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Global financial market
The global financial system is the worldwide framework of legal agreements, institutions, and both formal and informal economic action that together facilitate international flows of financial capital for purposes of investment and trade financing.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | contested (C-3847): late nineteenth century (cable 1866; gold standard after 1870; upswing from 1880) or earlier international finance (Renaissance Italy, Amsterdam) |
| born precision | decades |
| boundary | Inside: the cross-border part of finance: currencies exchanged, claims held across borders, the payment and settlement links between countries' banks, the global banks, dealers and offshore markets that intermediate, the cycle that moves through them, and the institutions and rules of the international monetary order. Outside: the national markets' own trading (the financial-market walk), each country's economy, governments and people, which send and receive the flows. |
| nested level | Built from national financial markets joined by FX, payments and global banks; the capital part of globalization; runs on national markets' allocation floors and on people's decisions. |
| scale | social |
Measures (40) published science
| FX turnover, April 2025 | 9.6 (7.5 in April 2022; about 1.5 around 2001 in Kahn and Roberds) US$ trillion per day |
| Dollar's share of FX trades (one side) | 89.2% (88.4% in 2022); euro 28.9% percent of trades |
| Share of FX trading in the top four centres | 75 (UK, US, Singapore, Hong Kong) percent |
| Inter-dealer share of FX turnover | 46 (47 in 2022) percent |
| Capital invested abroad, 1913 | 44 (UK 42%, France 20%, Germany 13%, US 8%) US$ billion (current) |
| British share of global foreign investment at its peak | almost 80 (US 22 in 1995; US maximum about 50 around 1960) percent |
| Information delay New York-London | up to three weeks before 1866; one day by cable; under a minute by 1914 time |
| Eurocurrency market gross size | 20 (1964) to 2,600 (1985); 26% a year US$ billion |
| Eurodollar premium over US rates | 66 bp (1962-65), 103 bp (1966-73, capital controls), 66 bp (1974-85) basis points |
| Cross-border investment positions, advanced economies | 68% of GDP (1980) to 438% (2007); emerging markets 35% to 73% percent of GDP |
| International capital flows, 2007 | 11 (3 in 2002) US$ trillion a year |
| Variance of risky asset returns explained by one global factor | 25 (858 assets, five continents) percent |
| Share of VIX variance explained by Fed funds shocks | about 4 to 10 (Rey); 17 with US broker-dealer leverage; almost 30 (Bruno and Shin) percent |
| Global financial cycle response times | VIX falls about 5 quarters after a Fed funds cut; gross credit flows rise after 12 quarters |
| Credit inflows correlation with VIX (inverted) | 0.24 (1990Q1-2012Q4); credit and portfolio debt inflows co-move at 0.52 correlation |
| Calibrated welfare gains from financial integration | a few tenths of a percent of permanent consumption |
| Asian-5 capital-flow swing, 1996-97 | 105 (from +93 to -12.1); 11% of GDP; 77 of it bank lending US$ billion |
| Dollar reserve sales by central banks, Q1 2020 | about 170 (euro about 25, yen under 10); over 80% of reserve sales against a 60.9% dollar share of reserves US$ billion |
| Fed swap-line lending to September 2011 | 10 (4.45 standardised to 1-month loans); peak balance 293.5 billion US$ trillion |
| Swap-line term | one week or three months (overnight to three months) time |
| SWIFT messages per day (2015) | over 32 million; more than 11,000 institutions in over 200 countries and territories messages per day |
| Settlement wait before CLS | three days or more; spot FX settles by the end of the second business day |
| Gross funds through FX settlement after Herstatt | down about 60% over three days percent |
| CLS single-day record | 15.4 (15 December 2021) US$ trillion settled |
| Average fee on an ordinary remittance | around 6 (8-14 on some US$200 corridors; SDG target under 3 by 2030) percent of amount |
| US share of world equity market capitalisation, 2021 | over 40; US debt securities US$49.1 trillion percent |
| Bank of England discount rate, July 30 to August 1 1914 | 3 to 10 percent |
| IMF members | 191 countries |
| Basel III capital threshold | 7 percent of risk-weighted assets |
| EMS central-rate adjustments | over 50 in twenty years count |
| Basel I minimum capital ratio | 8 (by end-1992) percent of risk-weighted assets |
| FX turnover still exposed to settlement risk, April 2022 | 2.2 (almost a third of deliverable turnover; 1.9 in April 2019) US$ trillion per day |
| FX turnover settled through CLS, April 2022 | 2.5 (18 currencies) US$ trillion per day |
| Dealers' trading with other financial institutions | 50 (47 in 2022) percent of FX turnover |
| Share of capital-flow variation explained by the global financial cycle | rarely more than a quarter (85 countries, 1990-2015) share of variance |
| Fit of capital-flow episode logits (Forbes and Warnock) | pseudo-R2 .04 (flight), .07 (surges), .13 (retrenchments), .15 (stops) |
| Dollar appreciation and EME growth-at-risk | 1 ppt broad dollar appreciation: growth outlook down over 0.3 ppt, growth-at-risk down 0.6 ppt; fades after about six quarters percentage points |
| Countries classified by exchange arrangement | 194 countries and territories, 1946-2016 |
| Germany 1931: Danatbank breakdown public to gold suspension | 2 days (13 to 15 July 1931) |
| FX swaps share of turnover | 42 (51 in 2022) percent |
Open contentions (9) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-3814 What caused the 1997 Asian financial crisis: a panic among lenders, or weak banks and bad policy at home?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: financial panic: a bad equilibrium of creditor withdrawal (Radelet and Sachs); fundamentals and policy: corrupt and mismanaged banking systems, weak governance (the culprits Radelet and Sachs name as the usual reading); moral hazard and bubble collapse (types listed by Radelet and Sachs); crises of the 1990s differed in breadth and cause: speculative attacks on mispriced pegs, self-fulfilling attacks, current-account reversals (encyclopedia) - C-3827 When a financial crisis spreads between countries, is it contagion or were the countries always that closely linked?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: contagion through trade, banking or geography goes with stops and retrenchments (Forbes and Warnock); no contagion, only interdependence: once correlations are corrected for volatility, 1987, 1994 and 1997 show virtually no contagion (Forbes and Rigobon, abstract); a systemic crisis in one country can easily infect others (encyclopedia); part of the disagreement is definitional: Forbes and Rigobon define contagion as a significant rise in cross-market correlation in turmoil, so transmission along existing trade, bank or geographic links counts as interdependence, which is much of what Forbes and Warnock call contagion (Forbes and Rigobon's definition; the comparison is the walker's) - C-3832 Did world finance pull back after 2008, or only change shape?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: retreat: post-crisis shrinkage in cross-border bank lending read as financial de-globalization (the reading Cerutti and Zhou report); restructuring: more regional links, less dependence on major lenders, no generalized retrenchment (Cerutti and Zhou); no reversal of equity-market integration since the Great Recession (Bekaert and Mehl, abstract) - C-3841 Since 1973, have most currencies really floated, or do most still shadow the dollar or euro?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: once the world's reserve currency floated, other nations adopted floating regimes (encyclopedia); the post-Bretton Woods transition from fixed to flexible arrangements is overstated; regimes with limited flexibility remain the majority (Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff, 194 countries 1946-2016) - C-3847 When did a single world financial market begin?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: late nineteenth century, with the first modern wave of globalization (encyclopedia; Obstfeld and Taylor's upswing from 1880); earlier: Renaissance Italian banks financed trade around the Mediterranean; the Dutch held perhaps 30 percent of global foreign assets in 1825; Amsterdam the first global centre (Obstfeld and Taylor); the rung-12 reading: the integrated, price-converging market needs the telegraph (cable 1866 cut New York-London news from three weeks to a day; Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin), so its start could sit with technology (rung 12); booked at rung 11, not ruled (Lead, step 3) - C-3854 Does opening a country to world finance make it grow, or make it fragile?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: benefits through indirect channels and above thresholds of institutional and financial development (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei); gains elusive: calibrated welfare gains a few tenths of a percent; robust growth effects hard to find (Rey); fragility: more volatile capital flows and contagion raise the risk of crises (encyclopedia; Forbes and Warnock on surges and stops); lower diversification gains in integrated eras as correlations rise (Goetzmann, Li and Rouwenhorst, abstract); capital controls insulate when the centre eases (Han and Wei, as reported by Cerutti, Claessens and Rose) against no evidence that controls insulate against capital-flow waves (Forbes and Warnock) - C-3855 What shape has financial globalisation traced since 1870: a U, or something else?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: U-shape: capital mobility high before 1914 and after 1989, low between (quantity and price measures); swoosh: high before 1913, higher after 1990, low in the interwar period (equity-return factor model, 17 countries); a narrower first age: long-term flows large but confined to few sectors; short-term flows far lower than today (Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin) - C-3879 After 2008, who moved from bank loans to bonds: rich countries, emerging ones, or both?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: the impact of global risk increased post-GFC for international bond flows and declined for cross-border loans (Avdjiev et al., as reported by Cerutti, Claessens and Rose); the post-GFC substitution of debt securities for bank lending was mainly among advanced-economy borrowers; emerging borrowers increased both (Cerutti and Hong, as reported by Cerutti, Claessens and Rose) - C-3892 Can a country with a floating currency still set its own interest rates?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: trilemma: with free capital mobility, independent monetary policy is feasible if exchange rates float (Obstfeld and Taylor); dilemma: the global financial cycle constrains national monetary policy whatever the regime; independence needs a managed capital account (Rey); no change: an integration measure back to the first era finds no evidence the trilemma has morphed into a dilemma (Bekaert and Mehl, abstract); floating still helps: exchange-rate flexibility and inflation targeting strengthen defences against dollar shocks (Obstfeld and Zhou); the global cycle explains a modest share of capital flows: VIX and common factors rarely explain more than a quarter of their variation (Cerutti, Claessens and Rose); autonomy depends on the regime: a moderately flexible rate confers autonomy (Klein and Shambaugh); floating alone does not (Han and Wei); global shocks transmit more strongly under fixed rates (Obstfeld et al.); all as reported by Cerutti, Claessens and Rose; pass-through tests consistent with the trilemma: floating suffices for independence (Bekaert and Mehl, read in sections in step 3)
Cross-scale patterns seen here (24) our proposal
Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Global financial market. Each links to every other system that shows it.
- borrowed-then-held (structural)
Lending of last resort first supplied from outside any standing institution (J.P. Morgan and the Treasury in 1907; ad hoc gold pools; swap lines 'briefly re-established' after 9/11), later held inside: the Federal Reserve founded so no individual need serve again (1913), Fed swap lines with five cen - runaway from an unstable balance (structural)
A panic is a bad equilibrium: short-term creditors withdraw from a solvent borrower and their withdrawal makes the fear true (Radelet and Sachs, after Diamond-Dybvig); FX settlement without payment-versus-payment has multiple equilibria in which expected default is self-fulfilling (Kahn and Roberds) - same role, different builds (structural)
International lending of last resort done by different builds: J.P. Morgan and the US Treasury (1907), a Bank of England gold pool of twenty-four nations (1907), the IMF's quota pool (1947), Fed swap lines through recipient central banks (2007-). Step 3: 1931 is the case with no build at all (Schnab - same shape, opposite sign (structural)
One mechanism, gross capital flows driven by one group of investors, booked in both directions: surges and stops (foreigners' gross inflows up or down), flight and retrenchment (domestic investors' gross outflows up or down). Swap lines are reciprocal by contract: the same contract can run dollars t - the whole sets the local reference (structural)
The global order sets each country's reference: under Bretton Woods every currency was pegged to the dollar; today the dollar is the anchor and funding currency, and the global financial cycle sets credit conditions 'not aligned with countries' specific macroeconomic conditions', even under floating - trade one property for another (structural)
The trilemma: of capital mobility, a fixed exchange rate and an independent monetary policy a country can have two; the orders sorted along the trade (gold standard: mobility and fixed rates; Bretton Woods: fixed rates and autonomy with controls; the float: mobility and autonomy). Rey argues the tra - who opens the door (structural)
Ports opened ahead of time: a swap line is 'a pre-approved lending program' the recipient central bank can draw on at the announced rate; CLS connects to each central bank's real-time gross settlement system through accounts set up before trades arrive; SWIFT membership and a BIC code come before an - conservation law plus closure (partial)
The balance of payments sums to zero: a current-account deficit must be matched by a financial-account surplus. The identity leaves open which side moves and why; it needs a behavioural closure (saving, investment, capital flows) to predict anything. - holding / entrainment (partial)
The global cycle sets the timing of national credit cycles: credit flows, leverage and asset prices across countries rise and fall with the VIX and centre-country policy, out of step with local conditions (Rey; Bruno and Shin: global factors dominate local ones in banking flows). The dark twin is cl - lightning (partial)
Herstatt's closure at the end of the German day in 1974 discharged the risk stored in unsynchronised settlement: gross funds moved through the netting system fell about 60% in three days, the risk got its name, and the line of committees ending in CLS (2002) followed. August 1914: the Bank of Englan - namespace completeness (the map predicts its gaps) (partial)
Forbes and Warnock's grid (foreign or domestic investors, gross flows up or down) predicts four kinds of episode; separating gross inflows from outflows showed episodes earlier work had misread from net flows. - partner-becomes-part (partial)
European currencies cooperating in the snake and the EMS (a parity grid with joint intervention, adjusted over 50 times) fused into one currency, the euro (1999), with one central bank; members gave up separate monetary policies. - same toolkit, independent builds (partial)
Separate payment-messaging networks built from the same parts by different states for the same job: SWIFT (bank cooperative, 1973), CIPS (China, for renminbi deals), SPFS (Russia's central bank, as a backup), INSTEX (EU, liquidated 2023). - seed (partial)
The eurodollar market's wholesale interbank dollars unpacked a new way of banking (liability management) and, with it, an 'explosion of financial innovations' in the 1970s; Battilossi calls it a far-reaching structural innovation. - symmetry breaking (name the cut) (partial)
Among many possible international currencies one is chosen and persists: the dollar's role far exceeds the US share of trade and output (invoicing several times the US share), and the theory finds 'conditions for the emergence and persistence of dominant currency equilibria'. Bretton Woods (1944) na - templating (partial)
One rule module reused across jurisdictions: Basel capital standards published by a committee at the BIS and implemented nation by nation (Basel I 1988; Basel III endorsed by the G-20 in 2010); SWIFT's ISO 9362 bank identifier codes used by every member. - The carry (partial)
The wait: before CLS each currency leg settled in its own country and time zone, and 'banks often waited three days or more' to know they had been paid; Herstatt's counterparties were caught in that gap. CLS settles both legs at once (payment-versus-payment), removing the wait for the counterparty's - Umwelt: each system carves its own slice of one shared medium (partial)
Each kind of flow reads its own slice of the same global cycle: credit and portfolio debt flows track the VIX (correlation 0.24 for credit), while FDI inflows are positively correlated with it in every region (Rey); foreigners and domestic investors drive different episodes (Forbes and Warnock). Ste - barrier-gates-complexity (surface)
Capital controls under Bretton Woods coincide with a near absence of banking crises (a chart caption in the encyclopedia, after Reinhart and Rogoff); no source read shows the controls letting the system build something it could not without them, and Forbes and Warnock find controls do not insulate a - causal ceiling (surface)
No single authority can reach the whole: 'no central political authority exists which can extend these arrangements globally', while firms and flows are global (Dudley: a system regulated on a largely national basis is untenable). A limit set by the structure of sovereignty, not by instruments; whet - coordination-before-mapping (surface)
Markets in many countries move together (one global factor, 25% of variance) with no central coordinator; the sources read do not show whether anything holds a map of the whole, so this stays surface. - nested ladder (surface)
The recommended order of opening the capital account: foreign direct investment first, then domestic equity, and short-term flows only once markets and regulation work; each step presumes the ones before. - smooth to sharp in finite time (surface)
Pegs held for years break in days (the gold window closed on one August day in 1971; the 1914 rate rise from 3% to 10% in three days); the sources show sharp breaks, not a smooth process reaching a singular value. - The Payment to Entropy (surface)
Each cross-border transfer pays a toll: an ordinary remittance still costs around 6% (SDG target under 3%), currency risk adding about as much as operators' markups. The toll is mostly income to operators (the dark twin: a hand-off to another user), so booked as surface; per-hop compounding through
Valence: what it trades, and with whom (15) published science
Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:money · Global financial market gain
- Government via sys:money · Global financial market mixed
- Financial market via sys:money · Global financial market gain
- US dollar via sys:money · Global financial market mixed
- Central bank via sys:foreign-exchange-market · Global financial market gain
- Great Depression via sys:central-bank-reserves · Global financial market loss
- Economy via sys:money · Global financial market gain
- Globalization via sys:financial-market · Global financial market gain
- International trade via sys:money · Global financial market gain
- Foreign exchange market via sys:foreign-exchange-market · Global financial market gain
- Financial innovation via sys:money · Global financial market gain
- SWIFT via sys:electromagnetic-field · Global financial market gain
- CLS Bank via sys:money · Global financial market gain
- IMF via sys:money · Global financial market gain
- BIS via sys:money · Global financial market gain
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (10)
- Financial market
- Foreign exchange market
- Eurodollar (offshore dollar) market
- Global banks
- Dealer banks
- SWIFT
- CLS Bank
- IMF
- BIS
- Swap-line network
Sits inside / holds (2)
expressed by (16)
- Scaffolding/Enablement (Meta-Tooling)
- Templating / Standardization
- Interoperability/Transduction (Bridging)
- Distributed Autonomy/Decentralized Execution (Subsidiarity)
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Sensing/Scanning
- Uncertainty Reduction/Learning
- Resource Denial/Attrition
- Reactive Response
- Proactive Defense
- Physical/Virtual Barrier
- Self-Monitoring
- Resilience & Repair
- Redundancy & Diversity
- Quality Control & Error Correction
- Bridging Supply Gaps (Store & Dormancy)
floor filled by (24)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Government
- Financial market
- US dollar
- Central bank
- Business
- Gold standard
- Foreign exchange market
- Eurodollar (offshore dollar) market
- Global banks
- Dealer banks
- SWIFT
- CLS Bank
- IMF
- BIS
- Swap-line network
- Capital flow
- Financial crisis
- Chiang Mai Initiative
- Correspondent banking
- International financial centre
- Global financial cycle
- Bretton Woods system
- Non-bank financial institution
Kinds (2)
Notes published science
- Before the transatlantic cable opened in 1866, news could take three weeks to get from New York to London; the cable cut it to a day, and by 1914 to under a minute. Prices of the same US bonds in the two cities converged right after (src:bordo-eichengreen-irwin-1999).
- When the German Herstatt bank was shut at the end of the German business day in 1974, banks that had already paid it Deutschmarks never got their dollars, which were due later that day in New York. Central banks set up the Basel Committee within months; a system that settles both sides of a currency trade at the same instant (CLS) took 28 years. Even now almost a third of deliverable currency trading, $2.2 trillion a day in 2022, still settles the old way (src:kahn-roberds-2001-cls, src:bcbs-history, src:glowka-nilsson-2022-fx-settlement).
- One hidden factor explains about a quarter of the ups and downs of 858 risky asset prices on five continents, and it moves with Wall Street's 'fear gauge', the VIX. That is why Hélène Rey argues a country can't fully run its own monetary policy just by letting its currency float; others find the same kind of factor rarely explains more than a quarter of capital flows themselves (src:rey-2015-dilemma, src:cerutti-claessens-rose-2017-gfcy).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
global financial market as international finance and financial history describe it: national markets and currencies joined by cross-border claims, through foreign exchange, payments and global banks, to the global financial cycle, the monetary order and the allocation of capital across countries (reader's view)
- L1: National financial markets, savers and borrowers in separate currencies and jurisdictions: consumers, multinational corporations, individual and institutional investors, banks, governments
- L2: Claims and currencies crossing borders: foreign exchange (US$9.6 trillion a day in April 2025; the dollar on one side of 89.2% of trades), cross-border loans, bonds, shares and direct investment
- L3: Messaging, payment and settlement between banks in different countries: correspondent banking over SWIFT's messaging network, settlement of each currency leg in its own country, payment-versus-payment settlement through CLS since 2002
- L4: Global intermediaries: global and dealer banks, the interdealer market (46% of FX turnover), offshore dollar (eurodollar) markets and the financial centres where trading concentrates (UK, US, Singapore, Hong Kong: 75% of FX trading)
- L5: The global financial cycle: common movements in gross capital flows, credit, leverage and risky asset prices, co-moving with the VIX and the dollar
- L6: The monetary order and its architecture: a dollar-anchored system with mixed de facto regimes (gold standard, Bretton Woods dollar peg, then floats alongside regimes of limited flexibility, still the majority), the trilemma that constrains it, and the institutions that hold it (IMF, BIS and the Basel committees, central banks' swap lines)
- L7: Allocation of capital and risk across countries and the handling of crises: surges and stops of capital, lending to deficit countries, international lending of last resort, and states' choices to open or close their capital accounts
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L4: Global intermediaries' balance sheets: global and dealer banks, the interdealer and offshore dollar markets, the main financial centres
- L5: The global financial cycle: co-moving gross flows, credit, leverage and risky asset prices (one global factor explains about a quarter of the variance of 858 risky asset prices)
- L6: The monetary order: a dollar-anchored system of mixed de facto regimes (gold, Bretton Woods, then floats beside regimes of limited flexibility), the trilemma or dilemma it lives under, and the institutions that hold it (IMF, BIS, Basel, the swap-line network and regional arrangements)
- L7: Allocation of capital and risk across countries and the handling of crises (surges, stops, flight, retrenchment; international lending of last resort)
way in: Global risk appetite and uncertainty (the VIX)
- L1: Investors' uncertainty and risk aversion across markets
- L2: Priced as the VIX, the implied volatility of US stock options
- L3: Read through dealers' value-at-risk limits: measured risk low, room to lend
way in: Monetary policy of the centre country (the Federal Reserve) and other main central banks
- L1: The Federal Reserve's policy rate (the centre country's monetary conditions)
- L2: Refinancing costs in dollars for banks everywhere (the dollar is the main currency of global banking)
- L3: Wholesale dollar funding passed from money market funds to global banks and on to regional banks
way in: National rules and international standards: capital controls, bank regulation, Basel standards
- L1: Each country's laws, finance ministries, treasuries and regulators
- L2: Domestic constraints: reserve requirements, interest-rate ceilings, capital controls (in force in the US until 1973)
- L3: Business routed to the least-regulated centre (London's dollar market outside sterling rules), and international standards (Basel) set to level the field
way in: Official liquidity: central bank swap lines and IMF lending
- L1: A source central bank's currency (the Fed's dollars) and the IMF's quota pool
- L2: The swap contract: dollars against the recipient's currency at today's spot rate, reversed at the same rate after one week or three months
- L3: The recipient central bank lends the dollars on to its own banks
way in: Prices and news from other financial centres, carried by the wires
- L1: Prices of the same and similar assets in other centres (London and New York prices of US bonds)
- L2: The wire: transatlantic cable from 1866 (three weeks cut to one day, under a minute by 1914), then radio telephone, now electronic feeds
- L3: Arbitrage between centres narrows the price gap
way in: Savings seeking returns abroad: domestic investors' gross outflows and surplus countries' savings
- L1: National savings, current account surpluses and official reserves
- L2: Gross outflows by domestic investors: flight (sharp rises) and retrenchment (sharp falls)
- L3: Placed abroad as direct investment, portfolio equity, portfolio debt and bank credit
way in: Shocks from outside finance: wars, pandemics, sanctions
- L1: War (August 1914), pandemic (March 2020), invasion and sanctions (2022)
- L2: Investors chase liquidity; banks borrow heavily; selling of the safest assets for cash
- L3: Money markets tighten and payments stall; in 1914 remittance to London became increasingly difficult
way in: Trade and its payments: exports and imports invoiced and paid in foreign currency
- L1: Exports and imports between countries
- L2: Invoiced mostly in a few currencies, above all the dollar, far beyond the US share of world trade
- L3: Converted in the foreign exchange market and paid through correspondent banks
way out: Capital flows into countries: surges and stops of foreign money
- L1: Credit, asset prices and output in the receiving country
- L4: Cross-border bank lending carries most of the swing
- L7: Foreign investors raise or cut their gross inflows
way out: Dollar credit to borrowers outside the United States
- L1: Output, consumption and investment in emerging and developing economies fall after dollar appreciation shocks
- L4: Global banks lend dollars to local banks who lend to firms
- L5: The dollar's exchange rate tracks global financial conditions
way out: Exclusion from the payment network (sanctions through SWIFT)
- L1: Alternative networks built: SPFS (Russia), CIPS (China)
- L3: The banks' messaging access is cut
- L7: Governments agree to remove banks from the messaging system
way out: International lending of last resort: swap lines and IMF lending
- L1: A ceiling on deviations from covered interest parity; lower bank borrowing costs; more cross-border lending
- L3: Recipient central banks auction the dollars to their banks
- L7: Swap lines extended (December 2007; nine more central banks on 20 March 2020)
way out: Selling pressure: the dash for cash across sovereign bond markets
- L1: Bid-ask spreads widen and liquidity deteriorates in national bond markets
- L3: Central banks sell dollar reserves (about $170 billion in Q1 2020)
- L5: Deleveraging turns into selling of the safest dollar assets
way out: Standards sent back to national banks (Basel capital and liquidity rules)
- L1: Banks hold capital at a share of risk-weighted assets (7% under Basel III)
- L3: National regulators implement them, often slowly
- L6: The Basel Committee publishes standards (Basel I 1988, II 2004, III 2010)