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Mental representation (beliefs, meanings, feelings and shared intentions)
In philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, neuroscience and cognitive science, 'a hypothetical internal cognitive symbol that represents external reality or its abstractions'; in cognitive psychology, 'patterns of neural activity that encode abstract concepts or representational copies of sensory information from the outside world'. It carries content (a vehicle told apart from what it is about) at the level 'between the physical implementation and behavioral output'.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| aliases | Mental representation (mental content: beliefs, meanings, feelings, shared and collective intentions) |
| born at | the Cambrian (hypothesised) |
| born precision | period (the abstract gives no number) |
| boundary | Inside: content-carrying states (vehicles with their contents): affective appraisals, concepts and semantic memory, beliefs and other attitudes, episodic records, representations of other minds, shared and collective contents, and spatial maps and images. Outside: the neural tissue that realises them (neurons, the electrochemical signalling: implementation), the behaviour they steer (output), the carriers that bring content in or take it out (light, sound, touch, writing), and what they are about (the represented things). |
| nested level | A level of description between implementation and behaviour: realised in nervous systems (many-to-one), held by animals from (hypothesised) Cambrian bilaterians up to human groups and their institutions; the medium on which the leaning walks (language, religion, science, emotional contagion, primate social groups, the Seeds of rung 11) put their mind floors. |
| scale | organism |
| why | Choice of key: 'mental representation' is the cognitive-science and philosophy term for the carrier of mental content, with a vehicle/content split that matches 'mediums carry, things own'; 'mind' names the owner (a system), and 'shared-intentionality' names only floors L6-L7. Sourced as its own level of description: functionalism is 'a theoretical level between the physical implementation and behavioral output' (Marr 1982), social cognition is 'a level of analysis', and multiple realizability gives 'a many-to-one mapping from physical states to mental states'. It sits between the carriers (sound, light, touch, writing) and the tissue (sys:electrochemical-gradient), and holds the floors the climb-7 walks had parked on carriers. |
Measures (10) published science
| cognitive map concept introduced (Tolman) | 1948 year |
| place cells discovered (O'Keefe and Dostrovsky, rats) | 1971 year |
| Nobel Prize for place and grid cells | 2014 year |
| animals with place cells | rodents, bats, monkeys and humans |
| theory of mind first posed (Premack and Woodruff, chimpanzees) | 1978 year |
| proposed origin of subjective experience | the Cambrian period |
| clock: iconic memory | a fraction of a second |
| clock: gaze following in infancy | most at 8-10 months, all at 11-14 months (Scaife and Bruner 1975) |
| clock: place-cell replay | 'at a much faster timescale' than the experience |
| kinds of conversational evidence (grounding) | 3: acknowledgements, relevant next turn, continued attention |
Open contentions (2) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-163 Do animals form mental maps of their surroundings?
booked: The map treats it as open: it records map-like memory in bees and rats, and keeps the argument that their shortcuts can be explained in simpler ways alongside.
the other reading: B: no clear evidence for Tolman-type maps in non-human animals; shortcuts explained by path integration, familiar routes or landmarks (Bennett 1996; Grieves and Dudchenko 2013) - C-173 Do mental representations really exist?
booked: The map follows the cognitive-science consensus that they do, and keeps the eliminativist and dynamical views alongside.
the other reading: B: eliminativism: 'the states (and representations) it postulates simply don't exist' (Churchland, Stich); C: anti-representational dynamical accounts: 'cognitive states are not relations to mental symbols'
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (7)
- Emotion (feelings)
- Concepts and semantic memory
- Episodic memory
- Theory of mind
- Shared intentionality and joint attention
- Collective representations
- Cognitive maps
Sits inside / holds (4)
Trades with (valence) (10)
- Religion via sys:mental-representation · Mental representation (beliefs, meanings, feelings and shared intentions) gain
- Grammar (the structure of a language, as linguistics describes it) via sys:mental-representation · Mental representation (beliefs, meanings, feelings and shared intentions) even
- Nervous system via sys:mental-representation · Mental representation (beliefs, meanings, feelings and shared intentions) gain
- Emotional contagion via sys:mental-representation · Mental representation (beliefs, meanings, feelings and shared intentions) even
- Primate social group via sys:mental-representation · Mental representation (beliefs, meanings, feelings and shared intentions) even
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:mental-representation · Mental representation (beliefs, meanings, feelings and shared intentions) gain
- Language (human language) via sys:mental-representation · Mental representation (beliefs, meanings, feelings and shared intentions) gain
- Cumulative culture (cumulative cultural evolution) via sys:mental-representation · Mental representation (beliefs, meanings, feelings and shared intentions) gain
- Psychological (perceptual) arrow of time via sys:mental-representation · Mental representation (beliefs, meanings, feelings and shared intentions) gain
- Emotion (feelings) via sys:mental-representation · Mental representation (beliefs, meanings, feelings and shared intentions) gain
expressed by (7)
- Mapping/Modeling
- Navigation/Pathfinding
- Uncertainty Reduction/Learning
- Multi-Scale Data Fusion / Triangulation
- Trail-Marking / Externalized Memory (Stigmergy)
- Surprise / Change-Point Detection
- Social Learning / Public Information Use
floor filled by (37)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Religion
- Electrochemical gradient
- Neuron (nerve cell)
- Nervous system
- Emotional contagion
- Mammal (class Mammalia)
- Neocortex (six-layered isocortex)
- Primate social group
- Language (human language)
- Cumulative culture (cumulative cultural evolution)
- Science (as a human social and cultural system)
- Emotion (feelings)
- Concepts and semantic memory
- Episodic memory
- Theory of mind
- Shared intentionality and joint attention
- Collective representations
- Cognitive maps
- Mental image
- Propositional attitude (belief, desire, intention)
- Joint attention
- Grid cell
- Place cell
- Desert-ant path integration
- Hippocampus (memory)
- Iconic memory
- Metric tree (real tree, R-tree; walked as an idea)
- Evolving wormhole (time-dependent Lorentzian wormhole; walked as an idea)
- Complex network (scale-free growth, preferential attachment, small worlds; walked as an idea)
- genealogy (descent as a medium)
- Great Depression
- Optics (light's behaviour: reflection, refraction, interference, lenses and instruments)
- Age of Enlightenment (the 17th-18th-century intellectual movement: its ideas, its networks of salons, academies, letters and print, and its effects on states and revolutions)
- Cave painting
- Epistemology (the theory of knowledge: the study and the knowing it studies)
- Free will
represents (1)
Kinds (8)
- Collective representations
- Cognitive maps
- Mental image
- Concept
- Propositional attitude (belief, desire, intention)
- Language of thought (mentalese)
- Distributed (connectionist) representation
- Eliminativism
Notes published science
- A desert ant keeps track of home from polarised skylight and by counting its own steps; a rat does the same job with grid cells laid out like 'a hexagonally organized sheet of graph paper'. Same job, different builds.
- Place cells replay a path the animal ran 'at a much faster timescale', which is thought to be how the memory gets consolidated.
- Theory of mind began as a question about chimpanzees (Premack and Woodruff 1978), and children only follow an adult's gaze reliably from about 11-14 months: the door for word meaning opens before the words.
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
mental representation: beliefs, meanings, feelings and shared intentions
- L1: Vehicles: 'a hypothetical internal cognitive symbol that represents external reality or its abstractions'; 'patterns of neural activity'; on the connectionist reading 'realized by patterns of activation in a network of simple processors'; one content, many realisers
- L2: Affect: appraisal 'provides an evaluation of events and objects'; valence and arousal as the first two dimensions (core affect); moods, on one reading, directed at the body's state
- L3: Concepts and semantic memory: 'general world knowledge', 'what a cat is'
- L4: Attitudes and episodes: beliefs, desires, intentions as 'relations to mental representations'; episodic memory of particular events ('stroking a particular cat'), consolidated in long-term memory
- L5: Theory of mind: ascribing mental states to others, knowing theirs may differ from one's own; develops in childhood with the prefrontal cortex
- L6: Shared intentionality, joint attention and common ground: 'the shared focus of two individuals on an object'; 'mutual knowledge, mutual beliefs, and mutual assumptions' built by presenting and accepting utterances
- L7: Collective intentionality and collective representations: minds 'jointly directed at a goal'; 'concepts, ideas, categories and beliefs that do not belong to isolated individuals', 'slow-changing and backed by social authority'
mental representation: cognitive maps of space (path integration, place and grid cells)
- L1: Cues: self-motion (vestibular, motor), landmarks, gradients; 'vision, proprioception, olfaction, and hearing'
- L2: Path integration: desert ants take heading from polarised light or sun and distance from leg movement or optic flow; in mammals grid cells 'playing the role of the path integrator'
- L3: Place cells: hippocampal pyramidal neurons active in one place field (rodents, bats, monkeys, humans); fields set by landmarks, smells and vestibular input
- L4: The map: place cells 'act collectively as a cognitive representation of a specific location'; connection strengths stand for distances; the hippocampus integrates spatial and nonspatial input
- L5: Use: shortcuts and goal finding (Tolman's rats; dogs; pigeons by landmarks); contested: rats rarely take a novel shortcut, and Bennett finds 'no clear evidence' of Tolman maps in non-human animals
mental representation: imagery and decodable activity patterns (iconic memory, imagery, reactivation)
- L1: Iconic memory: 'a brief sensory copy of visual information, lasting a fraction of a second'
- L2: Imagery 'of things that are not actually present to the senses', in any modality (vision most often, also hearing, smell, taste)
- L3: Decodable patterns: fMRI and multi-voxel analysis read imagery (primary visual cortex) and episodes (hippocampus); patterns reactivate 'without new information entering the brain'; experience alters them
- L4: Use: images to 'help solve certain types of problems'; representing things never experienced or that do not exist
Who fills each layer
- L1: Alphabet (one letter per phoneme), Positional (place-value) notation with zero, Psychological (perceptual) arrow of time
- L2: Social contagion
- L3: Alphabet (one letter per phoneme), Positional (place-value) notation with zero, Dijkgraaf-Witten model (topological gauge theory with a finite gauge group; walked as an idea), Evolving wormhole (time-dependent Lorentzian wormhole; walked as an idea), Metric tree (real tree, R-tree; walked as an idea), Complex network (scale-free growth, preferential attachment, small worlds; walked as an idea)
- L4: Psychological (perceptual) arrow of time, Social contagion
- L6: Alphabet (one letter per phoneme), Internet protocol suite (TCP/IP): the layered datagram protocols every host and router runs, the RFC record that specifies them, and the community that keeps them, Social contagion
- L7: Internet protocol suite (TCP/IP): the layered datagram protocols every host and router runs, the RFC record that specifies them, and the community that keeps them, genealogy (descent as a medium), Social contagion
Sources (19) published science
Cognitive map (Wikipedia, rev 1368875677, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Place cell (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Theory of mind (Wikipedia, rev 1380541034, 2026-10-16, via Wikimedia Enterprise cache) (behind its links)
Barron AB, Klein C (2016) What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness. PNAS 113(18):4900-4908. doi:10.1073/pnas.1520084113 (abstract via PubMed 27091981) (behind its links)
Joint attention (Wikipedia, rev 1363731710, 2026-07-12, via Wikimedia Enterprise cache) (behind its links)
Grounding in communication (Wikipedia, rev 1344855481, 2026-03-22, via Wikimedia Enterprise cache) (behind its links)
Shared intentionality (Wikipedia, rev 1368825478, 2026-08-11, via Wikimedia Enterprise cache) (behind its links)
Collective representations (Wikipedia, rev 1340975664, 2026-02-28, via Wikimedia Enterprise cache) (behind its links)
Semantic memory (Wikipedia, rev 1371973608, 2026-08-29, via Wikimedia Enterprise cache) (behind its links)
Pitt, D., Mental Representation, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2026 archive edition) (behind its links)
Redish AD. Mental Time Travel: A Retrospective. Hippocampus 35:e23661 (2025, online Dec 2024). doi:10.1002/hipo.23661 (behind its links)
Grammar (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Path integration (Wikipedia, rev 1354148857, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)