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Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states)

The mind–body problem is a philosophical problem concerning the relationship between thought and consciousness in the human mind and body.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born atbooked: the modern form with Descartes (Meditations 1641); earlier forms in Zoroastrian dualism (mid-fifth century BC), the Buddha (480-400 BCE), Plato and Aristotle
born precisioncenturies
boundaryInside: the question how mental states (thought, feeling, consciousness) relate to physical states of body, brain and nervous system; its sub-questions (interaction and mental causation, the explanatory gap and hard problem, unity, personal identity's bodily side); the positions that answer it; the evidence it weighs (first-person experience, neural correlates, lesions, interventions, thought experiments, physics, surveys, machines); its history from the Buddha, Plato and Aristotle through Descartes to now; and the people and fields that carry it. Outside: consciousness itself (its own walk), the brain itself (its own walk), free will (sibling), personal identity beyond the body, and the theories of truth (sibling).
nested levelA central problem of philosophy of mind (philosophy L6). It runs on people (human L6-L7: thought, experience, argument) and draws on neuroscience; it acts back through experiments, clinics and judgements about machines and animals.
scalesocial

Measures (23) published science

philosophers accepting physicalism51.9 % (PhilPapers 2020)
philosophers: hard problem genuine62.4 (29.7 say it does not exist) % (PhilPapers 2020)
consciousness researchers surveyed166 people (ASSC attendees)
researchers: explanatory gap remains67.5 % yes
researchers: complete biophysical explanation possible67.3 % yes
researchers: Mary learns something new89.6 % yes (the only question with consensus)
researchers: machines could be conscious67.1 % yes
researchers: zombies possible under our physics33.9 % yes
researchers: consciousness evolved for an adaptive function71.5 % yes
cerebellar share of the brain's neurons69 of 86 billion neurons
adversarial test participants256 people
decoherence time in brain1e-13 to 1e-20 s
neural dynamical timescale0.001 to 0.1 s
decision decoded in advanceup to 10 s
Descartes's Meditations (dualism formulated)1641 year
Elisabeth's letter to Descartes1643 year
Jean Cousin's pineal thesisJanuary 1641 date
first split-brain report (van Wagenen and Herren)1940 year
Ryle's The Concept of Mind1949 year
'hard problem' coined (Tucson talk)1994 year
first formal mind-body split (Zoroastrianism)mid-fifth century BC date
the Buddha's lifetime480-400 BCE years BCE
picosecond conformational transitions proposed as the timescale of conscious processes1e-12 s (order)

Open contentions (11) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (6)

Sits inside / holds (2)

Trades with (valence) (14)

expressed by (12)

floor filled by (10)

Kinds (12)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

mind-body problem: from the body, brain and world, through what each side shows, to how they relate, the rival positions and their use back on the world (reader's view)

  1. L1: The body, the brain and nervous system, and the world acting on them
  2. L2: Everyday mind–body connections: a stubbed toe and the 'ouch', a decision and the walk across the room
  3. L3: Two descriptions of one event: first-person experience (the mind-stream) and third-person accounts (body, brain, observables)
  4. L4: Correlation: neural correlates of consciousness (arousal and content), lesions and split brains, decoding and intervention
  5. L5: How they relate: mental causation, the explanatory gap, the easy problems and the hard problem
  6. L6: Rival positions: dualisms (substance, property; interactionism, parallelism, occasionalism, pre-established harmony, epiphenomenalism), monisms (physicalism: identity, functionalism, non-reductive and emergentist, eliminativist and illusionist; idealism; neutral and dual-aspect monism; panpsychism), and views that reject the dichotomy (hylomorphism, Ryle, Searle, the Buddha's interdependence, enactivism)
  7. L7: Positions put to use: theory-testing experiments, clinical practice, judgements about machines and animals, agency and responsibility

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L5: How mind and body relate: mental causation, the explanatory gap, easy problems and the hard problem (where every channel's evidence meets)
  2. L6: The rival positions, each an answer to how the two relate
  3. L7: A position put to use: in experiments, clinics, judgements about machines and animals, and in agency and responsibility

way in: Bodily events that cross into the mind (the stubbed toe)

  1. L1: A physical event at the body (an apple falls, a toe is stubbed)
  2. L2: Nerve firings in the toe
  3. L3: Carried to the brain
  4. L4: Felt as pain: the same event in mental terms

way in: First-person experience: the mind side as lived

  1. L1: The mind-stream: constantly changing sensory experiences and mental events
  2. L2: Attending to the stream (mindfulness, introspection)
  3. L3: The subjective aspect: something it is like
  4. L4: Report: experience turned into evidence (verbal report, dream reports on waking)

way in: Intervention: changing one side and watching the other (expectation, placebo, optogenetics)

  1. L1: An expectation set up by what a patient is told (a placebo said to be a dopamine drug)
  2. L2: The expectation of dopamine release itself
  3. L3: Learning signals change in striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex; the other way round, neurons switched optically induce or block an experience
  4. L4: Behaviour and affect change: reward learning enhanced; manipulable correlates assumed for every subjective state

way in: Lesions and surgery: what breaking the brain does to the mind

  1. L1: Injury or surgery: accidents, disease, focal brainstem lesions, cutting the corpus callosum for epilepsy
  2. L2: The mind changes with it, often predictably by site
  3. L3: Dissociations: perception split while action stays unified (split brain); coma from small upper-brainstem lesions; consciousness spared without the cerebellum
  4. L4: What it says about the subject: one consciousness or two, unsettled

way in: Machines as test cases: could a functional duplicate be conscious?

  1. L1: Computers that outperform people at tasks once thought to need minds
  2. L2: Functional equivalence: a silicon machine realising the right roles (multiple realizability)
  3. L3: Researchers asked: 67.1% say machines could be conscious
  4. L4: Theories split: IIT says a faithful digital simulation would experience next to nothing

way in: Neural correlates: measured brain activity matched to experience

  1. L1: Brain states formed by electrochemical interactions in the body
  2. L2: Measured: fMRI, MEG and intracranial EEG while people view stimuli
  3. L3: Level: arousal-enabling nuclei of thalamus, midbrain and pons (upper brainstem)
  4. L4: Content: correlates in cortex and its satellites; content found in visual, ventrotemporal and inferior frontal cortex

way in: Surveys of philosophers and consciousness researchers

  1. L1: Professionals asked (philosophers in PhilPapers 2020; 166 consciousness researchers at ASSC)
  2. L2: Answers given on a five-point scale
  3. L3: Counted: physicalism 51.9%; hard problem genuine 62.4%; explanatory gap 67.5%; complete biophysical explanation possible 67.3%
  4. L4: Read as a majority without consensus

way in: The tradition: texts from the Buddha and Aristotle to Descartes, Elisabeth, Leibniz, Ryle and Searle

  1. L1: Texts: Descartes's Treatise of Man and Passions of the Soul, Elisabeth's letters, De Anima, Monadology, The Concept of Mind
  2. L2: Read and re-read
  3. L3: Interpreted: the pineal theory's originality and anatomy disputed
  4. L4: Distilled into an argument (the interaction problem, the category mistake)

way in: Thought experiments: zombies, Mary's room, the bat, the vertiginous question

  1. L1: A case described: Mary the colour scientist in a black-and-white room; a zombie duplicate
  2. L2: The intuition drawn: Mary learns something new when she sees red
  3. L3: Intuitions counted: 89.6% of consciousness researchers say Mary learns; 33.9% think zombies possible under our physics
  4. L4: Drawn into an argument against physicalism, or dismissed (Dennett's 'zombie hunch')

way in: What physics allows: conservation, causal closure, quantum states

  1. L1: Physical law: energy conserved in every brain event
  2. L2: The causal closure of the physical
  3. L3: Quantum openings proposed: indeterminacy at the macroscopic scale (Eccles, Stapp); consciousness as quantum information in brain states (Georgiev)
  4. L4: Timescales checked: decoherence in 10^-13 to 10^-20 s against neural dynamics of 0.001 to 0.1 s

way out: Clinical use: what a patient is told acts on the patient's brain

  1. L1: Dopamine release in the striatum modulated
  2. L5: An expectation set (a pill described as a dopamine drug)
  3. L7: A position on the mind–brain relation shapes clinical work

way out: Theories put to experimental test

  1. L1: Brains measured while people view stimuli (256 participants)
  2. L6: Predictions preregistered with pass or fail criteria
  3. L7: Rival theories brought together with a theory-neutral consortium

way out: Writing positions and objections into the literature

  1. L1: Published: the record the next reader takes in
  2. L6: Written as a book or paper (The Concept of Mind, 1949; Facing up, 1995)
  3. L7: A position taken (Ryle against the ghost in the machine)

Sources (25) published science

Mind-body problem (Wikipedia, rev 1381179614, 2026-10-20, via Wikimedia Enterprise cache)
Cogitate Consortium, Ferrante O. et al. (2025) Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness. Nature. doi:10.1038/s41586-025-08888-1 (PMC12137136, CC BY) (behind its links)
Schmidt L., Braun E.K., Wager T.D., Shohamy D. (2014) Mind matters: placebo enhances reward learning in Parkinson's disease. Nat Neurosci 17:1793-1797. doi:10.1038/nn.3842 (behind its links)
Fuchs T. (2020) The Circularity of the Embodied Mind. Front Psychol 11:1707. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01707 (behind its links)
Physicalism (encyclopedia article, WME on-demand 2026-11-20) (behind its links)
Hard problem of consciousness (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Francken J.C., Beerendonk L., Molenaar D., Fahrenfort J.J., Kiverstein J.D., Seth A.K., van Gaal S. (2022) An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science. Neurosci Conscious niac011. doi:10.1093/nc/niac011 (behind its links)
Tononi G., Koch C. (2015) Consciousness: here, there and everywhere? Phil Trans R Soc B 370:20140167. doi:10.1098/rstb.2014.0167 (behind its links)
Tegmark M. (2000) The importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes. Phys Rev E 61:4194. arXiv:quant-ph/9907009 (behind its links)
Mind–body dualism (encyclopedia article, WME on-demand 2026-11-20) (behind its links)
Lokhorst G.J., Kaitaro T.T. (2001) The originality of Descartes' theory about the pineal gland. J Hist Neurosci 10(1):6-18. PMID 11446265 (behind its links)
de Haan E.H.F., Corballis P.M., Hillyard S.A., Marzi C.A., Seth A., Lamme V.A.F., et al. (2020) Split-Brain: What We Know Now and Why This is Important for Understanding Consciousness. Neuropsychol Rev 30:224-233. doi:10.1007/s11065-020-09439-3 (behind its links)
Georgiev D.D. (2020) Quantum information theoretic approach to the mind-brain problem. Prog Biophys Mol Biol 158:16-32. doi:10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2020.08.002; arXiv:2012.07836 (behind its links)
Chalmers D.J. (1995) Facing up to the problem of consciousness. J Consciousness Studies 2(3):200-219 (author's copy, consc.net) (behind its links)
Friston K.J., Wiese W., Hobson J.A. (2020) Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism. Entropy 22(5):516. doi:10.3390/e22050516 (behind its links)
Free will (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Truth (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Berhouma M. (2013) Beyond the pineal gland assumption: a neuroanatomical appraisal of dualism in Descartes' philosophy. Clin Neurol Neurosurg. PMID 23562082 (behind its links)
Functionalism (philosophy of mind) (Wikipedia, rev 1376345227, 2026-09-23, via Wikimedia Enterprise cache) (behind its links)
Neutral monism (encyclopedia article, WME on-demand 2026-11-20) (behind its links)
Panpsychism (encyclopedia article, WME on-demand 2026-11-20) (behind its links)
Solms M. (2018) The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle. Front Psychol 9:2714. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02714 (behind its links)
Mind (Wikipedia, rev 1374701255, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Paditz E., Shevchenko O., Upreti K. (2026) The pineal gland as the seat of the soul (René Descartes): History of reception, enlightenment, and consequences of a famous error. J Hist Neurosci. PMID 41277772 (behind its links)
Hoffman D.D., Prakash C. (2014) Objects of consciousness. Front Psychol 5:577. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00577 (behind its links)