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Free will

Free will is generally understood as the capacity or ability of people to either choose between different possible courses of action, exercise control over their actions in a way that is necessary for moral responsibility, or be the ultimate source or originator of their actions.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born atbooked: ancient Greek philosophy (a compatibilist notion attributed to Aristotle, 4th century BCE; an incompatibilist notion first in Alexander of Aphrodisias, 3rd century CE; the term liberum arbitrium 4th century CE); the capacity's origin contested (C-3256)
born precisioncenturies
boundaryInside: the capacity to choose among alternatives and control one's actions (the motives that feed it, deliberation, choice, the veto, the sense of being the author), the conceptions of that capacity (compatibilist, libertarian, hard determinist, hard incompatibilist; folk beliefs), and its tie to moral responsibility (praise, blame, desert). Outside: determinism as a thesis about the world (sys:determinism), the mind and its relation to the body (sys:mind, sys:mind-body-problem), moral theory at large (sys:ethics), law (sys:law), the brain's machinery as such (sys:human-brain).
nested levelA capacity carried by people (runs on human L7, intention and action) and a long-running topic of metaphysics (nests into metaphysics L5, rival theories on each topic). It touches ethics through moral responsibility and law through culpability and punishment.
scaleorganism

Measures (15) published science

readiness-potential onset before reported intention (W), type II seriesabout 350 (minimum about 150) ms
readiness-potential onset before W, type I series (some preplanning)about 800 (or 500, onset at 90% of area) ms
Libet 1983 sample5 subjects, at least 6 sessions each, series of 40 self-initiated movements count
readiness potential first recorded1964 (full publication 1965), Kornhuber and Deecke, Freiburg year
decision outcome decodable before awarenessup to 10 s
single-trial prediction from 256 SMA neurons>80% accuracy, 700 ms before reported awareness (1019 neurons, 12 subjects; recruitment over ~1500 ms) % / ms
point of no return for vetoing a self-initiated movement200 ms before movement onset
decision time, deliberate vs arbitrary2.33 (SD 0.51) vs 0.99 (SD 0.32)
anti-free-will manipulation meta-analysis145 experiments (95 unpublished) count
belief in free will, US and SingaporeUS 82.33% free will, 30.77% determinism, 75.77% dualism; Singapore 85.44%, 59.00%, 88.33% (n = 900 each) % of respondents
philosophers' views on free will (2020 survey)compatibilism 59.2%, libertarianism 18.8%, no free will 11.2% % of respondents
evolutionary biologists believing in free will (2007 survey)79% yes, 14% no, 7% no answer % of respondents
first compatibilist notion attributed (Aristotle)4th century BCE (Epictetus 1st century CE) era
term liberum arbitrium introduced4th century CE era
timescale critics say free will cannot be squeezed into150-350 ms

Open contentions (8) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (6)

Sits inside / holds (3)

Trades with (valence) (17)

expressed by (10)

floor filled by (18)

Kinds (6)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

free will: open alternatives, through motives, deliberation and choice, to the sense of agency, conceptions of freedom and moral responsibility (reader's view)

  1. L1: Open alternatives: courses of action the world allows, and the impediments that close them
  2. L2: Motives: desires (first- and second-order), urges, reasons, and the brain's spontaneous fluctuations
  3. L3: Deliberation: alternatives weighed by their values (deliberate) or settled by noise (arbitrary)
  4. L4: Choice: the decision (a threshold crossing on the accumulator reading), vetoable until about 200 ms before movement
  5. L5: The sense of agency: awareness of wanting and of being the author of the act
  6. L6: Conceptions of freedom: folk belief and the rival philosophical positions
  7. L7: Moral responsibility: desert of praise and blame, culpability and punishment

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L3: Deliberation: options, desires and reasons weighed; in deliberate choices the values of the alternatives drive the decision; in people, prefrontal and parietal networks
  2. L4: Choice: the decision, marked (on the accumulator reading) by a threshold crossing in medial frontal cortex (SMA, pre-SMA); a veto remains possible until about 200 ms before movement
  3. L5: The sense of agency: the felt authorship of the choice and the action (awareness of wanting, W; ownership vs agency), built from predictions and cues; dissociable (alien hand, delusions of control)
  4. L6: Conceptions of freedom: folk beliefs (free will widely believed; determinism split by culture) and the philosophers' positions (compatibilism, libertarianism, hard determinism, hard incompatibilism), none ruled
  5. L7: Moral responsibility: praise, blame, desert and punishment, which free will is meant to ground; the control and epistemic conditions

way in: Desires and urges: first-order wants and premonitory urges

  1. L1: A felt urge in the body (in tic disorders a premonitory urge, experienced as irresistible)
  2. L2: First-order desires, possibly conflicting (the addict's want for the drug and want to refrain)

way in: Reasons and prior intentions (thought)

  1. L1: Reasons, motives and values arrive as thoughts (where thoughts come from is contested)
  2. L2: Conditional intentions formed ahead of time configure how later choices run (set at the start of an experiment)

way in: Religious and cultural traditions about will, fate and providence

  1. L1: Teachings and texts (the Bhagavad Gita, the Buddha's sayings, Christian philosophy)
  2. L2: Doctrines: liberum arbitrium (4th century); dependent origination
  3. L3: Theological determinism and divine foreknowledge as a problem for free choice
  4. L4: Cultural frame: individualist and collectivist cultures differ on determinism, agree on free will

way in: Spontaneous neural fluctuations (the brain's own ongoing activity)

  1. L1: Ongoing spontaneous subthreshold fluctuations in neuronal activity
  2. L2: Slow cortical potential fluctuations (the EEG's autocorrelated drift)
  3. L3: A leaky stochastic accumulator integrates the fluctuations toward a bound (human EEG; rodent area M2)

way in: The felt consequences of one's own action (sensory feedback)

  1. L1: An effect in the world that follows the action (a tone after a key press; the limb's movement)
  2. L2: Sensory feedback from the body and the effect (proprioception; self-produced touch felt weaker)
  3. L3: Comparator: predicted state compared with actual state
  4. L4: Cue integration: many agency cues combined

way in: The situation's alternatives: courses of action open (or closed) to the agent

  1. L1: Courses of action open in the world, and the impediments that close them (restraint, coercion)
  2. L2: The options as presented and perceived: two charities named on a screen, one to receive a $1000 donation

way in: What brain recordings say about the timing of choice

  1. L1: Neuronal activity in medial frontal cortex before self-initiated movement (1019 neurons recorded in 12 subjects)
  2. L2: Scalp EEG: the readiness potential, a gradual build-up before voluntary movement
  3. L3: Averaged and decoded: the outcome readable up to 10 s ahead in prefrontal and parietal cortex
  4. L4: Compared with the reported time of conscious intention (W, read from a revolving clock spot)
  5. L5: Interpreted: unconscious initiation (Libet) or stochastic accumulation with the decision at threshold (Schurger); contested

way in: What others say: articles, courses and arguments about free will

  1. L1: A text or course: an article arguing free will is an illusion, a neuroscience course
  2. L2: Read or heard: the anti-free-will manipulation reaches the reader
  3. L3: Understood as old arguments made vivid by new illustrations
  4. L4: Weighed against one's own introspection, which people trust more for themselves than for others

way in: What physics says about the world's order (determinism and chance)

  1. L1: The natural world's cause-and-effect regularities
  2. L2: Laws of nature: future events necessitated by past and present events plus the laws
  3. L3: Laplace's demon: knowing all facts and laws would foresee the future
  4. L4: Modern science mixes deterministic and stochastic theories (quantum indeterminism)
  5. L5: Unsettled: current theories cannot decide whether determinism is true

way out: Praise, blame and punishment (and the law's judgements)

  1. L1: Sanctions in the world: punishment imposed, praise given
  2. L5: Legal doctrine: culpability, the insanity defence, diminished responsibility
  3. L6: Attitudes to punishment: retributive or consequentialist (weaker free will belief, less retributive)
  4. L7: Attributions of responsibility: who deserves praise or blame

way out: Reports of choosing (W time, verbal reports, survey answers)

  1. L1: A spoken or typed report
  2. L3: Recalled clock position at first awareness
  3. L5: Awareness of wanting to move, held for report

way out: The chosen act carried out (movement), with the veto

  1. L1: The act in the world: a key press, a wrist flick, a donation made
  2. L2: Muscle activity (EMG onset)
  3. L3: Sequential activation from the supplementary motor area to primary motor cortex
  4. L4: Intention to act; cancellable until the point of no return

way out: The written debate: arguments, papers, surveys

  1. L1: Published texts that the next reader takes in
  2. L6: A position argued (e.g. Pereboom's hard incompatibilism, Dennett's compatibilism)

Sources (23) published science

Free will (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot 2026-11-01)
Moore JW (2016) What is the sense of agency and why does it matter? Front Psychol. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01272 (behind its links)
Schurger A, Sitt JD, Dehaene S. An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement. PNAS 2012. doi:10.1073/pnas.1210467109 (behind its links)
Shariff AF et al. (2014) Free will and punishment: a mechanistic view of human nature reduces retribution. Psychol Sci. doi:10.1177/0956797614534693 (behind its links)
Genschow O et al. (2023) Manipulating belief in free will and its downstream consequences: a meta-analysis. Pers Soc Psychol Rev. doi:10.1177/10888683221087527 (behind its links)
Brembs B (2011) Towards a scientific concept of free will as a biological trait: spontaneous actions and decision-making in invertebrates. Proc R Soc B. doi:10.1098/rspb.2010.2325 (behind its links)
Sense of agency (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot) (behind its links)
Moral responsibility (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot) (behind its links)
Bereitschaftspotential (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot) (behind its links)
Schurger A, Hu P, Pak J, Roskies AL (2021) What is the readiness potential? Trends Cogn Sci. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2021.04.001 (behind its links)
Libet B, Gleason CA, Wright EW, Pearl DK (1983) Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). Brain 106:623. doi:10.1093/brain/106.3.623 (behind its links)
Soon CS, Brass M, Heinze HJ, Haynes JD (2008) Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nat Neurosci. doi:10.1038/nn.2112 (behind its links)
Fried I, Mukamel R, Kreiman G (2011) Internally generated preactivation of single neurons in human medial frontal cortex predicts volition. Neuron. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.11.045 (behind its links)
Schultze-Kraft M et al. (2016) The point of no return in vetoing self-initiated movements. PNAS. doi:10.1073/pnas.1513569112 (behind its links)
Maoz U, Yaffe G, Koch C, Mudrik L (2019) Neural precursors of decisions that matter: an ERP study of deliberate and arbitrary choice. eLife. doi:10.7554/eLife.39787 (behind its links)
Wisniewski D, Deutschländer R, Haynes JD (2019) Free will beliefs are better predicted by dualism than determinism beliefs across different cultures. PLoS One. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0221617 (behind its links)
Greene J, Cohen J (2004) For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything. Phil Trans R Soc B. doi:10.1098/rstb.2004.1546 (behind its links)
Determinism (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot) (behind its links)
Mind-body problem (Wikipedia, rev 1381179614, 2026-10-20, via Wikimedia Enterprise cache) (behind its links)
Truth (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Brass M, Furstenberg A, Mele AR (2019) Why neuroscience does not disprove free will. Neurosci Biobehav Rev. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.04.024 (behind its links)
Haggard P, Clark S, Kalogeras J (2002) Voluntary action and conscious awareness. Nat Neurosci. doi:10.1038/nn827 (behind its links)
Neuroscience of free will (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot) (behind its links)