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Consciousness
Consciousness is being aware of something internal to one's self, or of states or objects in one's external environment.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | one person: by 5 months (the earliest age recorded in the source) |
| born precision | lower bound |
| boundary | Inside: the states and processes the field files under consciousness: the level of consciousness (wakefulness, from alert waking through drowsiness, sleep and anaesthesia to coma) and its contents (what is experienced at a moment: seeing a red rose, hearing a clarinet, a pain, an emotion, a thought, a dream), the access of those contents to report, reasoning and control, and their felt, first-person character. Outside: the nonconscious processing that feeds it (the feedforward sweep, reflexes, vegetative regulation), the brain and body that carry it, and the world. Where the border runs inside the brain, and whether experience and access are one thing or two, is what the theories dispute (C-421, C-2817). |
| nested level | A state and a set of processes of a person (Human's L7 board floor 'consciousness') carried by the brain (human-brain's L8 'consciousness', contested seat C-421); fed by attention (attention's L7 'access'), perception, memory and emotion, and switched off and on by sleep and anaesthesia. Shared in some form with other mammals and birds and possibly all vertebrates and some invertebrates (C-2816). |
| scale | organism |
Measures (20) published science
| conscious access latency (ignition) | about 200-300 ms after stimulus onset |
| human behavioural information throughput | about 10 bits/s |
| speed of thinking (Twenty Questions) | 20 bits over a few seconds; 10 or less bits/s |
| capacity of the cones of one eye | about 1.6 gigabits/s (6 million cones) |
| ratio of sensory input to behavioural throughput | about 100,000,000 ratio |
| NREM-REM sleep cycle | approximately 90 minutes |
| awake eyes-closed EEG alpha | 10 Hz |
| early-night awakenings with no experience reported | up to 30 % |
| NREM awakenings with dream reports | up to 70 % |
| PCI cutoff separating conscious from unconscious (PCI*) | 0.31 index |
| PCI* sensitivity and specificity in the 150-subject benchmark | 100 / 100 % |
| minimally conscious patients above PCI* | 36 of 38 (94.7) patients (%) |
| cognitive motor dissociation among patients without observable command-following | 60 of 241 (25) patients (%) |
| disorders-of-consciousness cohort | 353 adults, six centres |
| Glasgow Coma Scale range; coma | 3-15; 3-8 coma; 15 full score |
| range of volatile anaesthetic concentration disrupting function across life | about 10-fold concentration range |
| Meyer-Overton correlation (lipophilicity vs potency) holds over | six orders of magnitude |
| Cogitate adversarial test participants | 256 people |
| philosophers who hold the hard problem genuine / non-existent (2020 PhilPapers) | 62.4 / 29.7 % |
| earliest age with an ignition-like signature recorded | 5 months |
Open contentions (11) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-413 Where do thoughts come from?
booked: No theory is proven, so the map lists the main ones side by side and doesn't pick one. It shows where thinking is handled in the brain, not where thoughts start.
the other reading: see C-413 - C-414 Where do emotions come from?
booked: No theory is proven, so the map lists the leading ones side by side and doesn't pick one.
the other reading: emotions innately programmed in subcortical areas (the view they argue against); interoceptive inference - C-421 Where in the brain does consciousness happen?
booked: The map puts consciousness at the top of the human stack without choosing a place in the brain for it.
the other reading: global neuronal workspace (prefrontal-parietal ignition); integrated information (posterior hot zone); recurrent processing (local sensory recurrence); higher-order (second-order representation); attention schema; brainstem core (Merker); Cogitate: neither GNWT nor IIT's central predictions survived intact - C-434 Could large language models be conscious?
booked: The map makes no claim about consciousness in these systems and lists the views side by side.
the other reading: see C-434 - C-447 Which animals can feel and experience things?
booked: The map describes how animals take in their state and choose behaviour, and makes no claim about experience for animals as a whole. Legal and scientific views on sentience are listed alongside.
the other reading: see C-447 - C-736 When a system first throws away its excess energy and later learns to store it for reuse, is that one process that grew or two separate ones?
booked: The map keeps both readings side by side and rules neither. A few examples fit the 'one process that grew' reading, but it hasn't been tested.
the other reading: a toll (signal lost); selection (loss by design) - C-2064 How does attention relate to consciousness?
booked: The map books attention as what lets things enter awareness, without ruling how.
the other reading: see C-2064 - C-2816 Which animals are conscious?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: rung 11: only humans; rung 9: first mammals; independently in mammals and birds; rung 7: the first animals with nervous systems, Cambrian (and invertebrates: cephalopods, decapods, insects); rung 13: machines (no current AI system, per Butlin et al.) - C-2817 In what order do the floors of consciousness stack?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: RPT: experience already at L4 (phenomenal without access); L5-L7 are access only; Merker: the core of the conscious state at L3 (upper brainstem), cortex supplying content; IIT: experience is the maximally irreducible structure itself, not a stage in a sequence; level as a precondition across all floors rather than a floor - C-2818 What is consciousness for?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: epiphenomenalism: causally inert (Huxley's steam-whistle); adaptation with survival value (James, Popper); exaptation or by-product; appearance-reality distinction (Carruthers) - C-2831 Can science explain why there is something it is like to be conscious?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: the hard problem is genuine (62.4% of philosophers in a 2020 survey; Chalmers, Block, Tononi, Koch); it does not exist or dissolves once the easy problems are solved (29.7%; Dennett, Churchland, Frankish, Dehaene, Seth); illusionism; panpsychism and other metaphysical readings (encyclopedia anchors only)
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (6)
- Brainstem and hypothalamic arousal systems (locus coeruleus, tuberomammillary nucleus, basal forebrain)
- Perception
- Global neuronal workspace (conscious access, as GNW theory names it)
- Central thalamus
- Posterior cortical 'hot zone' (temporo-parieto-occipital)
- Arousal nuclei and the VLPO: waking against sleep
Sits inside / holds (2)
Trades with (valence) (14)
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:sensory-environment · Consciousness gain
- Large language model via sys:written-record · Consciousness even
- Human brain via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Consciousness gain
- Emotion (feelings) via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Consciousness gain
- Animal (kingdom Animalia, Metazoa) via sys:sensory-environment · Consciousness gain
- Sleep via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Consciousness loss
- Memory via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Consciousness gain
- Perception via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Consciousness gain
- Attention via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Consciousness gain
- General anaesthesia via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Consciousness loss
- Motivation via sys:sensory-environment · Consciousness gain
- Metaphysics (the branch of philosophy: its practice and the questions about reality it works on) via sys:sensory-environment · Consciousness gain
- Free will via sys:sensory-environment · Consciousness mixed
- Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states) · Consciousness gain
expressed by (7)
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Mapping/Modeling
- Multi-Scale Data Fusion / Triangulation
- Surprise / Change-Point Detection
- Self-Monitoring
- Triage & Prioritized Allocation
- Quality Control & Error Correction
floor filled by (18)
- Thalamus
- Human brain
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Prefrontal cortex
- Brainstem and hypothalamic arousal systems (locus coeruleus, tuberomammillary nucleus, basal forebrain)
- Sleep
- Eye
- Working memory
- Perception
- Attention
- Global neuronal workspace (conscious access, as GNW theory names it)
- Central thalamus
- Posterior cortical 'hot zone' (temporo-parieto-occipital)
- Self-consciousness (selfhood)
- Psychology (the mind and behaviour as psychology describes them)
- Human physiology
- Free will
- Mind–body problem (how mental states relate to physical states)
represents (1)
Kinds (15)
- Coma (active phase)
- Dream
- Phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness)
- Access consciousness (A-consciousness)
- Self-consciousness (selfhood)
- Autobiographical consciousness
- General anaesthesia
- Unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (vegetative state)
- Minimally conscious state
- Cognitive motor dissociation (covert consciousness)
- Locked-in syndrome
- Brain death
- Altered states of consciousness (drugs, seizures, meditation, psychedelics)
- Animal consciousness
- Machine (artificial) consciousness
Notes published science
- Your senses take in about a billion bits a second (one eye's cones alone about 1.6 gigabits), but everything you consciously do, from typing to thinking of an answer in Twenty Questions, runs at about 10 bits a second, a gap of about 100 million that nobody has explained (src:zheng-meister-2024).
- Anaesthetics work on nearly everything alive, bacteria, yeast, worms, flies, plants and people, within about the same 10-fold range of concentration; in the 1800s Claude Bernard suggested that 'what is alive must sense and can be anesthetized, the rest is dead' (src:kelz-mashour-2019).
- One in four brain-injured patients who could not follow a single command at the bedside still followed commands inside their heads, imagining tasks on cue as seen by fMRI or EEG (60 of 241; src:bodien-2024).
- Consciousness researchers mostly think science can fully explain consciousness biologically (67.3%), yet nearly all of them (89.6%) also think Mary, a colour scientist who knows every physical fact about vision, learns something new the first time she sees red; the survey did not ask them where they stand on mind and body (src:francken-2022).
- The cerebellum holds 69 of the brain's 86 billion neurons, yet people who lose most of it walk and speak unsteadily without reporting any loss of consciousness; meanwhile the smallest lesions that cause coma sit in a tiny patch of the upper brainstem (src:tononi-koch-2015, src:solms-2018).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
consciousness: from what could be experienced to what is experienced, reported and acted on (reader's view)
- L1: What could be experienced: the world, the body and the brain's own activity, gathered by the senses at about 10^9 bits/s; visual sensations, sounds, bodily sensations, mental images, emotions, a stream of thought
- L2: Nonconscious processing: the feedforward sweep and specialised processors working in parallel; subliminal stimuli leave a decaying wave, not ignition
- L3: Level (wakefulness): the ascending arousal systems and central thalamus set how awake; lost in deep sleep, anaesthesia and coma, present without awareness in unresponsive wakefulness; on one account the core of the conscious state itself (Merker)
- L4: Local recurrent processing in sensory cortex: an organised percept; on RPT already experienced (phenomenal without access), on IIT the posterior lattice; in sleep the posterior hot zone
- L5: Selection and ignition: a limited-capacity workspace, one content at a time, a sudden divergence at 200-300 ms (board 'workspace')
- L6: Global availability: content broadcast to report, memory, reasoning and control; the metacognitive (higher-order) representation (board 'broadcast')
- L7: Experience and its use: something it is like; reported, remembered and acted on deliberately; the hard problem asks why (board 'experience')
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L5: Selection and ignition: a limited-capacity stage where one content wins; a sudden divergence 200-300 ms after onset between seen and unseen, spreading to prefrontal and parietal cortex; a second task waits
- L6: Global availability: the selected content amplified, sustained and made available to the processors (report, memory, reasoning, control); on higher-order theories, a second-order metacognitive representation
- L7: Experience: what it is like, unified at a moment and across time, with or without a self in view; reportable and used in deliberate control. Why any of the floors below come with experience is the hard problem (C-2831); which floor is the seat is C-421
way in: Arousal (the level channel: how awake)
- L1: Sleep pressure and the body's state: adenosine, nociception, time of day
- L2: The ascending arousal nuclei (locus coeruleus, raphe, tuberomammillary nucleus, ventral tegmental area; LDT/PPT) and the sleep-promoting VLPO that inhibits them
- L3: The central thalamus: arousal regulation and forebrain integration
- L4: The cortex driven into its active state (cholinergic drive via thalamus and from the basal forebrain)
way in: Bodily sensations (touch, pain, temperature: the body felt)
- L1: Bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; surgical nociceptive stimulation
- L3: Nociceptive signals that still drive arousal and the heart when consciousness is held off by anaesthesia
way in: Dreams (experience in sleep, disconnected from the world)
- L1: The sleeping brain cut off from the world: consciousness fades (no experience up to 30% of early-night awakenings) or dreams (up to 70% of NREM awakenings)
- L4: Posterior 'hot zone': a local fall in low-frequency activity, with high-frequency activity sited by content (faces, place, movement, speech)
way in: Emotion (emotional feelings)
- L1: Contested origin (C-414): events of significance; on LeDoux and Brown's account subcortical circuits supply nonconscious inputs
- L3: Subcortical survival circuits (amygdala and others): nonconscious inputs
- L4: The same general cortical network that assembles every conscious content (higher-order account)
way in: Hearing (auditory contents)
- L1: Sounds and sequences of sounds (an oddball tone in a sequence)
- L4: Auditory areas: an unconscious local prediction error (mismatch negativity), kept in coma, sleep or inattention
way in: Interoception (the body's inner state; feelings)
- L1: The body's inner state, read by interoceptive inference (one account of emotion and bodily selfhood)
way in: Sight (visual contents)
- L1: The visual scene: light on about 6 million cones per eye, about 1.6 gigabits/s of input
- L2: The feedforward sweep through the visual hierarchy: features extracted, not yet experienced
- L3: Primary visual cortex responding without awareness
- L4: Recurrent processing and content-specific activity in visual and ventrotemporal cortex (the posterior candidate content; in rivalry, temporal-lobe neurons follow the percept)
way in: Thought (the stream of conscious thought)
- L1: Contested origin (C-413): a thought arriving; its pace, measured as 20 bits over a few seconds in Twenty Questions
- L4: The 'inner brain' handling the few bits that steer behaviour; working memory held in mind
way out: Deliberate action (obeying commands; movement)
- L1: Movement on the world: the motor subscale, from 'no motor response' to 'obeys commands'
- L5: Command-following carried out in brain activity even where no movement follows (cognitive motor dissociation, 25% of unresponsive patients)
- L7: The deliberate control of behaviour
way out: Holding and laying down (conscious working memory; recall)
- L5: Without consciousness, no new memory: amnesia is one of anaesthesia's four traits
- L6: Working memory held by global, distributed persistent firing: conscious at encoding, refresh and use
way out: Report (speech and other signals of what is experienced)
- L1: Speech and answers at the bedside: the verbal subscale of the Glasgow Coma Scale ('no verbal response' to 'fully oriented')
- L6: Information about internal states retrieved and made available for verbal report
- L7: Subjective report, immediate or delayed: the benchmark of whether experience was present
way out: Top-down amplification and control of attention (back down to the processors)
- L4: Feedback from anterior cortex amplifying and sustaining relevant stimuli; bottom-up V1 signals vetoed when they conflict with the internal model
- L6: Workspace neurons mobilising or suppressing specialised processors through descending connections
- L7: A simplified model of one's own attention used to control it (attention schema theory)
Sources (21) published science
Brown E.N., Lydic R., Schiff N.D. (2010) General anesthesia, sleep, and coma. N Engl J Med 363:2638-2650. doi:10.1056/NEJMra0808281 (PMC3162622, author manuscript) (behind its links)
Graziano MSA, Webb TW (2015) The attention schema theory: a mechanistic account of subjective awareness. Front Psychol 6:500. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00500 (behind its links)
Butlin et al. 2023, Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (arXiv:2308.08708) (behind its links)
Siclari F., et al. (2017) The neural correlates of dreaming. Nat Neurosci 20:872-878. doi:10.1038/nn.4545 (PMC5462120, author manuscript) (behind its links)
Hard problem of consciousness (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Zheng J., Meister M. (2024) The Unbearable Slowness of Being: Why do we live at 10 bits/s? arXiv:2408.10234v2 (preprint; published in Neuron 2025) (behind its links)
Bodien Y.G., et al. (2024) Cognitive Motor Dissociation in Disorders of Consciousness. N Engl J Med 391:598-608. doi:10.1056/NEJMoa2400645 (PMC7617195, author manuscript) (behind its links)
LeDoux J.E., Brown R. (2017) A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness. PNAS 114(10):E2016-E2025. doi:10.1073/pnas.1619316114 (PMC5347624; abstract only served) (behind its links)
The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness (2024-04-19, New York University) (behind its links)
Westbrook A, Braver TS 2016. Dopamine does double duty in motivating cognitive effort. Neuron 89:695-710. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.12.029 (PMC4759499) (behind its links)