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Market competition
Competition is a constellation in which (i) at least two actors try to acquire (ii) a scarce (and rival, material or immaterial) good, and in which (iii) their interaction is structured by social institutions such that the allocation of the good depends on the actor's relative performance according to one or more performance measures (Altreiter et al. 2025); market competition adds a market on which prices form. Walked as both the rivalry itself (sellers against sellers, buyers against buyers, entrants against incumbents) and the economists' readings of it: a state (perfect competition) and a process (discovery, creative destruction).
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | not dated by the sources read for the practice (it is as old as markets, see market.json C-727); the idea: Smith 1776, Cournot 1838, Walras's rigorous definition (late 19th century), Arrow-Debreu 1950s |
| born precision | practice: unknown; idea: year |
| boundary | Inside: the rivalry among sellers for buyers (and among buyers for scarce goods) in one market, the entry and exit of rivals, and the pressure it puts on price, cost and products; the third party (buyers, an auction's rules) whose choice awards the trade. Outside: the firms and people themselves (their costs and wants), the market's own price formation (supply and demand), the law and the state that set the rules, and other markets. Where 'one market' ends is drawn, in competition policy, by the hypothetical-monopolist test: a group of products is a market if combining them under one hypothetical monopolist would likely worsen terms for customers (a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price, SSNIP). Concentration read on a market drawn too wide or too narrow misstates it (Syverson); national and local concentration can move in opposite directions (Rossi-Hansberg et al.). |
| nested level | Built from firms' and buyers' choices; part of a market (market.json floor 7, allocation); runs on its rivals' and buyers' decisions; policed by competition law. |
| scale | social |
Measures (30) published science
| average US markup over marginal cost, 1980 | 18 % above marginal cost (rising to 67% by 2014; sales-weighted) |
| average US markup over marginal cost, 2014 | 67 % above marginal cost |
| 90th-percentile US markup | 1.4 (1980) to 2.6 (2014) price / marginal cost |
| rise of markup over 35 years | 1 % per year of the price level relative to cost |
| five-year establishment entry rate (11 homogeneous US products, 1977-1997) | 22.3 % |
| five-year establishment exit rate (same sample) | 19.6 % |
| entry rate range across products (five-year) | 3.9 (sugar) to 26.6 (concrete) % |
| net entry share of five-year industry productivity growth (TFPQ) | 1.35 of 5.1 percentage points |
| traders needed for competitive equilibrium in double-auction experiments | 3 or 4 buyers and as many sellers traders |
| time to converge to competitive equilibrium (laboratory double auction) | several trading periods |
| rivals sufficient for the competitive price in Bertrand's model | 2 firms |
| effective competition (encyclopedia's rule) | 4 firms each below 40% share |
| dominant firm market share | 50 to over 90 % |
| HHI above which a market is highly concentrated (US merger guidelines 2023) | 1800 HHI points (0-10,000) |
| HHI rise counted significant | 100 HHI points |
| merged-firm share presumption | 30 % share with an HHI rise over 100 |
| US domestic concentration rise vs import-adjusted (manufacturing, Covarrubias et al. Figure) | 6.7 vs 1.6 percentage points |
| competition-law regimes (2020) | over 140 regimes |
| subjects in the auction fMRI study | 27 (nine male) people |
| average US markup over marginal cost, 1980 (published 2020 version) | 21 % above marginal cost (rising to 61% 'now') |
| average US markup over marginal cost, now (published 2020 version) | 61 % above marginal cost |
| average US profit rate, 1980 to now (published 2020 version) | 1 to 8 % |
| US markup rise, De Loecker-Eeckhout approach (as Syverson reports it) | 1.2 to 1.6 price / marginal cost, 1980-2015 |
| US markup rise with COGS+SG&A as variable cost (Traina 2018, reported by Syverson) | about 1 to 1.15 price / marginal cost, 1980-2015 |
| average scale elasticity, De Loecker-Eeckhout-Unger sample (as Syverson reports it) | 1.03 to 1.08 1980-2016 |
| firms at which lab Cournot markets stop colluding | 2: some collusion; 3: Nash; 4-5: never collusive firms |
| US iron-ore labour productivity, 1980 and 1985 | 2 to 4 tons of ore per worker-hour |
| local concentration after a top firm opens a plant | lower for at least 7 years |
| share of European technology upgrading 2000-2007 from Chinese import competition | around 15 % |
| Premerger filings in the last week before the 2025 HSR rule (normally 35-50 transactions a week) | 394 filings, about 200 transactions per week |
Open contentions (9) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-3465 What counts as a barrier to entry?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: Bain 1956: an advantage letting incumbents price above competitive levels without attracting entry; Stigler 1968: a cost borne by an entrant and not by incumbents; Fisher 1979: anything that prevents socially beneficial entry; Baumol-Willig 1981; Carlton-Perloff 1994; Wheelen-Hunger 2011 (as the encyclopedia lists them, after McAfee, Mialon & Williams) - C-3473 Is there a level of competition that is best for innovation?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: inverted U (Aghion et al.); the specialist reports a mildly negative relation in US data (Hashmi 2013) and a structural break that removes the inverted U in the UK data (Correa 2012); both not read; the older Arrow (1962) vs Schumpeter frame (replacement effect vs appropriability), specialist's lead, not read - C-3474 Is market competition a good thing?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: positive; negative; ambiguous - C-3475 What should competition law aim at?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: structure matters in itself (the structural presumption); only effects on consumer welfare matter (Chicago); the consumer welfare standard is too narrow (fairness, efficiency, justice) - C-3476 Is competition a state markets reach, or a process that never stops?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: state: competition is a market condition defined by price taking (Cournot's horizontal demand curve; perfect competition); process: competition is an activity of rivalry and discovery that the perfect-competition state assumes already finished (Hayek: 'the opportunity for the activity we call competition no longer exists'; Kirzner; Schumpeter's dynamic competition) - C-3501 Is rising market concentration a sign of efficiency or of weakened competition?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: good concentration: winner-take-most from more price-sensitive consumers and scalable intangibles (Autor et al., Haskel & Westlake as cited); bad concentration: rising barriers to competition (Furman as cited); both at once (Crouzet & Eberly as cited); Demsetz 1973: concentration reflects productivity differences (as cited by Covarrubias et al.) - C-3508 How many rivals does a market need to be competitive?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: few rivals suffice (Bertrand, Smith's experiments, contestable markets); many rivals needed (Cournot limit, perfect competition's atomistic firms); the answer depends on conduct and institution (lab: double auction vs posted offer; Cournot vs Bertrand); the specialist's Dufwenberg-Gneezy, Bresnahan-Reiss and Kreps-Scheinkman results are not read here - C-3534 How large is the rise in US markups since 1980?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: the rise reflects market power (De Loecker & Eeckhout); the size of the rise depends on how marginal cost and weights are measured; Harberger 1954's view that market power barely matters in aggregate was the long-standing default; the rise is much smaller when SG&A counts as variable cost (Traina 2018, via Syverson 2019); the production-function ratio estimator cannot identify markups from revenue data (Bond, Hashemi, Kaplan & Zoch 2020); published 2020 version now read at abstract level (21% to 61%) - C-3535 Is a high markup the same thing as market power?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: a rising markup reads as rising market power (De Loecker, Eeckhout & Unger); a rising markup can read as rising fixed costs or scale economies with no gain in market power (Syverson 2019); concentration, markups and profits are separate signals (Syverson 2019)
Cross-scale patterns seen here (19) our proposal
Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Market competition. Each links to every other system that shows it.
- coordination-before-mapping (structural)
Competitive outcomes with no one holding the map: 3 or 4 buyers and sellers with only private information reach competitive equilibrium, and much of the order 'derives from the institution, not merely the presumed rationality of the individuals' (Smith on Gode and Sunder); Hayek: knowledge that 'nev - same role, different builds (structural)
One job, holding sellers' price down by letting buyers choose among them, done by market institutions with money and contracts in people, and by partner choice without contracts among animals (biological traders whose competition 'can reduce the price of a commodity'). - same shape, opposite sign (structural)
Seller competition and buyer competition are one mechanism (several on one side of the trade bid against each other for the other side's single offer) with the side reversed: in a seller's market buyers compete, in a buyer's market sellers do; Martinez-Saito et al. set both side by side (two sellers - templating (structural)
The concentration index the antitrust agencies use is the same formula as ecology's Simpson diversity index, physics' inverse participation ratio and political science's effective number of parties: one module, swapped across fields and still working. - barrier-gates-complexity (partial)
Barriers to entry are a seal around incumbents, but here the seal lowers competition rather than enabling complexity; the contestable-market case (no barriers, no sunk costs) is the without-barrier case shown. What the seal gates is market power, not complexity: partial. - causal ceiling (partial)
Hayek: the theory of competition 'can never be empirically verified for those cases in which it is of interest', because competition is used exactly where the facts are unknown; and marginal cost, which defines the markup, is 'fundamentally not observed' (De Loecker & Eeckhout). The limit is set by - holding / entrainment (partial)
Competition sets the number of firms: entry where profits exceed normal, exit where they fall short, until zero economic profit; five-year entry 22.3% and exit 19.6% in the FHS sample. The whole (the market's price) sets the count of its parts. - namespace completeness (the map predicts its gaps) (partial)
The market-structure shelf is a map that predicts its members: perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly (duopoly), dominant firm, monopoly ordered by number of sellers and differentiation; Chamberlin and Robinson in 1933 filled the slot 'in between perfect competition and a monopoly' - red-queen (partial)
Neck-and-neck firms innovate to escape competition, and in those industries 'competition is particularly intense'; while both stay level neither gains ground. But a step-by-step leader can pull ahead, so the stalemate is not always held: partial. - The Payment to Entropy (partial)
Competition pays for rivalry with duplicated fixed costs ('competition requires the existing of multiple firms, so it duplicates fixed costs'), and where it weakens a firm 'that can command a price above marginal cost produce[s] less output' (the deadweight toll). Form: material/value, a toll per ri - the whole sets the local reference (partial)
Each firm reads its own position against one market price it does not set (price taking; Cournot's horizontal demand curve), and the price is set by all the rivals together. - trade one property for another (partial)
Competition buys lower prices with duplicated fixed costs, and buys innovation only up to a point: past the peak of the inverted U more competition costs innovation (the Schumpeterian effect). Industries sit at different points of the trade. - Umwelt: each system carves its own slice of one shared medium (partial)
Each rival reads a different slice of one market: the price-taking firm sees only a price (a flat demand curve), the firm with power its own sloped demand, the buyer the rival offers within reach, the agency the HHI; and the number of rivals changes what a bidder's frontopolar cortex registers. - who opens the door (partial)
Entry into a market: in a perfectly contestable market the door is open field (no barriers, no sunk costs); in most markets incumbents' sunk costs and scale, or the state's licences, set the door before any entrant arrives (a port held by the receiver). - borrowed-then-held (surface)
Competition's regulation first came from the state and courts (laws against restraint of trade back to Rome) and later from statutes written for competition itself; the market's own rules (a double auction) are borrowed from an institution. No source shows the borrowed phase then the held phase in o - lightning (surface)
Not seen as a discharge here; recorded because the lightning test applies: competition's 'allocation' role is met by a held process (rules, rivalry, prices) and is not trivial. Verdict kept as surface: hit-and-run entry is a sudden release of a stored difference (excess profit) that flips the market - nested ladder (surface)
Each condition a stronger form of the last: effective competition, monopolistic competition, perfect competition (adding identical products, price taking, perfect information, free entry); and perfectly contestable markets as a further rung on entry alone. - runaway from an unstable balance (surface)
Concentration that feeds itself: after 2000 leaders 'become more entrenched' with rising barriers to entry (Covarrubias et al.), a reinforcing loop away from the competitive balance. No sourced balance point is shown being left, so surface. - The carry (surface)
The wait face: a market reaches competitive equilibrium only after 'several trading periods' in the lab (Smith), and entry works in the long run, measured over five-year census intervals; the excess (profit above normal) is what the next entrant waits for.
Valence: what it trades, and with whom (14) published science
Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.
- Monopoly via sys:market · Market competition loss
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:human · Market competition gain
- Natural selection via sys:market · Market competition even
- Market and trade via sys:market · Market competition gain
- Labour market via sys:market · Market competition even
- Biological market via sys:market · Market competition even
- Oligopoly via sys:market · Market competition mixed
- Firm (the economic unit) via sys:market · Market competition gain
- Supply and demand via sys:market · Market competition gain
- Technology via sys:technology · Market competition mixed
- Entrepreneurship via sys:market · Market competition gain
- International trade via sys:international-trade · Market competition gain
- Competition law via sys:competition-law · Market competition gain
- Tacit collusion via sys:market · Market competition loss
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (3)
Sits inside / holds (2)
expressed by (14)
- Generation/Synthesis
- Quality Improvement/Refinement
- Distributed Autonomy/Decentralized Execution (Subsidiarity)
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Sensing/Scanning
- Search/Foraging
- Uncertainty Reduction/Learning
- Overcome Barrier
- Speed
- Resource Denial/Attrition
- Physical/Virtual Barrier
- Self-Monitoring
- Triage & Prioritized Allocation
- Quality Control & Error Correction
floor filled by (13)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Human brain
- Market and trade
- Biological market
- Firm (the economic unit)
- Supply and demand
- Technology
- Economy
- Marketing
- Entrepreneurship
- Competition law
- Algorithmic pricing
- Two-sided market (platform)
represents (1)
Kinds (15)
- Biological market
- Perfect competition
- Monopoly
- Oligopoly
- Monopolistic competition
- Contestable market
- Market and trade
- Dominant firm with a competitive fringe
- Bertrand (price) competition
- Cournot (quantity) competition
- Competition among buyers (a seller's market)
- Competition between nations
- Natural monopoly
- Competition among platforms (network effects)
- Tacit collusion
Notes published science
- The index US antitrust agencies use to decide whether a merger is too big is the same formula ecologists use for species diversity (Simpson's index), physicists for how spread out a quantum state is, and political scientists for the number of parties (src:wp:herfindahl-hirschman-index; thresholds in src:doj-ftc-2023-merger-guidelines).
- It takes surprisingly few rivals, in the right institution: in Vernon Smith's lab double auctions, 3 or 4 buyers and as many sellers, each knowing only their own values, reach the competitive price (posted-price markets, like most shops, get there more slowly); in lab quantity-setting markets two firms still collude a little, three reach the textbook outcome and four or five never collude (src:smith-2002-nobel, src:huck-normann-oechssler-2004).
- Hayek pointed out that perfect competition, the textbook benchmark, describes a state where the activity of competing has already stopped, and that competition's merits can never be checked in the very cases it is used for, because it is used exactly where nobody knows the answer in advance (src:hayek-1968-discovery).
- Pricing algorithms can learn to stop competing on their own: simple learning programs set against each other in a simulated market 'consistently learn to charge supra-competitive prices, without communicating with one another', and in German petrol stations margins rose after pricing software arrived, but only where every station in a two- or three-station market used it (src:calvano-2020, src:assad-2024).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
market competition as economists describe it: rival offers to allocation (reader's view)
- L1: Rival sellers and the buyers they court, around goods that are scarce
- L2: Offers: price, product, promotion and place; sellers bid against sellers
- L3: Buyers choose among rivals: the third party that awards the scarce good
- L4: Market structure: the number of rivals, their sizes, barriers to entry, the institution's rules
- L5: Competitive pressure: price toward marginal cost; the markup as its reading
- L6: Discovery and selection: what is scarce, who is cheapest, which firms survive
- L7: Allocation, entry and exit, innovation: resources moved to their most valued uses, old products replaced
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L5: Competitive pressure, in two parts the textbook keeps apart: price pushed to marginal cost (allocative efficiency, holds in short-run competitive equilibrium) and price pushed to the minimum of long-run average cost (productive efficiency, needs long-run free entry); read as the markup, profits and the market's structure, three readings that are not the same thing (C-3535)
- L6: Discovery and selection: competition finds out what is scarce, who can make it cheapest and what buyers want, and sorts firms by profitability (the process reading; Hayek, Kirzner, Schumpeter; the selection literature)
- L7: Allocation and order: resources moved to their most valued uses, goods made by the cheapest producers, old products replaced by new; in the textbook limit a Pareto optimum
way in: Buyers' choices: the third party that awards the trade
- L1: Buyers with wants and budgets, each with a willingness to pay
- L2: Buyers find and compare rival offers; how easily they search and switch sets how hard the rivals are pressed (switching costs, search frictions, clustered sellers); how many rivals there are changes how a person bids
- L3: Choice among sellers: the third party distributes the scarce good (Simmel); in nature, partner choice
- L4: Market shares move among sellers as buyers choose; survival follows profitability
way in: Dispersed knowledge and unknown facts
- L1: Knowledge of circumstances spread across many people, much of it the ability to detect conditions
- L2: Preliminary market outcomes tell people where it is worthwhile to search
- L3: Alert entrepreneurs notice price gaps and act on them (arbitrage)
- L4: Prices direct attention to what is demanded and how urgently
- L5: Relative prices tell each participant what to accomplish, not how much effort to spend
way in: Foreign rivals: imports
- L1: Producers abroad whose goods reach the home market
- L2: Firms and nations adapt production to compete with foreign products
- L3: Tariffs and protection can shut the channel
- L4: Import-adjusted concentration: the home market's structure counted with its foreign rivals
way in: New products and methods: innovation
- L1: New combinations: new goods, methods of production and forms of organisation
- L2: Firms innovate to cut costs step by step; a laggard must catch up before it can lead
- L3: Escape competition (neck-and-neck firms) against the Schumpeterian effect (laggards discouraged)
- L4: The innovation rate, read through patents, rising then falling with competition
way in: Potential entrants and barriers to entry
- L1: A pool of potential entrants outside the market
- L2: Barriers to entry: fixed costs an entrant must bear that incumbents did not; sunk costs block exit
- L3: The entry decision: hit-and-run entry where excess profits appear
- L4: Entry and exit rates: the turnover of the population of firms
way in: Rivals' offers: prices, products, promotion and place
- L1: Rival sellers of the same or close-substitute goods within buyers' reach
- L2: Each seller's offer as rivals and buyers see it; entrants come in with lower prices
- L3: The demand curve facing each firm: flat when it takes the price (Cournot's definition), sloped when it has power
- L4: Each firm's price set against its marginal cost (the markup; the Lerner index): the port where rivalry is read as a number
way in: Rules: competition law and its agencies
- L1: Statutes against restraint of trade and abuse of dominance (Canada 1889, Sherman Act 1890, Treaty of Rome 1957); over 140 regimes by 2020
- L2: Agencies draw the relevant market (the hypothetical-monopolist test, SSNIP) and then compute shares and the HHI
- L3: The structural presumption: highly concentrated (HHI > 1,800) and a rise of more than 100 points presumed to lessen competition
- L4: Enforcement: mergers enjoined, cartels and abuse of dominance prohibited
way out: Entry and exit: the population of firms turned over
- L1: Plants opened and closed, jobs moved; aggregate productivity raised
- L4: Entry and exit rates
- L6: Selection on profitability: less profitable firms exit, entrants displace them
way out: New products and methods; old ones made obsolete
- L1: New goods and services offered to buyers; product differentiation
- L5: Innovation effort set by the escape-competition and Schumpeterian effects
- L7: Creative destruction: new innovations replace old ones
way out: Prices and markups pushed down (or not)
- L1: The prices buyers pay; where competition weakens, markups above marginal cost
- L5: Long-run price at the minimum of average cost; zero economic profit
- L7: Goods sold at prices below what any non-producer could offer
way out: Shares concentrate in the winners
- L1: A market of few large sellers: dominant firm, oligopoly, or monopoly
- L4: Concentration ratios and the HHI rise
- L6: More productive firms expand (good concentration) or leaders entrench (bad concentration)
way out: Slack squeezed out inside firms: work practices and management
- L1: Output per worker raised; in X-inefficiency's terms, slack removed (lack of competition is one of its named causes)
- L4: Work rules loosened, labour reassigned, overhead shed; the lower tail of the productivity distribution cut off where buyers can switch easily
- L6: Facing competition, existing producers change how they work (within-firm improvement, distinct from selection and from innovation)