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Voting
Voting is the process of making collective decisions by means of submitting and then adding up individual choices.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | booked: human practice, undated in the sources read; first analysis 13th century (Llull) |
| born precision | century (analysis); practice undated |
| boundary | Inside: a group's act of deciding by submitting and adding up its members' choices: who may vote, the voter's decision to vote and what to choose, the ballot or signal, the count, and the aggregation rule with its limits. Outside: the offices and governments the decision fills, the election as a whole event (campaigns, management bodies), the parties, and the opinion that forms before the vote (public opinion). |
| nested level | Part of an election (its casting floor) and of democracy (its ballot door); also used in clubs, juries, companies, assemblies, and in some animal groups' consensus; carried by people (human L7: choosing and marking). |
| scale | social |
Measures (21) published science
| asymptotic probability of a Condorcet cycle, 3 candidates, impartial culture (worst case) | 8.77 % |
| Condorcet failure rate, 181 US ranked-choice elections 2004-2022 | 1.1 % |
| spoiler failure rate, same database | 1.6 % |
| compromise failure rate, same database | 3.8 % |
| majoritarian failure rate (ballot exhaustion), same database | 52.5 % |
| elections in the RCV database without a Condorcet winner | 1 of 182 elections |
| additional votes from one Facebook message, 2010 (direct + contagion) | 340,000 (60,000 direct, 280,000 by contagion) votes |
| users in the mobilisation experiment | 61 million people |
| races predicted by 100-ms face competence judgements, 2006 | 68.6 (governor), 72.4 (Senate) % |
| minimum face exposure as predictive as unlimited time | 100 ms |
| genetic contribution to voting in elections (civic engagement study) | 0.27 heritability |
| local public health spending rise after women's suffrage | about 35 % |
| lag from suffrage law to spending and roll-call shift | within a year time |
| child mortality decline after suffrage | 8-15 (about 20,000 child deaths a year) % |
| turnout cost of rain | 0.015 to 0.1 percentage points per mm |
| turnout, Australia 2016 House (compulsory voting) | 91 % |
| LLM voting personas emulated | more than 50,000 in 363 real elections personas |
| first online voting in Estonia (local elections) | 2005 year |
| marble voting introduced in Gambia | 1965 year |
| election cycle (the clock voting usually runs on in countries) | periodic elections cycle |
| self-consistency majority vote gain on GSM8K | +17.9 % points |
Open contentions (4) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-2363 How far does the pull to the median voter reach?
booked: The map keeps the theorem and its limits.
the other reading: broken by abstention, third parties and bimodal opinion - C-2987 Is voting only human, or do animals vote too?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: voting emerges in group-living animals (wild dogs' sneezes are 'in effect, voting'; herd animals' signals pressure minorities; democracy 'should be widespread') and so begins at rung 7-9; animal consensus is not voting but a different process the word only stretches over (no ballots, no rule chosen by the group) - C-2989 What can voting rules not do, and how often does it matter?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: rated rules escape Arrow's theorem; Gibbard's old reading ('democracy is impossible') against the modern reading (no point seeking agreement where there is none); impartial-culture estimates (8.77%) are a worst case; real electorates are more coherent - C-2990 Why do people vote?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: the paradox of voting holds and turnout is irrational for egoists; institutional factors (compulsory voting, ballot length, number of elections) drive most of the differences, not individual motives
Cross-scale patterns seen here (19) our proposal
Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Voting. Each links to every other system that shows it.
- same role, different builds (structural)
One job, adding up members' choices to commit the group, done by unrelated builds: ballots counted in human elections, sneezes counted to a quorum in wild dogs, waggle dances with stop signals in bee swarms, initiators' moves in baboons, sampled reasoning paths in a language model (self-consistency) - templating (structural)
The same majority/threshold module is swapped between brains and insect colonies and still works: separate populations accumulate evidence to a threshold, with cross inhibition (stop signals) as in neurons. - The carry (structural)
Overflow passed on: under STV a candidate elected with a surplus passes the excess votes to the next preferences; eliminated candidates' votes carry too. The wait: counting proceeds round by round until transfers settle. - the whole sets the local reference (structural)
Each voter's preference is transitive (reads true locally), yet the majority preferences may not close into one global order: A beats B, B beats C, C beats A. - trade one property for another (structural)
Speed bought with accuracy: the quorum threshold can be moved to compromise between the speed and the accuracy of decisions; kinds settle at different points (dogs' quorum lower when a dominant starts). - barrier-gates-complexity (partial)
The secret ballot seals the choice from onlookers; the without case is named (intimidation, blackmail, vote buying), but no gain in complexity is shown. - borrowed-then-held (partial)
The ballot's form was first borrowed from what was to hand (raised hands, shouts, coloured pencils, party-printed tickets, marbles), then held as an official ballot in a secret booth. - causal ceiling (partial)
A limit set by the structure of aggregation itself, not by any voter's means: no ranked rule can eliminate the spoiler effect (Arrow); every deterministic rule over 3+ options is dictatorial or manipulable (Gibbard-Satterthwaite). - runaway from an unstable balance (partial)
Quorum responses: each member's chance of joining rises sharply with the number already committed, so once off the even split the group runs to one option; stop signals keep the balance from deadlock between equal sites. - same toolkit, independent builds (partial)
Shared parts (members' signals, a count, a threshold), separate assemblies: wild dogs (sneezes), baboons (movement), honeybees (dances) and humans (ballots) reach consensus with the same parts, not inherited one from another. - symmetry breaking (name the cut) (partial)
Baboons with initiators pulling two ways: compromise when the angle is small, but past a large angle the symmetric compromise breaks and one direction is chosen. - The Payment to Entropy (partial)
Votes handed on lose part of what was sent: wasted votes elect no one; under ranked choice, ballot exhaustion makes 52.5% of 182 US RCV elections end without a majority of all ballots. Form: signal (votes dropped at the count). No per-hand-off efficiency booked (no totals read). - Umwelt: each system carves its own slice of one shared medium (partial)
Each kind of voter carves its slice of the same question: humans read faces in 100 ms and ballots, dogs hear sneezes, bees see dances, baboons see moves, LLM personas read text; each group's channels are its voting Umwelt. - who opens the door (partial)
The door into the count is opened by the receiving system ahead of time: the franchise law and the roll are set before any voter arrives (a port); in animal rallies no one opens it (open field: any audible sneeze counts). - holding / entrainment (surface)
In countries voting is held to the periodic election calendar: the whole sets when its parts vote. - namespace completeness (the map predicts its gaps) (surface)
Social choice maps the space of rules by properties (Condorcet consistency, IIA, strategyproofness, monotonicity) and the impossibility theorems mark which combinations stay empty. - nested ladder (surface)
A ladder of conditions: if the jury theorem's p > 1/2 more voters help, below 1/2 a single voter is best; Condorcet methods minimise spoilers to cycles only; with single-peaked preferences cycles vanish (median voter). - red-queen (surface)
Franchise contests: Jim Crow restrictions 1888-1908, then the VRA's protections and preclearance (1965), then post-Shelby (2013) cuts to early voting and roll purges: each side improving its tools over decades. - smooth to sharp in finite time (surface)
The quorum response is a sharply nonlinear function of how many already perform the behaviour: smooth accumulation becomes a step commitment at the threshold.
Valence: what it trades, and with whom (12) published science
Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:human-society · Voting gain
- Government via sys:human-society · Voting gain
- Large language model via sys:written-record · Voting mixed
- Social network via sys:social-network · Voting gain
- Honeybee (western honey bee, Apis mellifera) via sys:sensory-environment · Voting gain
- Political party via sys:human-society · Voting mixed
- Democracy via sys:human-society · Voting gain
- Election via sys:human-society · Voting gain
- African wild dog via sys:acoustic-wave · Voting gain
- Public opinion via sys:human-society · Voting gain
- Civil rights movement (United States) via sys:human-society · Voting gain
- Women's suffrage via sys:human-society · Voting gain
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (6)
Sits inside / holds (4)
expressed by (12)
- Generation/Synthesis
- Interoperability/Transduction (Bridging)
- Distributed Autonomy/Decentralized Execution (Subsidiarity)
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Sensing/Scanning
- Hypothesis/Goal Selection
- Multi-Scale Data Fusion / Triangulation
- Optimal Stopping & Patch-Switching
- Social Learning / Public Information Use
- Physical/Virtual Barrier
- Self-Monitoring
- Validation of Identity/Intention
floor filled by (17)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Government
- Law (rules and law)
- Human brain
- Human society (from local community up to societies)
- Social network
- Democracy
- Election
- Electoral system
- Suffrage
- African wild dog
- Women's suffrage
- Ballot
- Vote counting
- Secret (Australian) ballot
- Social choice theory
- Voting machine
represents (1)
Kinds (21)
- Single transferable vote
- Referendum
- First-past-the-post (plurality)
- Instant-runoff voting
- Approval voting
- Condorcet methods
- Score (range) voting
- Cumulative voting
- Limited voting
- Quota Borda system
- Voice vote
- Open ballot (show of hands; Landsgemeinde)
- Postal voting
- Online voting
- Proxy voting
- Compulsory voting
- Animal consensus decision (quorum voting)
- Blank vote / abstention
- Strategic (tactical) voting
- Expressive voting
- Recorded (roll-call) vote
Notes published science
- African wild dogs vote by sneezing. Before a pack sets off, the dogs hold a noisy greeting rally, and whether they actually leave depends on how many sneezes are heard. If a dominant dog starts the rally, fewer sneezes are needed, but enough sneezes from the others can carry the pack anyway (src:walker-2017).
- Majority rule can go in a circle: a majority can prefer A to B, B to C and C to A, even when every voter is perfectly consistent. Ramon Llull found this in the 1200s, but his work was lost until this century; Condorcet found it again in 1785 (src:wp:condorcet-paradox). In 182 real US ranked-choice elections, though, only 1 had no majority winner over all others (src:graham-squire-mccune-2023).
- When American women won the vote, legislators changed their roll-call votes and local public health spending rose about 35% within a year; door-to-door hygiene campaigns followed, and child deaths fell by 8-15%, about 20,000 children a year (src:miller-2008-qje).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L5: Adding up: every cast vote (or signal) counted; transfers and exhaustion under ranked rules; quorum reached in animal groups
- L6: The aggregation rule and what it can and cannot do: Condorcet cycles, Arrow's spoilers, Gibbard's manipulability, the jury theorem's gain, the median voter on one dimension
- L7: The collective decision, no longer any one member's, accepted by the group
voting: individual choices to a collective decision (reader's view)
- L1: The group and its question: people (and in some animal societies, group members) who must choose together among options; a decision about anything
- L2: The franchise: who may vote (suffrage by age, residency, citizenship; once by property, sex and race; the Voting Rights Act's bans on literacy tests)
- L3: The voter's decision: whether to vote (costs against benefits and duty, PB + D > C; social pressure and contagion; habit; genes linked to education) and whom or what to choose (rapid face judgements, information, strategy)
- L4: Expressing the choice: the ballot (single X, multiple X, ranked, scored, cumulative) or an open vote (hands, voice, rising); paper, machine, postal or online; secret or open
- L5: Adding up: votes tallied; transfers of surplus and eliminated votes under ranked rules; wasted and exhausted votes
- L6: The rule and its limits: majority, plurality, Condorcet, Borda, approval and score rules; what they can and cannot do (Condorcet's paradox, Arrow, Gibbard-Satterthwaite, the jury theorem, the median voter)
- L7: The collective decision acted on: an office filled, a law or verdict decided, a herd's departure; accepted by the group as its own
way in: AI voting personas (representing abstainers)
- L1: Generative AI assistants proposed as decision support or direct representation of abstaining voters
- L2: LLM voting personas emulated on real ballots
- L3: Ballot format matters: complex preferential ballots less consistent than simple majoritarian ones
- L4: Aggregated by equal shares and other proportional methods in emulation
way in: Cues about the options (faces, labels, information)
- L1: The candidates' faces seen
- L2: Face perception: 100-ms exposure suffices
- L3: Rapid, unreflective competence judgement
- L4: The choice: rapid judgements can affect voting decisions; deliberation lowered their predictive accuracy
way in: Members' signals in animal group decisions (sneezes, dances, initiators' moves)
- L1: Signals passed among group members: wild dogs' sneezes in a rally, honeybee scouts' waggle dances, baboon initiators' movements
- L2: Audible sneezes counted within the rally
- L3: Agreement accumulates: baboons follow when several initiators agree; bee scouts recruit and cross-inhibit
- L4: The quorum threshold, lowered when dominants start the rally
way in: Mobilisation and the decision to turn out
- L1: The social network: friends, close ties, neighbours; online networks
- L2: Messages and pressure: get-out-the-vote reminders, ballot-secrecy assurances, 'I voted' signals
- L3: Transmission through close friends, more than the message itself
- L4: The turnout decision: PB + D > C; duty and gratification; genes linked to education; habit
way in: The franchise (who may vote)
- L1: Society's struggles over who counts: universal male suffrage movements, then women's suffrage 1893-1930s, then civil rights
- L2: Eligibility law: age, residency, citizenship; once literacy tests and poll taxes; the VRA's protections
- L3: Administration of access: registration, rolls, early voting, voter ID; preclearance and its end (Shelby County 2013)
- L4: The electorate as counted: the set whose ballots enter the tally
way in: Voters' choices (ballots cast)
- L1: Each eligible voter's preference among the options (weather and distance touch whether it is cast)
- L2: The form the choice may take: ballot design (blank, party-printed, balanced; marbles in drums for non-readers)
- L3: Casting: in secret at a polling station, by post, online (Estonia 2005) or openly by show of hands (Landsgemeinde)
- L4: The ballot box or tabulator: where the cast vote enters the count
way out: Expression and acceptance (showing one voted; harmonising the group's account)
- L1: Political self-expression passed to friends
- L7: Acceptance of the outcome as the group's
way out: Laws, policies and verdicts decided
- L1: The population acted on: door-to-door hygiene campaigns; child mortality down 8-15%
- L4: Spending follows the electorate: local public health spending up about 35% within a year of women's suffrage
- L7: Policy decided by majority or super-majority; legislators' own roll-call votes
way out: Offices filled
- L1: Legislatures, councils and boards take their members (the election's mandate floor)
- L7: Representatives chosen
way out: The group moves (animal consensus)
- L1: The group travels together; failed initiators rejoin the majority
- L7: Departure decided: the rally succeeds
Sources (23) published science
Bond RM et al. (2012) A 61-million-person experiment in social influence and political mobilization. Nature 489:295-298, doi:10.1038/nature11421 (behind its links)
Sumpter & Pratt 2009, Quorum responses and consensus decision making. Phil Trans R Soc B 364:743-753. doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0204 (PMC2689713) (behind its links)
Wikipedia: Voter turnout (behind its links)
Suffrage (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Social choice theory (Wikipedia, WME) (behind its links)
Condorcet paradox (Wikipedia, WME) (behind its links)
Wang, Wei, Schuurmans, Le et al. 2022, Self-Consistency Improves Chain of Thought Reasoning in Language Models. arXiv:2203.11171 (behind its links)
Graham-Squire & McCune 2023, An Examination of Ranked Choice Voting in the United States, 2004-2022. arXiv:2301.12075 (preprint; later Representation) (behind its links)
Ballew C.C., Todorov A. (2007) Predicting political elections from rapid and unreflective face judgments. PNAS 104(46):17948-17953. doi:10.1073/pnas.0705435104 (behind its links)
Dawes, Settle, Loewen, McGue & Iacono 2015, Genes, psychological traits and civic engagement. Phil Trans R Soc B 370:20150015. doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0015 (PMC4633851) (behind its links)
Conradt L., Roper T.J. (2005) Consensus decision making in animals. Trends Ecol Evol 20(8):449-456. doi:10.1016/j.tree.2005.05.008 (behind its links)
Condorcet's jury theorem (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Wikipedia: Secret ballot (behind its links)
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise) (behind its links)
Women's suffrage (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Group decision-making (Wikipedia, WME) (behind its links)