written up: basic security theorem, unwinding theorems, hyperproperty decomposition

way out: Properties built into enforcing mechanisms (MAC modules, one-way links)

  1. L1: Requests allowed or refused; data moved one way only, from low to high
  2. L2: Mechanism configured to it: FreeBSD's mac_biba policy module; a data diode built to the *-property
  3. L3: A property chosen for enforcement (no write down; no read down for integrity)

Sources (24) published science

Bell DE, LaPadula LJ (1976) Secure Computer System: Unified Exposition and Multics Interpretation (MTR-2997 Rev. 1, ESD-TR-75-306)
Bell–LaPadula model (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01)
US Department of Defense (1985). Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (DoD 5200.28-STD, the Orange Book)
Bell DE (2005). Looking Back at the Bell-La Padula Model. Proceedings of the 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, 337-351. doi:10.1109/CSAC.2005.37 (behind its links)
Rushby J (1992). Noninterference, Transitivity, and Channel-Control Security Policies. SRI International Technical Report CSL-92-02 (behind its links)
Murray T, Matichuk D, Brassil M, et al. (2013). seL4: from General Purpose to a Proof of Information Flow Enforcement. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (behind its links)
Computer security model (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Clark-Wilson model (encyclopedia) (behind its links)
Graham–Denning model (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Cutler JW, Disselkoen C, Eline A, et al. (2024). Cedar: A New Language for Expressive, Fast, Safe, and Analyzable Authorization (extended version). arXiv:2403.04651 (CC BY 4.0) (behind its links)
Gaina L, Stangaciu CS, Stanescu D, Gusita B, Micea MV (2024). Unidirectional Communications in Secure IoT Systems: A Survey. Sensors 24(23), 7528. doi:10.3390/s24237528 (PMC11644384, CC BY) (behind its links)
Brewer DFC, Nash MJ (1989). The Chinese Wall Security Policy. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 206-214. doi:10.1109/SECPRI.1989.36295 (behind its links)
Take-grant protection model (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Non-interference (security) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5 (2017) (behind its links)
Sabelfeld A, Myers AC (2003). Language-Based Information-Flow Security. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 21(1), January 2003 (behind its links)
Clark DD, Wilson DR (1987). A Comparison of Commercial and Military Computer Security Policies. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 184-193. doi:10.1109/SP.1987.10001 (behind its links)
Double-entry bookkeeping (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Biba Model (encyclopedia) (behind its links)
Biba Integrity Model (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Harrison MA, Ruzzo WL, Ullman JD (1976) Protection in operating systems, Communications of the ACM 19(8):461-471 (doi:10.1145/360303.360333) (behind its links)
Clarkson MR, Schneider FB (2010). Hyperproperties. Journal of Computer Security 18(6), 1157-1210. doi:10.3233/JCS-2009-0393 (behind its links)
Goguen JA, Meseguer J (1982). Security Policies and Security Models. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, p. 11. doi:10.1109/SP.1982.10014 (behind its links)
Brewer and Nash model (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)