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Oligopoly

In economics an oligopoly is a market in which a few sellers hold pricing control, so that each must reckon with how the others will respond. Industrial organization models the interdependence as a game: quantities chosen at once (Cournot, 1838), prices chosen at once (Bertrand, 1883), or a leader moving first and followers responding (Stackelberg, 1934). Repeated play lets the few sustain prices above the one-shot level by a tacit understanding backed by the threat of retaliation (tacit collusion), or by an explicit agreement (a cartel), which competition law prohibits; how easily this holds depends on the number of firms, entry barriers, how often they meet, how well they see each other's prices, demand swings, cost and capacity asymmetries. Incumbents can deter entry by irreversible commitments. Walked here as that market form and the conduct it carries; the firms are sys:firm, the explicit agreement sys:cartel.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born atper market: any time concentration rises to a few sellers; described in theory from Cournot's spring-water duopoly (1838)
born precisionn/a
boundaryInside: the few sellers of one relevant market, their interdependent choices of price, quantity, capacity and investment, and whatever conduct regime holds among them (rivalry, tacit coordination, an explicit cartel). Outside: the buyers, potential entrants kept out by barriers, input suppliers, competition authorities and courts, and other markets. The line is drawn by market definition and entry barriers: an open oligopoly has none, a closed one has prominent barriers. In practice the relevant market is drawn by the hypothetical monopolist test: whether a hypothetical monopolist over a candidate market could profitably raise price.
nested levelBuilt from a few firms and the rules of play among them; a kind of market structure (between monopoly and many-firm competition); an industry within the economy; runs on its firms' decisions.
scalesocial

Measures (22) published science

critical discount factor for collusion, n identical price-setting firmsdelta* = 1 - 1/n: 0.50 for two firms, 0.67 for three dimensionless
HHI threshold for a highly concentrated market (US 2023)above 1,800; a change of more than 100 points is significant; 10,000 for one firm index points
four-firm concentration ratio for a tight oligopolyabove 60 (loose: 40-60) percent of market
cartel overcharge, raw case estimatesmean 31-49% (Connor and Lande 2008); mean 50.4% for successful cartels (Connor 2010) percent above competitive price
cartel overcharge, bias-correctedmean 15.47%, median 16.01% percent above competitive price
US base cartel fine, share of affected commerce20% (10% base plus 10% for buyers priced out) percent of affected commerce
cartel durationaverage about five years across studies; median five to six years; bimodal, many under one year, some decades
annual probability a functioning cartel is discoveredroughly 10% (as cited by Wachs and Kertesz); at most 13-17% for US conspiracies (Bryant and Eckard 1991); 12.9-13.3% for EU cartels (Combe, Monnier and Legal 2008) per year
Perth retail gasoline price cycle length after the focal point7 days for all firms from April 2009 (7 to 35 days before)
Perth average daily retail gasoline margin, before and after March 2010difference-in-difference against other Australian cities +3.49 cpl (SE 0.39), between 1.00 and 3.49 cpl (19-64%) depending on sampling; raw: 4.85 cpl (SD 4.19) before, 10.01 cpl (SD 4.68) after, which partly reflects a national trend Australian cents per litre
settling time of a coordinated equilibrium (Perth gasoline)about three years
Perth gasoline station shares 2005-2015BP 22%, Caltex 16%, Woolworths 14%, Coles 16%, remaining 32% largely independents percent of stations
experimental Cournot markets by number of firms2 firms: some collusion; 3: near Nash; 4-5: never collusive, at or above Cournot output qualitative
Theocharis stability bound, linear Cournot best-response dynamicsstable with 2 firms, oscillatory with 3, unstable with 4 or more (discrete best-reply adjustment, linear demand)
satellite duopoly constellations, leader and followerleader 29,750 satellites at 500 km; follower 1,945 satellites at 603 km satellites; km altitude
welfare lost to duopoly in orbit useup to 12% (about USD 1.1 billion per year) below a welfare-maximising public utility system; per-hand-off efficiency of orbit use under duopoly about 0.88 or more of the regulated benchmark percent of welfare
share of natural and medical science papers from the top five publishersa little over 20% (1973), 30% (1996), 50% (2006), 53% (2013) percent of papers
public contracts screened for cartel groups (Georgia 2011-2016)nearly 150,000 contracts
Lerner index and the Cournot marginL = (P - MC)/P, from 0 (competitive) to 1; Lerner rule L = -1/E_d for a profit-maximiser with market power; Cournot firm i: (P - c_i)/P = s_i / eta; the HHI tracks the share-weighted average margin under Cournot with linear costs dimensionless
average US markup over marginal cost (firm-level data)18% in 1980 rising to 67% (2017 working paper; the later published figures not read) percent above marginal cost
common-ownership-adjusted concentration, US airlinesincreases in concentration 10 times larger than what antitrust authorities presume likely to enhance market power
experimental Cournot output against predictionthe ratio of actual to predicted total output rises significantly with the number of firms qualitative

Open contentions (11) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (24) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Oligopoly. Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (12) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (4)

Sits inside / holds (4)

expressed by (18)

floor filled by (13)

represents (1)

Kinds (10)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

oligopoly as industrial organization describes it: a few sellers' market to their moves (reader's view)

  1. L1: Buyers' demand and the few sellers' offers on one relevant market; prices posted where buyers can compare them
  2. L2: The few: number of sellers and their shares (concentration: HHI, four-firm ratio), held few by entry barriers (investment, loyalty, regulation, scale)
  3. L3: Watching the rivals: observability of prices, terms and sales; detection of a deviation
  4. L4: Interdependence: each seller's best response to the others' quantities (Cournot), prices (Bertrand) or a leader's committed move (Stackelberg)
  5. L5: The conduct regime: rivalry, tacit coordination (focal points, price leadership) or an explicit cartel, held by the threat of retaliation and by patience
  6. L6: The settled outcome: market price, outputs, shares and margins between the competitive and the monopoly level
  7. L7: The moves acted on the world: prices and output set, irreversible commitments (capacity, R&D, advertising), entry deterred or accommodated, price wars launched

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: Interdependence: best responses to the rivals' quantities, prices or committed moves (Cournot, Bertrand, Stackelberg); conjectures about rivals' reactions
  2. L5: The conduct regime of repeated play: compete, coordinate tacitly, or agree explicitly; retaliation threats and the patience that sustain them
  3. L6: The settled outcome: price, outputs, shares, margins (between Bertrand cost pricing and the monopoly level)
  4. L7: The sellers' moves: set prices and quantities, commit capacity and R&D, deter or accommodate entry, launch or end price wars

way in: Competition law: prohibition, merger review, detection and fines

  1. L1: Statutes and agencies that prohibit price-fixing and review mergers
  2. L2: Merger review by concentration: structures conducive to coordination are blocked
  3. L3: Detection and penalties: roughly a 10% yearly chance of discovery; fines set on affected commerce; leniency for early confessors, the cornerstone of enforcement, turning members' trust problem against the cartel

way in: Contact in other markets and shared owners

  1. L1: The same rivals met in other geographic or product markets; rivals held by the same institutional investors
  2. L2: More frequent interaction across markets; cross-ownership lowering the gain from undercutting
  3. L3: Asymmetries in single markets softened by trading advantages across markets

way in: Costs and capacity: inputs, scale and technology

  1. L1: Inputs and technology; economies of scale
  2. L2: Marginal cost and capacity: whether one seller can supply the whole market
  3. L3: Cost asymmetry: a low-cost firm fears a price war less

way in: Demand: buyers' purchases and the sales each seller makes

  1. L1: Buyers choosing among the sellers' offers, observing their prices
  2. L2: Each seller's own sales and market share; large buyers can concentrate orders to make interaction less frequent (buyer power)
  3. L3: Demand shocks read through own sales: a drop may be bad luck or a rival's cheating; booms raise the gain from deviating

way in: Potential entrants: the threat of entry

  1. L1: Outside firms able to enter if profits are high and barriers low
  2. L2: Entry barriers that filter them: investment, loyalty, regulation, scale, sunk costs
  3. L3: Contestability: the credible threat of short-term entry disciplining the few

way in: Pricing algorithms: software that reads rivals' prices and sets one's own

  1. L1: Price data streams and the tools that track or predict competitor prices
  2. L2: The pricing agent (Q-learning or a large language model) taking in all prices and its own demand, without the demand function
  3. L3: Learned strategy: reward and punishment answering a rival's low (high) price with low (high) prices, decaying over periods; prompts shift the level

way in: Rivals' prices and quantities

  1. L1: The rivals' prices, outputs and terms offered to customers
  2. L2: Observability: how promptly and easily rivals' terms can be seen (published prices, trade publications, monitoring)
  3. L3: Detecting a deviation: an undercut must be identified before it can be punished

way in: Talk among sellers: meetings, associations, announcements

  1. L1: Meetings, industry and trade associations
  2. L2: Information exchange, public or private, raising observability
  3. L3: The terms of an agreement: when and how high, who leads, how fast to follow, what counts as violation

way in: The history of play: past price wars, past coordination, focal points

  1. L1: The whole history of play that strategies may condition on
  2. L2: Focal points that emerge from play (Thursday price jumps, 2-cent cuts)
  3. L3: Reputation of the market: prior coordination or failed attempts read as susceptibility

way out: Irreversible commitments: capacity, R&D, limit prices, aimed at entrants and rivals

  1. L1: Outside firms face a market they cannot profitably enter
  2. L2: The barrier raised: excess capacity or a limit price that makes entry unprofitable
  3. L7: Investment chosen to deter or accommodate entry (over- or under-invest)

way out: Prices and output to buyers

  1. L1: Buyers pay the price; overcharges under cartels
  2. L6: The margin above cost (above the competitive level when coordination holds)
  3. L7: Price or quantity chosen

way out: R&D races and new technology

  1. L1: New technology and patents in the world
  2. L7: R&D spending set against rivals' in a race to a patent

way out: Retaliation: price wars and targeted punishment

  1. L1: The deviant's sales and profits cut (fighting ships)
  2. L5: The trigger: revert to competition, or a price war for T periods
  3. L7: Retaliation launched after a deviation

way out: Signals to rivals: price leadership and price experiments

  1. L1: Rivals follow, raising or lowering by the same amount
  2. L3: The move made observable to rivals
  3. L7: A dominant firm leads a price rise or experiments with prices

Who fills each layer

Sources (35) published science

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U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 2023, Merger Guidelines (issued 18 December 2023) (behind its links)
Collusion (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01, version 1378531455; read in full from the cache) (behind its links)
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Wachs J, Kertesz J (2019). A network approach to cartel detection in public auction markets. Scientific Reports 9:10818. doi:10.1038/s41598-019-47198-1 (behind its links)
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Guyot J, Rao A, Rouillon S (2023). Oligopoly competition between satellite constellations will reduce economic welfare from orbit use. PNAS 120:e2221343120. doi:10.1073/pnas.2221343120 (behind its links)
Lariviere V, Haustein S, Mongeon P (2015). The oligopoly of academic publishers in the digital era. PLoS One 10:e0127502. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0127502 (behind its links)
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Hou et al. (2025). Stability analysis of heterogeneous oligopoly games of increasing players: a computational approach. PLoS One. PMC12582497 (behind its links)
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Fish S, Gonczarowski YA, Shorrer RI (2024, v6 2026). Algorithmic collusion by large language models. arXiv:2404.00806 (behind its links)
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Calvano E., Calzolari G., Denicolo V. & Pastorello S. 2020, Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Pricing, and Collusion, American Economic Review 110(10):3267-3297, doi:10.1257/aer.20190623 (author accepted manuscript, University of Bologna repository; abstract and introduction read) (behind its links)
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