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Tacit collusion

Tacit collusion is coordination among competitors (the encyclopedia's 'agreement about coordination of conduct' means a shared understanding, not an agreement in the legal sense, which tacit collusion lacks by definition) who do not explicitly exchange information but reach supra-normal (supracompetitive) prices or other coordinated conduct. Economics reads it as an equilibrium of repeated play: firms that meet again and again hold prices above the one-shot level because each expects a deviation to be detected and answered by retaliation (a price war, or a punishment aimed at the deviant), and it holds only if they weigh future profits enough. What sustains it: few sellers, entry barriers, frequent interaction and price changes, transparent prices, symmetric firms, stable or growing demand, contact in several markets; what breaks it: entry, demand swings and booms, innovation, asymmetries, mavericks, large buyers, opaque or infrequent dealing. Coordination itself runs through price leadership (dominant-firm or barometric), focal points and prices read as messages. Competition law sorts it into conscious parallelism (no communication) and concerted action (some indirect communication), separates it from an explicit agreement (a cartel), and in the US and EU treats parallel conduct alone as lawful, requiring plus factors or evidence of communication; merger control acts on market structures conducive to it. Pricing algorithms (Q-learning, LLM agents) have been shown to reach it in simulation, with field evidence from German gasoline. Walked here as that market conduct and the practice of reading it; the market form is sys:oligopoly, the explicit kind sys:cartel.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

asymmetrylow-cost or larger firms need larger shares; a dominant firm leads
born atper episode; the earliest dated tacit case read is the credit-card focal points of the early 1980s (Knittel and Stango 2003); the idea from Chamberlin (1929, contents only), Stigler (1964) and Friedman (1971) as cited
born precisionyears (earliest case)
boundaryInside: the coordinated conduct of a few rival sellers (or bidders) who meet repeatedly: the collusive path of prices, shares or bids, the shared understanding of it (focal points, who leads, that increases are matched), the monitoring that detects deviations and the retaliation that answers them. Outside: the buyers who pay, the firms' own internal decisions (each firm acts independently), entrants, competition authorities and courts, and explicit agreements (a cartel is the explicit kind, a sibling). The legal line runs through the middle of the economic one: economics counts any equilibrium supported by punishments as collusive, law asks whether an agreement was reached and how.
cheaterthe deviant who would undercut for a one-period gain: an off-path figure that equilibrium keeps from appearing; the sources read do not say who started Perth's 2009 BP-Caltex price war
driveequilibrium
enforcementsanction
flips whendemand peaks, entry, innovation, a maverick, a large buyer concentrating orders, or the discount factor falling below the threshold
joint outputprices and profits above the one-shot level that no firm can hold alone
knockoutIf instead one firm slightly undercuts the other, it captures the entire market and thus the entire collusive profit, but the ensuing price war will eliminate any future profit (Ivaldi et al., base model)
nested levelA kind of collusion (the tacit kind, beside the cartel); a conduct regime inside an oligopoly (its L5, in the oligopoly walk); runs on its member firms' decisions and, more and more, on their pricing algorithms; read and policed by competition law.
obligatefacultative
partnerssys:firm
recurrenceonly with repeated interaction; more frequent meetings make it easier
regimestarts by learning (Perth: three and a half years) or after talk; ends in price war or breakdown
saturationupper bound: the joint-profit (monopoly) price; with patient firms a range of prices can be sustained and where it settles is not predicted (o-which); with asymmetric firms the joint-profit point needs side-transfers tacit colluders cannot make
scalesocial
separabilityeach firm keeps its own ownership, costs and decisions

Measures (22) published science

critical discount factor, n identical price-setting firmsdelta* = 1 - 1/n: 0.50 for two firms, 2/3 for three (the report prints '1/3 = 0.67') dimensionless
critical discount factor with interaction every T periodsdelta* = (1/2)^(1/T) dimensionless
critical discount factor with demand swings of size epsilondelta* = (1+epsilon)/(2+epsilon) dimensionless
critical discount factor with entry probability mudelta* = 1/(2-mu) dimensionless
encyclopedia duopoly example thresholddelta > 6/13 (gain from cheating $30 against $35 a period lost) dimensionless
Perth price cycle after the focal points (characteristic clock)7 days (before April 2009: 7 to 35 days; station-level mean over the sample 8.8 days, SD 4.4)
Perth retail gasoline margin before and after March 20104.85 cents a litre (SD 4.19) before; 10.01 (SD 4.68) after cents per litre
Perth margin rise relative to other Australian cities (difference-in-difference)3.49 (SE 0.39) cents per litre
Perth transition to the focal-point equilibriumthree and a half years (April 2009 to August 2012)
BP share of Perth stations22 percent on average, 2005-2015 percent of stations
wait for a price lead to be matched under Perth's next-day price notification lawuntil the next day (before the law, Shell led over 85% of the time) days
length of the learned punishment (Q-learning duopoly)5-7 periods in most cases
Q-learning profit gain by number of firms85% (two firms), 64% (three), 56% (four) percent of the gap between Bertrand-Nash and monopoly profit
Q-learning periods to convergenceabout 850,000 periods (a few seconds of CPU time)
lab no-talk selling price, by whether a talk phase came first (four firms)6.0 (SD 0.6) when no talk came first; 67.0 (SD 33.8) after a talk phase experimental price units
lab price rise from talking, by number of firms+43.2 (n=2), +75.3 (n=4), +62.5 (n=6), +54.1 (n=8) experimental price units
experimental Cournot markets classed collusive2 of 6 duopolies; 0 with three, four or five firms markets
oligopoly experiments behind the meta-analysismore than 100 papers, some 500 settings papers / settings
bids in the PCS C-block auctionroughly 30,000 bids in 183 rounds, all public
share of AI pricing jobs among pricing jobsup more than ten-fold since 2010 ratio
the textbook spiral (The Making of a Fly)one seller priced at 1.27 times the other, which matched it; the book reached $23 million a copy US dollars
MillerCoors joint venture: prices and markups above Nash-Bertrandprices 6-8% higher; markups 17-18% higher percent

Open contentions (7) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (22) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Tacit collusion. Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (9) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (5)

Sits inside / holds (3)

expressed by (17)

floor filled by (12)

represents (2)

Kinds (6)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

tacit collusion as economists and competition lawyers describe it: a few sellers' repeated market to coordinated prices (reader's view)

  1. L1: A market where the same few sellers meet buyers again and again, with posted prices (or repeated auctions with public bids)
  2. L2: The conditions that make it possible: few sellers, entry barriers, frequent interaction and price changes, symmetric costs and capacities, stable demand, contact in several markets
  3. L3: Monitoring: rivals' prices, bids and sales made observable (posted prices, trade data, pricing software and surveillance tools); a deviation identified
  4. L4: Reading the market: inferring from market data whether the others are on the collusive path, or whether a fall in sales is bad luck or cheating
  5. L5: Discipline: the incentive constraint of repeated play: the short-run gain from undercutting against the retaliation it would bring, weighed by patience (the discount factor)
  6. L6: Mutual understanding without agreement: focal points, who leads and that increases are matched, prices read as messages
  7. L7: Coordinated conduct acted on the market: supracompetitive prices held, leads followed, shares and licences divided, deviations punished

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: Reading the market: inference from prices, sales, leads, words and history about whether the others keep to the collusive path
  2. L5: The incentive constraint: short-run gain from deviating against retaliation, weighed by the discount factor; raised or lowered by entry, demand, the law and multimarket contact
  3. L6: Mutual understanding without agreement: focal points (Thursday jumps, 2-cent cuts, a nonbinding ceiling), who leads, that increases are matched
  4. L7: The coordinated conduct: supracompetitive prices held, shares divided, deviations punished

way in: Competition law and enforcement

  1. L1: The rule: the illegality lies in an agreement (Sherman Act section 1)
  2. L2: The evidence standard: parallel conduct alone is not enough; proof must tend to exclude independent action
  3. L3: Merger review of structures conducive to coordination

way in: Contact in other markets

  1. L1: The same rivals present in several markets
  2. L2: More frequent interaction across markets
  3. L3: Asymmetries in single markets evened out overall

way in: Demand swings, growth and innovation

  1. L1: Demand rising, falling or cycling; innovation arriving
  2. L2: Today's demand read against tomorrow's
  3. L3: A peak raises the gain from deviating now

way in: Own sales and demand

  1. L1: Buyers' purchases, which each firm sees only as its own sales when rivals' prices are hidden
  2. L2: Own sales and market share held against the collusive path
  3. L3: A fall in sales read as bad luck or a rival's cheating

way in: Potential entrants

  1. L1: Outside firms able to enter (hit-and-run entry)
  2. L2: Entry barriers that keep them out
  3. L3: The prospect of entry shrinking what retaliation can take away

way in: Pricing algorithms' inputs

  1. L1: All prices set in the period and own demand, fed to the algorithm
  2. L2: The algorithm's state: last period's prices (Q-learning) or the prompt and history (LLM agents)
  3. L3: A learned reward-punishment response to the rival's price

way in: Public words and coded signals

  1. L1: Unilateral public announcements (a CEO speaking of 'price leadership' on an earnings call)
  2. L2: Coded signals carried inside market acts (licence numbers in the last digits of bids)
  3. L3: Some information exchanged without an explicit agreement (concerted action)

way in: Rivals' prices and bids

  1. L1: The rivals' posted prices and bids, the only medium between them where nothing else is said
  2. L2: Observability: published prices, public bids, monitoring and pricing software that track rivals
  3. L3: A deviation identified as such

way in: The history of play

  1. L1: Past episodes of play, including any earlier phase of talk
  2. L2: An established leader's record of influencing rivals
  3. L3: The past carried forward as higher prices (hysteresis)

way in: The leader's price moves

  1. L1: The leader's price jumps and experiments across its network (BP's Wednesday jumps in Perth)
  2. L2: Rivals see the lead and follow on the focal day
  3. L3: The moves read as messages

way out: Leads, experiments and coded bids sent to rivals

  1. L1: A price jump or coded bid placed where rivals see it
  2. L6: Test rivals and signal intentions

way out: Parallel conduct left in the record

  1. L1: Long high-frequency price panels that reveal transitions
  2. L7: Parallel prices and bids, with or without plus factors

way out: Prices held above the competitive level

  1. L1: Buyers pay the margin (Perth: 4.85 to 10.01 cents a litre)
  2. L6: Prices at the focal point
  3. L7: Hold the collusive price

way out: Retaliation: price wars and targeted punishment

  1. L1: Price war or a retaliatory bid lands on the deviant's market
  2. L5: Kept just long enough to discipline
  3. L7: Punish the deviation for a finite phase, then return

way out: Shares and territories divided

  1. L1: Licences allocated among bidders
  2. L7: Give the low-cost firm the larger share

Sources (29) published science

Tacit collusion (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01), version 1378909022
Ivaldi M, Jullien B, Rey P, Seabright P, Tirole J (2003). The Economics of Tacit Collusion. Final report for DG Competition, European Commission (IDEI Toulouse) (behind its links)
Byrne DP, de Roos N (2019). Learning to coordinate: a study in retail gasoline. American Economic Review 109(2):591-619. doi:10.1257/aer.20170116 (behind its links)
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 2023, Merger Guidelines (issued 18 December 2023) (behind its links)
Calvano E., Calzolari G., Denicolo V. & Pastorello S. 2020, Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion, American Economic Review 110(10):3267-3297, doi:10.1257/aer.20190623 (author accepted manuscript, University of Bologna repository; abstract and introduction read) (behind its links)
Fonseca MA, Normann H-T (2012). Explicit vs. tacit collusion: the impact of communication in oligopoly experiments. European Economic Review 56(8):1759-1772, doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.09.002. Full text read (author's posted copy; the paper portal reached the record only) (behind its links)
Collusion (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01, version 1378531455; read in full from the cache) (behind its links)
Harrington JE Jr (2012). A theory of tacit collusion. Johns Hopkins University Department of Economics Working Paper No. 588 (EconStor hdl 10419/101362). Full text read (introduction, sections on mutual understanding and the steady-state price) (behind its links)
Huck S, Normann H-T, Oechssler J (2001). Two are few and four are many: number effects in experimental oligopolies. Bonn Econ Discussion Paper 12/2001 (published J Econ Behav Organ 53:435-446, 2004) (behind its links)
Engel C (2007). How much collusion? A meta-analysis of oligopoly experiments. Journal of Competition Law & Economics 3(4), doi:10.1093/joclec/nhm016. Abstract only (paper portal) (behind its links)
Bajari P, Yeo J (2008). Auction design and tacit collusion in FCC spectrum auctions. NBER Working Paper 14441 (Information Economics and Policy 21(2):90-100, 2009). Full text read (behind its links)
Fish S, Gonczarowski YA, Shorrer RI (2024, v6 2026). Algorithmic collusion by large language models. arXiv:2404.00806 (behind its links)
Miller N, Weinberg M (2017). Understanding the price effects of the MillerCoors joint venture. Econometrica, doi:10.3982/ecta13333. Abstract only (paper portal; specialist pass) (behind its links)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), opinion of the Court (Cornell LII). Read in full (behind its links)
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Assad S., Clark R., Ershov D. & Xu L. 2024, Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market, Journal of Political Economy, doi:10.1086/726906 (abstract on EconPapers) (behind its links)
Ezrachi A, Stucke ME (2018/2020). Sustainable and unchallenged algorithmic tacit collusion. SSRN 3282235 (Northwestern Journal of Technology & Intellectual Property 17(2), 2020), doi:10.2139/ssrn.3282235. Full text read (paper portal, OpenAlex stored copy) (behind its links)
Knittel CR, Stango V (2003). Price ceilings as focal points for tacit collusion: evidence from credit cards. American Economic Review 93(5), doi:10.1257/000282803322655509. Abstract only (paper portal) (behind its links)
Axelrod R, Hamilton WD (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science 211(4489):1390-1396, doi:10.1126/science.7466396, PMID 7466396. Abstract only (paper portal) (behind its links)
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Ellison G (1994). Theories of cartel stability and the Joint Executive Committee. RAND Journal of Economics 25(1), doi:10.2307/2555852. Abstract only (paper portal; specialist pass) (behind its links)
Chamberlin EH (1929). Duopoly: value where sellers are few. Quarterly Journal of Economics 44(1), doi:10.2307/1885441. Record and contents list only (paper portal; specialist pass) (behind its links)
Federal Trade Commission (20 July 2010). FTC approves final order settling charges that U-Haul invited its main competitor to fix truck rental prices. Press release, read in full (behind its links)
Haltiwanger J, Harrington JE (1991). The impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior. RAND Journal of Economics 22(1), doi:10.2307/2601009. Abstract only (paper portal; specialist pass) (behind its links)
Borenstein S, Shepard A (1996). Dynamic pricing in retail gasoline markets. RAND Journal of Economics 27(3), doi:10.2307/2555838. Abstract only (paper portal; specialist pass) (behind its links)
Klein T (2021). Autonomous algorithmic collusion: Q-learning under sequential pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12383. Abstract only (paper portal; specialist pass) (behind its links)
Kovacic WE, Marshall RC, Marx LM, White HL (2011). Plus factors and agreement in antitrust law. Michigan Law Review 110(3):393-436, doi:10.36644/mlr.110.3.plus. Full text read (paper portal, OpenAlex stored copy; specialist pass) (behind its links)
Brown ZY, MacKay A (2023). Competition in pricing algorithms. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, doi:10.1257/mic.20210158. Abstract only (paper portal; specialist pass) (behind its links)
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs (24 November 2025). Justice Department requires RealPage to end the sharing of competitively sensitive information and alignment of pricing among competitors. Press release, read in full (behind its links)