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Firm (the economic unit)
In economics the firm is the unit that organises production: it buys inputs (labour, capital, materials) on factor markets, turns them into goods and services, and sells them on product markets. The theory of the firm asks why firms exist rather than all transactions being mediated by the market, where their boundaries lie, how they are organised and why they perform differently. Coase's answer (1937) is that using the price mechanism has costs, so inside the firm 'market transactions are eliminated' and the entrepreneur 'directs production'; later work adds team production and monitoring, asset specificity and opportunism (Williamson), residual control rights (Grossman, Hart, Moore), incentives under hidden action (Holmstrom) and bounded rationality (Simon, Cyert and March). Neoclassical price theory treats the firm as a production function with cost curves that chooses output to maximise profit and enters or exits a market as profits allow; empirical work finds large, persistent productivity differences among firms and constant reallocation through entry, growth, decline and exit. Walked here as that economic unit; the practice and its history are sys:business, the legal form sys:corporation.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| aliases | Firm (coordination by fiat) |
| born at | per firm: any year; kind: contested (C-2397) |
| born precision | n/a |
| boundary | Inside: the transactions for which the decision is to make rather than buy, the assets under one owner's residual control, and the people working under a power of direction in exchange for pay; allocation inside follows administrative decisions, not prices. Outside: the product and factor markets, rival firms and potential entrants, other firms it contracts with at arm's length, the state and its law. The line moves: a firm grows while organising one more transaction inside costs less than the market, and shrinks by outsourcing when it costs more (Coase, Williamson, Hart); economists also say the two shade into each other (C-2453). |
| nested level | Built from people (workers, managers, owners), capital and the contracts that bind them; a kind of organisation; part of an industry, the business population and the economy's productive sector; runs on its people's decisions. |
| scale | social |
Measures (18) published science
| TFP ratio, 90th to 10th percentile plant, within US 4-digit manufacturing industries | 1.92 (log difference 0.651); standard deviation across industries 0.173 ratio |
| TFP ratio, 90th to 10th percentile, China and India | over 5:1 ratio |
| persistence of producer TFP (one-year autoregressive coefficient) | 0.6 to 0.8 coefficient |
| characteristic clock: half-life of a publicly traded company | about a decade, regardless of sector (asymptotic about 7.02 years in the cohort fit) |
| hazard rate of publicly traded companies (including right-censored firms) | 0.058 (0.051 for the constrained dataset) per year |
| share of listed-company deaths by merger or acquisition, 1950-2009 | 45.1 percent |
| startups' share of US employment | 3 percent of total employment in any given year |
| startups' share of US gross job creation | almost 20 percent |
| share of startup jobs eliminated by firm exit within five years | about 47 percent |
| manufacturing firms reporting a U-shaped cost curve | 5 to 11 percent of manufacturing firms |
| learning by doing: labour hours per Lockheed L-1011 TriStar | over one million person-hours for the first units; halved by the 30th plane, halved again by the 100th person-hours per aircraft |
| upstream plants of vertically integrated firms shipping nothing to their own downstream plants | roughly one-third ship nothing; half ship less than three percent of output internally share of upstream plants |
| entrants' price gap relative to incumbents (revenue-weighted) | entrants' prices lower by more than 5 percent on average |
| firm size distribution, all US tax-paying firms | Zipf: P(size > s) inversely proportional to s power-law exponent about 1 |
| firm growth-rate distribution: tail exponent | exponential centre, power-law tails with exponent 3 |
| firms in the management practice survey | 732 medium-sized manufacturing firms in the US, France, Germany and the UK |
| share of the long tail of badly managed firms accounted for by weak competition and family firms | about half (and up to two thirds of the American advantage over Europe) share |
| US listed companies in the mortality study | more than 25 000, 1950-2009 companies |
Open contentions (8) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-1510 Do companies get safer as they age?
booked: The map books a roughly constant death rate for listed companies, and keeps the theories that risk falls or rises with age.
the other reading: young firms 'up or out', much higher exit (Haltiwanger et al.): a liability of newness - C-2397 When did business begin?
booked: The map keeps the competing starts.
the other reading: see C-2397 - C-2409 What is a firm's goal?
booked: The map keeps the competing answers.
the other reading: managers maximise sales after a minimum profit (Baumol); managers' own utility (Marris, Williamson) - C-2410 What law do firm sizes follow?
booked: The map keeps the competing fits.
the other reading: log-normal from Gibrat's law of proportionate effect - C-2453 Why do firms exist?
booked: The map keeps the competing theories.
the other reading: a sharp firm-market line (Coase) / the two 'shade into each other' (Putterman, Richardson, Klein) - C-2555 Does selection among firms act on productivity or profit?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: selection on (revenue) productivity, the reading of most earlier work - C-2563 Do real firms have U-shaped cost curves?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: only 5 to 11 percent of manufacturing firms report a U-shaped cost curve (estimates cited on the same page); Simon lists 'decreasing returns to scale' as one of the four facts maximising theory claims, and doubts each - C-2568 Why do firms integrate vertically?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: integration safeguards specific assets in a goods relation (Williamson; Hart's coal mine and power plant)
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (28)
- Labour market
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Management
- Capital (physical assets)
- Employment contract
- Establishments (plants, stores)
- Supply and demand
- Economy
- Sellers competing for buyers
- Business
- Worker and employer bargaining over the match surplus
- Strikes and lockouts
- Employers competing for workers (and colluding by concentration)
- Firm and market competing to coordinate each transaction
- Owners and managers over the firm's surplus (agency)
- Firms competing for the consumer's spending
- Dark patterns: an online service against the user's own decision
- Earnings management: preparers against readers
- Sellers competing for the same customers
- Well-managed and badly managed firms competing for market share
- Workers against firms over relative prices (inflation as conflict)
- Firms' claims against sustainability reporting and labels
- International trade
- Workers, capital owners and consumers over who bears a tax
- Users who take without contributing against the maintainers of the commons
- Hold-up: the parties to an incomplete contract over the surplus a specific investment creates
- Brands competing for the same buyers
- Counterfeiters against brand owners
Sits inside / holds (9)
- Law (rules and law)
- Market and trade
- Economy
- Business
- Industry (the firm's population of rivals)
- Management
- Brand
- Marketing
- Financial statement
Trades with (valence) (25)
- Market and trade via sys:human-society · Firm (the economic unit) mixed
- Labour market via sys:market · Firm (the economic unit) gain
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:human-society · Firm (the economic unit) gain
- Government via sys:law · Firm (the economic unit) mixed
- Law (rules and law) via sys:law · Firm (the economic unit) gain
- Money via sys:money · Firm (the economic unit) mixed
- Supply and demand via sys:market · Firm (the economic unit) mixed
- Energy via sys:energy · Firm (the economic unit) gain
- Economy via sys:human-society · Firm (the economic unit) gain
- Organization via sys:human-society · Firm (the economic unit) even
- Corporation via sys:law · Firm (the economic unit) gain
- Consumer via sys:market · Firm (the economic unit) gain
- Business via sys:market · Firm (the economic unit) even
- Computer-aided design via sys:market · Firm (the economic unit) mixed
- Personal finance (how a household earns, spends, saves, borrows and plans) via sys:money · Firm (the economic unit) gain
- Open-source software via sys:market · Firm (the economic unit) gain
- Management via sys:market · Firm (the economic unit) gain
- Brand via sys:market · Firm (the economic unit) gain
- Marketing via sys:market · Firm (the economic unit) mixed
- Financial statement via sys:market · Firm (the economic unit) mixed
- Unemployment via sys:labour-market · Firm (the economic unit) gain
- Gross domestic product via sys:market · Firm (the economic unit) even
- Contract via sys:market · Firm (the economic unit) gain
- International trade via sys:market · Firm (the economic unit) mixed
- Tax via sys:market · Firm (the economic unit) loss
expressed by (16)
- Generation/Synthesis
- Recombination/Composition
- Quality Improvement/Refinement
- Encapsulation & Modularity (Abstraction)
- Amplification/Scale-Up (Manufacture & Distribution)
- Symbiosis/Co-Creation (Collaborative Specialization)
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Sensing/Scanning
- Hypothesis/Goal Selection
- Search/Foraging
- Uncertainty Reduction/Learning
- Risk-managed Exploration
- Optimal Stopping & Patch-Switching
- Physical/Virtual Barrier
- Self-Monitoring
- Triage & Prioritized Allocation
floor filled by (31)
- Market and trade
- Labour market
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Law (rules and law)
- Accounting (the field and practice)
- Economy
- Hierarchy of offices
- Management
- Corporation
- Consumer
- Shareholders (members)
- Capital (physical assets)
- Employment contract
- Establishments (plants, stores)
- Industry (the firm's population of rivals)
- Supply contract
- Intangible capital (know-how)
- Supply and demand
- Computer-aided design
- Open-source software
- Newspaper
- Great Acceleration
- Brand
- Business
- Marketing
- Financial statement
- Unemployment
- Inflation (economics)
- Gross domestic product
- International trade
- Tax
Kinds (11)
- Monopoly
- Oligopoly
- Organization
- Corporation
- Incumbent firm
- Entrant firm (startup)
- Family firm
- Conglomerate
- Price-taking (perfectly competitive) firm
- Vertically integrated firm
- Exporting firm
wired (11)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Government
- Household
- Market and trade
- Order book and double auction (market institution)
- World trade web
- Consumer
- Statistical agency
- Trade unions, friendly societies, cooperatives
- Banks and financial intermediaries
- Employment agency (labour hired through an intermediary)
Notes published science
- Ronald Coase worked out why firms exist when he was 21, in the summer of 1932: using the market costs something (finding prices, haggling, writing contracts, settling disputes), so some coordination is cheaper done by a boss than by prices. He gave it as a lecture in Dundee that October; it won him a Nobel prize about 60 years later (src:coase-1991-nobel).
- Firms that own their own suppliers mostly don't use them as suppliers: about a third of the upstream plants in vertically integrated US firms ship nothing at all to their own downstream plants, and half ship less than 3 percent of their output in-house. Owning the chain seems to be about moving know-how and oversight, not goods (src:syverson-2010-productivity).
- Two plants in the same narrow US industry, with the same workers, machines and materials, differ by nearly two to one in what they produce (the 90th against the 10th percentile), and in China and India by over five to one. And bacteria do something like outsourcing too: free-living microbes drop costly 'leaky' jobs that their neighbours still do, and come to depend on them (src:syverson-2010-productivity, src:morris-2012-black-queen).
- After 25 years of inflation targeting in New Zealand, only 30% of firm managers could pick the central bank governor out of four names, and about 90% said their own shopping is how they learn about inflation; their expectations were not anchored at all (src:kumar-2015-nz-firms).
- Trade is carried by very few hands: of 5.5 million US firms in 2000 only 4% exported, and the top tenth of those made 96% of all US exports; most exporters sell to just one country. (src:bernard-jensen-redding-schott-2007)
- Hoffmann, Nagle and Zhou put the cost of rewriting the most widely used open-source code once at $4.15 billion, but its value to the firms that use it at $8.8 trillion: without it, firms would spend 3.5 times more on software, and 96% of that value comes from just 5% of the developers (src:hoffmann-nagle-zhou-2024).
- In a computer model of the Peter principle, promoting people at random kept an organisation more efficient than promoting the best performer, and real data from 214 sales firms fit the same story: each doubling of a new manager's past sales went with a 7.5% drop in their team's sales (src:pluchino-2010-peter, src:benson-2018-peter).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L4: The ledger: costs set against revenue, marginal cost against marginal revenue; productivity (TFP) as the shifter
- L5: Direction: allocation by administrative decision; job assignments, job design and rules; mostly fixed pay; management practices
- L6: Objective and control: profit maximisation, or targets and aspiration levels set by a coalition; residual control rights with the asset owners; the residual claimant
- L7: The choice: output and price, operate or shut down, make or buy, merge, enter, grow, export or exit
the firm as economists describe it: factor and product markets to the choice of what to make (reader's view)
- L1: The markets it faces: buyers on the product market (for a price-taking firm a perfectly elastic demand at the market price), sellers of labour, capital and materials on factor markets, rival producers and potential entrants
- L2: The boundary: few, long-term, incomplete contracts (employment, supply) in place of many market transactions; the make-or-buy line, which moves with transaction costs and asset specificity
- L3: Production: inputs (capital, labour, intermediate materials) turned into output; team production more productive together than at arm's length
- L4: Costs and productivity: fixed, variable and marginal cost; marginal cost set against marginal revenue; total factor productivity as the shifter that lets one producer make more from the same inputs; economies of scale
- L5: Direction: the entrepreneur and managers allocate resources by administrative decision; monitoring of effort, job assignments and design, rules, mostly fixed pay and low-powered incentives; management practices (operations, monitoring, targets, incentives)
- L6: Objective and control: profit maximisation in price theory, or sales after a minimum profit, managers' own utility, targets and aspiration levels (satisficing coalitions); residual control rights over the assets held by the owners, the residual claimant who monitors
- L7: The choice acted on the world: how much to produce and at what price, whether to operate or shut down, make or buy, merge, grow, export, enter or exit; the firm survives only while it coordinates more cheaply than the market and than another firm
way in: Demand: buyers' orders at a price
- L1: Buyers (households, other firms, governments) paying for goods and services
- L2: The demand curve the firm faces: perfectly elastic at the market price for a price taker, downward-sloping for a firm with market power; each producer's own idiosyncratic demand
- L3: Revenue and marginal revenue: what one more unit sold brings in
way in: Finance: owners' equity and lenders' credit
- L1: Owners, investors and lenders supplying funds
- L2: Financial structure: equity and debt contracts (irrelevant to total value under Modigliani-Miller assumptions; relevant once managers cannot be relied on)
- L3: Funds turned into assets: the sunk entry cost paid, capital K installed
way in: Inputs: materials and capital goods bought from suppliers
- L1: Suppliers of materials, parts and equipment
- L2: Purchase through the market at a transaction cost (prices discovered, contracts drawn up, inspections, disputes), or made in-house; long-term supply contracts where assets are specific
- L3: Intermediate materials in the production function; in integrated firms upstream plants ship surprisingly little to their own downstream plants
way in: Labour: people hired under an employment contract
- L1: People offering work; hiring and firing day by day through the market would be costly for both sides
- L2: The employment contract: few, complex, long-term; a power of direction in exchange for pay
- L3: Labour L as an input of the production function, with capital K and materials M
way in: Monitoring: the firm reading its own work
- L1: Team members' effort, whose separate marginal outputs are costly to measure
- L2: Signals of what the agent did (output measures, noisy); worth using only when informative
- L3: Accounting measures such as costs: controllable by employees, often partial
- L4: Management practices that read performance: operations, monitoring, targets, incentives
way in: Rivals and entrants: competition
- L1: Rival producers and a pool of potential entrants
- L2: Entry or expansion of rivals pushes down each firm's demand curve, price and marginal revenue
- L3: Competitive pressure, measured by proxies such as trade openness
way in: Technology and know-how: ideas, R&D, experience
- L1: Ideas and techniques: the firm's own R&D, spillovers from others' innovation
- L2: Experience from operating: learning by doing
- L3: Intangible capital: know-how embodied in the business, which keeps productivity differences persistent
way in: The state: law, taxes and market regulation
- L1: Government measures on markets: sales taxes, rationing, price controls
- L2: Company law: the legal forms a firm can take, registration, liquidation
way out: Entry, shutdown, export and exit
- L1: Producers and their jobs leave the market: about 47 percent of startup jobs gone by exit within five years
- L4: The cost test: price against average variable cost in the short run
- L7: Pay the sunk entry cost or not; operate, shut down, export or exit
way out: Jobs created and destroyed
- L1: Jobs in the economy: startups 3 percent of employment, almost 20 percent of gross job creation
- L2: Employment contracts written or ended
- L5: Work directed under the employment relation
- L7: Decision to hire, grow or shrink
way out: Make or buy: integrate, merge, outsource
- L1: Other firms absorbed (merger or acquisition is the leading cause of a listed firm's death) or work passed to the market
- L2: The boundary moved: growth when external transaction costs are higher, downsizing by outsourcing when lower
- L6: Residual control rights moved with ownership
- L7: Decision whether to merge or stay separate, make or buy
way out: Output supplied at a price
- L1: Goods and services in buyers' hands, for payment
- L3: Production of the chosen quantity
- L7: Output chosen where marginal revenue equals marginal cost
way out: Residual income to owners
- L1: Profit paid out to owners
- L4: Economic profit: revenue less explicit and implicit costs; normal profit the minimum to stay
- L6: The residual claimant, who monitors, receives the residual income