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Market competition

Competition is a constellation in which (i) at least two actors try to acquire (ii) a scarce (and rival, material or immaterial) good, and in which (iii) their interaction is structured by social institutions such that the allocation of the good depends on the actor's relative performance according to one or more performance measures (Altreiter et al. 2025); market competition adds a market on which prices form. Walked as both the rivalry itself (sellers against sellers, buyers against buyers, entrants against incumbents) and the economists' readings of it: a state (perfect competition) and a process (discovery, creative destruction).

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born atnot dated by the sources read for the practice (it is as old as markets, see market.json C-727); the idea: Smith 1776, Cournot 1838, Walras's rigorous definition (late 19th century), Arrow-Debreu 1950s
born precisionpractice: unknown; idea: year
boundaryInside: the rivalry among sellers for buyers (and among buyers for scarce goods) in one market, the entry and exit of rivals, and the pressure it puts on price, cost and products; the third party (buyers, an auction's rules) whose choice awards the trade. Outside: the firms and people themselves (their costs and wants), the market's own price formation (supply and demand), the law and the state that set the rules, and other markets. Where 'one market' ends is drawn, in competition policy, by the hypothetical-monopolist test: a group of products is a market if combining them under one hypothetical monopolist would likely worsen terms for customers (a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price, SSNIP). Concentration read on a market drawn too wide or too narrow misstates it (Syverson); national and local concentration can move in opposite directions (Rossi-Hansberg et al.).
nested levelBuilt from firms' and buyers' choices; part of a market (market.json floor 7, allocation); runs on its rivals' and buyers' decisions; policed by competition law.
scalesocial

Measures (30) published science

average US markup over marginal cost, 198018 % above marginal cost (rising to 67% by 2014; sales-weighted)
average US markup over marginal cost, 201467 % above marginal cost
90th-percentile US markup1.4 (1980) to 2.6 (2014) price / marginal cost
rise of markup over 35 years1 % per year of the price level relative to cost
five-year establishment entry rate (11 homogeneous US products, 1977-1997)22.3 %
five-year establishment exit rate (same sample)19.6 %
entry rate range across products (five-year)3.9 (sugar) to 26.6 (concrete) %
net entry share of five-year industry productivity growth (TFPQ)1.35 of 5.1 percentage points
traders needed for competitive equilibrium in double-auction experiments3 or 4 buyers and as many sellers traders
time to converge to competitive equilibrium (laboratory double auction)several trading periods
rivals sufficient for the competitive price in Bertrand's model2 firms
effective competition (encyclopedia's rule)4 firms each below 40% share
dominant firm market share50 to over 90 %
HHI above which a market is highly concentrated (US merger guidelines 2023)1800 HHI points (0-10,000)
HHI rise counted significant100 HHI points
merged-firm share presumption30 % share with an HHI rise over 100
US domestic concentration rise vs import-adjusted (manufacturing, Covarrubias et al. Figure)6.7 vs 1.6 percentage points
competition-law regimes (2020)over 140 regimes
subjects in the auction fMRI study27 (nine male) people
average US markup over marginal cost, 1980 (published 2020 version)21 % above marginal cost (rising to 61% 'now')
average US markup over marginal cost, now (published 2020 version)61 % above marginal cost
average US profit rate, 1980 to now (published 2020 version)1 to 8 %
US markup rise, De Loecker-Eeckhout approach (as Syverson reports it)1.2 to 1.6 price / marginal cost, 1980-2015
US markup rise with COGS+SG&A as variable cost (Traina 2018, reported by Syverson)about 1 to 1.15 price / marginal cost, 1980-2015
average scale elasticity, De Loecker-Eeckhout-Unger sample (as Syverson reports it)1.03 to 1.08 1980-2016
firms at which lab Cournot markets stop colluding2: some collusion; 3: Nash; 4-5: never collusive firms
US iron-ore labour productivity, 1980 and 19852 to 4 tons of ore per worker-hour
local concentration after a top firm opens a plantlower for at least 7 years
share of European technology upgrading 2000-2007 from Chinese import competitionaround 15 %
Premerger filings in the last week before the 2025 HSR rule (normally 35-50 transactions a week)394 filings, about 200 transactions per week

Open contentions (9) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (19) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Market competition. Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (14) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (3)

Sits inside / holds (2)

expressed by (14)

floor filled by (13)

represents (1)

Kinds (15)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

market competition as economists describe it: rival offers to allocation (reader's view)

  1. L1: Rival sellers and the buyers they court, around goods that are scarce
  2. L2: Offers: price, product, promotion and place; sellers bid against sellers
  3. L3: Buyers choose among rivals: the third party that awards the scarce good
  4. L4: Market structure: the number of rivals, their sizes, barriers to entry, the institution's rules
  5. L5: Competitive pressure: price toward marginal cost; the markup as its reading
  6. L6: Discovery and selection: what is scarce, who is cheapest, which firms survive
  7. L7: Allocation, entry and exit, innovation: resources moved to their most valued uses, old products replaced

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L5: Competitive pressure, in two parts the textbook keeps apart: price pushed to marginal cost (allocative efficiency, holds in short-run competitive equilibrium) and price pushed to the minimum of long-run average cost (productive efficiency, needs long-run free entry); read as the markup, profits and the market's structure, three readings that are not the same thing (C-3535)
  2. L6: Discovery and selection: competition finds out what is scarce, who can make it cheapest and what buyers want, and sorts firms by profitability (the process reading; Hayek, Kirzner, Schumpeter; the selection literature)
  3. L7: Allocation and order: resources moved to their most valued uses, goods made by the cheapest producers, old products replaced by new; in the textbook limit a Pareto optimum

way in: Buyers' choices: the third party that awards the trade

  1. L1: Buyers with wants and budgets, each with a willingness to pay
  2. L2: Buyers find and compare rival offers; how easily they search and switch sets how hard the rivals are pressed (switching costs, search frictions, clustered sellers); how many rivals there are changes how a person bids
  3. L3: Choice among sellers: the third party distributes the scarce good (Simmel); in nature, partner choice
  4. L4: Market shares move among sellers as buyers choose; survival follows profitability

way in: Dispersed knowledge and unknown facts

  1. L1: Knowledge of circumstances spread across many people, much of it the ability to detect conditions
  2. L2: Preliminary market outcomes tell people where it is worthwhile to search
  3. L3: Alert entrepreneurs notice price gaps and act on them (arbitrage)
  4. L4: Prices direct attention to what is demanded and how urgently
  5. L5: Relative prices tell each participant what to accomplish, not how much effort to spend

way in: Foreign rivals: imports

  1. L1: Producers abroad whose goods reach the home market
  2. L2: Firms and nations adapt production to compete with foreign products
  3. L3: Tariffs and protection can shut the channel
  4. L4: Import-adjusted concentration: the home market's structure counted with its foreign rivals

way in: New products and methods: innovation

  1. L1: New combinations: new goods, methods of production and forms of organisation
  2. L2: Firms innovate to cut costs step by step; a laggard must catch up before it can lead
  3. L3: Escape competition (neck-and-neck firms) against the Schumpeterian effect (laggards discouraged)
  4. L4: The innovation rate, read through patents, rising then falling with competition

way in: Potential entrants and barriers to entry

  1. L1: A pool of potential entrants outside the market
  2. L2: Barriers to entry: fixed costs an entrant must bear that incumbents did not; sunk costs block exit
  3. L3: The entry decision: hit-and-run entry where excess profits appear
  4. L4: Entry and exit rates: the turnover of the population of firms

way in: Rivals' offers: prices, products, promotion and place

  1. L1: Rival sellers of the same or close-substitute goods within buyers' reach
  2. L2: Each seller's offer as rivals and buyers see it; entrants come in with lower prices
  3. L3: The demand curve facing each firm: flat when it takes the price (Cournot's definition), sloped when it has power
  4. L4: Each firm's price set against its marginal cost (the markup; the Lerner index): the port where rivalry is read as a number

way in: Rules: competition law and its agencies

  1. L1: Statutes against restraint of trade and abuse of dominance (Canada 1889, Sherman Act 1890, Treaty of Rome 1957); over 140 regimes by 2020
  2. L2: Agencies draw the relevant market (the hypothetical-monopolist test, SSNIP) and then compute shares and the HHI
  3. L3: The structural presumption: highly concentrated (HHI > 1,800) and a rise of more than 100 points presumed to lessen competition
  4. L4: Enforcement: mergers enjoined, cartels and abuse of dominance prohibited

way out: Entry and exit: the population of firms turned over

  1. L1: Plants opened and closed, jobs moved; aggregate productivity raised
  2. L4: Entry and exit rates
  3. L6: Selection on profitability: less profitable firms exit, entrants displace them

way out: New products and methods; old ones made obsolete

  1. L1: New goods and services offered to buyers; product differentiation
  2. L5: Innovation effort set by the escape-competition and Schumpeterian effects
  3. L7: Creative destruction: new innovations replace old ones

way out: Prices and markups pushed down (or not)

  1. L1: The prices buyers pay; where competition weakens, markups above marginal cost
  2. L5: Long-run price at the minimum of average cost; zero economic profit
  3. L7: Goods sold at prices below what any non-producer could offer

way out: Shares concentrate in the winners

  1. L1: A market of few large sellers: dominant firm, oligopoly, or monopoly
  2. L4: Concentration ratios and the HHI rise
  3. L6: More productive firms expand (good concentration) or leaders entrench (bad concentration)

way out: Slack squeezed out inside firms: work practices and management

  1. L1: Output per worker raised; in X-inefficiency's terms, slack removed (lack of competition is one of its named causes)
  2. L4: Work rules loosened, labour reassigned, overhead shed; the lower tail of the productivity distribution cut off where buyers can switch easily
  3. L6: Facing competition, existing producers change how they work (within-firm improvement, distinct from selection and from innovation)

Sources (39) published science

Altreiter C., Graebner-Radkowitsch C., Puehringer S., Rogojanu A. & Wolfmayr G. 2025, Theorizing competition: An interdisciplinary framework, Competition & Change 29(5):593-614, doi:10.1177/10245294251330343
Competition (economics) (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01), version 1376339746 (behind its links)
Israel Kirzner (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Perfect competition (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
De Loecker J. & Eeckhout J. 2017, The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications, NBER Working Paper 23687 (working paper; published with Unger in QJE 2020, doi:10.1093/qje/qjz041, not read) (behind its links)
Foster L., Haltiwanger J., Syverson C. (2005) Reallocation, Firm Turnover, and Efficiency: Selection on Productivity or Profitability? NBER Working Paper 11555 (behind its links)
Smith V.L. 2002, Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics, Nobel Prize lecture (behind its links)
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U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 2023, Merger Guidelines (issued 18 December 2023) (behind its links)
Covarrubias M., Gutierrez G. & Philippon T. 2019, From Good to Bad Concentration? U.S. Industries over the Past 30 Years, NBER Working Paper 25983 (NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2019) (behind its links)
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Martinez-Saito M., Konovalov R., Piradov M.A., Shestakova A., Gutkin B. & Klucharev V. 2019, Action in auctions: neural and computational mechanisms of bidding behaviour, Eur. J. Neurosci. 50(8):3327-3348, doi:10.1111/ejn.14492 (behind its links)
De Loecker J., Eeckhout J. & Unger G. 2020, The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications, Quarterly Journal of Economics 135(2):561-644, doi:10.1093/qje/qjz041 (abstract on EconPapers) (behind its links)
Syverson C. 2019, Macroeconomics and Market Power: Facts, Potential Explanations and Open Questions, Brookings Economic Studies report (January 2019; the companion of his JEP 33(3) essay, which was not reached) (behind its links)
Huck S., Normann H.-T. & Oechssler J. 2004, Two are few and four are many: number effects in experimental oligopolies, J. Economic Behavior & Organization 53(4):435-446 (abstract on IDEAS/RePEc) (behind its links)
Syverson C. 2011 (working paper 2010), What Determines Productivity?, NBER Working Paper 15712 (published J. Economic Literature 49(2), not read); section 4.2 read, including its account of Schmitz 2005 and Pavcnik 2002 (behind its links)
Rossi-Hansberg E., Sarte P.-D. & Trachter N. 2018, Diverging Trends in National and Local Concentration, NBER Working Paper 25066 (NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2020) (behind its links)
Bloom N., Draca M. & Van Reenen J. 2011, Trade Induced Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT and Productivity, NBER Working Paper 16717 (published Review of Economic Studies 2016, not read) (behind its links)
Ferguson A.N. (FTC Chairman) 2025, Memorandum to FTC staff: Merger Guidelines, 18 February 2025 (behind its links)
Aghion P., Bloom N., Blundell R., Griffith R. & Howitt P. 2002, Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship, NBER Working Paper 9269 (published QJE 2005, not read) (behind its links)
Hayek F.A. 1968 (trans. M.S. Snow 2002), Competition as a Discovery Procedure, Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 5(3):9-23 (1968 Kiel lecture, Kieler Vortraege 56) (behind its links)
Calvano E., Calzolari G., Denicolo V. & Pastorello S. 2020, Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion, American Economic Review 110(10):3267-3297, doi:10.1257/aer.20190623 (author accepted manuscript, University of Bologna repository; abstract and introduction read) (behind its links)
Melitz M.J. 2002, The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity, NBER Working Paper 8881 (published Econometrica 2003, not read) (behind its links)
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