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Social norm
A social norm or norm is a shared standard of acceptable behavior by a group.
Properties published scienceour proposal
Sourced fields, and our own readings.
| born at | contested for the class: allusions to norms in religious doctrines and philosophy predate Aristotle by thousands of years (Legros and Cislaghi); third-party enforcement may be derived in the human lineage (Riedl 2012); each single norm has its own birth |
| born precision | millennia (class); unknown for most single norms |
| boundary | Inside: the shared standard itself as the fields describe it: members' empirical and normative expectations (descriptive and injunctive norms), the reference group whose conduct and approval count, the sanctions that back it (approval, gossip, ostracism, fines, physical punishment, execution), its internalization in persons, and its life cycle (emergence, cascade, maintenance, change, disappearance). Outside: the people and animals who carry it, the society, culture and institutions it is part of, formal law, private attitudes and values that need not concern behaviour, and the disciplines that study it; each walked or queued separately. |
| nested level | A social system at rung 11: built from expectations, a reference group and sanctions; a part of human societies, cultures and institutions (institutions are clusters of norms); carried by people's acts (runs on Human L7). |
| scale | social |
Measures (24) published science
| tipping prediction accuracy | 96% (23 of 24 societies) share of lab societies whose persistence or tipping the threshold model predicted |
| tipping threshold above which change fails | 35 % of the population that must deviate (predicted 100% tipping below, quickly 0% above) |
| self-set tipping threshold | 40 (could have been 23); 5 of 6 societies kept the detrimental norm % threshold, mean |
| lab norm-change transition | momentum around period 10 (rounds 10 to 13) periods of the social tipping game |
| preference switch rate in the tipping game | 10 % chance per period that a Blue-preferring player comes to prefer Green |
| societies coded for norm violations and punishment | 131 largely non-industrial societies (SCCS and eHRAF) |
| documents with evidence of each punishment type | physical 38, material 35, execution 34, reputational 25 % of 131 culture documents |
| documents with evidence of adultery violations | 59 (war cowardice 6.9) % of culture documents |
| phylogenetic signal of reputational punishment | 0.04 (90% HPDI 0-0.11) proportion of variance captured by phylogeny |
| COVID-19 cases, loose vs tight nations | 4.99 times (7132 vs 1428 per million) ratio, to 16 October 2020 |
| COVID-19 deaths, loose vs tight nations | 8.71 times (183 vs 21 per million) ratio, to 16 October 2020 |
| share scared of catching COVID-19, tight vs loose nations | 71 vs 52 (first 100 days) % |
| norm strength, high risk | 0.80 (low risk 0.72) norm strength index |
| groups reaching the threshold, high vs low risk | 0.75 vs 0.48 proportion of groups |
| collective-risk experiment length | 30 days, 28 game-days, n = 286 |
| great tit knowledge spread from two demonstrators | 75 (68-83) % of each local population solving at least once |
| great tit tradition strengthening | 14 (95% CI 8-18) % increase in bias per day |
| great tit movers matching the local tradition | 71 (10 of 14) % |
| great tit tradition lifetime | stable over two generations, with about 40% of birds surviving from one year to the next |
| fMRI studies in the norm meta-analysis | 36 (more than 60% using fairness tasks) articles |
| records found mapping the social-norms literature | 624 records at initial scoping |
| countries and participants in the metanorm survey | 57 countries, 22,863 participants countries; people |
| within-country correlation, violation appropriateness vs verbal confrontation appropriateness | -0.77 (95% CI -0.80 to -0.75); gossip -0.67; ostracism -0.39; non-action +0.57 mean correlation across 57 countries |
| countries where non-action was the highest-rated response | 31 of 57 (verbal confrontation highest in 26) countries |
Open contentions (8) open contention
Where sources or readings disagree. Both stay on the map.
- C-413 Where do thoughts come from?
booked: No theory is proven, so the map lists the main ones side by side and doesn't pick one. It shows where thinking is handled in the brain, not where thoughts start.
the other reading: see the registry - C-414 Where do emotions come from?
booked: No theory is proven, so the map lists the leading ones side by side and doesn't pick one.
the other reading: see the registry - C-1078 Are social norms held by individuals or by groups?
booked: The map treats norms as shared group standards that individuals also hold as their own expectations.
the other reading: social norms are individual constructs; social norms are collective constructs; a combination of both - C-2966 Are internalised moral norms a kind of social norm?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: internalized norms are still social norms; they are personal or moral norms and not social norms (several reviewers) - C-2969 When norms change, does behaviour change first or the norm?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: behaviour changes first and norms follow (Norway's smoking ban); norms change first and behaviour follows at a tipping point; mutual influence (Burke and Young; Young 2015) - C-2970 Why do people follow social norms?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: sanctions-only compliance; expectations-only (Bicchieri); multiple intersecting pathways (Legros and Cislaghi's own reading) - C-2971 How do social norms first emerge?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: consequentialism; relationalism; spontaneous order; design by entrepreneurs and legislators - C-2973 Do other animals have social norms?
booked: The map keeps the competing readings; none is ruled.
the other reading: norms are uniquely human (third-party enforcement derived in our lineage); conformist traditions in birds and primates are norms or proto-norms; chimpanzee bystander reactions to infanticide as an evolutionary precursor of social norms (Rudolf von Rohr et al. 2015, title only)
Partners and parts published science
Built from / builds (12)
- Human society (from local community up to societies)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Descriptive norms (empirical expectations)
- Injunctive norms (normative expectations)
- Reference group
- Sanctions (reputational, material, physical, execution)
- Human culture
- Society as sociologists see it (sociology's object: social structure and social action)
- Human cultures (anthropology)
- Institution (social)
- Social structure
- An old norm against a new one
Sits inside / holds (3)
Trades with (valence) (14)
- Ritual via sys:human-society · Social norm gain
- Human (Homo sapiens) via sys:human-society · Social norm gain
- Law (rules and law) via sys:human-society · Social norm mixed
- Human brain via sys:human-society · Social norm gain
- Human society (from local community up to societies) via sys:human-society · Social norm gain
- Emotion (feelings) via sys:human-society · Social norm gain
- Social network via sys:human-society · Social norm gain
- Socialization via sys:human-society · Social norm gain
- Human culture via sys:human-society · Social norm gain
- Public opinion via sys:human-society · Social norm mixed
- Institution (social) via sys:human-society · Social norm gain
- Ethics (moral philosophy: the study and the morality it studies) via sys:human-society · Social norm even
- Gender via sys:human-society · Social norm gain
- Social change via sys:human-society · Social norm mixed
expressed by (16)
- Templating / Standardization
- Interoperability/Transduction (Bridging)
- Distributed Autonomy/Decentralized Execution (Subsidiarity)
- Internal Coordination/Regulation
- Sensing/Scanning
- Mapping/Modeling
- Uncertainty Reduction/Learning
- Social Learning / Public Information Use
- Resource Denial/Attrition
- Divide & Isolate
- Cascade Induction
- Reactive Response
- Self-Monitoring
- Validation of Identity/Intention
- Deterrence
- Quality Control & Error Correction
floor filled by (24)
- Ritual
- Human society (from local community up to societies)
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Language (human language)
- Law (rules and law)
- Human brain
- The world through the senses (sensory environment)
- Emotion (feelings)
- Social network
- Socialization
- Institution (social)
- Descriptive norms (empirical expectations)
- Injunctive norms (normative expectations)
- Reference group
- Sanctions (reputational, material, physical, execution)
- Internalized personal or moral norms
- Metanorms (norms about enforcing norms)
- Norm entrepreneurs, leaders and role models
- Human culture
- Society as sociologists see it (sociology's object: social structure and social action)
- Human cultures (anthropology)
- Social structure
- Gender
- Social change
represents (2)
Kinds (12)
- Law (rules and law)
- Convention (coordination norm)
- Regulative norms
- Constitutive norms
- Prescriptive norms
- Proscriptive norms (taboos)
- Subjective norms
- Political norms
- Gender norms
- Internalized personal or moral norms
- Conformist traditions in other animals (norm precursors, contested)
- Metanorms (norms about enforcing norms)
wired (6)
- Social network
- Human (Homo sapiens)
- Institution (social)
- World population (human population)
- Monitoring and sanctioning (enforcement)
- Formal rules (laws, regulations)
Notes published science
- Ask people to set the punishment for not conforming themselves and they set it too high: in a lab experiment where 23% would have let a harmful norm tip, groups chose penalties giving a 40% threshold, and 5 of 6 stayed stuck in the norm they all disliked; a simple threshold model called the outcome right in 23 of 24 societies (src:andreoni-2021).
- Wild great tits keep 'local customs': seeded with two trained birds, each woodland settled on one arbitrary way of opening a puzzle box, the custom grew stronger by 14% a day and outlived most of the birds, and 10 of 14 birds that moved to a woodland with the other custom switched to the locals' way (src:aplin-2015).
- Across 57 countries, the richer and more individualist the country, the less people approve of confronting or shunning a rule-breaker and the more they approve of gossiping about them: gossip quietly takes over the job of punishment (src:eriksson-2021).
Layers
The ways it takes in its world, where they meet, and how it acts back, each from L1 (where it meets the world) up.
social norm: from conduct in shared space to a group's self-enforcing standard and its change (reader's view)
- L1: Conduct in shared space: what members do where others can see, and its traces
- L2: Noticing: seeing what peers do, hearing what they approve, receiving their reactions
- L3: Routing: social learning, framing, sanctions' consequences, newcomers' scripts, laws and role models
- L4: Expectations: empirical (descriptive) and normative (injunctive), sometimes misperceived
- L5: Compliance in the person: information, external obligation, internalization; brain systems for norm representation and violation
- L6: The shared norm: a reference group's self-enforcing standard, tight or loose
- L7: The norm's life acting back: emergence, cascade, persistence, tipping, change, codification
the boardroom (shared floors)
- L4: Expectations held by members: empirical (what others do; descriptive norms) and normative (what others think one ought to do; injunctive norms), including misperceived ones (pluralistic ignorance)
- L5: Compliance in the person: norms act as neutral information, external obligation or internal obligation (internalization); in the brain, ventromedial prefrontal regions for representing norms, right insula, dorsolateral prefrontal and dorsal cingulate cortex for violations
- L6: The shared norm: a group-level standard, self-enforcing within its reference group (an equilibrium of expectations and conduct), with its strength (tight or loose), range of tolerable behaviour and metanorms
- L7: The norm's life acting back on the world: emergence, cascade, internalization and persistence, tipping and change, codification into institutions and laws
way in: Collective threat and the consequences of conduct (disasters, disease, scarcity, invasion)
- L1: Natural disasters, disease, resource scarcity and invasions; a looming risk of collective loss
- L2: Perceived external threat (fear of the danger)
- L3: Changed costs and benefits of complying or violating
way in: Emotion (inner): guilt, shame and anticipated disapproval
- L1: Feelings around one's own conduct, including after a violation (origin contested, C-414)
- L2: Guilt felt after the act, as self-punishment
- L3: Emotional consequences counted among the costs of violation (shame when underdressed)
way in: Hearing and reading: talk, gossip, signs and normative messages
- L1: Words about conduct: signs, campaign messages, news of what others do, gossip
- L2: Being told what many others do (voter turnout messages)
- L3: Framing routes a message to one expectation or the other: prevalence (descriptive) or approval (injunctive)
way in: Law, power-holders, norm entrepreneurs and role models
- L1: Laws, reforms, leaders, entrepreneurs and role models acting on what the group approves (Norway's bar smoking ban)
- L2: Persuasion and influence received through emotion, attachment, connections, authority or identification
- L3: Legal reform routed to beliefs about what is approved, or to enforcement; laws and norms may pull apart
way in: Newcomers and children: scripts imported from earlier groups
- L1: New members arriving with histories and scripts from earlier groups
- L2: The newcomer meets the group's norms and usually adopts them
- L3: Common experience integrates members' schemas into the group's take on the right action
way in: Sanctions received: approval, reprimand, ostracism, fines, physical punishment
- L1: Others' reactions: body language, cues, rebuke, isolation, fines, imprisonment
- L2: Contact with the negative contingencies of deviance
- L3: Consequences routed as economic, reputational or emotional costs; operant learning
way in: Sight: others' conduct and its traces (descriptive information)
- L1: What others do where they can be seen, and the traces it leaves (an unlittered parking lot, a queue)
- L2: Watching peers act: seeing someone pick up litter, seeing peers comply or violate
- L3: Social learning routes what is seen: copy what others seem to approve, avoid what is seen punished; through network ties
way in: Thought (inner): weighing appropriateness and consequences
- L1: A thought about what to do arises (where it comes from is contested, C-413)
- L3: Two logics: appropriateness or cost-benefit calculation
way out: Codification: norms written into rules and laws; clusters of norms as institutions
- L1: Laws, the most formal norms
- L7: Informal understandings codified into rules and laws
way out: Conduct: complying, deviating, instigating change
- L1: Conduct in shared space, compliant or not, which others then see
- L7: Instigators of change, more risk tolerant and less conformist, deviate first
way out: Normative messages and campaigns (social norms marketing, correcting misperceptions)
- L1: Messages in circulation ("At Stanford University, 9 students out of 10 do not drink alcohol on Saturday night")
- L7: Campaigns giving accurate information on what the group does and approves
way out: Passing norms on to newcomers and the next generation
- L1: New members learning what is approved
- L7: Norms transmitted over generations, outlasting their first followers
way out: Sanctions sent: approval, gossip, ostracism, fines, physical punishment, execution
- L1: Reprimand, isolation, fines, bodily punishment reaching the deviant
- L7: Punishment chosen by type, in step with the society's economy
Sources (20) published science
Legros S, Cislaghi B (2020) Mapping the social-norms literature: an overview of reviews. Perspect Psychol Sci 15:62-80. doi:10.1177/1745691619866455 (PMC6970459) (behind its links)
Gavrilets S, Richerson PJ (2017) Collective action and the evolution of social norm internalization. PNAS 114(23):6068-6073. doi:10.1073/pnas.1703857114 (behind its links)
Riedl, Jensen, Call & Tomasello 2012, No third-party punishment in chimpanzees, PNAS, doi:10.1073/pnas.1203179109 (PMC3443148) (behind its links)
Zinchenko O, Arsalidou M (2018) Brain responses to social norms: meta-analyses of fMRI studies. Human Brain Mapping 39(2):955-970. doi:10.1002/hbm.23895 (behind its links)
Social structure (Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Enterprise snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)
Anthropology (Wikipedia) (behind its links)
Wikipedia: Institution (behind its links)
Centola D, Baronchelli A (2015) The spontaneous emergence of conventions: an experimental study of cultural evolution. PNAS 112(7):1989-1994. doi:10.1073/pnas.1418838112 (behind its links)
Rossano MJ (2012) The essential role of ritual in the transmission and reinforcement of social norms. Psychol Bull 138:529-549. doi:10.1037/a0027038 (behind its links)
Ethics (encyclopedia article, WME snapshot 2026-11-01) (behind its links)