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Romance scam

A confidence trick in which a false romantic relationship is built, usually online, to get the targeted person to send money or commit fraud on the offender's behalf (src:wp:romance-scam); 'the deployment of fake romantic relationships primarily for material ends' (src:lazarus-2023-systematic). Walked from the victim-support and researcher's side: the stages researchers describe, who is targeted and what is known about risk, the measured harm (financial and emotional, the double hit, under-reporting), the organised forms, the platforms' and banks' part, what prevention and support are measured to do, and the debates. No scripts or steps for doing it.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

born atthe 16th-century 'Spanish prisoner' scams (romantic deception for gain); the online form 'became apparent in about 2008' (Whitty & Buchanan 2012); IC3 counted it among the top 5 internet scams in 2011
born precisioncenturies (kind); about a decade (online form)
boundaryInside: the false relationship and its run as researchers describe it (preparation and persona, target selection, first contact, the shift to private channels, grooming, the requests (the sting), the payout, the squeeze, the aftermath), between the offender side and the targeted person, including the targeted person's appraisal, doubts, checks and exit. Outside: the platforms it runs on, the payment rails, banks, police and support services that answer it, the family and friends round the targeted person, and the criminal economies (fraud factories, laundering) it feeds.
nested levelRuns on people (Human L5-L7: the need for companionship, trust, love, decisions) and on the internet's services (dating sites and apps, social media, messaging); a kind of confidence trick and of advance-fee fraud, and one of social engineering's forms; feeds and is fed by organised crime.
scalesocial

Measures (32) published science

Grooming phase duration6-8 months (typical) time
Time to a declaration of lovewithin a week to a couple of weeks of first contact time
Bond phase duration in pig-butchering scams3 to 11 months (26 interviewed victims) time
Squeeze phase in pig-butchering scams1-7 months of continued large investments time
Longest reported scam durationup to 8 years (extreme cases) time
Fastest large payment in one studyabout £70,000 over a weekend after about a month GBP, time
FTC romance-scam reports, 202364,003 reports; about US$1.14 billion; median US$2,000 reports, USD
FTC romance-fraud reports, 2021over 56,000 victims; over US$547 million; +80% on 2020 victims, USD
IC3 confidence/romance complaints, 202523,159 complaints; US$929,287,469 (2024: 17,910; US$672,009,052) complaints, USD
IC3 confidence/romance victims and losses, 2012-20222012: 4,476, $55,991,601; 2017: 15,372, $211,382,989; 2019: 19,473, $475,014,032; 2021: 24,299, $956,039,739; 2022: 19,021, $735,882,192 victims, USD
UK romance-scam losses, 2023£93m, up by a third on 2022 (UK Finance) GBP
Australian romance-fraud losses, 2022AUD$210 million (ACCC)
Netherlands registered cases, 2023494 cases; 264 with financial loss; €7,644,870; average nearly €29,000 per victim cases, EUR
Estimated victims in Great Britain (survey)almost 230,000 people
Self-reported victimisation, general populationgeneral population: 6.17% once and 2.81% more than once (one study); 0.65% victims and 2.28% knowing a victim (another); summed by the review as 1-3%. Self-selected samples: 63% of one Facebook-user sample (29% more not sure); 88.55% of users of victim-awareness websites share
Share of scams reported (global)7% (Global State of Scams Report 2022) share
Share of elderly fraud reported (FTC)2% - 6.7% share
Share of fraud ever reportedless than one third (estimates) share
Victim panel (Whitty 2018)11,780 UK panel members; 200 romance-scam victims; of victims 63% middle-aged, 21% young, 16% older; 60% women; model Nagelkerke R2 = 0.354 people, share
Human accuracy at sorting fake from genuine profiles13.51 of 20 profiles correct on average (SD 2.63): 6.74 of 10 fake, 6.77 of 10 genuine; above the 10 of 20 a coin would score
Automatic scam-profile detection accuracy (research system)97% accuracy
Scam-profile demographics (one dating site)about 60% male, same as real profiles; scam female profiles about 30, male about 50; widowed over-represented; military and engineering occupations share, age
Pig-butchering losses per victim (interviews)US$600 to US$185,000 USD
Pig-butchering victims approached by recovery scams11 of 26 people
Pig-butchering victims finding the term offensive69.2% share
Pig-butchering complaints with wallet addresses (California DFPI)9.2% of 273 (96.7% actionable) share
Dating-app users exposed to pig butchering (US)12% in October 2023, up from 5% in 2018 share
Scammer location (one study)about 50% from African countries, 16% from Asian and English-speaking countries share
Firefly femme fatale hunting success (comparison)9 of 92 observations (9.8%) share
Convicted offenders' case files (Nigeria, EFCC)50 cases: victims 56% US; offenders posed as Caucasian American men 46%, military 12%, Caucasian European men 10%; targeted women 70%, men 14%; 74% university students; Facebook 46%; iPhone 58% share
Military narrative in Australian romance-fraud reports3,259 ACCC reports (Jul 2018 - Jul 2019); starting on a social networking site OR 1.843 for a military narrative; military narrative not significant for financial loss reports, odds ratio
Romance-scam victims in a UK online panel (Whitty 2018)200 of 11,780 (about 1.7%, derived; lifetime, self-reported, online panel) people

Open contentions (6) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (20) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Romance scam. Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (15) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (6)

Sits inside / holds (5)

expressed by (24)

floor filled by (19)

Kinds (6)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L4: The false relationship (grooming): where the offender side's persona, tailoring and pressure meet the target's needs, disclosures and hopes; a hyperpersonal online relationship of daily contact, declarations of love, a shared future, secrecy and isolation
  2. L5: The targeted person's appraisal: trust and love for the persona; ambivalence, denial or rationalisation of doubts; or suspicion and active checking. Traits measured in victims after the fact (urgency, sensation seeking, an addictive-disposition score in one UK panel; romantic idealisation in another) are correlates of having been a victim, not shown causes
  3. L6: The sting: requests for money (foot-in-the-door, crisis with deadline, door-in-the-face, an investment), reinforced by fake third parties and promises of repayment; the decision to pay, refuse or verify
  4. L7: Outcomes: money to the offenders (and sometimes the target made a mule); the squeeze (sextortion, extortion); the double hit; revelation, shame, silence, under-reporting; revictimisation (recovery scams, sucker lists, the scammer's return); or exit, report, support and recovery

the romance scam as victimologists and criminologists describe it: online spaces where people look for love, up to money lost, harm done and help found (reader's view)

  1. L1: The online spaces where people look for partners and talk: dating sites and apps, social media, email, messaging apps, forums and games; and the public traces people leave there
  2. L2: The persona and the first contact (the Setup, the Hunt and the Hook): a fabricated profile with stolen or AI-generated photos (soldiers, engineers, the widowed), targets chosen by wealth, nationality or signs of vulnerability, or contacted en masse
  3. L3: The Shift: the talk moved off the platform to email, instant messaging and phone, away from monitoring and reporting; daily routines of contact; the face kept out of sight (no meeting, one-way webcam)
  4. L4: The false relationship (grooming): love declared within weeks, intense daily contact, backstory and shared future, mirroring of the target's disclosures, love bombing, secrecy and isolation; often 6-8 months
  5. L5: The targeted person's appraisal: love and trust in the persona, idealisation, hope, urgency, the near-win; doubts denied or rationalised, or suspicion and checks
  6. L6: The sting: requests for money (small to large, crisis with deadline, decreasing amounts, or an investment), third parties who confirm the story, and the decision to pay, refuse or verify
  7. L7: Outcomes back on the world: money moved through banks, remittance, gift cards and cryptocurrency to the offenders (and the target sometimes made a mule); the double hit of money and relationship lost; shame, under-reporting and revictimisation; or exit, report, support and recovery

way in: Emotion and need: the targeted person's own situation (inner channel)

  1. L1: An unmet need for companionship, a wish for economic security, a lack of purpose; divorce or widowhood; loneliness (rising in lockdown)
  2. L2: Felt as longing and hope (Human emotion channel)
  3. L3: Romantic beliefs and idealisation of the partner

way in: Hearing: calls and voice

  1. L1: Telephone and VoIP calls; good-morning and good-night calls
  2. L2: Heard (Human hearing channel)
  3. L3: A voice taken as the persona's; voices can be disguised with apps or modulation software

way in: Images and identities taken for the persona

  1. L1: Photographs of models, soldiers, ordinary social media users and earlier victims; AI-generated images
  2. L2: Taken and reused; profiles recycled with minor edits
  3. L3: A persona with gender and backstory chosen to fit the target sought (a widowed man about 50, a woman about 30; military, engineering, medicine)

way in: Platform detection (an outside influence that removes personas before contact)

  1. L1: Profile data: demographics, descriptions, images; behaviour
  2. L2: Spam-style filters fail; machine-learning classifiers on profile features (one research system 97% accurate)
  3. L3: Profiles flagged or removed before they reach targets (the system's stated aim: early detection)

way in: Sight: profile photos, messages, poems, documents on a screen

  1. L1: Profile photographs, daily messages, love poems (often plagiarised), documents and photos sent
  2. L2: Read by eye (Human sight channel)
  3. L3: The persona read as a real person; the scammer's own face is never seen (no meeting, one-way webcam)

way in: Social conditions: the pandemic, online dating's growth

  1. L1: COVID-19 lockdowns: romance fraud reports rose after April 2020 above the pre-COVID trend
  2. L2: More internet use among older adults, more loneliness among young adults
  3. L3: More people meeting partners online: about 23% of UK internet users had met a romantic partner online (2007 figure cited)

way in: Targets' profiles and public traces (offender side)

  1. L1: Dating profiles, social media accounts and other online sources about people
  2. L2: Target selection: targeted (wealth, Western nationality, divorced or widowed), scattergun (mass messages, mass liking), sucker lists of past victims, or a past victim again
  3. L3: Reconnaissance: what is gathered is used to tailor the persona and the approach

way in: The group, its training and playbooks (organised forms)

  1. L1: The organisation: lone scammers, small teams, large networks; fraud factories where many workers are trafficked and forced
  2. L2: Induction and training (targets, conversation, digital tools, financial requests); playbooks with scenarios
  3. L3: Persona, backstory and false documents prepared before contact (the Setup)

way in: The target's doubts and refusals (read by the offender side)

  1. L1: The target questions a request or the story, or refuses to pay
  2. L2: Noticed by the offender side
  3. L3: Answered by returning to grooming, or by guilt, threats to end the relationship, silent treatment, threatened self-harm; amounts lowered (door-in-the-face)

way in: The target's messages and disclosures (read by the offender side)

  1. L1: The target's messages: self-disclosure, often far more than the persona gives back
  2. L2: Read by whoever is on shift: several scammers can answer as one persona at any hour
  3. L3: Used to emphasise similarities and personalise the persona (a feedback arrow in the script)

way in: The target's own checks

  1. L1: Search engines, reverse image search, scam-awareness sites and the persona's other online traces (or their absence)
  2. L2: An internet search of the persona, the commonest response to a suspicious profile
  3. L3: Image reuse, identity mismatches and warnings found; even no hits can raise suspicion (no digital footprint)
  4. L4: Active, iterative detection under emotional, social and relational pressure

way in: Thought: the story as it is taken in (inner channel)

  1. L1: The narrative: a shared future, a backstory, a crisis or an investment
  2. L2: Taken in as part of a relationship believed to be real (victims describe the grooming stage as therapeutic)
  3. L3: Each stage perceived as a near win, like gambling

way in: Warnings from outside: family, friends, banks, police, platforms

  1. L1: Warnings from family and friends, banks (which can lock accounts), police early-intervention, platform warning messages
  2. L2: Contextual warnings shown when money is asked for raised awareness and lowered risky behaviour
  3. L3: Often met with denial, anger or secrecy; police intervention most promising when the victim already doubts
  4. L4: Weighed against the relationship: counterevidence disregarded in some accounts, and the persona works to discredit outsiders (secrecy)

way out: Disclosure: personal details, documents and intimate images handed over

  1. L1: Material later used for identity fraud, sucker lists or sextortion (the squeeze)
  2. L2: Sent over private channels
  3. L4: Intimate self-disclosure; documents; intimate photos in some cases

way out: Help-seeking and recovery

  1. L1: Social ties rebuilt, or not; distress can persist beyond financial resolution
  2. L4: Shares the story; gains solidarity, acknowledgement and an understanding of how it happened
  3. L7: Seeks help: peer support groups, counselling, mental health care (most in one case study did not)

way out: Payment: money sent

  1. L1: Money leaves the target's accounts, savings, loans or second mortgages for the offenders
  2. L4: Bank transfer, Western Union or MoneyGram, gift-card codes, cryptocurrency, or a fake investment app
  3. L6: Persuaded to send money

way out: Proceeds to the offender side

  1. L1: Funds the groups and fraud factories that run more scams
  2. L4: Laundered through mule accounts and crypto platforms
  3. L7: Money siphoned off overseas through mules, remittance or cryptocurrency

way out: Reporting: police, bank, platform, fraud hotlines

  1. L1: A record in official statistics, or nothing; police often say little can be done when offenders are overseas
  2. L4: Report made (IC3, FTC, Action Fraud, Scamwatch, local police); fraud reported less than any other crime type, under one third
  3. L7: Decides to report, often after delay; shame and fear of judgement hold many back

way out: The target made a money mule

  1. L1: Others' money laundered through the target; the target may be treated as a co-offender
  2. L4: Forwards money to other accounts, empties accounts into cash or property, reships goods
  3. L6: Asked to forward money or packages for the persona

way out: Withdrawal from family and friends

  1. L1: Fewer people round the target to notice or warn; networks hard to rebuild after
  2. L2: Time and resources turned to the persona; contact with loved ones reduced
  3. L4: The relationship kept secret at the persona's request

Sources (31) published science

Romance scam (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01)
Schokkenbroek JM, Snaphaan T (2026) Love as Bait: A Scoping Review and Crime Script Analysis of Online Romance Scams. Trauma, Violence & Abuse; doi:10.1177/15248380251361046 (PMC13578658, CC BY) (behind its links)
Whitty MT (2018) Do You Love Me? Psychological Characteristics of Romance Scam Victims. Cyberpsychology, Behavior and Social Networking; doi:10.1089/cyber.2016.0729 (PMC5806049, CC BY) (behind its links)
Feng M (2026) Grooming in online dating romance frauds and scams: A scoping review. Journal of Economic Criminology; doi:10.1016/j.jeconc.2026.100231 (sections read: abstract, method, results on harm) (behind its links)
Pig butchering scam (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Lazarus S, Whittaker JM, McGuire MR, Platt L (2023) What do we know about online romance fraud studies? A systematic review of the empirical literature (2000 to 2021). Journal of Economic Criminology 2:100013; doi:10.1016/j.jeconc.2023.100013 (sections read: introduction, method, results, discussion of offender and victim studies, gaps and SPTM critique) (behind its links)
Coluccia A et al. (2020) Online Romance Scams: Relational Dynamics and Psychological Characteristics of the Victims and Scammers. A Scoping Review. Clinical Practice and Epidemiology in Mental Health 16:24-35; doi:10.2174/1745017902016010024 (PMC7254823) (behind its links)
Whitty MT (2013) Anatomy of the online dating romance scam. Security Journal; doi:10.1057/sj.2012.57 (sections read: introduction, the five stages, the four trajectories of the sting, second wave) (behind its links)
Oak R, Shafiq Z (2025) 'Hello, is this Anna?': Unpacking the Lifecycle of Pig-Butchering Scams. arXiv:2503.20821; sections read: abstract, lifecycle (sections 4.1-4.7), impact on victims (5), terminology and interventions (6) (behind its links)
Cross C (2023) Romance baiting, cryptorom and 'pig butchering': an evolutionary step in romance fraud. Current Issues in Criminal Justice; doi:10.1080/10345329.2023.2248670 (sections read: introduction, romance and investment fraud, convergence, distorting statistics) (behind its links)
Herrera LD, Hastings J (2024) The Trajectory of Romance Scams in the U.S. arXiv:2405.03828; sections read: abstract, IC3 and FTC tables, discussion (behind its links)
Balcombe L (2025) The Mental Health Impacts of Internet Scams. IJERPH 22:938; doi:10.3390/ijerph22060938 (PMC12192844; sections read: abstract, background, romance scams paragraph, Australian measures, conclusions) (behind its links)
Whitty MT (2019) Who can spot an online romance scam? Journal of Financial Crime; doi:10.1108/jfc-06-2018-0053 (accepted version, Warwick Research Archive Portal; sections read: abstract, method (materials and procedure), accuracy results, discussion) (behind its links)
Suarez-Tangil G, Edwards M, Peersman C, Stringhini G, Rashid A, Whitty M (2019) Automatically Dismantling Online Dating Fraud. arXiv:1905.12593 (IEEE TIFS); sections read: abstract, introduction, profile characteristics (behind its links)
Ko S, Kim J, Jang JY, Kim G (2026) Human-supervised LLM triage of pig butchering complaints. Journal of Forensic Sciences; doi:10.1111/1556-4029.70411 (PMC13736209) (behind its links)
Maquitico Y et al. (2024) Deceptive Seduction by Femme Fatale Fireflies and Its Avoidance by Males of a Synchronous Firefly Species. Insects 15:78; doi:10.3390/insects15010078 (PMC10816684; sections read: abstract, introduction, results, discussion) (behind its links)
Soares AB, Lazarus SI (2024) Examining fifty cases of convicted online romance fraud offenders. Criminal Justice Studies; doi:10.1080/1478601x.2024.2429088 (behind its links)
Cross C, Holt TJ (2021) The Use of Military Profiles in Romance Fraud Schemes. Victims & Offenders; doi:10.1080/15564886.2020.1850582 (sections read: abstract, data and method, quantitative results, start of the qualitative themes) (behind its links)
Whitty MT (2013) The Scammers Persuasive Techniques Model: Development of a Stage Model to Explain the Online Dating Romance Scam. British Journal of Criminology; doi:10.1093/bjc/azt009 (abstract only: the open copy at the Warwick repository returned an empty file to our one paced fetch) (behind its links)
Bilz A, Shepherd LA, Johnson GI (2023) Tainted Love: A Systematic Review of Online Romance Fraud. arXiv:2303.00070 (published Interacting with Computers 35(6), doi:10.1093/iwc/iwad048); sections read: abstract, 3.4-3.6 (victim impact, influential factors, countermeasures) (behind its links)
Cross C, Dragiewicz M, Richards K (2018) Understanding Romance Fraud: Insights From Domestic Violence Research. British Journal of Criminology; doi:10.1093/bjc/azy005 (submitted version at QUT ePrints; sections read: method and sample, economic abuse, creation of fear, isolation) (behind its links)
Amirkhani S, Krueger J, Randall D, Stevens G, Zytko D (2026) When Suspicion Becomes Detection: Folk Deception Cues and Detection Strategies in Online Dating Romance Scams. arXiv:2606.23241 (Proc. ACM HCI) (behind its links)
Bai J et al. (2026) Mental health and psychosocial sequelae of fraud victimization: a systematic review. Frontiers in Psychology; doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1805536 (PMC13170454; sections read: abstract, introduction, results and discussion on shame, stigma and institutions) (behind its links)
Fernández Lareo N (2024) Characterization of Business Email Compromise Threat Actors. Thesis, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPCommons; sections read: introduction, impact, historical evolution, types of attacks, discussion: final matrix, possible connections, evolution, geography and organization, malware usage). Leans on industry threat-intelligence reports (Agari and others) (behind its links)
Buil-Gil D, Zeng Y (2021) Meeting you was a fake: investigating the increase in romance fraud during COVID-19. Journal of Financial Crime; doi:10.1108/jfc-02-2021-0042 (sections read: abstract, data, results on the increase and age groups) (behind its links)
Alotti N, Osvath P, Tenyi T, Voros V (2024) Induced erotomania by online romance fraud: a novel form of de Clerambault's syndrome. BMC Psychiatry; doi:10.1186/s12888-024-05667-6 (PMC10953121) (behind its links)
Havers B et al. (2024) Cybercrime victimisation among older adults: A probability sample survey in England and Wales. PLoS One; doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0314380 (PMC11654966) (behind its links)
Acharya B, Holz T (2024) An Explorative Study of Pig Butchering Scams. arXiv:2412.15423 (behind its links)
Whitty MT, Buchanan T (2012) The online romance scam: a serious cybercrime. Cyberpsychology, Behavior and Social Networking; doi:10.1089/cyber.2011.0352 (behind its links)
Lazarus SI, Hughes M, Button M, Garba KH (2025) Fraud as Legitimate Retribution for Colonial Injustice: Neutralization Techniques in Interviews with Police and Online Romance Fraud Offenders. Deviant Behavior; doi:10.1080/01639625.2024.2446328 (sections read: abstract, literature on offenders, participants and method) (behind its links)
Abubakari Y, Oseh-Ovarah V (2025) The Gamification of Online Romance Fraud through Offenders' Cards. Digital Threats: Research and Practice; doi:10.1145/3773289 (behind its links)