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Financial innovation
Financial innovation is the act of creating new financial instruments as well as new financial technologies, institutions, and markets.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | contested (C-3937): 7th century BC (Lydian coinage, Flood) or 3rd century BC (adesha, encyclopedia); Babylonian interest-bearing loan documents from 653 BC (Csabai), older Old Babylonian interest rates studied by Van De Mieroop (cited) |
| born precision | centuries |
| boundary | Inside: the making, launch, adoption, copying and change of new financial products, platforms, processes, institutions and markets, and of the enablers they rest on (pricing models, financial software and data, legal forms such as limited liability). Outside: the financial system using established instruments (the financial-market and global-financial-market walks), the regulators and tax authorities that set the rules it answers to, the households, firms and states whose needs and risks it serves, and the technologies it borrows. |
| nested level | A process running on the financial system: carried by banks, exchanges, investment banks, funds and non-financial firms (telecoms, technology firms), fed by economic theory and information technology, answering to regulation and taxes; its products end up as parts of financial markets, money and payments. |
| scale | social |
Measures (34) published science
| Lead time of a financial innovation | about 12 (against about 20 years for significant technological innovations, Odgers and Nimmervoll) months |
| ATM development span | 18 years |
| Diffusion of value at risk as the risk benchmark | 1970s to 1990s decades |
| US stock market capitalization doubling time | 10 (1929-2009); Dow stocks' trading volume doubled every 7.5 years |
| New US exchange-traded futures contracts in the 1970s | 102 contracts |
| Financial patents granted 1971-2000 | 455 patents |
| Empirical studies of financial innovation (Frame and White survey) | 39 studies, 23 since 1998 (published abstract); 24 studies covering 14 phenomena, only 5 before the 1990s (the body of the text read, apparently an earlier version) |
| Quantitative diffusion studies (Akhavein et al. review) | 7 studies |
| Unit cost of financial intermediation (US, 130 years) | around 2% of outstanding assets a year; unadjusted series between about 1.5% and 2.5%; quality-adjusted mean 1.76% (sd 18.5 basis points, min 1.46%, max 2.18%); higher since the mid-1970s percent of intermediated assets per year |
| Finance income share of US GDP | 2% to 6% (1870-1930); under 4% (1950); 5% (1980); over 8% (2010) percent of GDP |
| US financial services share of GDP 1980-2007 | 4.9 to 7.9 percent of GDP |
| Professional asset management fee and its 30-year present value | 1.3% of assets a year; about one-third of the assets initially invested over 30 years percent |
| Mutual fund assets under management | $134 billion (1980) to over $12 trillion (2007) US dollars |
| Fixed-income securities relative to GDP | 57% (1980) to 182% (2007) percent of GDP |
| Credit default swaps gross notional outstanding, 2007 | $45 trillion to $62 trillion US dollars |
| Securitization outstanding, Q2 2008 | $10.24 trillion (US); $2.25 trillion (Europe); 2007 ABS issuance $3.455 trillion (US) US dollars |
| M-PESA adoption in the Jack-Suri panel | 43 to 70 percent of households |
| M-PESA access among Kenyan adults | about 70% within four years of launch; about 14 million accounts by April 2011 percent |
| Consumption drop after a negative shock | 7 (nonusers; 7-10 across specifications); users statistically indistinguishable from zero percent |
| M-PESA transfer fee | 30 Kenyan shillings (about 40 US cents) per SMS transfer; deposits free per transfer |
| Households lifted out of poverty by M-PESA access (Suri and Jack) | 194,000 (2% of Kenyan households) |
| Commercial banks' share of US nonfinancial borrowing | close to 40% (1974); below 30% (2005) percent |
| Money market funds that broke the buck before 2008 | 3 in 37 years; Reserve Fund paid 99.1 cents per share in 2008 funds |
| US index fund assets | $22 trillion (May 2026) US dollars |
| Benefit of ATM card ownership (Italy) | about 17 euros per year per household |
| Algorithmic share of trading in developed markets | approximately 70-80 percent |
| VOC founding capital | 6.4 million guilders; to be liquidated after ten years |
| Small business lending share with credit scoring | 8.4 percentage points higher portfolio share of small business loans under $100,000 (1997) |
| Share of 1987 public offerings in securities new since 1974 | 18 (dollar-weighted) percent |
| Securitized home mortgages (US) | $28 billion (1976) to $4.2 trillion (2003) US dollars |
| Misreporting in non-agency securitized loans, 2002-07 | 13.4% of loans reported with no second lien had one; 7.7% of owner-occupied loans may not be; 44.9% of appraisals 5% above an automated valuation; 48.8% misreported on at least one count; misreported loans 51% more likely to become delinquent percent |
| Babylonian loan interest rate | 20% a year in the commonest Neo-Babylonian interest clause (BM 31230, a five-mina silver loan renewed after almost seven months); sixteen intercalary-month loan documents dated 653-269 BC percent per year |
| Options exchange opening | 26 April 1973 (Cboe); Khraisha and Arthur write 1968 for the 'Chicago Board of Option Trade' date |
| Countries and years in Beck et al.'s innovation measure | 32 mostly high-income countries, 1996-2006 (R&D in financial intermediation, ANBERD) countries; years |
Open contentions (10) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-3924 Was the joint-stock company a deliberate design for long-distance trade, or pieced together repair by repair?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: the joint-stock form as a purposeful, coherent design for long-distance trade (Hansmann and Kraakman, as Gelderblom et al. report); the form owed less to foresight than to piecemeal engineering to remedy design flaws; limited liability emerged after experiments (Gelderblom, de Jong and Jonker) - C-3936 Has financial innovation made economies better off, or more fragile?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: bright side: innovations complete markets, share risk, improve allocation; compelling evidence of a link to growth (encyclopedia, Beck et al.); growth stops without financial innovation (Laeven, Levine and Michalopoulos, model); dark side: innovations as root cause of 2008 (encyclopedia's fragility view; Brunnermeier: unprecedented credit expansion; Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny: neglected risks, over-issuance); little productivity benefit: Volcker (little correlation with productivity growth; the ATM greater than asset-backed securitization), Krugman (rent-seeking), Turner (as the encyclopedia reports); no efficiency gain measured: the unit cost of intermediation is about 2% for 130 years and higher since the mid-1970s (Philippon); both at once, needing counterfactual histories to judge (Lerner and Tufano, abstract); innovation by innovation: mutual funds, index funds and ETFs likely beneficial relative to reasonable counterfactuals; securitization hard to assess because it is a class of entangled elements, its first three decades likely not welfare-reducing (Lerner and Tufano, NBER full text); bright and dark together in one data set: more financial R&D goes with faster growth in finance- and innovation-dependent industries and with more growth volatility, bank fragility and crisis losses (Beck et al., working paper abstract) - C-3937 When did financial innovation begin: with coinage, with ancient loan notes, or 4000 years ago?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: Lydian coinage, 7th century BC, as the first entry in the chronicle (Flood); the Mauryan adesha, 3rd century BC (encyclopedia); 4000 years of surviving documents (Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst, as reported); for derivatives: Thales' olive presses (as told), Japanese rice futures 'around 1730' (encyclopedia, Financial innovation) or from 1710 (encyclopedia, Dojima); Babylonian interest-bearing loans and promissory notes: sixteen documents in intercalary months, 653-269 BC, at rates such as 20% a year (Csabai 2020, full text); Old Babylonian interest rates are the subject of Van De Mieroop 1995, cited by Csabai (title only) - C-3942 Is there one general explanation for why financial innovations appear?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: a general theory: innovations lessen financial constraints imposed on banks (Silber 1975); regulations and taxes are the major impulses (Miller 1986); no single general theory is feasible; a meta-theory combining life-cycle, evolutionary, economic and institutional theories (Khraisha and Arthur); demand-side rationalist view (M&M, Ross, Allen and Gale) against a supply-side view (Awrey 2013, record only) and technology push - C-3949 When was the first index fund: 1971, 1973, the end of 1975, or 1976?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: 1973: first two S&P index funds for institutional clients (encyclopedia); 'early 1970s' (Lerner and Tufano); 1971 Wells Fargo for Samsonite (the specialist, unsourced); 31 December 1975: Bogle started the First Index Investment Trust (encyclopedia); 1976: creation of the first indexed mutual fund (Lerner and Tufano) - C-3951 Are waves of financial innovation rational learning, or risks that everyone neglected?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: waves cited as irrational excess are consistent with fully rational learning; welfare is enhanced when more firms adopt innovations of questionable value (Persons and Warther, abstract); investors and intermediaries neglect improbable risks (local thinking), so new securities are over-issued and markets fragile (Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny); not exclusive: Persons and Warther's model is a formal model of Merton's spiral (Lerner and Tufano); waves may be rational learning about value while neglecting tail risk (the specialist's reading, unsourced) - C-3959 Did mobile money lift Kenyan households out of poverty?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: M-PESA access lifted 194,000 households (2%) out of poverty, more for female-headed households (Suri and Jack 2016, abstract); the claim ignores enterprise exit (about 46% of Kenyan micro and small enterprises closing within a year, per the Kenya survey they cite) and displacement of existing traders, and has methodological flaws (Bateman, Duvendack and Loubere 2019); risk sharing: users' consumption unaffected by shocks that cut nonusers' by 7 percent (Jack and Suri, AER) is a separate, narrower finding - C-3960 When was the first money market fund: 1971 or 1972?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: 1971: Bent and Brown created the money market fund (Khraisha and Arthur; encyclopedia: 'established the first money market fund'); September 1972: the Reserve Fund launched, the Capital Preservation Fund a few weeks later (Lerner and Tufano, citing Fink) - C-3962 When did exchange trading of options begin: 1968 or 1973?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: 1968: 'the Chicago Board of Option Trade began trading options' (Khraisha and Arthur); 26 April 1973: Cboe began trading (the exchange's own history page); 1968 as the start of planning by the Chicago Board of Trade (the specialist's reading, unconfirmed) - C-4002 Who innovates in finance: the big firms or the small ones?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: large firms: larger banks adopted ATMs and credit scoring sooner; Merrill Lynch, Salomon and large banks led notable innovations (Frame and White, casual empiricism); small and marginal firms: Silber predicted marginal firms contribute most; Lerner finds smaller and less profitable firms over-represented (1990-2002); market structure: Schumpeter (concentration helps) against Arrow (competition helps); less innovation under universal banking (Boot and Thakor); innovators gain share, not price (Tufano 1989); the measure shapes the answer: Lerner's result counts innovations in Wall Street Journal stories, 1990-2002 (Lerner and Tufano)
Cross-scale patterns seen here (23) our proposal
Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Financial innovation. Each links to every other system that shows it.
- barrier-gates-complexity (structural)
Locked-in capital as the barrier: with circulating capital that investors could withdraw, the VOC 'could only afford intermittent campaigns' and lost positions; permanent capital (and later limited liability) let it build the larger operation. The without-the-barrier case is shown (1602-1612). - borrowed-then-held (structural)
Borrowed then held, twice. Kenyans transferred airtime as money (the telecom network did the job) before M-PESA held it as a service (2007). The VOC ran on capital borrowed voyage by voyage, to be returned after ten years, until by the early 1620s it held permanent capital. - conservation law plus closure (structural)
Modigliani-Miller is a balance law (the securities must add up to the same value) that leaves open which securities exist; a second law (taxes, regulation, frictions, incomplete markets) is needed to say anything about innovation. 'Economic theory has much to say about what types of securities shoul - lightning (structural)
A stored difference released at once: securities over-issued while risks were neglected; 'a small piece of news' brings the risks to mind, valuations are revised drastically, new issuance stops. The Reserve Fund breaking the buck (September 2008) set off hundreds of billions of withdrawals across th - same role, different builds (structural)
Sending value across distance without moving coin, done by unrelated builds: a Mauryan order on a banker (3rd c. BC), Tang fey tsien (8th c.), suftadja, Italian bills of exchange (13th-15th c.), the telegraph narrowing price gaps, M-PESA's SMS transfers (2007). - seed (structural)
The Black-Scholes(-Merton) equation (1973) unpacked an options and derivatives industry: options grew explosively after it, and models of its kind advanced derivatives, risk management and asset management. A small packet that opened many combinations. Qualified: the options exchange began trading 2 - templating (structural)
The mortgage securitization module was swapped into automobile loans in 1985 and worked (a $60 million deal); traded innovations are standardized modules (futures on standardizable commodities). Same module, new asset class. - The carry (structural)
Overflow passed on: Regulation Q capped what bank deposits could pay; as the ceilings fell behind market rates, the excess demand for interest flowed into money market funds and eurodollars (and maturity mismatch moved into the shadow banking system). The wait: after a change in conditions, a flurry - trade one property for another (structural)
Tranching trades safety for yield and spreads the kinds along the trade: the super senior tranche gets a low rate and is paid first, mezzanine in between, the equity tranche ('toxic waste') paid last. Also: non-patentable innovators buy protection from copying with complexity, paid in opacity. - who opens the door (structural)
The receiving side builds the door ahead: M-PESA agents set up and trained as cash-in, cash-out points before customers come; a money market fund's $1.00 share value fixed before any saver arrives; rating thresholds fixed before tranches are sized to meet them. - causal ceiling (partial)
Collingridge's dilemma of control: early on, consequences cannot be foreseen for want of knowledge; once visible, the innovation may be locked in. Because a financial innovation transfers value through time, its effect is 'to be seen in the future'. A limit set by when the information exists, though - coordination-before-mapping (partial)
Stock exchanges, clearing houses and fractional reserve banking 'emerged without direct government control' (self-organization in Khraisha and Arthur's reading); self-regulating organizations coordinate members without a central plan. Whether no map was used is not shown. - holding / entrainment (partial)
The VOC's whole set its parts' clock: the size of each expedition 'was determined by the flow of installments coming in', the returns of one voyage financing the next. - nested ladder (partial)
Logical necessity: risk management first required a problem, then theory, then data, then regulators' consensus, then computers; each step a logical requirement for the next (Khraisha and Arthur after Poole and Van de Ven). - red-queen (partial)
Two forms. Kane's regulatory dialectic: institutions innovate round rules, authorities answer with new rules, 'this game is endless'. Laeven, Levine and Michalopoulos: every screening process becomes less effective as technology advances, so financiers must keep innovating for growth not to stop. Bo - runaway from an unstable balance (partial)
Short funding of long assets: off-balance-sheet vehicles rolled over 90-day paper; investors 'might suddenly stop buying', and once they did the run fed itself (the Reserve Fund's loss spreading to the whole prime sector; one failure triggering a contagious collapse of healthy firms). The balance po - same toolkit, independent builds (partial)
Forward and futures trading in rice at Dojima (futures from 1710; the brokers' system 'developed independently and privately') and the later Western exchanges; options on VOC stock in Amsterdam by 1688. Shared parts (a promise to deliver later, a central market); whether the builds were independent - The Payment to Entropy (partial)
Every pass through the financial system pays a toll: the unit cost of intermediation has stayed around 2% of intermediated assets a year for 130 years (1.5-2.5%), and did not fall with IT or the innovations of the last 30 years (Philippon). A 1.3% asset-management fee compounds to about a third of t - the whole sets the local reference (partial)
Benchmarks set every contract's local reference: much of the credit derivatives market 'would not be possible without' pricing benchmarks such as the LIBOR swap curve; a shared formula lets dispersed agents agree on prices. - Umwelt: each system carves its own slice of one shared medium (partial)
Each innovator takes in its own slice of one financial world: Llewellyn's defensive, aggressive, responsive and protective motives; different stakeholders attend to different subjects (Flood, as Khraisha and Arthur report). The nine channels here are this system's slice. - not-diluting wins (surface)
Passive index funds keep their returns while active funds' returns are diluted by fees (1.3% a year, about a third over 30 years, by managers who do not outperform passive benchmarks); index funds grew to $22 trillion. A loose reading: growth by lower cost, not a density held constant. - same shape, opposite sign (surface)
Regulation is two-edged: the same binding rule inhibits some innovation and induces circumvention, so no sign can be assigned a priori (Frame and White). One mechanism (a binding constraint), both signs on the innovation rate; but the two effects run through different routes, so this is near the dar - symmetry breaking (name the cut) (surface)
A cut in the financial system sets what innovation follows: less financial innovation under universal banking than under functional separation of commercial and investment banks (Boot and Thakor, as reported). No symmetric before is shown.
Valence: what it trades, and with whom (14) published science
Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:sensory-environment · Financial innovation gain
- Financial market via sys:financial-market · Financial innovation gain
- Money via sys:money · Financial innovation gain
- Commercial banks (creators of most money) via sys:money · Financial innovation gain
- Central bank via sys:economy · Financial innovation even
- Economy via sys:economy · Financial innovation gain
- Mobile phones via sys:information-technology · Financial innovation gain
- Corporation via sys:human-society · Financial innovation gain
- Financial regulation (the Chinese Wall) via sys:financial-regulation · Financial innovation mixed
- Economics (the field) via sys:economy · Financial innovation gain
- Startup company via sys:market · Financial innovation gain
- Telegraph via sys:electromagnetic-field · Financial innovation gain
- Credit rating agencies via sys:financial-market · Financial innovation gain
- Global financial market via sys:money · Financial innovation gain
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (6)
- Commercial banks (creators of most money)
- Financial economics
- Startup company
- Investment banks
- Information and communications technology
- Stock exchange
Sits inside / holds (2)
expressed by (28)
- Generation/Synthesis
- Recombination/Composition
- Scaffolding/Enablement (Meta-Tooling)
- Templating / Standardization
- Niche Construction (alter environment)
- Quality Improvement/Refinement
- Interoperability/Transduction (Bridging)
- Encapsulation & Modularity (Abstraction)
- Amplification/Scale-Up (Manufacture & Distribution)
- Symbiosis/Co-Creation (Collaborative Specialization)
- Evolvability/Plasticity Engineering (Design for Future Variation)
- Sensing/Scanning
- Search/Foraging
- Mapping/Modeling
- Uncertainty Reduction/Learning
- Active Experimentation / Probing (Optimal Experimental Design)
- Surprise / Change-Point Detection
- Social Learning / Public Information Use
- Evade Detection
- Overcome Barrier
- Speed
- Reactive Response
- Proactive Defense
- Physical/Virtual Barrier
- Validation of Identity/Intention
- Validation of Effectiveness
- Resilience & Repair
- Bridging Supply Gaps (Store & Dormancy)
floor filled by (17)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Financial market
- Commercial banks (creators of most money)
- Economy
- Transaction cost
- Financial regulation (the Chinese Wall)
- Financial economics
- Startup company
- Investment banks
- Information and communications technology
- Stock exchange
- Black-Scholes(-Merton) model
- Credit rating agencies
- Shadow price
- Financial engineering
- M-PESA agent network
- Self-regulatory organization
Kinds (9)
- Defensive financial innovation
- Protective financial innovation
- Product innovation (finance)
- Institutional innovation (finance)
- Enabling financial innovation
- Aggressive financial innovation
- Responsive financial innovation
- Process innovation (finance)
- Organizational-form innovation (finance)
Notes published science
- The money market fund was invented to get round a rule: Regulation Q capped what banks could pay on deposits, so Bruce Bent and Henry Brown created a fund that paid market rates (1971 in one account; the Reserve Fund opened to investors in September 1972 in another). The ceilings were gone by 1986, and in September 2008 the same Reserve Fund 'broke the buck' and set off a run on the whole industry (src:khraisha-arthur-2018, src:lerner-tufano-2011-nber, src:wp:regulation-q, src:gennaioli-shleifer-vishny-2012).
- Across 130 years, from the telegraph to the computer, it has cost the US financial sector about 2 cents a year to move each dollar through it, and the cost has risen since the mid-1970s. That figure is for the whole sector; reading it as 'innovation never lowered the toll' is our inference, not the author's (src:philippon-2012).
- The famous Black-Scholes option formula started out as only a rough fit to market prices; then traders used it, and prices moved to fit the formula. After the 1987 crash the fit broke down again (src:mackenzie-2003).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
financial innovation as financial economics and financial history describe it: the needs, risks, rules and frictions of the financial system (L1), the gaps and profit opportunities they open (L2), the innovators and their tools (L3), design and financial engineering (L4), introduction and market building (L5), diffusion, imitation and standardization (L6), and the changed financial system with its benefits and harms (L7) (reader's view)
- L1: The financial system's needs and pressures: households saving and borrowing, firms financing, risks to manage, rules and taxes, volatile rates and prices
- L2: Gaps and opportunities: incomplete markets, transaction costs, binding rules (shadow prices), tax differences, risks that cost; new potential profits
- L3: Innovators and their tools: banks, investment banks, exchanges, funds, marginal firms and outsiders (telecoms, fintech startups), drawing on theory, IT and legal forms
- L4: Design and financial engineering: claims combined and unbundled, pooled and tranched, contracts written
- L5: Introduction and market building: launch, marketing, liquidity, ratings; trial and error, most new contracts fail
- L6: Diffusion: adoption, imitation, standardization and collective acceptance; fast for securities (months), slow for ATMs (decades)
- L7: The changed financial system and its effects: lower costs and risks, completed markets, access and growth; shifted and neglected risks, fragility, and the regulators' answer
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L4: Design and financial engineering: unbundling and recombining claims, pooling and tranching, writing the contract, adapting it to clients
- L5: Introduction and market building: launch, marketing, the fixed costs of a liquid market, ratings, trial and error; many new products fail
- L6: Adoption, imitation, diffusion and standardization: imitators copy, rivals follow, a group accepts the product as a store of value, a standard language forms
- L7: The changed financial system: costs or risks reduced, markets completed, access widened, growth supported; and risks shifted, neglected or concentrated, new fragility, regulators' answer
way in: Demand for cash-flow patterns, hedges and services not on offer (incomplete markets)
- L1: Savers, borrowers, investors and firms with needs to save, borrow, hedge and pay that existing instruments do not meet
- L2: The unmet trade shows as a price: strong demand for a cash-flow pattern in short supply keeps its price high
- L3: Intermediaries and exchanges read the gap and look for an instrument that meets it
way in: Financial theory and models (intellectual technologies)
- L1: Published finance theory: Bachelier, Markowitz, CAPM, Black-Scholes-Merton, the Gaussian copula
- L2: A model turns an instrument into something priceable and hedgeable
- L3: Models taken up across derivatives, risk management, asset management and banking
way in: Financing needs of the real economy and its new technologies
- L1: Projects and entrepreneurs needing funds: long-distance trade, railroads, information technology, biotechnology
- L2: Information gaps widen as technology advances: old screening stops working
- L3: Financial entrepreneurs invest in better screening because investors pay for it
way in: Information and communications technology
- L1: Telegraph, computers, data networks, mobile phones
- L2: Costs of accounting-intensive and calculation-heavy products fall
- L3: Technology from outside finance taken in (automation in retail before the ATM; SMS before mobile money)
way in: Macroeconomic volatility: interest rates, prices, exchange rates
- L1: Fluctuating prices, interest rates and exchange rates (the 1970s rise in the level and variance of rates; the end of Bretton Woods)
- L2: Risk becomes a cost for risk-averse holders
- L3: Specific new risks named: interest and exchange risks after Bretton Woods; energy prices, inflation, funding costs
way in: News of losses, failures and crises
- L1: Events and news: defaults, prepayments, a fund breaking the buck, a contract that does not trade
- L2: The news brings neglected states to mind and valuations are revised
- L3: Investors and intermediaries take the surprise in; products are dropped, rules are questioned
way in: Regulation and taxes
- L1: Rules and taxes on financial activity: deposit-rate ceilings (Regulation Q), capital requirements (Basel I's 8%), bans, taxes on notes and income streams
- L2: A binding constraint gets a shadow price: the cost of the rule rises as it binds
- L3: Institutions look for a way round the rule that keeps their profits
way in: Rivals' innovations and imitation
- L1: Competitors' new products and adoptions
- L2: A rival's adoption raises one's own chance of adopting
- L3: Innovators answer imitation by innovating faster or by making products more complex
way in: Trust and confidence of users
- L1: A general climate of confidence among users
- L2: Users often cannot evaluate a new product themselves
- L3: So some form of assurance is needed (ratings, agents, brands)
way out: Activity moved round the rules (regulatory and tax arbitrage)
- L1: The rule binds less; regulators face pressure to re-legislate (money market accounts allowed 1982; ceilings phased out 1981-1986)
- L7: An innovation built to avoid a rule or tax goes into use
way out: New institutions and organizational forms
- L1: Firms and savers use the new form (money market funds draw savings from bank deposits)
- L7: A new kind of firm or legal form set up (the VOC's permanent capital, the money market fund, the index fund)
way out: New instruments released into markets
- L1: Held and traded by investors (US$10.24 trillion securitized outstanding in 2008)
- L5: Listed or placed: exchanges list contracts, dealers place tranches
- L7: A new security, contract or fund is issued and sold
way out: New ways to pay, save and send money reaching households
- L1: Households hold less cash, receive remittances, smooth consumption
- L5: Delivered through agents and machines (M-PESA agents; ATM networks)
- L7: A process innovation offered to the public (ATM, debit card, mobile money)
way out: Risk shifted to other holders (and neglected risk left with investors)
- L1: Investors bear risks they do not recognise; when news arrives they sell
- L7: Risk offloaded through securitization and credit default swaps
Sources (32) published science
Baicu, The impact of financial innovation on banking regulation: evidence from the global financial crisis (2011), RePEc (OpenAlex W1539223374) (behind its links)
Securitization (Wikipedia), sections: lead, structure, history (behind its links)
Suri and Jack, The long-run poverty and gender impacts of mobile money, Science (2016), doi:10.1126/science.aah5309 (behind its links)
Money market fund (Wikipedia), sections: lead, history, breaking the buck, September 2008 (behind its links)
Index fund (Wikipedia), sections: lead, history (behind its links)
Csabai, Intercalary Months and Interest-bearing Loans in Babylonia, Hungarian Assyriological Review (2020), doi:10.52093/hara-202001-00005-000 (behind its links)
Cboe, Cboe's Beginnings in the Words of Our Founding President (exchange history page) (behind its links)
Persons and Warther, Boom and Bust Patterns in the Adoption of Financial Innovations, Review of Financial Studies 10(4) (1997), doi:10.1093/rfs/10.4.939 (behind its links)
M-Pesa (Wikipedia), sections: lead, history (behind its links)
Miller, Financial Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 21(4) (1986), doi:10.2307/2330693 (behind its links)
Regulation Q (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Bill of exchange (Wikipedia; redirects to Negotiable instrument), sections: lead, history, bills of exchange (behind its links)
Joint-stock company (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Dōjima Rice Exchange (Wikipedia) (behind its links)