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Free will
Free will is generally understood as the capacity or ability of people to either choose between different possible courses of action, exercise control over their actions in a way that is necessary for moral responsibility, or be the ultimate source or originator of their actions.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | booked: ancient Greek philosophy (a compatibilist notion attributed to Aristotle, 4th century BCE; an incompatibilist notion first in Alexander of Aphrodisias, 3rd century CE; the term liberum arbitrium 4th century CE); the capacity's origin contested (C-3256) |
| born precision | centuries |
| boundary | Inside: the capacity to choose among alternatives and control one's actions (the motives that feed it, deliberation, choice, the veto, the sense of being the author), the conceptions of that capacity (compatibilist, libertarian, hard determinist, hard incompatibilist; folk beliefs), and its tie to moral responsibility (praise, blame, desert). Outside: determinism as a thesis about the world (sys:determinism), the mind and its relation to the body (sys:mind, sys:mind-body-problem), moral theory at large (sys:ethics), law (sys:law), the brain's machinery as such (sys:human-brain). |
| nested level | A capacity carried by people (runs on human L7, intention and action) and a long-running topic of metaphysics (nests into metaphysics L5, rival theories on each topic). It touches ethics through moral responsibility and law through culpability and punishment. |
| scale | organism |
Measures (15) published science
| readiness-potential onset before reported intention (W), type II series | about 350 (minimum about 150) ms |
| readiness-potential onset before W, type I series (some preplanning) | about 800 (or 500, onset at 90% of area) ms |
| Libet 1983 sample | 5 subjects, at least 6 sessions each, series of 40 self-initiated movements count |
| readiness potential first recorded | 1964 (full publication 1965), Kornhuber and Deecke, Freiburg year |
| decision outcome decodable before awareness | up to 10 s |
| single-trial prediction from 256 SMA neurons | >80% accuracy, 700 ms before reported awareness (1019 neurons, 12 subjects; recruitment over ~1500 ms) % / ms |
| point of no return for vetoing a self-initiated movement | 200 ms before movement onset |
| decision time, deliberate vs arbitrary | 2.33 (SD 0.51) vs 0.99 (SD 0.32) |
| anti-free-will manipulation meta-analysis | 145 experiments (95 unpublished) count |
| belief in free will, US and Singapore | US 82.33% free will, 30.77% determinism, 75.77% dualism; Singapore 85.44%, 59.00%, 88.33% (n = 900 each) % of respondents |
| philosophers' views on free will (2020 survey) | compatibilism 59.2%, libertarianism 18.8%, no free will 11.2% % of respondents |
| evolutionary biologists believing in free will (2007 survey) | 79% yes, 14% no, 7% no answer % of respondents |
| first compatibilist notion attributed (Aristotle) | 4th century BCE (Epictetus 1st century CE) era |
| term liberum arbitrium introduced | 4th century CE era |
| timescale critics say free will cannot be squeezed into | 150-350 ms |
Open contentions (8) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-413 Where do thoughts come from?
booked: No theory is proven, so the map lists the main ones side by side and doesn't pick one. It shows where thinking is handled in the brain, not where thoughts start.
the other reading: the theories listed under C-413; Jerry's own reading, labelled his: thoughts arrive as patterns from outside one's own slice of consciousness - C-1061 Do we have free will?
booked: The map doesn't rule. It describes decisions and the will as the sources do and lists the views.
the other reading: compatibilism (59.2% of philosophers, 2020 survey); metaphysical libertarianism (18.8%); hard determinism; hard incompatibilism / illusionism (no free will either way; Pereboom); free will as an illusion (Wegner; Spinoza); free will as a biological trait (Brembs); free will as a pseudo-problem (verbal) - C-2841 How do competing motives get settled?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: highest net force acted on; rational deliberation may act against the strongest motive - C-3248 Can we still veto an action the brain has started?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: Libet: a 'conscious veto' remains since the RP does not always lead to action; Schurger 2021: Libet's veto window begins when subjects can no longer veto, so 'free won't' seems untenable; the veto itself may first arise subconsciously (encyclopedia) - C-3251 Do ordinary people think free will fits with determinism?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: incompatibilism not intuitive (Nahmias); incompatibilism intuitive (Cokely); depends on emotional engagement (Knobe and Nichols); free will beliefs better predicted by dualism than determinism (Wisniewski et al. 2019) - C-3255 Does believing in free will change how people behave?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: eroded belief increases cheating, lying, aggression (Vohs; Baumeister, via encyclopedia); no downstream consequences across 145 experiments (Genschow et al. 2023); manipulations may induce fatalism rather than determinism belief (encyclopedia) - C-3256 Do animals have free will?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: a biological trait of most if not all brains, studied in invertebrates (Brembs 2011): rung 7; a human capacity for deliberate, reasoned choice that moral responsibility needs (the encyclopedia's framing; Maoz 2019 on deliberate decisions) - C-3278 What does the readiness potential show about decisions?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: an unconscious initiation of the act, before awareness (Libet 1983; Soon 2008 up to 10 s); an artifact of averaging stochastic fluctuations; the decision is the threshold crossing, coinciding with awareness (Schurger 2012, 2021); the decision process, configured by conditional intentions, not its outcome (Brass et al. 2019); a feature of arbitrary choices only; absent for deliberate ones (Maoz et al. 2019)
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (6)
- Free will and determinism
- Volition (the future side)
- Sense of agency
- Deliberation
- Moral responsibility (the status free will is tied to)
- Supplementary motor area and pre-SMA (neural part)
Sits inside / holds (3)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Philosophy (the field: the practice and the questions it works on)
- Metaphysics (the branch of philosophy: its practice and the questions about reality it works on)
Trades with (valence) (17)
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:sensory-environment · Free will gain
- Religion via sys:sensory-environment · Free will mixed
- Prefrontal cortex via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Free will gain
- Law (rules and law) via sys:sensory-environment · Free will gain
- Quantum mechanics via sys:sensory-environment · Free will mixed
- Human brain via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Free will gain
- Consciousness via sys:sensory-environment · Free will mixed
- Fruit fly (Drosophila melanogaster) via sys:sensory-environment · Free will gain
- Psychology (the mind and behaviour as psychology describes them) via sys:sensory-environment · Free will gain
- Physics (the field) via sys:sensory-environment · Free will mixed
- Ethics (moral philosophy: the study and the morality it studies) via sys:sensory-environment · Free will gain
- Philosophy (the field: the practice and the questions it works on) via sys:sensory-environment · Free will gain
- Metaphysics (the branch of philosophy: its practice and the questions about reality it works on) via sys:sensory-environment · Free will gain
- Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) · Free will gain
- Truth via sys:sensory-environment · Free will even
- Determinism via sys:sensory-environment · Free will mixed
- Mind via sys:sensory-environment · Free will gain
expressed by (10)
- Generation/Synthesis
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Hypothesis/Goal Selection
- Uncertainty Reduction/Learning
- Optimal Stopping & Patch-Switching
- Offline Simulation & Replay-Guided Planning
- Self-Monitoring
- Validation of Identity/Intention
- Deterrence
- Quality Control & Error Correction
floor filled by (18)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Religion
- Prefrontal cortex
- Mental representation (beliefs, meanings, feelings and shared intentions)
- Law (rules and law)
- Human brain
- Human society (from local community up to societies)
- Emotion (feelings)
- Volition (the future side)
- Consciousness
- Psychology (the mind and behaviour as psychology describes them)
- Physics (the field)
- Ethics (moral philosophy: the study and the morality it studies)
- Sense of agency
- Metaphysics (the branch of philosophy: its practice and the questions about reality it works on)
- Deliberation
- Moral responsibility (the status free will is tied to)
- Supplementary motor area and pre-SMA (neural part)
Kinds (6)
- Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states)
- Compatibilism
- Metaphysical libertarianism
- Hard determinism
- Hard incompatibilism (illusionism)
- Free will as a biological trait (behavioural variability under the brain's control)
Notes published science
- When people chose which of two charities would get $1000, the brain signal famous for 'deciding before you know it' (the readiness potential) simply was not there; it showed up only when the choice did not matter and both charities got the same money (src:maoz-2019).
- A brain-computer game let people try to beat a machine that read their readiness potential in real time: they could still call off a movement after the brain signal had started, right up to about 200 ms before moving (src:schultze-kraft-2016).
- Fruit flies turning in a blank arena are not just noisy: their spontaneous turns carry a nonlinear signature, as if fly brains run near an unstable edge that amplifies tiny differences, and flies can be trained to narrow that variability (src:brembs-2011).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
free will: open alternatives, through motives, deliberation and choice, to the sense of agency, conceptions of freedom and moral responsibility (reader's view)
- L1: Open alternatives: courses of action the world allows, and the impediments that close them
- L2: Motives: desires (first- and second-order), urges, reasons, and the brain's spontaneous fluctuations
- L3: Deliberation: alternatives weighed by their values (deliberate) or settled by noise (arbitrary)
- L4: Choice: the decision (a threshold crossing on the accumulator reading), vetoable until about 200 ms before movement
- L5: The sense of agency: awareness of wanting and of being the author of the act
- L6: Conceptions of freedom: folk belief and the rival philosophical positions
- L7: Moral responsibility: desert of praise and blame, culpability and punishment
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L3: Deliberation: options, desires and reasons weighed; in deliberate choices the values of the alternatives drive the decision; in people, prefrontal and parietal networks
- L4: Choice: the decision, marked (on the accumulator reading) by a threshold crossing in medial frontal cortex (SMA, pre-SMA); a veto remains possible until about 200 ms before movement
- L5: The sense of agency: the felt authorship of the choice and the action (awareness of wanting, W; ownership vs agency), built from predictions and cues; dissociable (alien hand, delusions of control)
- L6: Conceptions of freedom: folk beliefs (free will widely believed; determinism split by culture) and the philosophers' positions (compatibilism, libertarianism, hard determinism, hard incompatibilism), none ruled
- L7: Moral responsibility: praise, blame, desert and punishment, which free will is meant to ground; the control and epistemic conditions
way in: Desires and urges: first-order wants and premonitory urges
- L1: A felt urge in the body (in tic disorders a premonitory urge, experienced as irresistible)
- L2: First-order desires, possibly conflicting (the addict's want for the drug and want to refrain)
way in: Reasons and prior intentions (thought)
- L1: Reasons, motives and values arrive as thoughts (where thoughts come from is contested)
- L2: Conditional intentions formed ahead of time configure how later choices run (set at the start of an experiment)
way in: Religious and cultural traditions about will, fate and providence
- L1: Teachings and texts (the Bhagavad Gita, the Buddha's sayings, Christian philosophy)
- L2: Doctrines: liberum arbitrium (4th century); dependent origination
- L3: Theological determinism and divine foreknowledge as a problem for free choice
- L4: Cultural frame: individualist and collectivist cultures differ on determinism, agree on free will
way in: Spontaneous neural fluctuations (the brain's own ongoing activity)
- L1: Ongoing spontaneous subthreshold fluctuations in neuronal activity
- L2: Slow cortical potential fluctuations (the EEG's autocorrelated drift)
- L3: A leaky stochastic accumulator integrates the fluctuations toward a bound (human EEG; rodent area M2)
way in: The felt consequences of one's own action (sensory feedback)
- L1: An effect in the world that follows the action (a tone after a key press; the limb's movement)
- L2: Sensory feedback from the body and the effect (proprioception; self-produced touch felt weaker)
- L3: Comparator: predicted state compared with actual state
- L4: Cue integration: many agency cues combined
way in: The situation's alternatives: courses of action open (or closed) to the agent
- L1: Courses of action open in the world, and the impediments that close them (restraint, coercion)
- L2: The options as presented and perceived: two charities named on a screen, one to receive a $1000 donation
way in: What brain recordings say about the timing of choice
- L1: Neuronal activity in medial frontal cortex before self-initiated movement (1019 neurons recorded in 12 subjects)
- L2: Scalp EEG: the readiness potential, a gradual build-up before voluntary movement
- L3: Averaged and decoded: the outcome readable up to 10 s ahead in prefrontal and parietal cortex
- L4: Compared with the reported time of conscious intention (W, read from a revolving clock spot)
- L5: Interpreted: unconscious initiation (Libet) or stochastic accumulation with the decision at threshold (Schurger); contested
way in: What others say: articles, courses and arguments about free will
- L1: A text or course: an article arguing free will is an illusion, a neuroscience course
- L2: Read or heard: the anti-free-will manipulation reaches the reader
- L3: Understood as old arguments made vivid by new illustrations
- L4: Weighed against one's own introspection, which people trust more for themselves than for others
way in: What physics says about the world's order (determinism and chance)
- L1: The natural world's cause-and-effect regularities
- L2: Laws of nature: future events necessitated by past and present events plus the laws
- L3: Laplace's demon: knowing all facts and laws would foresee the future
- L4: Modern science mixes deterministic and stochastic theories (quantum indeterminism)
- L5: Unsettled: current theories cannot decide whether determinism is true
way out: Praise, blame and punishment (and the law's judgements)
- L1: Sanctions in the world: punishment imposed, praise given
- L5: Legal doctrine: culpability, the insanity defence, diminished responsibility
- L6: Attitudes to punishment: retributive or consequentialist (weaker free will belief, less retributive)
- L7: Attributions of responsibility: who deserves praise or blame
way out: Reports of choosing (W time, verbal reports, survey answers)
- L1: A spoken or typed report
- L3: Recalled clock position at first awareness
- L5: Awareness of wanting to move, held for report
way out: The chosen act carried out (movement), with the veto
- L1: The act in the world: a key press, a wrist flick, a donation made
- L2: Muscle activity (EMG onset)
- L3: Sequential activation from the supplementary motor area to primary motor cortex
- L4: Intention to act; cancellable until the point of no return
way out: The written debate: arguments, papers, surveys
- L1: Published texts that the next reader takes in
- L6: A position argued (e.g. Pereboom's hard incompatibilism, Dennett's compatibilism)
Sources (23) published science
Moore JW (2016) What is the sense of agency and why does it matter? Front Psychol. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01272 (behind its links)
Schurger A, Sitt JD, Dehaene S. An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement. PNAS 2012. doi:10.1073/pnas.1210467109 (behind its links)
Shariff AF et al. (2014) Free will and punishment: a mechanistic view of human nature reduces retribution. Psychol Sci. doi:10.1177/0956797614534693 (behind its links)
Genschow O et al. (2023) Manipulating belief in free will and its downstream consequences: a meta-analysis. Pers Soc Psychol Rev. doi:10.1177/10888683221087527 (behind its links)
Sense of agency (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot) (behind its links)
Moral responsibility (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot) (behind its links)
Bereitschaftspotential (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot) (behind its links)
Schurger A, Hu P, Pak J, Roskies AL (2021) What is the readiness potential? Trends Cogn Sci. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2021.04.001 (behind its links)
Soon CS, Brass M, Heinze HJ, Haynes JD (2008) Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nat Neurosci. doi:10.1038/nn.2112 (behind its links)
Schultze-Kraft M et al. (2016) The point of no return in vetoing self-initiated movements. PNAS. doi:10.1073/pnas.1513569112 (behind its links)
Maoz U, Yaffe G, Koch C, Mudrik L (2019) Neural precursors of decisions that matter: an ERP study of deliberate and arbitrary choice. eLife. doi:10.7554/eLife.39787 (behind its links)
Greene J, Cohen J (2004) For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything. Phil Trans R Soc B. doi:10.1098/rstb.2004.1546 (behind its links)
Determinism (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot) (behind its links)
Mind-body problem (Wikipedia, rev 1381179614, 2026-10-20, via Wikimedia Enterprise cache) (behind its links)
Truth (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Brass M, Furstenberg A, Mele AR (2019) Why neuroscience does not disprove free will. Neurosci Biobehav Rev. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.04.024 (behind its links)
Haggard P, Clark S, Kalogeras J (2002) Voluntary action and conscious awareness. Nat Neurosci. doi:10.1038/nn827 (behind its links)
Neuroscience of free will (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot) (behind its links)