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Two-sided market (platform)

A market in which an intermediary, the platform, serves two distinct groups of users who value each other's presence (cardholders and merchants, readers and advertisers, gamers and game developers, riders and drivers), so that the value of joining for one group depends on how many of the other group join (cross-side or indirect network effects). Economists define it by what the platform must choose: not only a price level but a price structure, the split of charges between the two sides, which changes volume and profit because end users cannot pass the charges through to each other (the failure of the Coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient). Platforms therefore often charge one side little, nothing or less than nothing (a loss leader or subsidy side) and recover on the other (the money side). Users may single-home or multihome; where one side single-homes, platforms compete hard for it and charge the multihoming side monopoly prices for access (a competitive bottleneck). Network effects push such markets toward tipping and a few large platforms, so market power, market definition and conduct (interchange fees, anti-steering rules, exclusivity, tying, envelopment) are read differently in competition law, as in Ohio v. American Express (2018) and the EU's card-fee caps and Digital Markets Act. Payment cards, newspapers and media, operating systems and game consoles, and digital platforms (search, marketplaces, ride hailing) are the worked cases.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

aliasesTwo-sided market
born atper platform: any date; earliest cases read here: newspapers carrying paid advertisements (circulation and advertising markets studied since Corden 1952-53 and Reddaway 1963), the first general-purpose charge card (Diners Club, 1950), BankAmericard (1958); the economics: Rochet-Tirole 2003, Caillaud-Jullien 2003, Armstrong 2006
born precisionn/a
boundaryInside: the platform (the intermediary firm or association that runs the rules, the technology and the prices), the two (or more) groups of users who join it, and the interactions it carries between them (a card transaction, an advertisement seen, a game bought for a console, a ride matched). Outside: the users' alternatives (cash, other platforms they could join or already multihome on, one-sided sellers), the rival platforms, the suppliers of the platform's inputs, and the state and courts that regulate its prices and conduct. Where the line falls is itself contested in law: one market spanning both sides (transaction platforms, per the 2018 majority) or two linked markets (the dissent; media platforms).
nested levelBuilt from a platform firm (or a not-for-profit association of member banks), two user groups and the cross-side network effects between them; a kind of market; embedded in an economy under competition law and the state. Two-sidedness may be a strategy chosen by a firm (Amazon added a marketplace after starting as a retailer) rather than fixed by technology.
scalesocial

Measures (31) published science

Split of a $100 card purchase (US example)about 98 to the retailer; 1.75 issuer, 0.18 network, 0.07 acquirer US dollars
US average interchange rate179 basis points (1.79%)
US interchange fee, as a share of transaction valueapproximately 2 percent
EU interchange caps (Regulation 2015/751)0.3 credit, 0.2 debit percent of transaction
Interchange share of merchants' card fees70 to 90 percent
Visa and MasterCard interchange fees collected26 (2004); 30.7 (2005) billion US dollars
Merchant fee to the merchant's banktypically less than 3 percent of the purchase
Card association membersover 6,000 bank and nonbank members (Visa and MasterCard)
US credit-card shares by transaction volume (as of 2013)Visa 45; Amex 26.4; MasterCard 23.3; Discover 5.3 percent
Amex merchant price rises without losing a large merchant (2005-2010)20 price rises in five years
US bottom-quintile households with a credit card2 (1970) to over 38 (2001) percent
Interchange-fee settlement, US merchants' class action (2013)7.25 billion US dollars
Waterbed effect in mobile telephonytermination rates down about 10%, mobile retail prices up 5% percent
Italian newspapers: observed markup per copy0.943 euro per copy
Italian newspapers: own price elasticity of readers' demandaround 0.48 elasticity
Share of newspaper revenue from advertising70-80 percent
Share of video game titles released on more than one consoleabout 12 to almost 40 percent, over 20 years (to about 2005)
PlayStation 3 loss per console sold250 US dollars per unit
Free-PC losses (1999)80 million US dollars
Ride-hailing surge response period (model)roughly 5-10 minutes per period
Cardholder single-homing spellmonths time a consumer sticks to a single card
Public awareness of interchange fees (US, January 2007)about a third of the public had heard of them
Reserve Bank of Australia interchange reduction (2003)about 0.95 to approximately 0.5 percent of the transaction
US debit interchange cap (Regulation II)21 cents plus 5 basis points of value; up to 1 cent more for fraud prevention (about 24 cents on the average $38 transaction) per debit transaction
Amazon's own share of new items listed (books against electronics)more than 50 (books); closer to 1 (electronics) percent of new items listed sold by Amazon itself
Share of eBay buyers who leave feedbackapproximately 65 (over 80 in eBay's early days) percent
eBay seller percent positive against effective percent positivepercent positive mean 99.3, median 100; EPP mean 64, median 67 percent (about two million sellers, June 2011-May 2014)
Annual transfer between cash and card payers (US calibration)149 paid by each cash buyer; 1,133 received by each card buyer US dollars a year
Banks' card merchant-fee revenue from cash payersabout 79 percent
Annual redistribution through credit card rewards (US)15 billion US dollars a year
UberX consumer surplus (2015)about 2.9 (four US cities); about 6.8 (US, back-of-the-envelope); about 1.60 per dollar spent billion US dollars

Open contentions (8) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (22) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Two-sided market (platform). Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (8) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (5)

Sits inside / holds (3)

expressed by (14)

floor filled by (14)

Kinds (9)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: The price structure and level: the two-sided Lerner rule, the split set by elasticities and cross-side effects, the Ramsey benchmark
  2. L5: Both sides on board: the balance of participation, market power and its check by the cross-side feedback; the platform's governance
  3. L6: Network scale and platform competition: increasing returns, homing, competitive bottlenecks, tipping or coexistence
  4. L7: The business model: money side and subsidy side, openness, exclusivity, envelopment

two-sided market as economists describe it: two groups of users who value each other's presence, joined through a platform's prices (reader's view)

  1. L1: Two groups of end users who value each other's presence: cardholders and merchants, readers and advertisers, gamers and developers, riders and drivers
  2. L2: Joining: membership on each side (a card in the wallet, a terminal at the till, a subscription, an installed console, an app), each side needing different functionality and its own door
  3. L3: The interaction carried through the platform (a card transaction, an ad seen by a reader, a game played on a console, a ride matched); the cross-side effect is realised here and not taken into account by the end users
  4. L4: The price structure and the price level: the total set by a Lerner rule on the summed elasticities, the split by the ratio of elasticities and the cross-side effects; marginal cost read as an opportunity cost
  5. L5: Getting both sides on board: the balance between the two sides' participation, where the platform's market power sits and where the cross-side feedback checks it; governance (for-profit platform or members' association)
  6. L6: Network scale and platform competition: increasing returns, single- and multihoming, competitive bottlenecks, tipping to one or a few platforms or coexistence by differentiation
  7. L7: The business model acted on the market: which side is the money side and which the subsidy side, how open (how many sides, compatibility), exclusivity and steering rules, envelopment; all under competition law and regulation

way in: Competition law and regulators

  1. L1: Legislatures, courts, competition authorities and central banks (US antitrust, EU competition law, the Reserve Bank of Australia)
  2. L2: Cases and rules aimed at platforms: interchange caps, no-surcharge and anti-steering cases, gatekeeper rules
  3. L3: The test the law applies: one market or two, both sides weighed or one, market definition by a two-sided SSNIP
  4. L4: The remedy acting on a price or a rule: a capped fee on one side, a struck anti-steering clause

way in: Costs of serving each side and each interaction

  1. L1: The platform's inputs and technology: cards, terminals, consoles, presses, servers
  2. L2: Fixed costs per member on each side and a marginal cost per interaction
  3. L3: Marginal cost reinterpreted as an opportunity cost: the cost of one more interaction net of what the other side then pays

way in: Pass-through between end users (whether the two sides can re-price between themselves)

  1. L1: The end users' own transaction, where a charge on one side could be passed to the other
  2. L2: Surcharges or separate cash and card prices, blocked by no-surcharge rules, menu costs or unmeasurable attention
  3. L3: The degree of pass-through: complete (one-sided), partial (transaction platforms) or zero (media)

way in: Rival platforms and multihoming

  1. L1: Competing platforms (Visa against Amex, consoles of one generation, newspapers against TV)
  2. L2: Homing: the share of users on each side who single-home or multihome
  3. L3: Steering: undercutting to make multihomers drop the rival

way in: Side A: participation and demand of the subsidised or single-homing side (cardholders, readers, gamers, users, riders)

  1. L1: Users who choose whether to join and how much to use
  2. L2: Membership and usage decisions, each depending on the charges the platform sets
  3. L3: The side's elasticity, raised by competition and multihoming into an own-brand elasticity

way in: Side B: participation and demand of the money or multihoming side (merchants, advertisers, developers, drivers)

  1. L1: Merchants, advertisers, developers who decide whether to accept, list or advertise
  2. L2: Acceptance or listing: the door each seller must install (terminals, pinpads, signage, development kits)
  3. L3: The side's willingness to pay, which rises with the other side's size

way in: The cross-side effect: how many are on the other side

  1. L1: The other side's count and activity on the platform
  2. L2: Demand on one side shifts outward as the other side grows
  3. L3: The externality the end user does not internalise, priced by the platform as the other side's contribution

way out: Matching and real-time prices (ride hailing, surge pricing)

  1. L1: Some riders wait out the surge; drivers move into the region
  2. L3: Riders and drivers matched by the platform
  3. L4: A surge multiplier set on current demand and supply

way out: Openness: how many sides to run and how compatible to be

  1. L1: Third-party sellers on Amazon's marketplace; Microsoft's browser inside Windows
  2. L6: Integrate a side in, or open it to third parties; seek compatibility or incompatibility
  3. L7: Choose the number of sides and the relation to rival platforms

way out: Rules that bind a side: anti-steering, no-surcharge, honour-all-cards, exclusive contracts

  1. L1: Merchants cannot steer buyers to cheaper networks; games stay on one console
  2. L5: Anti-steering and exclusivity clauses written into contracts
  3. L7: Decide to restrict how a side may treat rival platforms

way out: The money side's price (merchant discount, advertising rates, royalties, developer fees)

  1. L1: Merchants, advertisers or developers pay for access to the other side
  2. L4: The fee set on that side, often per transaction
  3. L7: Decide which side pays

way out: The subsidy side's price: low, free or negative (rewards, free readers, cheap consoles, free papers)

  1. L1: More members on the subsidised side; the other side's demand shifts out
  2. L4: A price below cost, zero or negative on that side
  3. L7: Decide which side is the loss leader

Sources (29) published science

Rochet, J.-C. and Tirole, J. (2005) Two-sided markets: a progress report (RAND Journal of Economics 2006)
Economic Sciences Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (2014) Jean Tirole: Market power and regulation. Scientific background on the 2014 prize (behind its links)
Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018), slip opinion with the dissent (full text, U.S. Supreme Court PDF, read in sections: syllabus, Parts I-II of the opinion, the dissent's account of the trial findings) (behind its links)
Two-sided market (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Genakos, C. and Valletti, T. (2011) Testing the 'waterbed' effect in mobile telephony. Journal of the European Economic Association, doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01040.x (full text, through the paper portal; read: abstract, introduction, results summary) (behind its links)
Hu, B., Hu, M. and Han, Z. (2021) Surge pricing and two-sided temporal responses in ride hailing. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, doi:10.1287/msom.2020.0960 (full text, through the paper portal; read: abstract, introduction, model set-up, discussion) (behind its links)
Rysman, M. (2009) The economics of two-sided markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(3) 125-143, doi:10.1257/jep.23.3.125 (full text, through the paper portal) (behind its links)
Jullien, B. and Sand-Zantman, W. (2021) The economics of platforms: a theory guide for competition policy. Information Economics and Policy 54, doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100880 (full text, through the paper portal; read: sections on tipping, congestion, interoperability, mergers) (behind its links)
Rochet, J.-C. and Tirole, J. (2003) Platform competition in two-sided markets. Journal of the European Economic Association 1(4) 990-1029, doi:10.1162/154247603322493212 (full text, through the paper portal's OpenAlex stored copy) (behind its links)
Ohio v. American Express Co. (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Interchange fee (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Argentesi, E. and Filistrucchi, L. (2007) Estimating market power in a two-sided market: the case of newspapers. Journal of Applied Econometrics, doi:10.1002/jae.997 (full text, through the paper portal; read: introduction, data, results, conclusions) (behind its links)
Newspaper (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Corts, K. S. and Lederman, M. (record year 2008, online first; the specialist gives the issue year as 2009, not checked) Software exclusivity and the scope of indirect network effects in the U.S. home video game market. International Journal of Industrial Organization, doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.08.002 (full text through the paper portal; read: introduction) (behind its links)
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (29 June 2011) press release: final rule establishing standards for debit card interchange fees (Regulation II) (full page, own fetch) (behind its links)
Hagiu, A. and Wright, J. (2015) Multi-sided platforms. International Journal of Industrial Organization 43, open copy doi:10.2139/ssrn.2794582 (full text, through the paper portal; read: definition section, the reseller and input-supplier trade-offs, the Amazon evidence) (behind its links)
Tadelis, S. (2016) Reputation and feedback systems in online platform markets. Annual Review of Economics 8, doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015325 (full text, through the paper portal; read: introduction, eBay's system, one- and two-sided feedback, bias and EPP) (behind its links)
Schuh, S., Shy, O. and Stavins, J. (2010) Who gains and who loses from credit card payments? Theory and calibrations. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Public Policy Discussion Paper 10-03, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1652260 (full text, through the paper portal; read: introduction, transfer results, disclaimer) (behind its links)
Agarwal, S., Presbitero, A., Silva, A. C. and Wix, C. (2023) Who pays for your rewards? Redistribution in the credit card market. IMF Working Paper, doi:10.5089/9798400232428.001 (full text, through the paper portal; read: abstract and introduction) (behind its links)
Cohen, P., Hahn, R., Hall, J., Levitt, S. and Metcalfe, R. (2016) Using big data to estimate consumer surplus: the case of Uber. NBER Working Paper 22627, doi:10.3386/w22627 (abstract only, through the paper portal) (behind its links)
Park, K., Seamans, R. and Zhu, F. (Strategic Management Journal article; the portal's record gives 2017, the year of the SSRN working paper doi:10.2139/ssrn.3048348; the specialist reports Crossref dates the journal DOI 2020, not checked here) Homing and platform responses to entry: historical evidence from the U.S. newspaper industry. Strategic Management Journal, doi:10.1002/smj.3241 (abstract only; the portal's full-text door answered 502) (behind its links)
Armstrong, M. (2006) Competition in two-sided markets. RAND Journal of Economics 37(3), doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x (full text, through the paper portal; read: introduction, section 5) (behind its links)
Filistrucchi, L., Geradin, D. and van Damme, E. (record year 2012; the DOI suffix reads woco2013003, so the journal issue is likely 2013, not checked) Identifying two-sided markets. World Competition, doi:10.54648/woco2013003 (full text, through the paper portal; read: definitions sections) (behind its links)
Filistrucchi, L., Geradin, D., van Damme, E. and Affeldt, P. (2014) Market definition in two-sided markets: theory and practice. Journal of Competition Law & Economics 10(2) 293-339; working-paper copy OpenAlex W3122961739 (full text, through the paper portal; read: abstract, Suggestions 1-4) (behind its links)
Bostoen, F. (2023) Understanding the Digital Markets Act. The Antitrust Bulletin, doi:10.1177/0003603x231162998 (abstract only through the portal; open copies listed, not fetched) (behind its links)
Mostafa, Krueger, Nies, Frunzke et al. 2024. Microbial markets: socio-economic perspective in studying microbial communities. microLife 5:uqae016 (doi:10.1093/femsml/uqae016), PMC11421381 (behind its links)
Credit card (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot; history section) (behind its links)
Regulation (EU) 2015/751 on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions, EUR-Lex text (Articles 3-5 and 18 read, own fetch) (behind its links)
Court of Justice of the EU, Case C-382/12 P MasterCard v Commission, judgment of 11 September 2014, EUR-Lex text (heading, paragraphs on two-sidedness, operative part read, own fetch) (behind its links)