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Decision-making

In psychology, decision-making is regarded as the cognitive process resulting in the selection of a belief or a course of action among several possible alternative options.

Properties published scienceour proposal

Sourced fields, and our own readings.

aliasesDecision making
born atkind: not dated in the sources read; in a person: equality principles grasped at 9-21 months, adaptive decision-making from about 11-12 years
born precisionnot dated (kind); months to years (person)
boundaryInside: the processes that take a set of alternatives to one selected belief or course of action: taking in the options (described or experienced), representing their attributes, valuing them on a common scale (risk, delay and losses weighed), comparing them (evidence accumulated to a bound, or a heuristic rule), and committing to a choice, which may or may not prompt action. Outside: the senses that bring the options in, the motor systems that carry out the act, the outcomes in the world, the memory and learning that store what happened, the emotions and motives that weigh on it, and the groups and institutions in which choices are pooled. Where 'decision-making' ends and problem solving, learning or motivation begins is drawn differently by different fields.
nested levelA process running in the brain (valuation in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum, comparison in parietal and frontal circuits, selection through the basal ganglia), part of a person's upper floors (Human L6-L7) and studied by psychology, neuroscience and economics; found in other animals and, as collective choice, in groups of bees, birds and people.
scaleorganism

Measures (17) published science

loss aversion coefficientabout 2-2.5 ratio of the value function's slope for losses to gains
fMRI studies of subjective value meta-analysed206 studies
participants in the valuation meta-analysis3,857 participants; 348 contrasts; 3,933 foci count
studies by stage in the meta-analysis27 at the decision stage; 140 at outcome delivery studies
evidence integration beyond the visual summation windowpast ~60-100 ms
fMRI studies in the common-currency meta-analysis13 studies
inter-trial interval in monkey gambling tasksa few seconds (lengthened to dozens of seconds, risk-seeking falls); hundreds or thousands of trials
honeybee swarm quorum used in the model0.8 fraction of the swarm committed
risk-attitude estimates, deprived against satiatedn = 162, z = −3.2, p = 0.001 (less risk averse when deprived) Wilcoxon rank test
monkey gamble outcome0.5 ml or nothing (two monkeys) ml juice
age adaptive decision-making appears11-12 and older years
songbird flock record23 years of weather radar data
age equality principles understood9-21 months
loss aversion coefficient (meta-analysis)mean between 1.8 and 2.1 (Bayesian hierarchical average 1.7-1.9); 607 estimates from 150 articles; varies with study design ratio
description-experience gap meta-analysismore than 70,000 choices by more than 6,000 participants count
prospect theory replication94% of items replicated; 12 of 13 theoretical contrasts; n = 4,098, 19 countries, 13 languages share of items
amygdala lesion sample behind the loss-aversion finding2 people

Open contentions (12) open contention

Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.

Cross-scale patterns seen here (14) our proposal

Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Decision-making. Each links to every other system that shows it.

Valence: what it trades, and with whom (26) published science

Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.

Partners and parts published science

Built from / builds (8)

Sits inside / holds (3)

expressed by (16)

floor filled by (21)

represents (1)

Kinds (14)

Notes published science

Layers

The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.

decision-making: from options in the world to a choice made and acted on (reader's view)

  1. L1: The options in the world: alternatives with their outcomes, probabilities and delays (money, food, juice, nest sites, programmes, partners), met as descriptions or as experience
  2. L2: Taking them in: the senses read a description or a stimulus, meet outcomes one by one, and feel the body's state (Human's channels)
  3. L3: Representing the options: alternatives described by criteria; editing sets the reference point and codes outcomes as gains or losses; the frame decides which aspects stand out
  4. L4: Value signals, the ports: a ventromedial prefrontal / orbitofrontal subregion, ventral striatum and posterior cingulate carry subjective value; dopamine neurons the prediction error; parietal neurons the forming decision and its confidence
  5. L5: Valuation on a common scale: losses weighed more than gains (meta-analytic mean 1.8-2.1), probabilities distorted by channel (described: rare overweighted; experienced: rare as if underweighted), delays discounted, the body's state and emotion folded in; on another reading there is no separate value stage
  6. L6: Comparison and selection: the greatest value selected, or evidence accumulated to a threshold (its locus contested), or a heuristic that ignores part of the information; faster automatic and slower controlled processing (two systems or a continuum: contested)
  7. L7: The choice and what follows: a belief or course of action selected, which may or may not prompt action; the act, the vote, the commitment; for a group, a choice of the whole

the boardroom (shared floors)

  1. L5: Valuation: each option given a scalar subjective value on a common scale (ventromedial prefrontal / orbitofrontal cortex, ventral striatum, posterior cingulate), with gains and losses read from the reference point (losses weighted about 1.8-2.1 times on the meta-analytic mean, 2-2.5 in Kahneman's figure), probabilities weighted by channel (rare events overweighted when described, underweighted as if when experienced) and delays discounted (steeply at first). Whether value is a separate stage at all is contested (C-3483)
  2. L6: Comparison and selection: values or evidence compared, by accumulation to a bound (accumulation-like signals in parietal and frontal areas; where integration happens is contested), with the threshold adjusted through the subthalamic nucleus, by a heuristic rule that ignores part of the information, or by deliberation; faster, more automatic and slower, more controlled processing are both observed, and whether these are two systems is contested
  3. L7: The choice: one belief or course of action selected, a final choice that may or may not prompt action; in a group, a choice no longer attributable to any single member; in a swarm, the option whose committed bees reach quorum

way in: Bodily state (hunger, thirst and the bodily reactions that mark options)

  1. L1: The body's state: mild food and water deprivation against satiety
  2. L3: Physiological reactions (skin conductance) that, on the somatic marker hypothesis, mark options as positive or negative
  3. L4: Neural systems that map the bodily states elicited while deliberating

way in: Described options (outcomes, probabilities and delays put in words or numbers)

  1. L1: Options described in words or numbers: lotteries with stated outcomes and probabilities, programmes framed as lives saved or lost, money now or later
  2. L3: Editing: outcomes ordered, equivalent ones grouped, a reference point set and outcomes coded as gains or losses
  3. L4: The reference point as the port: the decision-maker's current situation, against which each outcome is read as a gain or a loss; the frame decides which

way in: Emotion (feelings that weigh on the choice; losses felt more than gains)

  1. L1: Emotion comes in; where emotions come from is contested (C-414). Emotion appears able to aid the decision process
  2. L4: The amygdala: with it damaged, loss aversion is lost while general risk aversion stays

way in: Experienced outcomes (rewards and losses as they arrive, choice after choice)

  1. L1: Outcomes met one by one: squirts of juice, points won or lost, the reward structure learned through experience rather than explained
  2. L3: The outcome response: skin conductance after each outcome, greater for losses than wins in one of two studies
  3. L4: Midbrain dopamine neurons signal a signed reward prediction error: above baseline for more reward than predicted, at baseline for fully predicted reward, below for less; rare events learned this way act as if underweighted

way in: Memory (cues, recognition and past outcomes brought back)

  1. L1: What is known about the options: recognition, stored cues and their validities
  2. L4: Cues retrieved from memory in the order of their validity (take-the-best)

way in: Others' choices and signals (group members' stated preferences; scouts' waggle dances; flockmates' headings)

  1. L1: Members' initial preferences expressed; in a honeybee swarm, scouts dancing for the sites they found; in a flock, neighbours' headings
  2. L3: Information gathered and shared, with a bias towards what members already share

way in: Sensory evidence (a noisy stimulus to be judged: which way the dots move)

  1. L1: A noisy stimulus with two possible answers (random dot motion in the two-alternative forced choice task)
  2. L3: Stimulus difficulty sets the quality of the information the decision is based on
  3. L4: Area MT neurons, firing with motion strength in their preferred direction: the evidence
  4. L5: Subtraction (comparison) and integration of MT spikes in time into a decision variable in LIP

way in: Thought (deliberation, the controlled mode)

  1. L1: A thought comes in: where thoughts come from is contested (C-413); the walk books only that deliberate reasoning enters the choice
  2. L4: Slower, more controlled processing (Kahneman's controlled mode, 'System 2'); whether fast and slow processing are two systems is contested

way out: Acting on the choice (a saccade, a lever, a reach, a purchase, a move)

  1. L1: The act in the world: a gamble taken, a juice option chosen, a programme adopted
  2. L4: A response initiated once the criterial amount of information is reached; LIP projects to oculomotor areas FEF and superior colliculus
  3. L7: The final choice, which may or may not prompt action

way out: Bodily states sent out while deliberating (the somatic marker route)

  1. L1: The body
  2. L3: Anticipatory skin conductance before a choice (measured; did not reliably predict optimal play)
  3. L5: Deliberation of future consequences elicits emotional/bodily states

way out: Declaring the choice to others (a stated preference, a vote, a dance)

  1. L1: The group's combined choice: no longer attributable to any one member
  2. L3: Stated to the group: a preference expressed, a vote cast (majority, plurality, score); a scout's waggle dance for its site
  3. L7: The member's choice

Sources (39) published science

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