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Decision-making
In psychology, decision-making is regarded as the cognitive process resulting in the selection of a belief or a course of action among several possible alternative options.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| aliases | Decision making |
| born at | kind: not dated in the sources read; in a person: equality principles grasped at 9-21 months, adaptive decision-making from about 11-12 years |
| born precision | not dated (kind); months to years (person) |
| boundary | Inside: the processes that take a set of alternatives to one selected belief or course of action: taking in the options (described or experienced), representing their attributes, valuing them on a common scale (risk, delay and losses weighed), comparing them (evidence accumulated to a bound, or a heuristic rule), and committing to a choice, which may or may not prompt action. Outside: the senses that bring the options in, the motor systems that carry out the act, the outcomes in the world, the memory and learning that store what happened, the emotions and motives that weigh on it, and the groups and institutions in which choices are pooled. Where 'decision-making' ends and problem solving, learning or motivation begins is drawn differently by different fields. |
| nested level | A process running in the brain (valuation in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum, comparison in parietal and frontal circuits, selection through the basal ganglia), part of a person's upper floors (Human L6-L7) and studied by psychology, neuroscience and economics; found in other animals and, as collective choice, in groups of bees, birds and people. |
| scale | organism |
Measures (17) published science
| loss aversion coefficient | about 2-2.5 ratio of the value function's slope for losses to gains |
| fMRI studies of subjective value meta-analysed | 206 studies |
| participants in the valuation meta-analysis | 3,857 participants; 348 contrasts; 3,933 foci count |
| studies by stage in the meta-analysis | 27 at the decision stage; 140 at outcome delivery studies |
| evidence integration beyond the visual summation window | past ~60-100 ms |
| fMRI studies in the common-currency meta-analysis | 13 studies |
| inter-trial interval in monkey gambling tasks | a few seconds (lengthened to dozens of seconds, risk-seeking falls); hundreds or thousands of trials |
| honeybee swarm quorum used in the model | 0.8 fraction of the swarm committed |
| risk-attitude estimates, deprived against satiated | n = 162, z = −3.2, p = 0.001 (less risk averse when deprived) Wilcoxon rank test |
| monkey gamble outcome | 0.5 ml or nothing (two monkeys) ml juice |
| age adaptive decision-making appears | 11-12 and older years |
| songbird flock record | 23 years of weather radar data |
| age equality principles understood | 9-21 months |
| loss aversion coefficient (meta-analysis) | mean between 1.8 and 2.1 (Bayesian hierarchical average 1.7-1.9); 607 estimates from 150 articles; varies with study design ratio |
| description-experience gap meta-analysis | more than 70,000 choices by more than 6,000 participants count |
| prospect theory replication | 94% of items replicated; 12 of 13 theoretical contrasts; n = 4,098, 19 countries, 13 languages share of items |
| amygdala lesion sample behind the loss-aversion finding | 2 people |
Open contentions (12) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-413 Where do thoughts come from?
booked: No theory is proven, so the map lists the main ones side by side and doesn't pick one. It shows where thinking is handled in the brain, not where thoughts start.
the other reading: positions listed in C-413 - C-414 Where do emotions come from?
booked: No theory is proven, so the map lists the leading ones side by side and doesn't pick one.
the other reading: positions listed in C-414 - C-3470 Does the brain value everything on one common scale?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: domain-specific value representations: the domain-general conclusion is 'necessarily provisional given the low spatial resolution of the underlying data' (src:bartra-2013); monkey single units show a subjective value signal in dorsal striatum that has rarely been observed in human fMRI (src:levy-glimcher-2012); the scale is relative to the choice set: a decoy can raise another option's share (src:wp:decoy-effect); divisive normalisation of value by the other options (specialist's lead, Louie et al., not opened) - C-3483 Does the brain value options first and compare after, or decide another way?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: OFC's core job is not value but a cognitive map of task states, from which values and other predictions are derived; OFC is not necessary for simple value-based behaviour (src:zhou-2021, src:wilson-2014); action-based / affordance competition, value biasing competing potential actions (specialist's lead: Cisek 2007; not opened); comparison within the valuation region itself (specialist's lead: Hunt et al. 2012; not opened); economic value not represented as such anywhere (specialist's lead: Hayden & Niv 2021; not opened) - C-3485 Does the brain use one system or two to weigh rewards that come later?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: the two-system (beta-delta, quasi-hyperbolic) reading; the single-valuation reading - C-3491 Are there really two kinds of thinking, fast and slow?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: two systems or process types (Kahneman 2002; Stanovich & West's labels); a single-system continuum between implicit and explicit processing; the dichotomy does not cover the range of processes (Osman) (src:wp:dual-process-theory); Melnikoff & Bargh 2018 against Pennycook et al. 2018 (the dispute as the sibling cognition walk books it; not opened here) - C-3494 Where in the brain is evidence added up to a decision?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: LIP's decision signals not necessary: inactivating LIP had no measurable effect on choices, inactivating MT did (src:katz-2016); in rats posterior parietal cortex codes graded accumulated evidence while frontal orienting fields code a categorical provisional choice; such correlates are reported in several interconnected regions (src:hanks-2015); single-trial LIP activity as discrete steps rather than ramps (specialist's lead: Latimer et al. 2015; not opened) - C-3506 Are heuristics biases or tools that fit the world?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: heuristics as error-prone shortcuts against a normative standard; heuristics as adapted tools that can beat optimizing models under uncertainty; related: C-964 (probabilistic brain or a bag of tricks); cross-link: C-3491 (the ecological-rationality side rejects the two-system split, per the specialist; not opened) - C-3525 Does the brain's amygdala produce loss aversion?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: conflicting studies: whether the brain's response to losses is loss aversion or 'merely ... an alerting or orienting aspect of losses' (src:wp:neuroeconomics); the lesion finding rests on two individuals (n = 2; src:de-martino-2010) - C-3526 How much more do losses weigh than gains?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: multiple studies question loss aversion's existence; Gal and Rucker (2018) argue losses do not generally loom larger (src:wp:loss-aversion); loss aversion near 1 for small stakes and dependent on method (specialist's leads: Yechiam 2019, Walasek et al.; not opened) - C-3546 Are monkeys natural risk-takers, or does the test make them look so?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: risk-seeking as a generalizable preference of rhesus macaques that distinguishes them from humans and other animals (the reading Heilbronner & Hayden argue against) - C-3556 Do bodily feelings steer our decisions?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: Wright & Rakow 2023: anticipatory skin conductance did not reliably predict optimal play in either study; outcome responses larger for losses only in one of two studies
Cross-scale patterns seen here (14) our proposal
Shapes that recur when the same kind of problem is solved at different scales, and how each shows in Decision-making. Each links to every other system that shows it.
- same role, different builds (structural)
One job, choosing the best of several options, done by a brain's valuation and accumulation circuits in a person or a monkey and by a honeybee swarm with no brain at all (scouts dancing, stop signals, a quorum), and the swarm's choices obey the same psychophysical laws (Hick-Hyman, Piéron, Weber) as - same shape, opposite sign (structural)
One value function, defined on gains and losses from the reference point, is concave for gains (favouring risk aversion) and convex for losses (favouring risk seeking): the same diminishing sensitivity, its sign set by which side of the reference point the outcome falls. The same lives-saved problem - symmetry breaking (name the cut) (structural)
Two nest sites of equal quality: the swarm has no preferred option, and must break the decision deadlock and select any one; recruitment (waggle dances) and cross-inhibition (stop signals) make the cut, and quorum on one site sets where the colony goes. - trade one property for another (structural)
Speed bought with accuracy: instructions for speed or accuracy move the amount of information required before responding (the bound), and a swarm's signalling rate trades discriminability for speed in the same way; maximizers buy a better choice with time and regret, satisficers the reverse; heurist - causal ceiling (partial)
A limit set by the problem, not the decider's means: many real-world problems are computationally intractable (Bayesian inference in belief networks is NP-hard), so no decider can optimize them; bounded rationality names the decider's own limits of information, time and processing alongside it. - lightning (partial)
A held build-up released at once: accumulated evidence crosses a threshold and the decision terminates in a choice (even if provisional), after which the act follows; in a swarm, quorum on one site ends the decision. Capped and gated, so it passes the lightning test (not a trivial discharge). - templating (partial)
One common scale reused for every kind of reward: money, snack foods and trinkets valued in one representation in a vmPFC/OFC subregion; the same valuation regions answer to prospects and to outcomes received. A module reused across reward kinds within one system (the domain-general reading is conte - The carry (partial)
The wait: evidence is accumulated until it reaches a threshold, whence the decision terminates in a choice; the time to decide is set by how fast the evidence fills to the bound, and a colony's decision time grows with the number of options. The lookahead face: an urgency signal that grows with elap - the whole sets the local reference (partial)
Each outcome is read as a gain or a loss against a reference point set by the decision-maker's current situation, not on an absolute scale; the same outcome reads as a gain from one reference and a loss from another (framing). The choice set itself sets the reference too: adding a decoy can raise an - Umwelt: each system carves its own slice of one shared medium (partial)
The same gamble met two ways: described in words to people, or learned through experience in fast repeated trials as monkeys meet it; the experienced slice comes with small stakes and quick repeats, and monkeys' risk-seeking falls when the gap between trials is lengthened. Across people, one gamble - who opens the door (partial)
The receiving system sets its doors before the input arrives: instructions for speed or accuracy set the bound the evidence must reach before any stimulus is shown, and the reference point decides ahead of the outcome whether it will be coded a gain or a loss. - coordination-before-mapping (surface)
The swarm coordinates its choice though no bee explicitly encodes the dynamics: the group as a whole does, as neurons do; individual scouts still assess their own sites, so the absence of any map is not shown. - runaway from an unstable balance (surface)
With equal sites the swarm sits at a balance; recruitment feeds on itself, and with cross-inhibition the deadlock is broken; but quorum is not guaranteed when options are similar, so the runaway is not shown to be certain. - The Payment to Entropy (surface)
Signal form, in the hand-off from members to a group: members discuss what they already share over what only one of them holds, so unshared information tends not to reach the group's choice; no efficiency figure is given in the sources read.
Valence: what it trades, and with whom (26) published science
Each exchange with a neighbour, read from both sides: who gains, who pays, and what carries it.
- Cognition via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making even
- Basal ganglia via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Decision-making gain
- Amygdala via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Decision-making gain
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making gain
- Prefrontal cortex via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Decision-making gain
- Human brain via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Decision-making gain
- Emotion (feelings) via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making gain
- Consciousness via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making gain
- Honeybee (western honey bee, Apis mellifera) via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making gain
- Market and trade via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making even
- Dopamine via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Decision-making gain
- Memory via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making gain
- Striatum via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Decision-making gain
- Probability: weighing chances, in brains and in people's mathematics, and the structure it works on via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making gain
- Perception via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Decision-making gain
- Attention via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making loss
- Motivation via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making gain
- Risk via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making mixed
- Economics (the field) via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making even
- Learning via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making gain
- Adolescence via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making mixed
- Free will via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making even
- Game theory via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making even
- Lateral intraparietal area (parietal cortex) via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Decision-making even
- Migrating songbird flock via sys:sensory-environment · Decision-making gain
- Reward system via sys:electrochemical-gradient · Decision-making gain
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (8)
- Orbitofrontal cortex
- Anterior cingulate cortex
- Ventromedial prefrontal cortex
- Dopamine
- Striatum
- Posterior cingulate cortex
- Lateral intraparietal area (parietal cortex)
- Automatic and controlled systems compete for the judgment (parallel-competitive model)
Sits inside / holds (3)
expressed by (16)
- Templating / Standardization
- Distributed Autonomy/Decentralized Execution (Subsidiarity)
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Sensing/Scanning
- Hypothesis/Goal Selection
- Search/Foraging
- Mapping/Modeling
- Uncertainty Reduction/Learning
- Risk-managed Exploration
- Intrinsic Motivation / Curiosity-Driven Sampling
- Multi-Scale Data Fusion / Triangulation
- Hypothesis Portfolio / Multiple Hypothesis Tracking
- Optimal Stopping & Patch-Switching
- Offline Simulation & Replay-Guided Planning
- Social Learning / Public Information Use
- Triage & Prioritized Allocation
floor filled by (21)
- Cognition
- Basal ganglia
- Amygdala
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Prefrontal cortex
- Orbitofrontal cortex
- Anterior cingulate cortex
- Emotion (feelings)
- Money
- Honeybee (western honey bee, Apis mellifera)
- Heuristic
- Ventromedial prefrontal cortex
- Dopamine
- Striatum
- Probability: weighing chances, in brains and in people's mathematics, and the structure it works on
- Perception
- Posterior cingulate cortex
- Lateral intraparietal area (parietal cortex)
- Group decision-making
- Prospect theory
- Frontal orienting fields (rat)
represents (1)
Kinds (14)
- Deliberate decision
- Arbitrary decision
- Individual decision-making
- Group decision-making
- Collective decision-making in animals (swarms, flocks)
- Decision under risk
- Decision under uncertainty
- Intertemporal choice
- Perceptual decision-making (two-alternative forced choice)
- Expected utility theory
- Prospect theory
- Heuristics-and-biases program
- Ecological rationality (fast-and-frugal heuristics)
- Diffusion decision model (evidence accumulation)
Notes published science
- A honeybee swarm choosing a new home obeys the same three laws of psychophysics as a person judging a light or a sound: it takes longer with more options (Hick-Hyman), less long when the options are good (Piéron), and errs by Weber's law, yet no single bee carries the rule; the swarm as a whole does, as neurons do in a brain (src:reina-2018).
- Tell people a treatment has 90% short-term survival and more choose surgery than when told it has 10% immediate mortality; experienced physicians were swayed by the wording just as much as patients (src:kahneman-2002).
- Rhesus monkeys looked like born gamblers, picking a risky squirt of juice over a sure one of equal average value, lab after lab; stretch the pause between choices from a few seconds to dozens of seconds and they become clearly less risk-seeking (src:heilbronner-hayden-2013).
- The same gamble flips depending on how you meet it: read about a rare outcome and people act as if it is more likely than it is; learn it by trying the options yourself and they act as if it is less likely, mostly because people stop sampling too soon (src:wulff-2018).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
decision-making: from options in the world to a choice made and acted on (reader's view)
- L1: The options in the world: alternatives with their outcomes, probabilities and delays (money, food, juice, nest sites, programmes, partners), met as descriptions or as experience
- L2: Taking them in: the senses read a description or a stimulus, meet outcomes one by one, and feel the body's state (Human's channels)
- L3: Representing the options: alternatives described by criteria; editing sets the reference point and codes outcomes as gains or losses; the frame decides which aspects stand out
- L4: Value signals, the ports: a ventromedial prefrontal / orbitofrontal subregion, ventral striatum and posterior cingulate carry subjective value; dopamine neurons the prediction error; parietal neurons the forming decision and its confidence
- L5: Valuation on a common scale: losses weighed more than gains (meta-analytic mean 1.8-2.1), probabilities distorted by channel (described: rare overweighted; experienced: rare as if underweighted), delays discounted, the body's state and emotion folded in; on another reading there is no separate value stage
- L6: Comparison and selection: the greatest value selected, or evidence accumulated to a threshold (its locus contested), or a heuristic that ignores part of the information; faster automatic and slower controlled processing (two systems or a continuum: contested)
- L7: The choice and what follows: a belief or course of action selected, which may or may not prompt action; the act, the vote, the commitment; for a group, a choice of the whole
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L5: Valuation: each option given a scalar subjective value on a common scale (ventromedial prefrontal / orbitofrontal cortex, ventral striatum, posterior cingulate), with gains and losses read from the reference point (losses weighted about 1.8-2.1 times on the meta-analytic mean, 2-2.5 in Kahneman's figure), probabilities weighted by channel (rare events overweighted when described, underweighted as if when experienced) and delays discounted (steeply at first). Whether value is a separate stage at all is contested (C-3483)
- L6: Comparison and selection: values or evidence compared, by accumulation to a bound (accumulation-like signals in parietal and frontal areas; where integration happens is contested), with the threshold adjusted through the subthalamic nucleus, by a heuristic rule that ignores part of the information, or by deliberation; faster, more automatic and slower, more controlled processing are both observed, and whether these are two systems is contested
- L7: The choice: one belief or course of action selected, a final choice that may or may not prompt action; in a group, a choice no longer attributable to any single member; in a swarm, the option whose committed bees reach quorum
way in: Bodily state (hunger, thirst and the bodily reactions that mark options)
- L1: The body's state: mild food and water deprivation against satiety
- L3: Physiological reactions (skin conductance) that, on the somatic marker hypothesis, mark options as positive or negative
- L4: Neural systems that map the bodily states elicited while deliberating
way in: Described options (outcomes, probabilities and delays put in words or numbers)
- L1: Options described in words or numbers: lotteries with stated outcomes and probabilities, programmes framed as lives saved or lost, money now or later
- L3: Editing: outcomes ordered, equivalent ones grouped, a reference point set and outcomes coded as gains or losses
- L4: The reference point as the port: the decision-maker's current situation, against which each outcome is read as a gain or a loss; the frame decides which
way in: Emotion (feelings that weigh on the choice; losses felt more than gains)
- L1: Emotion comes in; where emotions come from is contested (C-414). Emotion appears able to aid the decision process
- L4: The amygdala: with it damaged, loss aversion is lost while general risk aversion stays
way in: Experienced outcomes (rewards and losses as they arrive, choice after choice)
- L1: Outcomes met one by one: squirts of juice, points won or lost, the reward structure learned through experience rather than explained
- L3: The outcome response: skin conductance after each outcome, greater for losses than wins in one of two studies
- L4: Midbrain dopamine neurons signal a signed reward prediction error: above baseline for more reward than predicted, at baseline for fully predicted reward, below for less; rare events learned this way act as if underweighted
way in: Memory (cues, recognition and past outcomes brought back)
- L1: What is known about the options: recognition, stored cues and their validities
- L4: Cues retrieved from memory in the order of their validity (take-the-best)
way in: Others' choices and signals (group members' stated preferences; scouts' waggle dances; flockmates' headings)
- L1: Members' initial preferences expressed; in a honeybee swarm, scouts dancing for the sites they found; in a flock, neighbours' headings
- L3: Information gathered and shared, with a bias towards what members already share
way in: Sensory evidence (a noisy stimulus to be judged: which way the dots move)
- L1: A noisy stimulus with two possible answers (random dot motion in the two-alternative forced choice task)
- L3: Stimulus difficulty sets the quality of the information the decision is based on
- L4: Area MT neurons, firing with motion strength in their preferred direction: the evidence
- L5: Subtraction (comparison) and integration of MT spikes in time into a decision variable in LIP
way in: Thought (deliberation, the controlled mode)
- L1: A thought comes in: where thoughts come from is contested (C-413); the walk books only that deliberate reasoning enters the choice
- L4: Slower, more controlled processing (Kahneman's controlled mode, 'System 2'); whether fast and slow processing are two systems is contested
way out: Acting on the choice (a saccade, a lever, a reach, a purchase, a move)
- L1: The act in the world: a gamble taken, a juice option chosen, a programme adopted
- L4: A response initiated once the criterial amount of information is reached; LIP projects to oculomotor areas FEF and superior colliculus
- L7: The final choice, which may or may not prompt action
way out: Bodily states sent out while deliberating (the somatic marker route)
- L1: The body
- L3: Anticipatory skin conductance before a choice (measured; did not reliably predict optimal play)
- L5: Deliberation of future consequences elicits emotional/bodily states
way out: Declaring the choice to others (a stated preference, a vote, a dance)
- L1: The group's combined choice: no longer attributable to any one member
- L3: Stated to the group: a preference expressed, a vote cast (majority, plurality, score); a scout's waggle dance for its site
- L7: The member's choice
Sources (39) published science
Group decision-making (Wikipedia, WME) (behind its links)
Reina A, Bose T, Trianni V, Marshall JAR (2018) Psychophysical laws and the superorganism. Sci Rep 8:4387. doi:10.1038/s41598-018-22616-y (CC BY) (behind its links)
Levy & Glimcher 2012, The root of all value: a neural common currency for choice, Curr. Opin. Neurobiol., doi:10.1016/j.conb.2012.06.001 (behind its links)
Neuroeconomics (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Kable JW, Glimcher PW (2007) The neural correlates of subjective value during intertemporal choice. Nat Neurosci 10:1625-1633. doi:10.1038/nn2007 (PMC2845395) (behind its links)
Expected utility hypothesis (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Kahneman D (2002) Maps of bounded rationality: a perspective on intuitive judgment and choice. Nobel Prize Lecture, December 8, 2002 (nobelprize.org PDF) (behind its links)
Shadlen MN, Kiani R (2013) Decision making as a window on cognition. Neuron 80(3). doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2013.10.047 (PMC3852636, author manuscript) (behind its links)
De Martino B, Camerer CF, Adolphs R (2010) Amygdala damage eliminates monetary loss aversion. PNAS 107(8):3788-3792. doi:10.1073/pnas.0910230107 (PMC2840433) (behind its links)
Schultz W (2016) Dopamine reward prediction error coding. Dialogues Clin Neurosci 18:23-32. doi:10.31887/DCNS.2016.18.1/wschultz (PMC4826767, open) (behind its links)
Heuristics in judgment and decision-making (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Prospect theory (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Cognition (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Ecological rationality (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Brighton H, Gigerenzer G (2012) Homo heuristicus: less-is-more effects in adaptive cognition. Malays J Med Sci 19(4):6-16 (PMC3629675) (behind its links)
Temporal discounting (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Loss aversion (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Dual process theory (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)
Decoy effect (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot) (behind its links)