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Consciousness

Consciousness is being aware of something internal to one's self, or of states or objects in one's external environment.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born atone person: by 5 months (the earliest age recorded in the source)
born precisionlower bound
boundaryInside: the states and processes the field files under consciousness: the level of consciousness (wakefulness, from alert waking through drowsiness, sleep and anaesthesia to coma) and its contents (what is experienced at a moment: seeing a red rose, hearing a clarinet, a pain, an emotion, a thought, a dream), the access of those contents to report, reasoning and control, and their felt, first-person character. Outside: the nonconscious processing that feeds it (the feedforward sweep, reflexes, vegetative regulation), the brain and body that carry it, and the world. Where the border runs inside the brain, and whether experience and access are one thing or two, is what the theories dispute (C-421, C-2817).
nested levelA state and a set of processes of a person (Human's L7 board floor 'consciousness') carried by the brain (human-brain's L8 'consciousness', contested seat C-421); fed by attention (attention's L7 'access'), perception, memory and emotion, and switched off and on by sleep and anaesthesia. Shared in some form with other mammals and birds and possibly all vertebrates and some invertebrates (C-2816).
scaleorganism

Measures (20) published science

conscious access latency (ignition)about 200-300 ms after stimulus onset
human behavioural information throughputabout 10 bits/s
speed of thinking (Twenty Questions)20 bits over a few seconds; 10 or less bits/s
capacity of the cones of one eyeabout 1.6 gigabits/s (6 million cones)
ratio of sensory input to behavioural throughputabout 100,000,000 ratio
NREM-REM sleep cycleapproximately 90 minutes
awake eyes-closed EEG alpha10 Hz
early-night awakenings with no experience reportedup to 30 %
NREM awakenings with dream reportsup to 70 %
PCI cutoff separating conscious from unconscious (PCI*)0.31 index
PCI* sensitivity and specificity in the 150-subject benchmark100 / 100 %
minimally conscious patients above PCI*36 of 38 (94.7) patients (%)
cognitive motor dissociation among patients without observable command-following60 of 241 (25) patients (%)
disorders-of-consciousness cohort353 adults, six centres
Glasgow Coma Scale range; coma3-15; 3-8 coma; 15 full score
range of volatile anaesthetic concentration disrupting function across lifeabout 10-fold concentration range
Meyer-Overton correlation (lipophilicity vs potency) holds oversix orders of magnitude
Cogitate adversarial test participants256 people
philosophers who hold the hard problem genuine / non-existent (2020 PhilPapers)62.4 / 29.7 %
earliest age with an ignition-like signature recorded5 months

Open contentions (11) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (6)

Sits inside / holds (2)

Trades with (valence) (14)

expressed by (7)

floor filled by (18)

represents (1)

Kinds (15)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

consciousness: from what could be experienced to what is experienced, reported and acted on (reader's view)

  1. L1: What could be experienced: the world, the body and the brain's own activity, gathered by the senses at about 10^9 bits/s; visual sensations, sounds, bodily sensations, mental images, emotions, a stream of thought
  2. L2: Nonconscious processing: the feedforward sweep and specialised processors working in parallel; subliminal stimuli leave a decaying wave, not ignition
  3. L3: Level (wakefulness): the ascending arousal systems and central thalamus set how awake; lost in deep sleep, anaesthesia and coma, present without awareness in unresponsive wakefulness; on one account the core of the conscious state itself (Merker)
  4. L4: Local recurrent processing in sensory cortex: an organised percept; on RPT already experienced (phenomenal without access), on IIT the posterior lattice; in sleep the posterior hot zone
  5. L5: Selection and ignition: a limited-capacity workspace, one content at a time, a sudden divergence at 200-300 ms (board 'workspace')
  6. L6: Global availability: content broadcast to report, memory, reasoning and control; the metacognitive (higher-order) representation (board 'broadcast')
  7. L7: Experience and its use: something it is like; reported, remembered and acted on deliberately; the hard problem asks why (board 'experience')

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L5: Selection and ignition: a limited-capacity stage where one content wins; a sudden divergence 200-300 ms after onset between seen and unseen, spreading to prefrontal and parietal cortex; a second task waits
  2. L6: Global availability: the selected content amplified, sustained and made available to the processors (report, memory, reasoning, control); on higher-order theories, a second-order metacognitive representation
  3. L7: Experience: what it is like, unified at a moment and across time, with or without a self in view; reportable and used in deliberate control. Why any of the floors below come with experience is the hard problem (C-2831); which floor is the seat is C-421

way in: Arousal (the level channel: how awake)

  1. L1: Sleep pressure and the body's state: adenosine, nociception, time of day
  2. L2: The ascending arousal nuclei (locus coeruleus, raphe, tuberomammillary nucleus, ventral tegmental area; LDT/PPT) and the sleep-promoting VLPO that inhibits them
  3. L3: The central thalamus: arousal regulation and forebrain integration
  4. L4: The cortex driven into its active state (cholinergic drive via thalamus and from the basal forebrain)

way in: Bodily sensations (touch, pain, temperature: the body felt)

  1. L1: Bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; surgical nociceptive stimulation
  2. L3: Nociceptive signals that still drive arousal and the heart when consciousness is held off by anaesthesia

way in: Dreams (experience in sleep, disconnected from the world)

  1. L1: The sleeping brain cut off from the world: consciousness fades (no experience up to 30% of early-night awakenings) or dreams (up to 70% of NREM awakenings)
  2. L4: Posterior 'hot zone': a local fall in low-frequency activity, with high-frequency activity sited by content (faces, place, movement, speech)

way in: Emotion (emotional feelings)

  1. L1: Contested origin (C-414): events of significance; on LeDoux and Brown's account subcortical circuits supply nonconscious inputs
  2. L3: Subcortical survival circuits (amygdala and others): nonconscious inputs
  3. L4: The same general cortical network that assembles every conscious content (higher-order account)

way in: Hearing (auditory contents)

  1. L1: Sounds and sequences of sounds (an oddball tone in a sequence)
  2. L4: Auditory areas: an unconscious local prediction error (mismatch negativity), kept in coma, sleep or inattention

way in: Interoception (the body's inner state; feelings)

  1. L1: The body's inner state, read by interoceptive inference (one account of emotion and bodily selfhood)

way in: Sight (visual contents)

  1. L1: The visual scene: light on about 6 million cones per eye, about 1.6 gigabits/s of input
  2. L2: The feedforward sweep through the visual hierarchy: features extracted, not yet experienced
  3. L3: Primary visual cortex responding without awareness
  4. L4: Recurrent processing and content-specific activity in visual and ventrotemporal cortex (the posterior candidate content; in rivalry, temporal-lobe neurons follow the percept)

way in: Thought (the stream of conscious thought)

  1. L1: Contested origin (C-413): a thought arriving; its pace, measured as 20 bits over a few seconds in Twenty Questions
  2. L4: The 'inner brain' handling the few bits that steer behaviour; working memory held in mind

way out: Deliberate action (obeying commands; movement)

  1. L1: Movement on the world: the motor subscale, from 'no motor response' to 'obeys commands'
  2. L5: Command-following carried out in brain activity even where no movement follows (cognitive motor dissociation, 25% of unresponsive patients)
  3. L7: The deliberate control of behaviour

way out: Holding and laying down (conscious working memory; recall)

  1. L5: Without consciousness, no new memory: amnesia is one of anaesthesia's four traits
  2. L6: Working memory held by global, distributed persistent firing: conscious at encoding, refresh and use

way out: Report (speech and other signals of what is experienced)

  1. L1: Speech and answers at the bedside: the verbal subscale of the Glasgow Coma Scale ('no verbal response' to 'fully oriented')
  2. L6: Information about internal states retrieved and made available for verbal report
  3. L7: Subjective report, immediate or delayed: the benchmark of whether experience was present

way out: Top-down amplification and control of attention (back down to the processors)

  1. L4: Feedback from anterior cortex amplifying and sustaining relevant stimuli; bottom-up V1 signals vetoed when they conflict with the internal model
  2. L6: Workspace neurons mobilising or suppressing specialised processors through descending connections
  3. L7: A simplified model of one's own attention used to control it (attention schema theory)

Sources (21) published science

Consciousness (Wikipedia, rev 1382504398, 2026-10-29, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot)
Mashour GA, Roelfsema P, Changeux JP, Dehaene S. 2020. Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis. Neuron. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2020.01.026 (PMC8770991, author manuscript) (behind its links)
Brown E.N., Lydic R., Schiff N.D. (2010) General anesthesia, sleep, and coma. N Engl J Med 363:2638-2650. doi:10.1056/NEJMra0808281 (PMC3162622, author manuscript) (behind its links)
Graziano MSA, Webb TW (2015) The attention schema theory: a mechanistic account of subjective awareness. Front Psychol 6:500. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00500 (behind its links)
Butlin et al. 2023, Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (arXiv:2308.08708) (behind its links)
Siclari F., et al. (2017) The neural correlates of dreaming. Nat Neurosci 20:872-878. doi:10.1038/nn.4545 (PMC5462120, author manuscript) (behind its links)
Hard problem of consciousness (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Zheng J., Meister M. (2024) The Unbearable Slowness of Being: Why do we live at 10 bits/s? arXiv:2408.10234v2 (preprint; published in Neuron 2025) (behind its links)
Casarotto S., et al. (2016) Stratification of unresponsive patients by an independently validated index of brain complexity. Ann Neurol 80:718-729. doi:10.1002/ana.24779 (PMC5132045) (behind its links)
Bodien Y.G., et al. (2024) Cognitive Motor Dissociation in Disorders of Consciousness. N Engl J Med 391:598-608. doi:10.1056/NEJMoa2400645 (PMC7617195, author manuscript) (behind its links)
Kelz M.B., Mashour G.A. (2019) The Biology of General Anesthesia from Paramecium to Primate. Curr Biol 29(22):R1199-R1210. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2019.09.071 (PMC6902878, author manuscript) (behind its links)
Cogitate Consortium, Ferrante O. et al. (2025) Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness. Nature. doi:10.1038/s41586-025-08888-1 (PMC12137136, CC BY) (behind its links)
LeDoux J.E., Brown R. (2017) A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness. PNAS 114(10):E2016-E2025. doi:10.1073/pnas.1619316114 (PMC5347624; abstract only served) (behind its links)
The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness (2024-04-19, New York University) (behind its links)
Westbrook A, Braver TS 2016. Dopamine does double duty in motivating cognitive effort. Neuron 89:695-710. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.12.029 (PMC4759499) (behind its links)
Bassler M, Pennartz CMA. Overcoming essentialism: evaluation of theories of consciousness by the lawful regularities they predict. Neurosci Conscious 2026. doi:10.1093/nc/niag069 (behind its links)
Libet B, Gleason CA, Wright EW, Pearl DK (1983) Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). Brain 106:623. doi:10.1093/brain/106.3.623 (behind its links)
Chalmers D.J. (1995) Facing up to the problem of consciousness. J Consciousness Studies 2(3):200-219 (author's copy, consc.net) (behind its links)
Svet M., Perera Molligoda Arachchige A.S. (2026) Beyond Cortical Signatures: Measurement Gaps Across Theories of Consciousness. Brain Sci 16(10):1087. doi:10.3390/brainsci16101087 (PMC13702712, CC BY) (behind its links)
Birch J, Ginsburg S, Jablonka E 2020. Unlimited Associative Learning and the origins of consciousness: a primer and some predictions. Biol Philos. doi:10.1007/s10539-020-09772-0 (behind its links)
Laureys S., et al. (2010) Unresponsive wakefulness syndrome: a new name for the vegetative state or apallic syndrome. BMC Med 8:68. doi:10.1186/1741-7015-8-68 (PMC2987895, CC BY) (behind its links)