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Monopoly
A market in which one seller is the only supplier of a good or service with no close substitutes, so that it sets the price (or the quantity) instead of taking it from the market. Economics treats it as one pole of market structure: the seller faces the whole market's downward-sloping demand, sets marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, and so sells less at a price above marginal cost, and can earn a monopoly profit, leaving a deadweight loss; the markup is limited by how elastic demand is (the Lerner rule). Its power comes from barriers to entry: economies of scale (natural monopoly, where one firm's costs are subadditive), control of a critical resource, legal grants (letters patent, charters, patents and copyrights, state monopolies), network effects, and deliberate exclusion. Law treats monopoly as significant market power: holding it is mostly not illegal, abusing or attempting it is (the Sherman Act 1890, Article 102 TFEU), and natural monopolies are regulated or publicly owned. History runs from Aristotle's Thales and state salt monopolies through chartered trading companies and the trusts to today's platforms; how harmful monopolies are, and how long they last, stays disputed.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | per monopoly: any date; the concept: Aristotle's Politics (Thales and the olive presses; a Sicilian's iron corner; cities making 'a monopoly of provisions'); state monopolies of salt and iron under Han Emperor Wu (before 87 BCE); a Tang salt commission from 758 (draft said 'a legal monopoly by 758') |
| born precision | n/a |
| boundary | Inside: the one seller's supply of a good with no close substitute, the barriers that keep others out, and the seller's pricing and conduct; the seller is, for practical purposes, the industry. Outside: the buyers (who buy on its terms or do without), potential entrants and substitutes, the suppliers of its inputs, and the state that grants, regulates or breaks up monopolies. Where the line falls depends on how the market is defined (product and geography): defined narrowly, more sellers look dominant; defined broadly, fewer. |
| nested level | Built from a firm (the single seller), its barriers to entry and the buyers' demand it faces; a kind of market structure (with perfect competition, monopolistic competition and oligopoly); embedded in a market and an economy under competition law and the state. |
| scale | social |
Measures (33) published science
| Deadweight loss from monopoly, US industry (Harberger 1954) | about 0.1 percent of US GNP |
| Cost of markup misallocation in aggregate TFP | about 15 percent of aggregate TFP (two orders of magnitude above Harberger's 0.1 percent; data imperfect, heavily imputed) |
| Average markup over marginal cost, US listed firms | 18 percent (1980) to 67 percent (2016 data, paper of 2017) percent above marginal cost |
| Rate of rise of the price level relative to cost | about 1 percent per year over 35 years |
| US spending on rent-seeking of all kinds, 1985 (Laband and Sophocleus) | about 1 trillion US dollars per year |
| Share of the labour-share fall explained by rising concentration | about a third fraction |
| Domestic against import-adjusted concentration rise, import-exposed US manufacturing | 6.7 against 1.6 percentage points |
| Industry leaders' share of US CAPX plus R&D | 35 percent before 1995; 29 percent after 1996 |
| Standard Oil share of US oil refining, 1904 | 91 (refining); 85 (final sales) percent |
| U.S. Steel share of US steel output | 67 (first full year, from 1901) to 50 (by 1911) percent |
| De Beers share of the diamond market by value | as high as 90 (1980s) to under 40 (2012) percent |
| EU dominance presumption threshold (AKZO) | 50 percent market share |
| Lowest EU market share found dominant | 39.7 percent |
| US merger guidelines: HHI line for 'not concentrated' | 1000 HHI (sum of squared shares) |
| Lerner index range | 0 (perfect competition) to 1 index |
| Patent term today (characteristic clock of a legal monopoly) | usually 20 years from filing |
| Patent term under the Statute of Monopolies (1624) | 14 or under years |
| Dutch East India Company charter monopoly term | 21 years (from 1602) |
| Lifetime of the French Gabelle | 1286 to 1945 (659 years) |
| Revenue-maximising example (demand P = 50 - 2Q) | Q = 12.5, P = 25 units, price |
| Breeding success of burying beetles prevented from burying their carcass | none broods raised |
| US merger guidelines 2023: highly concentrated HHI | above 1,800 (with a change above 100 points: presumed to lessen competition) HHI |
| US merger guidelines 2023: share presumption | over 30 percent (with an HHI change above 100) percent market share |
| Average markup over marginal cost, US firms (published QJE 2020) | 21 percent (1980) to 61 percent; median unchanged percent above marginal cost |
| Average profit rate, US firms (published QJE 2020) | 1 to 8 percent |
| Standard Oil share of US refining capacity, 1880 and 1911 | 90 (1880); 60 to 65 (1911) percent |
| Corporations appealing in the Standard Oil case | 34 (Standard of New Jersey and thirty-three others) corporations |
| Time allowed to execute the Standard Oil dissolution decree | at least six months (extended from thirty days) |
| US Steel case: bill to decision | 1911 to 1 March 1920 years |
| Sicilian iron corner's gain (Aristotle) | 200 percent |
| Posted-wage gap, 25th to 75th percentile of labour-market concentration | 17 percent lower |
| Firms surveyed on management practices | 732 medium manufacturing firms in the US, France, Germany and the UK |
| Bell System breakup: successor regional companies | seven, from twenty-two AT&T-controlled members; effective 1 January 1984 companies |
Open contentions (12) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-3464 How should the 1984 breakup of AT&T be described?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: the Monopoly page: AT&T 'broken up into various components, MCI, Sprint' (src:wp:monopoly; MCI and Sprint were rivals, per the specialist) - C-3472 Does monopoly help or hurt innovation?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: Schumpeter: monopoly rents reward innovation (standard IO theory, per Aghion et al.); empirical positive link between competition and innovation (Geroski, Nickell, Blundell-Griffith-Van Reenen, per Aghion et al.) - C-3477 Why have markups and concentration risen since 1980?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: SCP against Chicago: concentration causes profit, or efficient firms cause both (2014 Nobel background); the published markup rise is in the upper tail with the median unchanged (src:deloecker-eeckhout-unger-2020-qje), a fact both readings lean on - C-3495 Is charging a monopoly price against the law?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: the encyclopedia's general 'In law' sentence, which frames monopoly by overly high prices - C-3498 How long did France's salt monopoly, the gabelle, last?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: - C-3532 Can markups be measured from company accounts at all?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: the ratio estimator without output quantity data may not identify markups or their trend (Bond, Hashemi, Kaplan and Zoch 2020); specialist's leads, not opened: Traina 2018 (SG&A as variable cost), Basu 2019 and Syverson 2019 (JEP reviews) - C-3536 How much does monopoly cost an economy?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: the Chicago reading: concentration and profit can reflect efficiency, not harm (Demsetz, via the 2014 Nobel background); what is compared differs: Harberger's partial-equilibrium triangle against Baqaee-Farhi's general-equilibrium loss from markup dispersion (specialist pass) - C-3537 Do monopolies last?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: persistence depends on the barrier: natural and legal monopolies last as long as the cost structure or the grant (the Gabelle 659 years); Standard Oil's share was already eroding (90 percent 1880, 60-65 percent by 1911, src:wp:standard-oil); U.S. Steel lost share from 67 to 50 percent and won its case in 1920 (src:us-v-us-steel-1920); perfect contestability needs no sunk costs and is not possible in real life (src:wp:contestable-market) - C-3539 Can a monopolist extend its power into a second market?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: the one-monopoly-profit theorem: a monopolist can extract only one premium, so leveraging does not pay (the once prevalent Chicago view); the mechanism: an upstream monopolist that cannot commit against secret deals earns only the Cournot outcome; vertical integration or exclusivity restores the monopoly (Hart and Tirole 1990, via src:nobel-2014-tirole-background) - C-3557 Into how many companies was Standard Oil broken up?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: 33 companies (the Monopoly article); 34 corporations as appellants in the 1911 opinion (src:us-v-standard-oil-1911: Standard of New Jersey 'and thirty-three other corporations'); the specialist recalls 34 from business histories - C-3558 When was the suit against Standard Oil filed?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: 1909 (a sentence of the Standard Oil page, which elsewhere also says 1906) - C-3565 When did the antitrust case against U.S. Steel end?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: the encyclopedia: 'antitrust prosecution that year [1911] failed' (src:wp:monopoly)
Cross-scale patterns seen here (21) our proposal
Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Monopoly. Each links to every other system that shows it.
- same role, different builds (structural)
One job, holding the single-seller seat against entrants, done by unrelated builds: falling average cost (natural monopoly), control of a raw material (salt springs, diamond mines), a legal grant (letters patent, charters, patents), an installed base of users (network effects), and deliberate exclus - The Payment to Entropy (structural)
Re-read against the catalog's firing rule (part of what is handed over arrives in a form the next holder can't use; dark twin: a loss that is really a hand-off to another user, or only a gap in the measurement). The deadweight triangle does not fit: it is trade that never happens, so nothing is hand - the whole sets the local reference (structural)
Whether a seller is dominant is read against a market whose bounds the court draws: the same firm is dominant in a narrowly defined market and not in a broadly defined one, and import-adjusted concentration rose far less than domestic concentration (6.7 against 1.6 points). The whole (the defined ma - trade one property for another (structural)
Regulating a natural monopoly trades cost-cutting incentive against the rent left to the firm: rate-of-return and cost-plus rules give no motive to cut cost; price caps give strong incentives but large rents to efficient firms; the optimal scheme sits between (Laffont-Tirole). The monopolist itself - barrier-gates-complexity (partial)
In the burying beetle, burying the carcass (the barrier that monopolizes it) gates the whole of parental care: beetles prevented from burying never raised offspring, and parental care is most common where resources can be monopolized. In markets the claimed form is that a patent's barrier pays for i - borrowed-then-held (partial)
The East India companies borrowed their exclusion from the state (a royal charter; the Dutch company's 21-year monopoly) and came to hold it with their own force and quasi-governmental powers (the English company's armies of about 260,000; the Dutch company's power to wage war). Both phases are show - conservation law plus closure (partial)
Profit = revenue minus cost leaves price and quantity open for a monopoly: with no supply curve, it closes only with a behavioural rule (MR = MC) on the demand curve; regulation closes it differently (average-cost pricing, price caps). - namespace completeness (the map predicts its gaps) (partial)
The market-structure grid (number of sellers, number of buyers, substitutability) sorts monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition and perfect competition, and its mirror on the buyers' side predicts monopsony and the rest. The grid is a classification more than a predictive map, so partial. - outside-to-inside (partial)
Rivalry among separate companies moved inside one trust: Standard Oil combined companies under one control, and the 1911 breakup showed the parts (33 or 39 companies) that had been rivals or units outside before. The outside phase (separate refiners) is told in the histories but not quantified in th - red-queen (partial)
Neck-and-neck firms innovate to escape competition (the escape-competition effect); both sides improve and, while neck and neck, neither escapes. The stalemate is the model's state, the measured result an inverted U, so partial. - runaway from an unstable balance (partial)
Network effects: once one good gains an initial edge, more users raise its value and draw more users, and the market tips to one good; the scale loop does the same for a natural monopoly out of an initial rivalry. The balance point (equal rivals) is implied, not measured, so partial. - same shape, opposite sign (partial)
Monopoly and monopsony: one seller against many buyers, one buyer against many sellers; the same act (one side alone restricting the quantity traded to move the price in its favour) with the direction reversed. The monopsony mechanism is named in the sources read only as 'the ability to influence th - same toolkit, independent builds (partial)
State salt monopolies built separately from the same parts (control of a scarce, needed mineral plus a tax): Tang China's salt commission from 758 and France's Gabelle from 1286. Independence is plausible from time and place but not argued in the source, so partial. - symmetry breaking (name the cut) (partial)
A natural monopoly often comes out of an initial rivalry of several competitors (a symmetric start), broken when an early entrant exploits the cost structure and expands; the cut is named (the cost structure and the speed of expansion), but the before-state is described only in words. - templating (partial)
One pricing module reused across market structures: monopoly and competitive firms share cost functions and the profit rule, and the Lerner markup rule reads both (L = 0 for the competitive firm, above 0 for the monopolist). Reuse of a model, so partial. - Umwelt: each system carves its own slice of one shared medium (partial)
The monopolist reads its slice of buyers' lives for willingness to pay (postcodes, dress, car, occupation, income and spending), while the courts read the same market as shares and HHI, and economists read markups from firm data: three slices of one market. - who opens the door (partial)
Two doors, two openers. A legal monopoly's door is opened from outside the market, ahead of time, by the crown or legislature (letters patent, a charter, a patent): the grant waits before any entrant arrives. The buyer's door is a port the seller installs ahead of time: the posted price or price men - causal ceiling (surface)
The regulator cannot observe whether the monopoly is doing its best to keep costs low: the social surplus 'will never be fully revealed by prices'. Framed as an information asymmetry the mechanism designer works around, not a structural bound, so surface. - lightning (surface)
The 1911 Standard Oil ruling: a stored tension (91 percent of refining, two decades of antitrust law) released at once, the trust dissolved into dozens of companies, two of whose children are ExxonMobil and Chevron. A single court discharge that reshaped the industry; told as an event, not a mechani - not-diluting wins (surface)
In a natural monopoly the large firm's fixed cost is diluted over its output while a small entrant's is not; in ponds, the first colonists' numbers dilute later migrants' genes (the monopolization hypothesis). Diluting wins here, the sign of the template reversed, so surface; also booked as same-sha - partner-becomes-part (surface)
U.S. Steel was made by combining Carnegie Steel, Federal Steel and National Steel into one company; separate firms became parts. They were rivals more than gain/gain partners, so surface.
Valence: what it trades, and with whom (12) published science
Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:human-society · Monopoly gain
- State (polity); the nation state its predominant modern form via sys:human-society · Monopoly mixed
- Market and trade via sys:market · Monopoly gain
- Labour market via sys:human-society · Monopoly gain
- Oligopoly via sys:market · Monopoly even
- Firm (the economic unit) via sys:market · Monopoly gain
- Entrant firm (startup) via sys:market · Monopoly gain
- Consumer via sys:market · Monopoly gain
- Corporate law via sys:human-society · Monopoly gain
- Patent via sys:human-society · Monopoly gain
- Market competition via sys:market · Monopoly loss
- Competition law via sys:human-society · Monopoly loss
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (5)
- Firm (the economic unit)
- Consumer
- Barriers to entry
- The incumbent monopolist and would-be entrants competing for the market
- The monopolist and its buyers competing for the gains from trade
Sits inside / holds (3)
expressed by (10)
- Generation/Synthesis
- Amplification/Scale-Up (Manufacture & Distribution)
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Sensing/Scanning
- Resource Denial/Attrition
- Subversion & Co-optation
- Battlespace Shaping
- Leverage Host/Amplification
- Physical/Virtual Barrier
- Deterrence
floor filled by (17)
- State (polity); the nation state its predominant modern form
- Market and trade
- Firm (the economic unit)
- Natural resource
- Consumer
- Patent
- Competition law
- Barriers to entry
- Price discrimination
- Network effect
- Economies of scale
- Rent-seeking
- Deadweight loss
- Lerner index
- Economic regulation (price caps, rate of return)
- Tacit collusion
- Two-sided market (platform)
represents (1)
Kinds (7)
- Market structure
- Firm (the economic unit)
- Market competition
- Natural monopoly
- Government-granted (legal, de jure) monopoly
- Government (state-owned) monopoly
- Platform (two-sided) dominance
Notes published science
- Aristotle already knew how monopolies work and how rulers react. In the Politics he tells of Thales cornering the olive presses and of a man in Sicily who bought up all the iron and made 200 percent. The tyrant Dionysius let him keep his money but banished him from Syracuse for finding a way to get rich that hurt the state. Aristotle adds that cities short of money 'make a monopoly of provisions' (src:aristotle-politics-jowett).
- Economists still argue about how much monopoly costs and even about how to measure it. In 1954 Harberger put the cost at about 0.1 percent of US GNP. A newer estimate from firm markups puts it nearer 15 percent of productivity, and published figures have US average markups rising from 21 to 61 percent above cost since 1980, but the median firm's markup hasn't moved. Other economists doubt the method can measure markups at all (src:hines-1999-harberger-triangles, src:baqaee-farhi-2017-misallocation, src:deloecker-eeckhout-unger-2020-qje, src:bond-2020-markup-arithmetic).
- A monopolist's worst competitor can be itself. If it sells something durable and can't promise not to cut the price later, buyers just wait, and the price slides toward cost (the Coase conjecture). The same trap catches regulators who can't commit and suppliers who can't refuse secret side deals (src:nobel-2014-tirole-background).
- Burying beetles are monopolists too. They bury a carcass to keep it from rivals, and beetles prevented from burying never raised a single brood. Biologists find parental care is most common where a resource can be monopolized (src:bolger-martin-2026-burying-beetles).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
monopoly as economists and lawyers describe it: the whole market's buyers to the sole seller's choice of price and output (reader's view)
- L1: The buyers: the whole market's demand, downward-sloping, every buyer facing the one seller
- L2: The seat: the only seller, no close substitutes, kept so by barriers to entry (economic, legal, deliberate)
- L3: Production and the cost function: high fixed and low marginal cost; in a natural monopoly, one firm's costs subadditive
- L4: The pricing calculus: marginal revenue below price, set equal to marginal cost; the Lerner markup inversely proportional to demand elasticity
- L5: Market power: the price maker sets price or quantity (not both); where it can sort buyers, it prices them apart
- L6: Rents and their keeping: monopoly profit held by barriers; sought and defended (rent-seeking, lobbying, capture); checked by potential entry, regulation and law
- L7: The choice acted on the market: less output at a higher price than competition would give, a deadweight loss; exclusion, price discrimination, innovation; all under competition law
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L4: The pricing calculus: marginal revenue set equal to marginal cost; the markup over cost set by demand elasticity (the Lerner index, 0 to 1)
- L5: Market power: the price maker, setting price or quantity but not both, pricing segments apart where it can
- L6: Rents and their keeping: monopoly profit, held by barriers, sought by rent-seekers, eroded by entry, capped or taken by regulation
- L7: The choice: output and price, whether to exclude, discriminate, lobby or innovate
way in: A critical resource held
- L1: Scarce deposits of a raw material the final good needs
- L2: Control of the deposits (whoever holds the mines and springs)
- L3: Supply held back: buying and stockpiling others' output to control price
way in: Competition law and regulation
- L1: Courts, competition authorities and regulators
- L2: The statutes: Sherman Act section 2 (1890), Article 102 TFEU
- L3: The tests: market definition, market shares, HHI
- L4: A finding of dominance and of abuse (having a monopoly is not itself illegal)
- L5: Remedies and regulation: breakups, unbundling, price caps or rate-of-return rules, public ownership
way in: Costs: inputs and technology
- L1: Inputs bought on factor markets, assumed competitive
- L2: Technology and scale: high fixed, low marginal cost; fixed costs diluted as output grows
- L3: The cost function; subadditive in a natural monopoly (Baumol 1977)
way in: Demand: buyers' willingness to pay
- L1: Buyers who take the good on the seller's terms or do without
- L2: The market demand curve, all of it the monopolist's, sloping down
- L3: Marginal revenue, below price at every output
way in: Entrants and substitutes
- L1: Potential competitors and substitutes outside the market
- L2: The barrier tested: excess profits draw entrants where entry is free
- L3: The entry threat read: a contestable market forces competitive behaviour
way in: Information about buyers
- L1: Buyers' characteristics and actions: where they live, what they drive, income, spending
- L2: Market information gathered
- L3: Buyers sorted into segments
- L4: Marginal revenue set equal across segments at the common marginal cost (third-degree discrimination): the less elastic segment pays more
way in: The state's grant (letters patent, charters, patents, licences)
- L1: The state (crown, parliament, legislature) and its law
- L2: The grant instrument: letters patent, a charter, a patent, a statute reserving a trade
- L3: The exclusive right and its term (14 years in 1624; 21 years for the Dutch company; usually 20 years for a patent today)
- L4: Others excluded from making, using or selling the good
way in: Users joining (network effects)
- L1: Users whose use changes the product's value to others
- L2: The installed base: more users, more demand
- L3: Tipping: one good pulls away and dominates
way out: Exclusion of rivals
- L1: Entrants kept out, bought out or driven out
- L6: Price set low for a time to force entrants out
- L7: Exclusionary conduct chosen: limit pricing, predation, exclusive dealing, tying, buying rivals
way out: Innovation for the rent
- L1: A superior innovation that may unseat the incumbent
- L3: New technology in production; patents taken
- L7: Innovating to escape competition or to win a temporary monopoly rent
way out: Output at the monopoly price
- L1: Fewer goods in buyers' hands at a higher price; trades valued above cost forgone
- L5: One price posted for all buyers (in the standard model)
- L7: Output chosen where marginal revenue equals marginal cost
way out: Prices set apart by segment
- L1: Buyers paying different prices for the same good; some pooled with high payers excluded
- L5: A price per segment, version or buyer
way out: Rent-seeking toward the state
- L1: Rules that control entry: grants, licences, regulations
- L6: Resources spent to obtain or keep monopoly positions