← all systems · see it in The System
Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states)
The mind–body problem is a philosophical problem concerning the relationship between thought and consciousness in the human mind and body.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | booked: the modern form with Descartes (Meditations 1641); earlier forms in Zoroastrian dualism (mid-fifth century BC), the Buddha (480-400 BCE), Plato and Aristotle |
| born precision | centuries |
| boundary | Inside: the question how mental states (thought, feeling, consciousness) relate to physical states of body, brain and nervous system; its sub-questions (interaction and mental causation, the explanatory gap and hard problem, unity, personal identity's bodily side); the positions that answer it; the evidence it weighs (first-person experience, neural correlates, lesions, interventions, thought experiments, physics, surveys, machines); its history from the Buddha, Plato and Aristotle through Descartes to now; and the people and fields that carry it. Outside: consciousness itself (its own walk), the brain itself (its own walk), free will (sibling), personal identity beyond the body, and the theories of truth (sibling). |
| nested level | A central problem of philosophy of mind (philosophy L6). It runs on people (human L6-L7: thought, experience, argument) and draws on neuroscience; it acts back through experiments, clinics and judgements about machines and animals. |
| scale | social |
Measures (23) published science
| philosophers accepting physicalism | 51.9 % (PhilPapers 2020) |
| philosophers: hard problem genuine | 62.4 (29.7 say it does not exist) % (PhilPapers 2020) |
| consciousness researchers surveyed | 166 people (ASSC attendees) |
| researchers: explanatory gap remains | 67.5 % yes |
| researchers: complete biophysical explanation possible | 67.3 % yes |
| researchers: Mary learns something new | 89.6 % yes (the only question with consensus) |
| researchers: machines could be conscious | 67.1 % yes |
| researchers: zombies possible under our physics | 33.9 % yes |
| researchers: consciousness evolved for an adaptive function | 71.5 % yes |
| cerebellar share of the brain's neurons | 69 of 86 billion neurons |
| adversarial test participants | 256 people |
| decoherence time in brain | 1e-13 to 1e-20 s |
| neural dynamical timescale | 0.001 to 0.1 s |
| decision decoded in advance | up to 10 s |
| Descartes's Meditations (dualism formulated) | 1641 year |
| Elisabeth's letter to Descartes | 1643 year |
| Jean Cousin's pineal thesis | January 1641 date |
| first split-brain report (van Wagenen and Herren) | 1940 year |
| Ryle's The Concept of Mind | 1949 year |
| 'hard problem' coined (Tucson talk) | 1994 year |
| first formal mind-body split (Zoroastrianism) | mid-fifth century BC date |
| the Buddha's lifetime | 480-400 BCE years BCE |
| picosecond conformational transitions proposed as the timescale of conscious processes | 1e-12 s (order) |
Open contentions (11) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-413 Where do thoughts come from?
booked: No theory is proven, so the map lists the main ones side by side and doesn't pick one. It shows where thinking is handled in the brain, not where thoughts start.
the other reading: see C-413 (thought origin); the Buddha: aggregates arising by five causal laws; Jerry's position, labelled as his: patterns arriving from outside one's slice of consciousness (not sourced here) - C-421 Where in the brain does consciousness happen?
booked: The map puts consciousness at the top of the human stack without choosing a place in the brain for it.
the other reading: global neuronal workspace; integrated information theory; upper-brainstem affect (Solms; Merker); Cogitate 2025: neither survived intact - C-434 Could large language models be conscious?
booked: The map makes no claim about consciousness in these systems and lists the views side by side.
the other reading: functionalism: a silicon machine could have our mental life; IIT: a faithful digital simulation would experience next to nothing; 67.1% of researchers: machines could be conscious - C-1076 How is the mind related to the body?
booked: The map treats the mind as carried by the brain and body, the dominant view, without ruling out the other positions.
the other reading: substance dualism (Descartes; Swinburne, Moreland, Lowe, Taliaferro today); property dualism, and emergentism (named 'the current standard' among scientists by the encyclopedia, unsourced to a survey); interactionism (Popper, Eccles, Elitzur's 'reluctant dualist'); psychophysical parallelism, double aspectism (Spinoza, Fechner), occasionalism (Malebranche), pre-established harmony (Leibniz); epiphenomenalism (Huxley); identity theory; functionalism (Putnam); eliminativism and illusionism; idealism; conscious realism (Hoffman and Prakash); neutral monism (James, Russell); dual-aspect monism (Solms); Markovian monism (Friston, Wiese, Hobson: physicalism most plausible, rivals not ruled out); panpsychism and panprotopsychism (the combination problem); rejections of the dichotomy: Aristotle's hylomorphism, Aquinas, the Buddha's interdependence, Ryle's category mistake, Searle's biological naturalism, structuralism, enactivism's body-body problem - C-2818 What is consciousness for?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: epiphenomenalism (Huxley's steam whistle); 71.5% of consciousness researchers: evolved for an adaptive function; mental causation through emergence, circular causation (Freeman, Fuchs), or formal and final causation (Northoff) - C-2831 Can science explain why there is something it is like to be conscious?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: genuine (62.4% of philosophers; 67.5% of consciousness researchers say something is left out after function); does not exist or dissolves (29.7%; Dennett, Churchland, Frankish); real but beyond human faculties (cognitive closure) - C-3264 How can the mind cause bodily action?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: reduce the mental (Kim: only reduction preserves mental causation); accept overdetermination; epiphenomenalism; emergent causal powers (critics: tends toward dualism); circular causation (Freeman; Fuchs: downward and upward causation); formal and final causation (Northoff); interaction through quantum indeterminacy (Eccles, Stapp) - C-3266 Who first posed the mind-body problem?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: Descartes: first documented Western philosopher to formulate it in its present form; Zoroastrian divinity-secularity dualism, mid-fifth century BC: the first formal concept of a split; the Buddha (480-400 BCE): interdependence of mind and body; Plato and Aristotle; Avicenna; earlier Asian traditions - C-3272 Was Descartes's pineal 'seat of the soul' original to him?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: original (Lokhorst and Kaitaro 2001, against Soury, Thorndike and Sherrington); not very original (Soury, Thorndike, Sherrington, as cited); an ad hoc neurophysiology with deliberate anatomical approximations built to serve his dualism (Berhouma 2013); a famous error still propagated (Paditz et al. 2026) - C-3277 Does quantum physics play a part in the mind?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: the brain's cognitive degrees of freedom are classical: decoherence 10^-13 to 10^-20 s against 0.001-0.1 s (Tegmark 2000); consciousness as unobservable quantum information in brain states, picosecond timescale (Georgiev 2020); Penrose: the brain as a quantum computer (named by Tegmark); macroscopic indeterminacy as the mind's door (Eccles, Stapp) - C-3286 Does splitting the brain split the mind?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: two conscious agents synchronising their output; one agent with an unintegrated stream (like a film with sound and picture out of sync); intermediate conceptualisations, not a simple yes or no
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (6)
- Human brain
- Hard problem of consciousness
- Problem of mental causation
- Neural correlates of consciousness
- Mind–body dualism
- Physicalism
Sits inside / holds (2)
Trades with (valence) (14)
- Free will · Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) gain
- Human (Homo sapiens) · Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) gain
- Religion · Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) mixed
- Science (as a human social and cultural system) · Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) gain
- Quantum mechanics · Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) mixed
- Human brain · Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) gain
- Consciousness · Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) gain
- Energy · Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) loss
- Mental health · Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) gain
- Psychology (the mind and behaviour as psychology describes them) · Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) gain
- Artificial intelligence · Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) gain
- Philosophy (the field: the practice and the questions it works on) · Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) gain
- Metaphysics (the branch of philosophy: its practice and the questions about reality it works on) · Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) gain
- Truth via sys:sensory-environment · Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) even
expressed by (12)
- Generation/Synthesis
- Recombination/Composition
- Quality Improvement/Refinement
- Interoperability/Transduction (Bridging)
- Sensing/Scanning
- Active Experimentation / Probing (Optimal Experimental Design)
- Multi-Scale Data Fusion / Triangulation
- Hypothesis Portfolio / Multiple Hypothesis Tracking
- Offline Simulation & Replay-Guided Planning
- Self-Monitoring
- Validation of Effectiveness
- Quality Control & Error Correction
floor filled by (10)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Religion
- Science (as a human social and cultural system)
- Human brain
- Consciousness
- Mental health
- Psychology (the mind and behaviour as psychology describes them)
- Artificial intelligence
- Philosophy (the field: the practice and the questions it works on)
- Metaphysics (the branch of philosophy: its practice and the questions about reality it works on)
Kinds (12)
- Free will
- Hard problem of consciousness
- Problem of mental causation
- Mind–body dualism
- Physicalism
- Idealism
- Neutral monism
- Panpsychism
- Functionalism (philosophy of mind)
- Epiphenomenalism
- Psychophysical parallelism
- Vertiginous question
Notes published science
- Consciousness researchers mostly think science can fully explain consciousness biologically (67.3%), yet nearly all of them (89.6%) also think Mary, a colour scientist who knows every physical fact about vision, learns something new the first time she sees red; the survey did not ask them where they stand on mind and body (src:francken-2022).
- The cerebellum holds 69 of the brain's 86 billion neurons, yet people who lose most of it walk and speak unsteadily without reporting any loss of consciousness; meanwhile the smallest lesions that cause coma sit in a tiny patch of the upper brainstem (src:tononi-koch-2015, src:solms-2018).
- Descartes's pineal gland as 'the seat of the soul' was criticised within decades by Willis, Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant, but the idea outlived its anatomy: Blavatsky tied it to chakras in 1888 and Steiner to 'cosmic energies' in 1922/1923, and a 2026 history finds it still turning up (src:paditz-2026).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
mind-body problem: from the body, brain and world, through what each side shows, to how they relate, the rival positions and their use back on the world (reader's view)
- L1: The body, the brain and nervous system, and the world acting on them
- L2: Everyday mind–body connections: a stubbed toe and the 'ouch', a decision and the walk across the room
- L3: Two descriptions of one event: first-person experience (the mind-stream) and third-person accounts (body, brain, observables)
- L4: Correlation: neural correlates of consciousness (arousal and content), lesions and split brains, decoding and intervention
- L5: How they relate: mental causation, the explanatory gap, the easy problems and the hard problem
- L6: Rival positions: dualisms (substance, property; interactionism, parallelism, occasionalism, pre-established harmony, epiphenomenalism), monisms (physicalism: identity, functionalism, non-reductive and emergentist, eliminativist and illusionist; idealism; neutral and dual-aspect monism; panpsychism), and views that reject the dichotomy (hylomorphism, Ryle, Searle, the Buddha's interdependence, enactivism)
- L7: Positions put to use: theory-testing experiments, clinical practice, judgements about machines and animals, agency and responsibility
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L5: How mind and body relate: mental causation, the explanatory gap, easy problems and the hard problem (where every channel's evidence meets)
- L6: The rival positions, each an answer to how the two relate
- L7: A position put to use: in experiments, clinics, judgements about machines and animals, and in agency and responsibility
way in: Bodily events that cross into the mind (the stubbed toe)
- L1: A physical event at the body (an apple falls, a toe is stubbed)
- L2: Nerve firings in the toe
- L3: Carried to the brain
- L4: Felt as pain: the same event in mental terms
way in: First-person experience: the mind side as lived
- L1: The mind-stream: constantly changing sensory experiences and mental events
- L2: Attending to the stream (mindfulness, introspection)
- L3: The subjective aspect: something it is like
- L4: Report: experience turned into evidence (verbal report, dream reports on waking)
way in: Intervention: changing one side and watching the other (expectation, placebo, optogenetics)
- L1: An expectation set up by what a patient is told (a placebo said to be a dopamine drug)
- L2: The expectation of dopamine release itself
- L3: Learning signals change in striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex; the other way round, neurons switched optically induce or block an experience
- L4: Behaviour and affect change: reward learning enhanced; manipulable correlates assumed for every subjective state
way in: Lesions and surgery: what breaking the brain does to the mind
- L1: Injury or surgery: accidents, disease, focal brainstem lesions, cutting the corpus callosum for epilepsy
- L2: The mind changes with it, often predictably by site
- L3: Dissociations: perception split while action stays unified (split brain); coma from small upper-brainstem lesions; consciousness spared without the cerebellum
- L4: What it says about the subject: one consciousness or two, unsettled
way in: Machines as test cases: could a functional duplicate be conscious?
- L1: Computers that outperform people at tasks once thought to need minds
- L2: Functional equivalence: a silicon machine realising the right roles (multiple realizability)
- L3: Researchers asked: 67.1% say machines could be conscious
- L4: Theories split: IIT says a faithful digital simulation would experience next to nothing
way in: Neural correlates: measured brain activity matched to experience
- L1: Brain states formed by electrochemical interactions in the body
- L2: Measured: fMRI, MEG and intracranial EEG while people view stimuli
- L3: Level: arousal-enabling nuclei of thalamus, midbrain and pons (upper brainstem)
- L4: Content: correlates in cortex and its satellites; content found in visual, ventrotemporal and inferior frontal cortex
way in: Surveys of philosophers and consciousness researchers
- L1: Professionals asked (philosophers in PhilPapers 2020; 166 consciousness researchers at ASSC)
- L2: Answers given on a five-point scale
- L3: Counted: physicalism 51.9%; hard problem genuine 62.4%; explanatory gap 67.5%; complete biophysical explanation possible 67.3%
- L4: Read as a majority without consensus
way in: The tradition: texts from the Buddha and Aristotle to Descartes, Elisabeth, Leibniz, Ryle and Searle
- L1: Texts: Descartes's Treatise of Man and Passions of the Soul, Elisabeth's letters, De Anima, Monadology, The Concept of Mind
- L2: Read and re-read
- L3: Interpreted: the pineal theory's originality and anatomy disputed
- L4: Distilled into an argument (the interaction problem, the category mistake)
way in: Thought experiments: zombies, Mary's room, the bat, the vertiginous question
- L1: A case described: Mary the colour scientist in a black-and-white room; a zombie duplicate
- L2: The intuition drawn: Mary learns something new when she sees red
- L3: Intuitions counted: 89.6% of consciousness researchers say Mary learns; 33.9% think zombies possible under our physics
- L4: Drawn into an argument against physicalism, or dismissed (Dennett's 'zombie hunch')
way in: What physics allows: conservation, causal closure, quantum states
- L1: Physical law: energy conserved in every brain event
- L2: The causal closure of the physical
- L3: Quantum openings proposed: indeterminacy at the macroscopic scale (Eccles, Stapp); consciousness as quantum information in brain states (Georgiev)
- L4: Timescales checked: decoherence in 10^-13 to 10^-20 s against neural dynamics of 0.001 to 0.1 s
way out: Clinical use: what a patient is told acts on the patient's brain
- L1: Dopamine release in the striatum modulated
- L5: An expectation set (a pill described as a dopamine drug)
- L7: A position on the mind–brain relation shapes clinical work
way out: Theories put to experimental test
- L1: Brains measured while people view stimuli (256 participants)
- L6: Predictions preregistered with pass or fail criteria
- L7: Rival theories brought together with a theory-neutral consortium
way out: Writing positions and objections into the literature
- L1: Published: the record the next reader takes in
- L6: Written as a book or paper (The Concept of Mind, 1949; Facing up, 1995)
- L7: A position taken (Ryle against the ghost in the machine)
Sources (25) published science
Schmidt L., Braun E.K., Wager T.D., Shohamy D. (2014) Mind matters: placebo enhances reward learning in Parkinson's disease. Nat Neurosci 17:1793-1797. doi:10.1038/nn.3842 (behind its links)
Fuchs T. (2020) The Circularity of the Embodied Mind. Front Psychol 11:1707. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01707 (behind its links)
Physicalism (encyclopedia article, WME on-demand 2026-11-20) (behind its links)
Hard problem of consciousness (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Tononi G., Koch C. (2015) Consciousness: here, there and everywhere? Phil Trans R Soc B 370:20140167. doi:10.1098/rstb.2014.0167 (behind its links)
Tegmark M. (2000) The importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes. Phys Rev E 61:4194. arXiv:quant-ph/9907009 (behind its links)
Mind–body dualism (encyclopedia article, WME on-demand 2026-11-20) (behind its links)
Lokhorst G.J., Kaitaro T.T. (2001) The originality of Descartes' theory about the pineal gland. J Hist Neurosci 10(1):6-18. PMID 11446265 (behind its links)
Chalmers D.J. (1995) Facing up to the problem of consciousness. J Consciousness Studies 2(3):200-219 (author's copy, consc.net) (behind its links)
Friston K.J., Wiese W., Hobson J.A. (2020) Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism. Entropy 22(5):516. doi:10.3390/e22050516 (behind its links)
Free will (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Truth (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Berhouma M. (2013) Beyond the pineal gland assumption: a neuroanatomical appraisal of dualism in Descartes' philosophy. Clin Neurol Neurosurg. PMID 23562082 (behind its links)
Functionalism (philosophy of mind) (Wikipedia, rev 1376345227, 2026-09-23, via Wikimedia Enterprise cache) (behind its links)
Neutral monism (encyclopedia article, WME on-demand 2026-11-20) (behind its links)
Panpsychism (encyclopedia article, WME on-demand 2026-11-20) (behind its links)
Solms M. (2018) The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle. Front Psychol 9:2714. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02714 (behind its links)
Mind (Wikipedia, rev 1374701255, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)